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Abstract 
China’s economic development over the past four decades has come at considerable cost to 
its environment. Yet, in recent decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities have 
responded with a series of legislative measures consistent with principles of ‘sustainable 
development’ (ĨǷã). These environmental reforms have caught the attention of 
ecological modernisation theorists who argue that China is undergoing form of ‘ecological 
modernisation’. However, despite their focus on the process of ecological modernisation 
within China, there has been little scholarly attention on the influence of ecological 
modernisation as a policy discourse in China. Examining this environmental policy discourse 
helps to define the parameters within which Chinese authorities are prepared to act and arrest 
the environmental impact of rapid economic development. 
This thesis argues that since the 1980s Chinese authorities have drawn on the environmental 
reform experience of developed nations and steadily incorporated ecological modernisation 
ideas into their environmental policies. Environmental bureaucratic agencies have been the key 
pioneers for their inclusion, although economic bureaucratic organs have also supported 
environmental reform measures. This has fostered a convergence of economic and 
environmental rationality within environmental policy discourse. However, despite these 
reforms, this thesis will also show how political interests, ranging from local cadres to the upper 
echelons of the Party, can stymie the inclusion of certain ecological modernisation ideas when 
these ideas challenge embedded economic and political rationalities.
The empirical material for this research is derived from an examination of policy discussions 
surrounding five proposed environmental policy reforms in China: ‘cleaner production’ (ƐƂ
ư#), ‘circular economy (ČƩǳƇ), ‘green GDP’ (ǹȏ GDP), ‘low-carbon economy’ (4Ǒ
ǳƇ), and ‘ecological civilisation’ (ưđĻŅ). It utilises Chinese-language material from a 
variety of official Party and Chinese government sources: policies, legislation, speeches, 
articles and interviews in order to demonstrate that Chinese officials’ ecological modernisation 
beliefs stem from their need to balance the PRC’s twin guiding principles of a ‘socialist market 
economy’ and ‘sustainable development’. The incorporation of ‘ecological civilisation’ into 
this policy discourse encapsulates this wish to create ‘ecological modernisation with Chinese 
characteristics’. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In recent decades, China has experienced enormous changes throughout its society. When 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Deng Xiaoping ɠÞñ, began its ‘reform and 
opening up’ (Ĵʒýĵ) initiative after the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 
December 1978, it set in motion a series of gradual liberal economic reforms that shook China 
out of its languid economic state and helped it develop into the world’s second largest 
economy.1 This exceptional economic rise has resulted in hundreds of millions of its citizens 
being lifted out of extreme poverty.2 It has also resulted in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) obtaining the financial means to undertake a military modernisation that is shifting the 
geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific region.3 Many argue that these achievements would 
have been impossible without its unique and momentous economic modernisation based on 
market forces and advanced techniques of industrialisation. 4  Never before has a country 
acquired so much wealth in such a short space of time. However, the environmental yin to this 
economic yang is that China has achieved this remarkable economic development at an 
environmental cost. Its economy has utilised vast amounts of resources and has damaged 
China’s natural ecosystems. This thesis seeks to locate itself within these changes and tensions. 
Specifically, it examines how officials within the Chinese government have sought to 
understand and reconcile the deleterious effect that their nation’s economic modernisation has 
had on the environment. 
At the beginning of this process, as the Maoist period came to a close, China was a 
desperately poor nation with a gross domestic product (GDP) on par with present-day 
Colombia.5 Its self-vaunted planned economy during those two and a half decades was ill-
equipped to provide the level of growth required to keep even eighty-five per cent of its citizens 
 
1 Barboza, David. 2010. “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” New York Times, 15 August, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html. Accessed 22 October 2018. 
2 World Bank. 2009. “China From Poor Areas to Poor People: China’s Evolving Poverty Reduction Agenda (An 
Assessment of Poverty and Inequality in China),” http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
816851468219918783/pdf/473490SR0CN-0P010Disclosed0041061091.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2018. 
3 White 2012. 
4 Naughton 2007; Garnaut, Song, and Cai 2018. 
5 GDP statistics sourced from World Bank. 2019. “World Bank Open Data,” https://data.worldbank.org/. 
Accessed 22 July 2019. 
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out of extreme poverty.6 However, with Party support for market-based and export-orientated 
economic development, as part of the ‘reform and opening up’, Chinese authorities provided 
the catalyst for over three decades of sustained high growth. Double-digit annual economic 
growth became routine with only a couple of brief instances of low or negative annual growth.7 
Its economy has grown to over US$13.6 trillion in 2018.8 In more recent years, China’s annual 
economic growth has fallen somewhat as its economy shifts to ‘the new normal’ (Ŀïđ)9, but 
some experts predict that even with a forecasted six per cent economic growth, China will 
overtake the United States to assume the mantle of the world’s largest economy in as little as 
four years.10 China’s last three decades of economic development have helped lift over 750 
million people out of extreme poverty. It also has contributed to several hundred million 
Chinese citizens migrating from the farm to the factory to secure better economic opportunities 
in China’s industrialised urban centres. The consensus is that future industrialisation will assist 
even more Chinese citizens to break the cycle of poverty, with the World Bank and the State 
Council’s Development Research Centre estimating that, between 2013 and 2030, a further 
210 million rural dwellers will migrate to China’s cities.11  
This industrial and urban transformation has required and will continue to require large 
quantities of non-renewable resources. Its industry is devouring its local reserves of iron, 
manganese, copper, aluminium, lead and zinc.12  China’s ‘construction boom’ has also 
 
6 World Bank. 2010. “Results Profile: China Poverty Reduction,” 19 March, https://www.worldbank.org/en/-
news/feature/2010/03/19/results-profile-china-poverty-reduction. Accessed 15 October 2018.  
7 Naughton 2007, 9-10. 
8 2018 GDP statistics sourced from World Bank. 2019. “World Bank Open Data,” https://data.worldbank.org/. 
Accessed 22 July 2019. 
9 This is a consumption-led economy that places less emphasis on investment-led economic growth, see Zhang 
and Chen 2017. 
10 Standard Chartered. 2010. “The Super-Cycle Report,” https://www.sc.com/id/_documents/press-releases/ 
en/The%20Super-cycle%20Report-12112010-final.pdf. Accessed 11 February 2019; IHS Economics. 2014. 
“China to Become World’s Largest Economy in 2024 Reports IHS Economics,” 7 September, https://news. 
ihsmarkit.com/press-release/economics-country-risk/china-become-worlds-largest-economy-2024-reports-ihs-
economics. Accessed 11 February 2019. However, this is dependent on the metrics used to measure the Chinese 
(and US) economy, see Fickling, David. 2019. “China Could Outrun the U.S. Next Year. Or Never,” 
Bloomberg, 9 March, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-08/will-china-overtake-u-s-gdp-
depends-how-you-count. Accessed 11 February 2019. 
11 Figures based on World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council estimates that two-
thirds of China’s population will have migrated to urban centres, see World Bank and DRC 2013, 9. 
12 Garnaut, Ross and Ligang Song. 2007. “China’s Resources Demand at the Turning Point,” ANU Crawford 
School of Public Policy, https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/china_updates/China%20Resources%20Demand% 
20At%20The%20Turning%20Point.pdf. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
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consumed enormous resources. One particular statistic highlights the urbanisation pressures 
underlying this construction boom: from 2001 to 2011, China built over 20 million new 
dwellings annually to cope with the continuous flow of rural migrants to its urban centres.13 
Because of this steady migration, China’s urban planners are forced to construct entire new 
cities based on projected housing demand in a ‘build it, and they will come’ Field of Dreams-
like strategy. This strategy has resulted in some infamous cases of planning failures, or ‘ghost 
cities’ (ʡ°), such as Kangbashi, a subdivision of Ordos in Inner Mongolia, where citizens 
have yet to move in anticipated numbers.14 Apart from these planning aberrations, China has 
needed to construct new and fully-functioning modern cities where previously there was just 
farmland. The result of these cities is that China, between 2011 and 2014, consumed more 
concrete than the United States used in the whole of the 20th century.15 Drawing upon such 
resources in such prodigious quantities will be unsustainable unless Chinese society can 
refashion a new type of social and economic modernisation that decouples economic growth 
from non-renewable resources. 
This urban and industrial growth has also affected China’s energy consumption. China’s 
cities are more affluent than rural areas, and increased automobile ownership is correlated with 
China’s growing urban middle class. In 2017, over 300 million cars were registered by Chinese 
drivers.16 This growth in the number of vehicles on China’s roads has become the driving force 
behind China’s growing oil consumption. For most of its history, China exported the majority 
of the crude oil it produced. However, in 1993, China became a net importer of oil, and it is 
now the largest importer of crude oil in the world. With each passing year the gap between 
what it consumes and what it produces grows larger.17 Beyond increased oil consumption, all 
 
13 See Chapter Eight in Kroeber 2016. 
14 Shephard, Wade. 2016. “An Update On China’s Largest Ghost City – What Ordos Kangbashi Is Like Today,” 
Forbes, 19 April, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/04/19/an-update-on-chinas-largest-ghost-
city-what-ordos-kangbashi-is-like-today/#4742f6bb2327. Accessed 22 October 2018. 
15 McCarthy, Niall. 2014. “China Used More Concrete In 3 Years Than The U.S. Used In The Entire 20th 
Century [Infographic],” Forbes, 5 December, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2014/12/05/china-
used-more-concrete-in-3-years-than-the-u-s-used-in-the-entire-20th-century-infographic/#66001a884131. 
Accessed 23 October 2018. 
16 Zheng, Sarah. 2017. “China now has over 300 million vehicles ... that’s almost America’s total population,” 
South China Morning Post, 19 April, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2088876/chinas-
more-300-million-vehicles-drive-pollution-congestion. Accessed 21 October 2018. 
17 In 2018, China sourced just under 440 million tonnes of crude oil from the world market (just under 70 per 
cent of its total oil consumption), see BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” 
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the new buildings from China’s construction boom consume significant amounts of energy. In 
2018, the International Energy Agency estimated that close to one-sixth of China’s energy 
needs went towards powering and heating buildings.18 China’s total primary energy demand in 
2017 was calculated at 3051 million tonnes of oil equivalent.19 These consumption levels 
represent a nearly eight-fold increase from the start of the reform period in the late 1970s.20 
Industry has contributed to just under half of China’s total primary energy. 21  As China 
continues its modernisation, it will need to become even more efficient if it wants to avoid 
further increasing its energy consumption.22 
China’s social and economic modernisation has created extraordinary results, but as this 
thesis seeks to emphasise, it was achieved at the expense of the environment beyond the issue 
of intensive resource use. Degrading the environment for economic ends is not a new 
phenomenon for China. During the Maoist years, China waged a ‘war on nature’ for close to 
three decades as it sought to undertake its socialist economic modernisation.23 Environmental 
historians have also uncovered evidence that China’s imperial era resulted in a literal ‘retreat 
of the elephants’ as Chinese society laid claim to vast tracts of wilderness.24 However, those 
epochs pale in significance compared to the pollution and ecological destruction that China’s 
environment has sustained after the Chinese leadership decided to welcome market-orientated 
development.  
 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. 
Accessed 22 July 2019. 
18 IEA 2018, 578. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Oil consumption statistics from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. 
Accessed 22 July 2019. 
21 IEA 2018, 578. 
22 If measured in energy used per unit of GDP (current US$), then China is over twice as inefficient than the 
United States. Statistics sourced from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. 
Accessed 22 July 2019; World Bank. 2019. “World Bank Open Data,” https://data.worldbank.org/. Accessed 22 
July 2019. 
23 Shapiro 2001. 
24 Elvin 2004. 
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The result of this modernisation is that China now contains many of the world’s most 
polluted cities, rivers and countryside. 25  The tools and resources that achieved this 
unprecedented modernisation may have brought economic prosperity, but they have also 
wrought considerable environmental damage by fouling all spheres of China’s environment. 
China’s remarkable economic modernisation may also have allowed its citizens to lead more 
progressively prosperous lives, but that increased affluence has resulted in the adoption of 
Western consumption patterns and behaviours ill-suited to the ecological limits of China’s 
environment.26 Moreover, this same modernisation may have increased the life expectancy of 
a Chinese citizen by a couple of decades, but longer lives mean that China contains more people 
who negatively impact the environment over a longer period. Despite the strict implementation 
of a ‘one-child policy’ in the 1980s, China’s population has still risen by more than 400 million 
people in under four decades with each Chinese birth increasing the country’s ecological 
footprint.27 This footprint had already overshot China’s biocapacity in the early 1970s but it 
has steadily increased in recent years predominantly because of increased greenhouse gas 
emissions, mainly carbon dioxide, caused by economic development. In 2014, the non-
governmental organisation (NGO) Global Footprint Network calculated China’s ecological 
footprint per capita at over 3.7 global hectares an ecological deficit of 2.6 global hectares, with 
regard to its present biocapacity (see Figure 1.1). 28  Even so, China’s modernisation has 
marched on regardless of the ecological carrying capacity of its land. 
 
25 Kuo, Lily. 2018. “China ‘environment census’ reveals 50% rise in pollution sources,” The Guardian, 31 
March, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/31/china-environment-census-reveals-50-rise-in-
pollution-sources. Accessed 23 October 2018; Stanway, David. 2019. “China soil pollution efforts stymied by 
local governments: Greenpeace,” Reuters, 17 April, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-pollution-
soil/china-soil-pollution-efforts-stymied-by-local-governments-greenpeace-idUSKCN1RT04D. Accessed 22 
June 2019. 
26 Kahn, Matthew. 2016. “As incomes rise in China, so does concern about pollution,” The Conversation, 25 
October, http://theconversation.com/as-incomes-rise-in-china-so-does-concern-about-pollution-65617. Accessed 
23 October 2018; Poulden, Gervase. 2011. “China exports its environmental problems as consumer culture 
booms,” Ecologist: A Journal for a Post-Industrial Age, 6 September, https://theecologist.org/2011/sep/06/ 
china-exports-its-environmental-problems-consumer-culture-booms. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
27 For details on China’s ‘one-child policy’ see Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005. Population statistics from World 
Bank. 2019. “World Bank Open Data,” https://data.worldbank.org/. Accessed 22 July 2019. 
28 Global Footprint Network. 2019. “Country Trends,” http://data.footprintnetwork.org/#/countryTrends?cn= 
5001&type=BCtot,EFCtot. Accessed 23 June 2019. 
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Air pollution has also become an increasingly pressing concern.29 The increased automobile 
ownership mentioned earlier has granted China’s car owners the freedom and independence to 
travel in a manner incongruent with past Maoist-levels of control, but the proliferation of cars 
has clouded many of China’s largest cities in deadly photochemical smog and has led to 
increased respiratory diseases for many urban inhabitants.30 Moreover, while China’s coal-
fired power stations have helped power more and more households and factories, critically 
underpinning China’s modernisation, the coal used to fuel these power plants has steadily 
increased airborne and solid waste emissions, clouding the atmosphere (and covering the 
landscape) in toxic coal-ash and heavy metals.31 China has created some of the most advanced 
cities in the world, but the means to achieve that modernisation has shrouded many of those 
cities in carcinogenic smog.32 China’s longstanding air pollution problems were famously 
epitomised by Beijing’s ‘Airpocalypse’ in 2013 when China’s capital endured two weeks of 
particulate matter levels 20-times in excess of the World Health Organisation stipulated safe 
levels.33 That same year an Asian Development Bank and Tsinghua University report listed 
seven Chinese cities within the world’s ten most polluted cities based on air pollution.34 
Intensive resource use also has brought negative environmental impacts to China’s soils and 
river systems. China’s mines may have supplied the fuel and minerals needed for China’s 
modernisation, but in many cases their extraction methods have scarred the landscape and 
polluted its soils and waterways with toxic heavy metals that will linger in some cases for 
 
29 Lu, Hai. 2018. “Xi vows tough battle against pollution to boost ecological advancement,” Xinhuanet, 19 May, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/19/c_137191441.htm. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
30 Kao, Ernest. 2018. “Air pollution is killing 1 million people and costing Chinese economy 267 billion yuan a 
year, research from CUHK shows,” South China Morning Post, 2 October, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ 
science/article/2166542/air-pollution-killing-1-million-people-and-costing-chinese. Accessed 24 October 2018. 
31 Chen, Stephen. 2016. “What exactly is causing China’s toxic smog?,” South China Morning Post, 21 
December, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2056366/what-exactly-causing-chinas-
toxic-smog. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
32 Pearce, Fred. 2018. “How a ‘Toxic Cocktail’ Is Posing a Troubling Health Risk in China’s Cities,” Yale 
Environment 360, 17 April, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-a-toxic-cocktail-is-posing-a-troubling-health-
risk-in-chinese-cities. Accessed 23 October 2018; Rapoza, Kenneth. 2015. “China Bans Cars As Air Pollution 
Hits Red-Alert Status,” New York Times, 8 December, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/12/08/ 
china-bans-cars-as-air-pollution-hits-red-alert-status/#dddc3b3dce1b. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
33 Kaiman, Jonathan. “Chinese struggle through ‘airpocalypse’ smog,” The Guardian, 17 February, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/16/chinese-struggle-through-airpocalypse-smog. Accessed 23 
October 2018. 
34 Taiyuan, Beijing, Urumqi, Lanzhou, Chongqing, Jinan and Shijiazhuang, see China.org.cn. 2013. “Top 10 
most polluted Chinese cities in Q3,” 23 October, http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2013-10/23/content_ 
30376739.htm. Accessed 22 October 2018. 
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millennia.35 Copper smelters may have helped supply the wiring to electrify China, but their 
noxious fumes have poisoned China’s soils and waterways, harming life right down to the most  
 
 
Figure 1.1: China’s Ecological Footprint36 
basic bacterial life forms.37 Fertilisers have allowed Chinese farmers to grow increasingly 
larger yields from their nutrient-depleted soils, but the phosphorus and nitrogen runoff from 
these farms has led to eutrophication and algal blooms that have crowded out native biota.38  
Dams and canals have blocked and diverted rivers allowing more and more hectares of irrigated 
 
35 Gao, Shengke and Kai Wang. 2013. “The houses built on China’s ‘poisoned’ land,” China Dialogue, 5 June, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6070-The-houses-built-on-China-s-poisoned-land. 
Accessed 24 October 2018. 
36 Global Footprint Network. 2019. “Ecological Footprint: China,” http://data.footprintnetwork.org/#/. Accessed 
23 June 2019. 
37 China Water Risk. 2018. “Pollutions and Crops,” http://www.chinawaterrisk.org/the-big-picture/pollution-
crops/. Accessed 24 October 2018; Yang, Chunmian. 2011. “Toxic mine spill was only latest in long history of 
Chinese pollution,” The Guardian, 14 April, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/14/toxic-
mine-spill-chinese-pollution. Accessed 23 October 2018; Tan, Deborah. 2014. “The State of China’s 
Agriculture,” China Water Risk, 9 April, http://www.chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/the-state-of-
chinas-agriculture/. Accessed 20 January 2018.  
38 2015. “China wants zero growth in the use of polluting chemical fertilisers by 2020,” South China Morning 
Post, 18 March, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1740896/china-wants-zero-growth-use-polluting-
chemical-fertilisers-2020. Accessed 24 October 2018. 
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farmland, with the added benefit of flood control, but those same dams and canals have led to 
more saline and sediment-laden rivers such as the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. Factories may 
have employed millions of Chinese workers, but the at times untreated effluent from these 
factories has poisoned China’s rivers and inlets. In 2017, an official from the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection39 (MEP) revealed that around 85 per cent of China’s 40 million 
tonnes of ‘hazardous waste’ is disposed of through general waste channels. This has led to the 
leaching of toxic chemicals into soils and rivers and air pollution by way of illegal dumping.40 
In 2014, the MEP and Ministry of Land Resources released the results of a national soil 
pollution survey following public pressure (it was previously classified as a ‘state secret’ £×
ǘÙ). The report revealed that 20 per cent of China’s soils were contaminated with a variety 
of hazardous heavy metals.41  
The same fossil fuels used in China’s automobiles and coal-fired power plants have also 
severely exacerbated its carbon dioxide emissions, harming global efforts to prevent 
anthropogenic climate change. Figure 1.2 and 1.3 shows this correlation between rising carbon 
dioxide emissions and increased oil and coal consumption. In 1965, China contributed less than 
five per cent of total carbon dioxide emissions despite constituting one-fifth of the total global 
population. Now with increased oil and coal consumption, as the result of its rapid 
modernisation, China contributes over one-quarter of all carbon dioxide emissions with its 
2017 emissions tallied at 9,232.6 million tonnes.42 If the global community wants to keep 
atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide below 450 million parts per million in order to prevent 
global temperature rises of over two degrees Celsius, then China must reduce its reliance on 
these fossil fuels that so far have successfully fuelled its modernisation. If the one-fifth of 
 
39 Chinese name is £×Ʃµɤ  
40 Qu, Qiuyan. 2017. “85% of hazardous waste in China not being treated properly: expert,” Global Times, 8 
August, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1061302.shtml. Accessed 23 October 2018; 2018. “China’s war on 
pollution targets illegal waste dumping,” South China Morning Post, 11 May, https://www.scmp.com/news/ 
china/society/article/2145741/chinas-war-pollution-targets-illegal-waste-dumping. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
41 Wang, Yue. 2014. “Almost one-fifth of our arable land is polluted, admit Chinese officials,” China Dialogue, 
17 April, https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6921-Almost-one-fifth-of-our-arable-land-is-polluted-admit-
Chinese-officials/en. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
42 Statistics from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” https://www.bp.com/ 
en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. Accessed 22 July 
2019. 
 
 9 
humanity residing in China disregards the risks of carbon-based development, then it is 
predicted that the earth will descend into a ‘hothouse earth’.43 
 
Figure 1.2: China’s Carbon Dioxide Emissions (1979-2017)44 
 
 
China’s environmental problems are not unique. Western developed nations and Japan 
experienced similar environmental issues during their industrial phases, and their ongoing 
development still negatively impacts their local (and the global) environment. 45  Yet, the 
difference with China’s industrialisation is that it has occurred within a highly populated 
country of 1.4 billion people. Furthermore, because of the rapid pace of China’s economic 
modernisation, its environmental issues have become magnified beyond anything any other 
country has experienced in human history. It has also transpired in an age that still has not 
found a comprehensive and workable solution for ‘sustainable development’. So, with this in 
 
43 Steffen et al. 2018. 
44 Carbon dioxide statistics from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-2018),” 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html. 
Accessed 22 July 2019. 
45 Namely through high carbon-dioxide emissions, see Rapier, Robert. 2018. “China Emits More Carbon 
Dioxide Than The U.S. and EU Combined,” Forbes, 1 July, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/07/ 
01/china-emits-more-carbon-dioxide-than-the-u-s-and-eu-combined/#537a0221628c. Accessed 23 October 
2018. 
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mind, the relevant question is, how have China’s authorities responded to the negative 
consequences of their country’s economic modernisation? 
 
Figure 1.3: China’s Oil and Coal Consumption (1979–2017)46 
Since the early 1970s, China’s leaders progressively have appreciated that China’s 
economic modernisation negatively impacts the environment and they resultingly have created 
a set of institutions, legislation, policies, and principles in order to ‘protect the environment’ 
(>ĤƩµ). For instance, China established its first environmental protection law in 1979, 
converting it from a ‘trial law’ (ȲȜ) to an established permanent law a decade later.47 Other 
laws have sought to tackle air, water, and solid waste pollution, encourage cleaner production 
and circular economies, improve environmental impact assessments, conserve energy, and 
promote renewable or clean energy. 48  In 1994, the State Council formally endorsed 
‘sustainable development’ as one of China’s guiding principles.49 Chinese authorities have 
 
46 Coal and oil consumption statistics from BP 2019. “Statistical Review of World Energy – all data (1965-
2018),” https://www.bp.com/en/global/. Accessed 22 July 2019. 
47 Ferris Jr. and Zhang 2005, 76-78. 
48 Qin and Meng 2017. 
49 Guowu yuan. 1994. “Guowuyuan guanyu guanche shishi Zhongguo 21 shiji yicheng – Zhongguo 21 shiji 
renkou, huanjing yu fazhan baipishu de tongzhi” (Notice of the State Council on implementing China’s Agenda 
21 – China’s white paper on population, environment and development in the 21st Century), Beida fabao, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=d8f6542c980cd81dbdfb. Accessed 17 May 2018. 
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allowed a variety of non-government stakeholders to involve themselves increasingly in 
matters of environmental protection, such as civil society and the media, even if there are 
limitations to their involvement and many instances where state actions defy the non-
governmental groundswell for increased involvement. The ‘opening up’ (ýĵ) of China to 
foreign influences has given rise to numerous international stakeholders (governments, NGOs, 
and multinationals) collaborating with Chinese organisation on a wide variety of sustainability 
projects associated with environmental protection. Clean energy investment has also grown 
markedly in recent years. Furthermore, the relaxation of social controls combined with rising 
discontent towards environmental issues has seen Chinese citizens becoming more actively 
involved in environmental concerns, whether protesting in person or online. The Chinese 
government permits this, as long as these protests refrain from attacking the CCP’s political 
legitimacy.50  
China’s leaders themselves have become increasingly vocal about the threat of 
environmental pollution and the need for a more sustainable path. Western media often point 
to Premier Li Keqiang’s ŜFā remarks at the Third Plenum of the 18th National Party 
Congress in March 2013 that China needed to ‘wage war on pollution’ (ŻťÔĝ) and his 
comments two years later that pollution in China was ‘weighing heavily on the will of the 
people’ (ųĎƷ ). 51  Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for the construction of a 
‘beautiful China’ (Ǿ£) with ‘blue sky, green vegetation and clear rivers, so that the 
people will enjoy life in a liveable environment with the ecological benefits created by 
economic development’.52 
In recent years, this new institutional environmental awareness (along with Chinese 
authorities’ efforts to combat environmental pollution through laws, institutions, and more 
 
50 Ho and Edmonds 2007, 332; Jing 2010.  
51 Di Yuxi. 2014. “Li Keqiang zhengfu gongzuo baogao xiang huanjing wuran xuanzhan” (Li Keqiang’s 
government work report declares war on environmental pollution), Niuyue shibao zhongwen wang, 6 March, 
https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140306/c06smog/. Accessed 25 October 2018. Xinhua she. 2015. “Shengtai yu 
shengcun, Zhongguo zai “jiannan de pingheng” zhong xun lu (Ecology and survival, China finds a way to 
“balance difficulties”), 6 March, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-03/06/c_1114544279.htm. Accessed 
25 October 2018. 
52 Phillips, Tom. 2016. “China ratifies Paris climate change agreement ahead of G20,” The Guardian, 3 
September, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/03/china-ratifies-paris-climate-change-agreement. 
Accessed 25 October 2018. 
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relaxed controls on civil society and media) has caught the attention of ecological 
modernisation theorists. This optimistic group of environmental sociologists observed 
sociological phenomena in China that bore many similarities to the environmental reform and 
‘ecological restructuring’ of Western European societies from the 1970s onwards.53 Led by 
Dutch sociologist Arthur Mol, some ecological modernisation theorists believe that China has 
commenced a process characterised by ‘the centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas 
and considerations within the social practices and institutional developments of modern 
societies’. 54  While Mol acknowledges that China’s environmental reform exhibits many 
unique contextual factors and differs in many respects from Western Europe’s environmental 
reform, he still argues that ‘most environmental reform initiatives [in China] are firmly based 
on, make use of and take place within the context of China’s modernisation process. In that 
sense, it seems justified to use the term “ecological modernisation” to describe China’s 
attempts at restructuring its economy along ecological lines’.55 
In opposition to those views, other commentators have been less optimistic about Chinese 
environmental reform and ecological restructuring. For instance, Chinese environmental 
sociologist Huan Qingzhi ɣõſ from Peking University argued in the pages of Environmental 
Politics that he was ‘not fully convinced that ecological modernisation’ should conceptually 
56frame China’s sustainable modernisation.   
Given these positions, the question remains: can ecological modernisation shed light on the 
environmental reforms and transformation underway in China? In particular, this question 
needs to be considered given the increasing environmental awareness that Chinese officials are 
showing towards environmental issues and their apparent wish for legislative and policy 
solutions that balance economic and ecological objectives.  
This thesis will utilise a discursive reading of the concept of ecological modernisation in 
order to explore the interaction between ecological modernisation and China’s environmental 
policy agenda. This version of ecological modernisation treats the concept not as a societal 
 
53 Carter and Mol 2006; Mol 2006. 
54 Mol 2006, 33. 
55 Ibid, 51-52. 
56 Huan 2007, 686-687. 
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process of environmental reform, but as a ‘story-line’, ‘ideology’, ‘belief system’ or ‘discourse’ 
that emerged first in West Germany and the Netherlands arguing that that end-of-pipe 
approaches to pollution control were ineffective.57 This led to a growing consensus among 
political parties, bureaucracies, companies, scientists and NGOs that the right mix of policies 
and values could promote continued economic growth in a way that would be environmentally 
sustainable and within ecological limits.58 This ecological modernisation approach will be 
explored in greater detail during Chapter Two, but at this point in my introduction, I can already 
pose the question: have Chinese officials also sought to use ecological modernisation ideas to 
frame their environmental reform measures? 
Many studies suggest that prima facie evidence exists for the incorporation of ecological 
modernisation ideas within China’s environmental policy agenda.59 For instance, Mol and a 
number of his colleagues noted that ‘in general, ecological modernisation gets along well with 
the concepts that are currently popular and promoted in China, including the circular economy 
(namely, industrial ecology), green GDP (full cost, environmental accounting), cleaner 
production, and harmonious development’.60 Mol in 2015 even briefly discussed “(reflexive) 
ecological modernisation” as one of the sustainable discourses in China.61  
As China continues its modernisation, its society and economy will place further stress on 
the environment. Therefore, it is important to examine the extent to which ecological 
modernisation ideas guide Chinese policymakers. Their decisions will influence the future of 
China and the world. For the discipline of environmental sociology, discursively applying 
‘ecological modernisation’ to China provides for more thorough appreciation for the extent to 
which ecological modernisation ideas shape policymakers in developing countries. 
Thesis Structure 
In order to examine the influence of ecological modernisation ideas on China’s policy 
discourse, this thesis is structured into the following nine chapters. Chapter Two locates the 
research problem for this thesis. It firstly reviews the literature on the impact of China’s 
modernisation on the environment, paying particular attention to the Maoist (1949–1976) and 
 
57 Weale 1992; Hajer 1995; Christoff 1996; Dryzeck 2013. 
58 Langhelle 2000, 303; Seippel 2000, 288-289. 
59 See Mol 2006; Carter and Mol 2006. 
60 Zhang, Mol and Sonnefeld 2007. 
61 Mol 2015, 356-358. 
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Reform (1979–present) eras, laying a scholarly foundation for the central theme of the thesis: 
how have Chinese authorities responded to the contradictions of their economic development? 
Chapter Two then discusses the societal eco-restructuring and environmental reforms that have 
occurred under the political leadership of the CCP, and how these changes have garnered the 
interest of ecological modernisation theorists. The rest of Chapter Two outlines the distinction 
between the process of ecological modernisation and the discourse of ecological 
modernisation, speculating that a constructivist reading of this concept could provide a useful 
conceptual framework to explain the types of environmental reform measures that Chinese 
authorities have undertaken over the past few decades. 
The next two chapters provide the methodological and empirical foundation for this thesis.  
Chapter Three details the research methods that assist in answering whether ecological 
modernisation has been incorporated into China’s environmental policy agenda. It starts with 
a personal reflection that justifies the decision to utilise a discursive take on ecological 
modernisation and the selection of the five case studies. The chapter then details the process 
utilised for operationalising ecological modernisation and answering the research questions of 
this thesis.  
Chapter Four provides an empirical context for this thesis. It firstly details the political 
milieu in China and how that influences the country’s environmental policymaking, detailing 
the importance of the CCP, the role of the Chinese government and National People’s 
Congress, the fragmented aspect of China’s bureaucracy and the factional nature of Chinese 
politics. The second part of Chapter Four outlines the contextual economic backdrop to the 
exploration of China’s environmental reform measures. It outlines how China’s economy, 
politics and society have witnessed changes in its ‘ecological rationality’, with the introduction 
of a capitalist mindset (or capitalist ‘economic rationality’) in China that has gradually 
privileged maximising efficient and profitable production. 
Chapter Five to Chapter Nine detail the empirical findings and analysis of this thesis by 
examining five key environmental reform measures in China: cleaner production, circular 
economy, green GDP, low-carbon economy and ecological civilisation. The main analytical 
questions that guide these chapters are where, why, and how China’s environmental reform 
ideas originated, and the extent to which they reflect the ideas of ecological modernisation. 
These chapters are chronological, yet due to the complex nature of China’s environmental 
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issues and policy, various environmental ideas appear multiple times across chapters. Each 
chapter builds upon the other to demonstrate the evolution and progression of environmental 
reform in China. 
Chapter Five explores the origins of ‘cleaner production’ and how this concept emerged out 
of a growing ‘ecological rationality’ amongst government officials towards industrial 
pollution, balanced with the need to continue China’s industrialisation.  
Chapter Six examines the idea of the ‘circular economy’, situating its maturation within the 
growing unease within China towards population growth, solid waste and industrial pollution, 
and new thinking on how to reduce the resource use and waste in China in a manner that is 
coherent with China’s ‘socialist market economy’.  
Chapter Seven scrutinises the policy measure of accounting for China’s development with 
a ‘green GDP’ metric that seeks to achieve ‘sustainable development’. It also analyses the 
failed implementation of green GDP within the broader issue of political interests in China.  
Chapter Eight examines ‘low-carbon economy’. It investigates the calls for low-carbon 
development within policymaking circles and shows that these calls stem from the desire to 
reduce China’s carbon footprint in a manner that allows China’s economy to continue growing, 
as well as the wish to avoid future economic losses of climate policy inaction. 
Chapter Nine will explore the latest environmental reform concept in China, ‘ecological 
civilisation’, suggesting that this capstone concept reflects a manifestation of ‘ecological 
modernisation with Chinese characteristics’ within China’s environmental policy discourse. 
Chapter Ten summarises the findings of this thesis. It argues that the notions of ecological 
modernisation have diffused into most policymaking circles of China’s party-state system. 
Ecological modernisation beliefs stem from a need to balance the PRC’s twin guiding 
principles of a ‘socialist market economy’ and ‘sustainable development’. The recent 
incorporation of ‘ecological civilisation’ into this policy discourse encapsulates China’s aim to 
create ‘ecological modernisation with Chinese characteristics’. Understanding the 
environmental rationales that guide China’s policymakers can assist researchers in more 
accurately grasping the policy processes that lead to new environmental policy reforms in 
China.  
 16 
Chapter Two: Literature Review  
As noted in the introductory chapter, although China has achieved remarkable economic 
success in the past four decades, it also has experienced severe ecological crises that have 
impacted all parts of its biosphere. Whether these issues are toxic chemicals leaked into the 
Song River in 2005, 15,000 pig carcasses floating down the Huang Pu River in 2013, or deadly 
air containing particulate matter more than 25 times the World Health Organisation’s stipulated 
safe levels blanketing Beijing for two weeks in 2013, China’s economic development has been 
far from an environmentally-benign process.62 
Within that empirical context, this chapter will examine the history of China’s 
environmental problems, exploring the literature relating to the environmental problems of the 
Maoist (1949–1976) and Reform (1979–present) periods. It will then examine research that 
explores how Chinese society and authorities responded to the growing environmental impact 
of China’s modernisation, especially by focusing on the arguments surrounding the efficacy of 
environmental governance in China. The third section of this chapter builds on the preceding 
sections to examine a critical sociological question relevant to China, namely, do China’s 
environmental reforms provide evidence of ecological modernisation? The fourth section 
examines the constructivist readings of ecological modernisation and proposes that this 
conceptualisation of ecological modernisation can shed light on the environmental changes 
transforming China’s politics and society. The chapter will close by drawing out the research 
problem and detailing the questions and hypotheses that frame this thesis. 
Environmental Degradation in Maoist China 
Although China’s environmental problems are longstanding, they have only attracted recent 
widespread international media headlines after incidents such as Beijing’s 2013 ‘Airpocalypse’ 
 
62 Green, Nat. 2009. “Positive Spillover? Impact of the Songhua River Benzene Incident on China’s 
Environmental Policy,” Wilson Center, March, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/positive-spillover-
impact-the-songhua-river-benzene-incident-china-s-environmental. Accessed 23 October 2018; Davison, 
Nicola. 2013. “Rivers of blood: the dead pigs rotting in China’s water supply,” The Guardian, 30 March, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/29/dead-pigs-china-water-supply. Accessed 23 October 2018; 
Kaiman, Jonathan. “Chinese struggle through ‘airpocalypse’ smog,” The Guardian, 17 February, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/16/chinese-struggle-through-airpocalypse-smog. Accessed 23 October 2018.  
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and China’s growing greenhouse emissions.63 Scholarly interest in China’s environmental 
issues, though, precedes this new interest by several decades. Vaclav Smil, a Canadian 
geographer, was one of the first scholars to scrutinise the causes behind land degradation and 
pollution in pre-reform Maoist China.64 Before then, much of the work resorted to, in Smil’s 
words, ‘gross overgeneralisations’ and ideologically based arguments that were myopic and 
ignored the actual reality and causes of China’s environmental woes.65 Depending on the 
ideological disposition of the particular author, and their opinion of the socialist government 
in Beijing, China’s environment was either great or disastrous. Their examinations reflected 
little rigorous intellectual nuance.66  
This lack of nuance soon changed with the research of Vaclav Smil. Writing in Asia Survey 
in 1980, he detailed how China’s development during the Maoist period caused significant 
environmental damage through misguided policies which resulted in soil erosion, water 
overuse, air and water pollution, deforestation and noise pollution.67 He followed these articles 
up in 1984 with a more in-depth treatment in The Bad Earth, and then in 1993 with China’s 
Environmental Crisis.68 Smil’s research stressed that Chinese Maoist leaders, through mainly 
ill-conceived strategies, caused a similar set of environmental problems to those facing 
Western developed nations. This approach provided a rebuttal to Chinese authorities’ 
assertions that, in contrast to Western capitalist nations, their version of socialism was 
harmonious with nature.69 One example that he focused on was the lauded Maoist strategy of 
boosting arable land availability through land reclamation. Smil noted that even though 
reclaiming terra firma from lakes and rivers did increase arable land by 3-4 per cent, these 
changes to the environment also resulted in fewer water resources, such as freshwater fish. In 
many cases, the nutritional value of the reclaimed land also fell below its previous level when 
 
63 Kaiman, Jonathan. “Chinese struggle through ‘airpocalypse’ smog,” The Guardian, 17 February, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/16/chinese-struggle-through-airpocalypse-smog. Accessed 23 October 2018; 
Rapier, Robert. 2018. “China Emits More Carbon Dioxide Than The U.S. and EU Combined,” Forbes, 1 July, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/07/01/china-emits-more-carbon-dioxide-than-the-u-s-and-eu-
combined/#537a0221628c. Accessed 23 October 2018. 
64 Smil 1980a, 1980b; Wu 2009. 
65 Smil 1984: iv. 
66 Ibid; Smil 1980b: 14. See also Kapp 1975. 
67 Smil 1980a. 
68 Smil 1984, 1993. 
69 Ottley and Valaukas 1983, 85. 
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the rivers and lakes were in their original state, because the new farmland was ill-suited for 
agricultural use.70
Since this early research of Vaclav Smil, more researchers have also turned their attention 
towards understanding the key historical causes of China’s environmental problems.71 For 
instance, historian Mark Elvin argues that the economic development that occurred in Imperial 
China in the 1800s resulted in more significant environmental stress than those France and 
other Western European nations experienced during the same period. In China’s case, this 
situation was made more acute because it was unable to export this environmental ‘pressure’ 
to external imperial holdings, unlike European nations. 72  Elvin used the literal retreat of 
elephants to the south of China as a metaphor for the expansion of economic activity coming 
at the expense of China’s wilderness and environment.  
Another significant observer was the US scholar Judith Shapiro. She followed up the early 
work of Vaclav Smil and others in her widely cited book Mao’s War Against Nature.73 
Shapiro’s book explored the underlying reasons why there was so much environmental havoc 
wrought during the Maoist period. One point that Shapiro stressed is the ‘militarisation’ of 
Chinese society under China’s then ‘paramount leader’ Mao Zedong ŲƁ. She outlined how 
he inculcated a martial mindset promoting the mentality that ‘man must conquer nature’ (%Ñ
ȇ½) into many small or large development projects to such a significant extent it supplanted 
the longstanding Confucian principle of the ‘harmony between man and nature’ (½%).74 
Through her examination of such case studies as population growth, dam construction and land 
reclamation, she showed that the crux of China’s man-made environmental damage in the 
Maoist era was due to four central causes: (1) political oppression whereby those who proffered 
heterodox ideas challenging embedded ideological notions often experienced persecution for 
these views; (2) utopian urgency where considered policy preparations were eschewed in 
favour of hastily implemented mass mobilisation campaigns; (3) dogmatic uniformity where 
ideas needed to conform with Maoist ideological principles; and (4) state-ordered relocations 
 
70 Smil 1980b, 17. 
71 See, for example, Elvin 2004; Shapiro, 2001. 
72 Elvin 2004, 470. See also Crosby 1986. 
73 Shapiro 2001. 
74 Ibid, 66. 
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which allowed the Chinese state to control Chinese society in a way that ignored previous 
historical, cultural and geographical connections.75  
The confluence of these causes, Shapiro argued, provided Mao with the ability to undertake 
massive socialist campaigns in which, for example, large swathes of forests were destroyed by 
villagers during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) to fuel their sub-standard ‘backyard steel 
furnaces’. Moreover, Shapiro showed that these four causes also allowed the Chinese state to 
carry out the ill-conceived construction of the Sanmenxia hydroelectric dam on the Yellow 
River against the technical advice of hydro-engineers. In the end, the dam’s construction led to 
the relocation of millions of people and irreparable environmental damage to the water quality 
of the river. In terms of one of its original objectives, it produced less than the forecast 
electricity generation due to silt sedimentation within the hydroelectric turbines. The hydro-
engineer Huang Wanli ʥɦ was purged by authorities for raising precisely this problem 
before its construction.76 In Judith Shapiro’s opinion, Mao Zedong and the Chinese state during 
this period were a fundamental factor in China’s environmental damage. This led to her 
theoretical reformulation of Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren’s iconic I=PAT formula, because 
it ‘inadequately accounts for the role of the state, which may powerfully shape the elements on 
the right side of the equation and govern their interaction’.77 This environmental history points 
to a complex and troubled relationship between socialist economic modernisation and 
environmental degradation in Maoist China. 
The Impact of ‘Reform and Opening Up’ on China’s Environment 
More recently, scrutiny has centred on exploring the growing impact of social and economic 
activities on China’s environment during the Reform period, which Deng Xiaoping and 
Chinese authorities initiated at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978. This 
increased attention partly stems from Chinese researchers having access to more noteworthy 
information (such as interviews and official documents) than was available when Smil wrote 
his early research outside China.78 First and foremost, however, this increased scrutiny resulted 
 
75 Ibid, 4. 
76 See Chapter Three in ibid. 
77 Ibid, 196. See also Ehrlich and Holdren 1971. 
78 He had to rely primarily on Chinese-language news reports because of travel restrictions, see Wu 2013, 105. 
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from an acknowledgement that environmental problems have increased in severity since 
‘reform and opening up’ and since China transitioned away from its Maoist command economy 
to a ‘socialist market economy’ (ǒ/ì¨ǳƇ) based on market principles. For instance, 
China’s township village enterprises (TVEs, ɷ,,) have helped absorb large surpluses of 
rural labour on the way to constituting around 42 per cent of industrial output in 1994.79 
However, as Smil notes, China’s State Environmental Protection Bureau80 (SEPB) ‘can only 
guess at the total amount of untreated waste’ that leaves these companies on a daily basis.81 
Moreover, much of this research reflects the point of view that China’s market-led economic 
growth over close to four decades has, to refer to the I=PAT formula again, significantly 
increased its ‘affluence’ (increased consumption per capita within China – A) and ‘technology’ 
(the enhanced processes China now uses to obtain and transform resources into goods and 
services – T), while its ‘population’ (P) also has continued to grow in spite of the ‘one-child 
policy’.82 This can only mean that the resulting impact (I) on the environment has grown.
China’s increased integration with the world economy since it acceded to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001 also has placed further pressure on its environment, as it has 
further entrenched the nation’s role as the ‘world’s factory’ (ƴè|).83 The accession was a 
boon for China’s economy. For instance, China’s economy witnessed ten-fold increase in GDP 
during the 17 years following inclusion within the WTO.84 China also experienced an upswing 
in the amount of merchandise exported as full advantage was taken of its more globally-
integrated economy.85 Yet, as indicated by the illustration of China’s ecological footprint in 
Chapter One, that same upward economic trajectory affected China’s overall environmental 
footprint.  
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Accession to the WTO was a mixed blessing, according to the US academic Abigail Jahiel. 
On the one hand, she conceded that China’s WTO accession could have improved some aspects 
of China’s environmental protection efforts through the adoption of international monitoring 
standards, such as ISO 14001 environmental management standards. However, on the other 
hand, she was more firmly of the view that China’s further integration into the global economy 
would place further pressure on China’s environment, and that the economic growth facilitated 
by WTO membership would soon overwhelm any environmental protection work undertaken 
by Chinese authorities. She argued that WTO accession would reinforce ‘the normative 
premise of the WTO’ to prioritise economic development.86 
Earlier studies correspond with the underlying logic of Jahiel’s argument. For instance, the 
International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD) and the China Council for 
International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) in a joint 2004 report 
entitled An Environmental Impact Assessment of China’s WTO Accession, argued that China’s 
WTO accession had resulted in unfavourable environmental outcomes. In a survey of six 
economic sectors, they found that WTO membership resulted in significant ‘economic effects’ 
that would ‘scale up’ China’s production through increased foreign trade.87 This increased 
production would promote dirtier industries due to China’s low-cost position within the world 
economy. While preventative pollution technologies could mitigate and lessen these adverse 
effects, the IISD and the CCICED concluded that China’s WTO accession ‘brought significant 
new challenges for environmental management in China’.88 US academic Elizabeth Economy 
also made a similar point, highlighting that China’s WTO membership facilitated the growth 
of highly polluting small-scale industries like the textile industry where environmental 
management is unable to quickly mitigate or reduce effluent and emissions.89 This literature 
links China’s recent rapid economic development and increased global economic integration 
with environmental degradation. Increasingly, researchers have begun focusing on its impact 
on different parts of China’s biosphere. 
 
86 Jahiel 2006, 325. 
87 The sectors were textile, energy, forestry, agriculture, automobiles and aquaculture, see CCICED and IISD 
2004, 1. 
88 Ibid, 3. 
89 Economy 2010, 202-203. 
 
 22 
China now suffers from significant and severe ecological degradation that crosses all areas 
of its biosphere. In recent years, research has confirmed that China’s rapid modernisation has 
led to ambient air pollution within its cities. Many studies point out that China’s cities have 
some of the deadliest air in the world.90 China’s water quality also has experienced severe 
declines to the point that close to half of its rivers are harmful or too toxic for human use.91 
Soil quality has fared little better. As noted in Chapter One, in 2014 the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) released the details of a 2005 to 2013 soil pollution survey it 
conducted with the Ministry of Land Resources92 after previously labelling the survey findings 
a ‘state secret’. This report found that just over one-seventh of China’s land was polluted, and 
just over one-fifth of farmland was polluted with toxic heavy metals such as mercury and 
cadmium.93 Some Chinese experts viewed these results as ‘conservative’ and not reflecting the 
full extent of the problem.94 For the most part, recent Western research has increasingly 
focused on China’s expanding carbon footprint and its effect on anthropogenic climate 
change.95 This attention reflects the significance of China’s growing carbon dioxide emissions 
and the recognition by experts that China needs to be a crucial player in preventing the harmful 
consequences of climate change.96
Research also has noted a negative feedback loop between environmental degradation and 
some indicators of socio-economic development. Many studies have explored the health 
impacts of environmental pollution in China, with a recent World Health Organisation report 
calculating that over one million people died due to air pollution in China in 2015.97 A ‘2010 
Global Burden of Disease Study’ published in the UK medical journal Lancet in 2012 placed 
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the number of ‘premature deaths’ in China at 1.2 million – more than any other nation.98 The 
growing issue of ‘cancer villages’ (Ƹƶŝ) in China is also a serious matter, with many villages 
throughout China encountering statistically significant higher rates of cancer due to the 
presence of polluting industries.99 These studies reveal the interconnected relationship between 
environmental pollution and public health.  
Turning to economic impacts, research has attempted to account for the adverse economic 
externalities surrounding China’s modernisation.100 In 2007 the World Bank jointly explored, 
along with the State Environmental Protection Administration, the ‘costs of pollution’ in China. 
Using a methodology that placed a monetary value on certain kinds of pollution and 
environmental degradation, the report estimated that the total environmental cost of pollution 
in China’s water supply and groundwater depletion was 341.4 billion yuan in 2003, just under 
3 per cent of its then GDP.101 Nine years later, another World Bank report into global pollution 
found that outdoor and indoor pollution had cost the Chinese economy over 10 per cent of its 
GDP in 2013.102 
Beyond these health and economic costs, China’s environmental degradation and pollution 
also has raised concerns over notions of ‘security’, or to be more precise ‘insecurity’. Soil 
degradation and loss of arable land due to urban expansion have frequently emerged as topics 
of debate within the context of China’s environmental problems.103 The concern for food 
security has been raised because, as McBeath and Huang-McBeath note, China has 22 per cent 
of the global population, but just 7 per cent of total land.104 Although conjecture still exists 
about the extent of China’s food insecurity due to methodological difficulties surrounding the 
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calculation of arable land in China, studies have claimed that China has a significant problem 
with food security due to soil pollution associated with its rapid social and economic 
development.105 These issues are exacerbated and amplified when taken in context with the 
MEP report referred to earlier estimating around 20 per cent of China’s land was toxic. 
Water security also presents another serious problem for China that interlinks with matters 
of agricultural production and public health. Council on Foreign Relations analyst Elizabeth 
Economy raised in testimony to a US congressional roundtable on China’s environment that 
China’s annual per capita water supply was 25 per cent below the global average. She noted 
that by 2030 its already scarce water resources were expected to decrease by a further 500 
cubic metres (m3) per capita from 2,200 m3 to 1,700 m3.106 Moreover, Asian Development 
Bank, outlined in a 2012 report that 12 provinces and municipalities in China, or 32 per cent 
of the population, were classified as suffering from water scarcity (under 1000m3 per capita). 
Regions suffer from an unequal distribution of water: Southern China has 1,100 m3 per capita, 
while Northern China contains just 434 m3 per capita.107 
Another theme explored in the extensive literature on China’s environment addresses the 
possibility that China’s environmental pollution could result in civil unrest.108 This is a growing 
issue in China, in which mounting environmental problems are playing a leading role. For 
instance, in 2004, Chinese authorities documented over 74,000 ‘mass incidents’ of Chinese 
citizens protesting. In 2005, there were close to 51,000 protests linked to pollution, an increase 
of 30 per cent from the previous year.109 Statistics such as these are frequently cited in the 
literature to demonstrate that China has experienced growing civil unrest due to its 
environmental pollution.110 The chapter so far has revealed that, since the advent of the Reform 
period, there has been a growing acknowledgement amongst scholars that the relationship 
between the economy and the environment in China is complex and troubling. The question 
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that emerges from this literature is: how have Chinese authorities responded as their 
environment has deteriorated?  
The Emergence of Environmental Institutions and Laws in China 
Although the continuation of severe environmental pollution and degradation might suggest 
to the contrary, China’s authorities have undertaken a variety of measures to protect the 
environment over the last four decades since the reform process began. Yet, as the above 
discussions suggest and the following scholarly debates will illustrate, their efficacy in 
protecting China’s environment remains a disputed issue. However, one consensus within the 
academic literature is that recognition of the need for environmental protection emerged in the 
early 1970s when the Chinese government, as a newly recognised country, sent a United 
Nations delegation to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, at the urging of then Premier Zhou Enlai ėş.111 Although Chinese authorities 
had organised a handful of sporadic and ad hoc environmental measures such as the ‘three 
wastes’ to tackle waste and public sanitation before this conference, nevertheless this United 
Nations conference marks the point when they experienced ‘their birth of environ-mental 
consciousness’. 112  This conference laid the path for further environmental protection 
initiatives. Within a year of the Stockholm Conference, Party authorities convened their first 
National Conference on Environmental Protection, which led in 1974 to the creation of the first 
institutions tasked with environmental protection work, namely the Environmental Protection 
Leading Small Group (ʗÝÞǰ)113 and its Environmental Protection Office114, both situated 
underneath the State Council.115 
Since the early 1970s, China watchers have noted how authorities have instituted a series of 
administrative reshuffles to strengthen institutions responsible for environmental protection. In 
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1982, the State Council relocated the Environmental Protection Office to the Ministry of Urban 
and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection116, which some researchers argued was 
a regressive measure as it was not given the elevated status of a stand-alone institution.117 
However, that point marks the only time when the central government did not bureaucratically 
upgrade its lead institution for environmental protection. Six years later, in 1988, the Chinese 
government, in a broad set of administrative reforms, increased the status of China’s lead 
environmental agency by moving the Urban and Rural Construction Environmental Protection 
Agency118 back underneath the State Council and providing it with a higher ‘bureau rank’ (â
ǭ). Since then, as China’s leading environmental bureaucratic organisation, it has experienced 
a continual strengthening of its bureaucratic status. Over a series of administrative and 
institutional reforms that have occurred in 10-year increments, the Chinese government has 
bolstered the bureaucratic importance of its environmental bureaucracy. In 1998, the State 
Council promoted the State Environmental Protection Agency to an ‘administration’ (ĕâǭ) 
bureaucratic rank, renaming it the State Environmental Protection Administration119 (SEPA). 
Ten years later, the State Council created the Ministry of Environmental Protection, upgrading 
SEPA’s bureaucratic status to that of a ‘ministry’ (ɤǭ), which gave it a minister position 
within China’s cabinet.120 The final stage of bureaucratic reform occurred in 2018 when the 
State Council renamed the MEP as the Ministry of Ecological Environment121, allowing it to 
assume the joint-lead role on climate change with the National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC). 122  This bureaucratic history reveals that, while China’s economic 
miracle was being sustained, Chinese authorities were active in administratively strengthening 
their environmental institutions. 
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Over the same period, a range of environmental laws and international treaties were 
legislated and ratified to control environmental pollution and define what constituted 
environmental protection. Scholars have noted how the first of these laws was passed in 1979 
when China’s National People’s Congress123 (NPC) passed the Environmental Protection Law 
(Trial) and Forestry Law. 124  These laws were crucial at the time because (as Ottley and 
Valauskas have noted) before 1979, laws were rarely used to change social behaviour, let alone 
regulate conduct that impacted negatively on the environment. 125  In 1987, the Chinese 
government ratified the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
joining global efforts to phase out chlorofluorocarbons.126 Two years later, the NPC upgraded 
a trial environmental protection law to permanent status when they enacted the Environmental 
Protection Law.127 Many other related laws have since been legislated by the NPC. Richard 
Ferris Jr. and Zhang Hongjun have listed 19 environmental laws passed between 1979 and 
2005, tackling such issues as cleaner production, air pollution, water pollution, and solid 
waste.128 Since 2005, the NPC has passed several new or revised laws to bolster environmental 
legislation in China, including a circular economy law (passed in 2007 and amended in 2018), 
an energy conservation law (passed in 1997 and amended in 2007, 2016 and 2018), a renewable 
energy law (passed in 2005 and amended in 2009), an environmental protection law (passed in 
1989 and amended in 2014), a coal law (passed in 1996 and amended in 2016), a water 
pollution control law (passed in 1984 and amended in 1996, 2008 and 2017), an ocean 
environmental protection law (passed in 1982 and amended in 1999, 2013 and 2016), an air 
pollution control law (passed in 1987 and amended in 1995, 2000 and 2018), and an 
environmental protection taxation law (passed in 2016 and amended in 2018).129  China’s 
steadily growing collection of environmental-based legislation and legislative amendments 
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demonstrates that, at least superficially, Chinese authorities are increasingly concerned with 
the environmental costs of China’s modernisation. 
Many environmental researchers believe that the combination of these environmental 
protection institutions and laws have created a modern environmental regulatory regime in 
China. 130  As noted below, while much of the research highlights ‘deficiencies’ in these 
environment agencies and legislation, there is also explicit or implicit recognition within the 
literature that China has created a notable environmental bureaucracy and regulatory regime 
that has achieved many successes.131 In 1989, the year that the SEPB formally commenced 
overseeing national environmental planning as an independent bureau, the Chinese government 
devolved authority to local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs, Ă¦Ʃ>â) to enforce 
its new environmental protection law. Focusing on the development of China’s environmental 
protection institutions and legislation, Ferris Jr. and Zhang deem China’s environmental reform 
as a positive work-in-progress.132 They state that despite its idiosyncrasies and faults, Chinese 
authorities have undertaken a ‘significant amount of positive work…toward a more robust 
environmental protection regime in China.’ In many cases, these new laws have strengthened 
the power of China’s lead environmental agency to levy fines, seize polluting equipment, 
restrict or suspend production, and improve environmental information disclosure.133  For 
instance, Jan Hamrin, a renewable energy policy expert, commented that the final draft of the 
2005 Renewable Energy Law included penalty mechanisms which, if enforced, were suitable 
for their purpose. She noted that one section of the Renewable Energy Law stipulated that 
power grid companies which did not take electricity from renewable power operators and 
refused to rectify the situation ‘will be fined an amount that may not exceed twice the economic 
loss incurred by the relevant enterprise’.134 Moreover, in 2014, the MEP issued new rules that 
required over 15,000 plants (the top 65 per cent of polluting enterprises) to disclose ‘hourly 
data on air and water pollution releases’. 135  Elizabeth Economy has criticised Chinese 
authorities’ environmental protection efforts in the past, but she also has acknowledged that 
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Chinese environmental protection authorities such as the then-SEPA have participated in 
significant enforcement campaigns that have resulted in the closure of polluting industries.136  
US political scientist Bruce Gilley also has focused on the ability of Chinese authorities to 
achieve positive environmental outcomes within the more extensive debate of ‘authoritarian 
environmentalism’, which he describes as ‘a non-participatory approach’ to the formulation 
and implementation of environmental policies. 137  He argues that China’s environmental 
institutions and governance system have significant drawbacks and hinder environmental 
protection. However, he argues that they do allow for ‘a rapid, centralised response to severe 
environmental threats’, which is a significant advantage when coordinating state and societal 
efforts to combat climate change.138 Gilley’s argument is a more nuanced version of that 
proposed by Thomas Friedman, who, in an often-cited article, highlighted the benefits of 
‘enlightened authoritarianism’ in China for coordinating an effective climate change 
response.139 Thus, just as political authoritarianism has been seen by commentators to be 
compatible with spectacular economic growth, the same authoritarianism has been seen to hold 
some advantages in pursuing environmental goals.140  
Researchers have also documented the manner in which Chinese leaders have sought to 
make China’s economy more environmentally sustainable. 141  Over the past two decades, 
Chinese authorities have ‘promoted’ ‘cleaner production technology’ within Chinese 
companies.142 They have also sought to shift China’s development towards ‘circular economic’ 
principles. These policies seek to move beyond simple end-of-pipe pollution treatment to 
reduce resource use and pollution during the production process.143 Chinese leaders have also 
called for a ‘resource-saving and environmentally-friendly society’ and to undertake ‘low-
carbon’ or ‘green’ development. 144  China’s recent five-year plans have included such 
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ecological concepts to frame China’s future economic development. 145  Recently, China 
watchers have noticed how China’s most powerful politician, Xi Jinping, has expressed the 
wish for the creation of an ‘ecological civilisation’ in China with ‘mountains of gold and silver’ 
and ‘clear waters and green mountains’ – a reference to the twin objective of environmental 
protection and economic development.146 These examples of policy initiatives and political 
rhetoric highlight how Chinese authorities view issues of sustainability through an economic 
lens. 
This economic aspect of environmental reform is further illustrated by the involvement of 
economic sectors of China’s bureaucracy in environmental policy initiatives. Up until the mid-
1990s, the SEPB was the sole institution involved in environmental policy. However, Shi and 
Zhang argue that the contribution of economic agencies emerged in the decade leading up to 
the mid-2000s when China witnessed a ‘greening of economic agencies’, whereby an 
environmental awareness developed within the NDRC and, its predecessor, the State Economic 
and Trade Commission147  (SETC). They argue that these institutions have contributed to 
formulating many of the aforementioned economic-centred policies that Chinese authorities 
have designed to protect the environment.148 
The Chinese state has also permitted over the past few decades the development of an 
environmental civil society that acts as ‘third force’149 in China, providing expertise, or another 
unofficial monitor of local authorities. In many cases, environmental bureaucrats have 
welcomed the entrance of Chinese environmental NGOs.150 Private environmental NGOs in 
China have established numerous wildlife campaigns related to such issues as anti-poaching 
and migratory route protection for Tibetan Antelope and wetland conservation for migratory 
birds.151 Others have acted as legal advocates for pollution victims.152 The environmental space 
in China also has experienced the entrance of governmental organised NGOs (known as 
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‘GONGOs’) that have allowed central environmental protection authorities such as SEPA and 
the MEP to devolve responsibility for specific environmental protection tasks, such as raising 
awareness for certain environmental issues or training personnel for environmental protection 
activities in a manner that conforms with their environmental policy objectives.153 Academic 
Fengshi Wu also has noted that environmental GONGOs enjoy funding and personnel with 
former high-level politicians, government officials or ‘techno-politicians’ that allow them to 
achieve environmentally-related goals such as training of government officials.154 However, 
her research shows that these GONGOs are becoming increasingly independent by establishing 
links with organisations outside of the government.155 Overall the literature notes that China’s 
civil society has led to positive environmental outcomes. Studies have been conducted that 
show that environmental NGOs are fostering a ‘green public culture’ in China that has led to 
increased environmental awareness.156 
However, there still exists much scepticism concerning the ultimate efficacy of 
environmental NGOs and whether these organisations can act in a similar way to Western 
environmental NGOs that challenged the state from the 1960s onwards. An important point 
often raised in the literature concerning environmental issues, civil society and NGOs is that 
Chinese civil society is different than Western nations because ‘associational life in China 
remains deeply embedded within the state’.157 One potential impediment identified is that the 
political restrictions placed on environmental NGOs by Chinese authorities. For instance, like 
all NGOs, they must register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs158 and meet precise guidelines 
if they want to operate as a ‘social organisation’ (ǒ/ 5). The Ministry of Civil Affairs and 
sponsoring units can refuse applications for NGO status with no right of appeal for the 
applicant.159 These guidelines mean that, as Schwartz elaborates, NGOs ‘without legal status 
and a sponsor… will encounter difficulties accessing funding, obtaining legal protection and 
interacting with government’.160 These guidelines also signify that Chinese environmental 
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NGOs will shy away from challenging the government on anything that possibly calls into 
question the CCP’s political legitimacy.161 Recent research shows no sign that authorities will 
relax their control on environmental NGOs. 162  The overarching theme of the literature 
concerning Chinese environmental NGOs is that they must remain non-political if they wish 
to function within China’s political system.163 From this description, it is clear that researchers 
are divided on the extent to which China’s civil society can perform the same role that they are 
claimed to have performed in the West. However, the fact that they have materialised at all in 
a Marxist-Leninist state suggests that Chinese authorities take environmental problems 
seriously. 
The Chinese government also has become increasingly involved with international 
stakeholders to achieve better environmental outcomes. An implicit and explicit recognition of 
some research is that Chinese institutional stakeholders have become more integrated into the 
global epistemic environmental community.164 They are quite content to utilise the expertise 
of international experts, whether they are from foreign governments, multilateral organisations, 
or NGOs if their expertise provides the technical or institutional answers to cope with and solve 
China’s environmental problems. Chinese government departments have also drawn from the 
financial assistance from foreign governments to drive environmental policy initiatives. For 
instance, Jost Wübbeke (as well as Andreas Hofem and Sebastian Heilmann) explored the role 
that the UK Government (through its Foreign Office) played in promoting the concept of ‘low-
carbon economy’ in China, through providing financial assistance and policy expertise to the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).165 Over the years, China also has become more 
productively involved in international fora and environmental regimes. Elizabeth Economy 
noted that back in 1972, the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment fell back on ‘cold war rhetoric’.166 Yet studies have noticed the constructive role 
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that Chinese bureaucrats have performed in international environmental regimes ranging from 
the Montreal Protocol to more recent global climate change mitigation.167 
What this literature suggests is that the Chinese government has taken the environmental 
implications of China’s development seriously. Moreover, environmental awareness has 
spread to economic agencies as well as the highest political office in China. Despite China 
having an economy that remains predominantly reliant on coal, in recent years the Chinese 
government has fostered growth in their non-hydro renewable energy industry, with 
exponential growth in installed capacity.168 As to the energy industry, it has closed down coal-
fired power plants and pledged ambitious targets to the international community to limit coal 
consumption and carbon emissions by 2030.169 Moreover, China has begun to slowly arrest its 
carbon emissions and industrial pollution (air and water) if viewed in per unit of GDP and per 
capita terms.170 These examples suggest that the recent policy efforts of Chinese authorities are 
making a real difference to the impact of industry on the environment.  
Yet, despite these positive institutional and legislative assessments, there remains much 
pessimism and criticism among China scholars regarding the overall effectiveness of China’s 
environmental protection institutions and policies. Usually, the guiding empirical question for 
many of the critical treatments of China’s environmental reforms is, to paraphrase Xiaoying 
Ma and Leonard Ortolano171, why does China still have environmental degradation despite a 
modern and extensive environmental protection administrative and regulatory regime? 
Richard Sanders argues that China’s economic ethos during this early industrialisation, 
characterised by Deng Xiaoping’s apocryphal maxim ‘to get rich is glorious’ (ȌÚEȓ), meant 
‘that environmental legislation and the structures and institutions it established to reduce levels 
of environmental pollution and degradation had little chance to make headway’.172 Such a 
dictum, others have noted, typically means that legislation to promote increased sustainability, 
such as cleaner production and circular economic practices, in China’s economy, are based 
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more on ‘encouragement’ and ‘promotion’ rather than hard policy sticks.173 Moreover, even 
though China participated positively in the 2016 Paris Agreement concerning climate change 
mitigation, there is still the perception in academia and the media that China ultimately 
prioritises its economy over the health of the planet.174 These critics suggest that Chinese 
authorities ground their political achievements ultimately in matters of economic development, 
rather than environmental protection. 
Others have centred their attention on the efficacy of China’s leading central environmental 
institution, the MEP. There is a recognition that China’s environmental protection agency has 
increased the MEP’s bureaucratic rank, and thus its authority, within China’s political system. 
Yet the MEP still cannot effectively control smaller subordinate work units outside of Beijing. 
For example, some scholars, such as Elizabeth Economy, Kenneth Lieberthal, Abigail Jahiel, 
and Ran Ran state that China’s ongoing environmental degradation has been partly the result 
of low environmental enforcement by local EPBs. This weak enforcement resulted from 
‘fragmented authority’ between central environmental protection authorities and local EPBs.175 
Since the late 1980s, through the work of Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikel Oksenberg, a 
consensus has emerged within the literature is that while China remains a Marxist-Leninist 
one-party State, it suffers from ‘fragmented authoritarianism’.176  In short, fragmented 
authoritarianism can result from what Lieberthal terms the ‘“line-lump relationship” (Ş¬M
Ǫ) matrix muddle’ whereby tiao (Ş), or vertical lines of authority (from vertically-integrated 
bureaucracies), intersect with kuai (¬), or horizontal lines of authority (from geographic units 
such as provinces). Kenneth Lieberthal argues this ‘fragmentation of authority in the Chinese 
political-administrative hierarchy makes it relatively easy for one actor to frustrate the adoption 
or successful implementation of important policies, especially since units (and officials) of the 
same bureaucratic rank cannot issue binding orders to each other’.177 Therefore, in the case of 
China’s local EPBs, researchers have noted how their responsibility for enforcement of China’s 
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laws conflicts with their relationship with local governments who pay their salaries and provide 
them with office space and parking, among other things.178  
In some cases, state funds are insufficient to meet the needs of environmental enforcement. 
Jahiel has reported that some local officials engage in the practice of ‘eating discharge fees’ 
(ĮŻɄ), which sees pollutant discharge and other environmental fees used to supplement 
government funds. This dearth of resources for local EPBs can also result in bargaining 
between local EPBs and enterprises to arrive at a mutually agreeable fine arrangement that is 
more in line with profits and budgetary resources than environmental protection.179 Also, low 
environmental legislative enforcement is compounded by the fact that some of China’s 
environmental laws lack adequate penalty mechanisms to force industries to comply with 
environmental protection measures. Elizabeth Economy notes that the reason legislation has 
set environmental violation penalties at low levels is to increase compliance. However, in many 
cases, the polluting businesses roll any potential fines into operating costs, as pollution 
prevention technology is more expensive than running ‘business as usual’.180 Moreover, other 
researchers have noted instances of local EPBs fining local polluters only to have that fine 
balanced out by local or provincial government tax breaks. This literature places China’s 
environmental problems within the context of environmental maladministration due to the 
peculiarities of China’s governance system. Here the ‘fragmented’ nature of China’s 
decentralised environmental governance is seen as reducing, rather than improving, 
‘environmental performance’.181  
Beyond issues of fragmentation, other research notes how China’s political system can 
stymie government openness and transparency. As China law expert Alex Wang notes, 
‘institutional actors are ever vigilant for any indication that disclosure may pose a threat to 
social stability. Where perceived risks emerge, environmental bureaus retreat, security 
institutions enter the fray, and the balance of efforts shifts decisively toward social control’.182 
Therefore, despite positive legislative efforts that have allowed for greater information 
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disclosure, Chinese authorities can promote political and security concerns over environmental 
interests. 
Chapter Two up to this point has described how the Chinese government has perceived and 
acted upon environmental protection over the past four decades. It also has canvassed the many 
impediments and contradictions that the Chinese government must overcome before the 
country can effectively tackle its environmental problems. Over the years, the Chinese 
government has steadily built a suite of institutions, laws and policies to regulate and reduce 
pollution and environmental damage caused by China’s industry and its citizens. Its lead 
environmental protection organisation, the Ministry of Ecological Environment, is a member 
of China’s state cabinet. As to civil society involvement, Chinese authorities have permitted 
the proliferation of environmental NGOs to assist unofficially as an environmental protection 
watchdog or practitioner. The literature also acknowledges that China’s international 
integration has brought about positive environmental protection outcomes. China participates 
in a raft of international regimes and fora to tackle environmental problems, and it has benefited 
to a degree from foreign aid and investment to combat environmental issues as well as draw 
from external policy expertise. China today is starkly different from the China of four decades 
ago because of these environmental reforms. However, there are researchers who question the 
efficacy of these actions. Another question that emerges from all these documented shifts is 
whether China is presently experiencing unique environmental reforms based on their peculiar 
set of political, economic and cultural circumstances? Or, alternatively, are these 
environmental governance reforms reflective of a broader change that has already occurred in 
the Western developed nations and transcends national boundaries? 
China and the Ecological Modernisation Debate 
These questions concerning ecological restructuring and environmental reform in China 
drew the attention of an optimistic group of environmental sociologists labelled ‘ecological 
modernisation theorists’. Their interest in China formed part of a broader interest in developing 
nations and environmental reform that occurred from the early 2000s onwards.183 The critical 
question that motivated their research was whether environmental shifts within these 
developing countries formed part of a universal ecological transformation that some modern 
nations at a more advanced stage had already experienced known as ‘ecological 
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modernisation’. Ecological modernisation theorists were aware that China’s environmental 
problems were in some instances quite severe and they remained cognisant of the many 
environmental reform obstacles Chinese authorities had yet to surmount. Nonetheless, the 
optimistic underpinnings to their environmental outlook meant they focused on the positive 
developments outlined in the previous section of this chapter to analyse whether such 
developments indicated that China was undergoing a similar trend as had occurred in countries 
such as West Germany and the Netherlands in the 1980s. The ecological modernisation 
theorists associated this earlier European trend with rising environmental consciousness. As a 
later section will detail, they concluded that China’s environmental state and society had been 
transformed in a manner similar to Western Europe and the United States, albeit with some 
unique and contextual differences. 
The chief proponent of ecological modernisation theory (EMT) is the Dutch academic 
Arthur Mol. He is also the pioneer for this theoretical pivot to China, having written or co-
written multiple articles and book chapters that applied EMT to China.184 Mol also co-edited a 
special issue of Environmental Politics ‘Environmental Governance in China’ in 2006 
featuring some of the scholars already cited earlier in this chapter: Elizabeth Economy, Abigail 
Jahiel, and Han Shi. That issue and its collaborators demonstrate symbolically and practically 
how earlier empirical research informed Mol’s work, as well as how he sought to embed 
himself within the earlier empirical work of these researchers. However, before the literature 
that applies EMT to China is reviewed, it is useful to provide an overall context and explanation 
of EMT. 
Ecological Modernisation Theory 
EMT provides a hopeful framework for the prospects of environmental reform and 
environmental sustainability. Its original adherents, primarily from Germany and the 
Netherlands, believed that post-industrial nations could undergo a process of ‘ecological 
modernisation’ and move to a stage where economic growth would not negatively impact on 
the environment.185 Two German political scientists, Joseph Huber and Martin Jänicke, are 
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credited as the progenitors of EMT in the early 1980s.186 Their work, Mol argued, evolved as 
a theoretical response to more radical de-modernisation or neo-Marxist theoretical perspectives 
which either rejected the ‘modernisation project’ or criticised the inherently destructive 
‘treadmill’ logic of capitalism.187 Proponents of EMT believed that evidence from Western 
Europe demonstrated that there were alternatives to deindustrialisation and reverting to 
lifestyles extolling ‘small is beautiful’.188 They also disagreed with neo-Marxist theories that 
capitalism and its insatiable need to extract value out of the environment would subvert any 
meaningful environmental reforms.189  
EMT thereby provided an optimistic appraisal of the political and economic systems that 
had overseen the deleterious ecological consequences of post-World War II economic 
development. It rejected the argument that science and technology were inherently facilitators 
and accelerators of environmental degradation and pollution. The institutions that produced 
scientific and industrial innovations could instead transform and create technology that made 
modern societies more environmentally sustainable. Affluent societies could grow and still 
retain capitalistic structures while simultaneously reducing their environmental impact. 
Germany and the Netherlands provided the empirical evidence for this argument. EMT’s 
sanguine view of modernity, many observers note, helped it gain supporters because its core 
economic message of ‘business as usual’ with less environmental damage was a more 
politically palatable concept than what the neo-Marxists offered.190
In the beginning, ‘ecological modernisation’ was a simple concept that highlighted 
‘institutional restructuring’ in Western Europe within the ‘techno-sphere’.191 However, Arthur 
Mol, with the help of Gert Spaargaren, elevated the concept into a fully-fledged sociological 
theory.192 As noted in Chapter One, these efforts led Mol to define the ‘basic premise’ of EMT 
as ‘the centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations involved in social 
practices and institutional developments, which results in the constant environmental 
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restructuring of modern societies’.193 This restructuring of society along ecological lines also 
led to the ‘growing autonomy, independence or “differentiation” of an environmental 
perspective and environmental rationality vis-a-vis other perspectives and rationalities’.194 
This ecological modernisation process would eventually lead to a decoupling of economic 
growth from environmental damage. With that context outlined, the next question involves 
exploring the concepts that Mol and other ecological modernisation theorists employed to 
interpret the environmental changes taking place. 
Mol separated this process of ecological modernisation into five ‘themes’ or indicators that 
have remained a core part of the theory since the mid-1990s.195 The first of these themes relates 
to the twin core aspects of modernity: science and technology. These two modern ‘institutions’ 
could help societies ecologically reform by assisting the development of ‘preventive socio-
technological approaches [that incorporate] environmental considerations from the design 
stage of technological and organisational innovations’. 196  This focus on preventative 
technological measures is a core aspect of EMT because they are considered superior to 
‘traditional curative and repair options’ applied under the outdated notion that ‘pollute now, 
clean up later’ or ‘end-of-pipe’ approaches could ameliorate environmental harm.197
In the second of the themes, EMT places importance on ‘economic and market dynamics, 
institutions and agents’ as important actors in environmental reforms. For instance, Mol argued 
that insurance companies or credit institutions could become ‘social carriers of ecological 
restructuring, innovation and reform’ based on market logic as well as concern for the 
environment. This point has opened ecological modernisation theorists to accusations of ‘neo-
liberalism’.198 However, Mols defends his position by arguing that this accusation reflects 
criticism of the ‘very optimistic, perhaps naive, attitude toward market actors and market 
dynamics in environmental reforms’ that reflected the first contribution to ecological 
modernisation.199 As he and his colleagues perceive it, EMT provides a ‘broader framework’ 
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to understand the ‘relationships between private firms, states, and civil society actors and 
organisations’ and moves ‘beyond the narrow neo-liberal frameworks for understanding the 
role of privatisation, marketisation and liberalisation in environmental politics’.200 They also 
acknowledge the arguments that ecological modernisation is an ‘ill-fit’ with US environmental 
reform, partly because of that nation’s ‘dominance of neo-liberalism’.201 
The third EMT theme involves changes in the characteristics of the ‘environmental state’. 
In societies experiencing ecological modernisation such as Germany, environmental 
governance has devolved from central authorities to cater for more ‘decentralised, flexible and 
consensual styles’, which replaced or complemented conventional top-down mechanisms of 
environmental governance.202 Civil societal actors, such as NGOs, emerge to assist with new 
styles of environmental governance. This focus positions ecological modernisation in similar 
terrain as ‘new social movement’ theorists.203  
Civil society also informs the fourth theme. Nations experiencing ecological modernisation 
witness a shift in the ‘position, role, and ideology of social movements’.204  These social 
movements, rather than stationing themselves on the political periphery, like radical green 
organisations during the 1970s, instead become involved in mainstream politics, such as green 
parties. These green parties also exhibit an ideology that is distinct from pre-existing ideologies 
such as socialism and conservatism.205 
The fifth of Mol’s EMT themes involves linking what could be termed the ‘realist’ (Mol, 
Spaargaren and Sonnenfeld) and ‘constructivist’ reading of ecological modernisation (the latter 
of which will be detailed in further depth later in this chapter). Mol states that societies 
experiencing ecological modernisation witness a growing ‘parity’ between ‘ecological (or 
environmental) rationality’ and ‘economic rationality’.206 In societies experiencing ecological 
modernisation, the ‘complete neglect of the environment and the fundamental counter 
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positioning of economic and environmental interests are no longer accepted as legitimate 
positions’.207 Mol often cites the discourse theorist Marteen Hajer and the political scientist 
Albert Weale as two sources for this fifth theme.208 Their research into Dutch and German 
environmental reform concluded that ecological modernisation was a constructed ‘discourse’ 
or ‘belief system’.209 While Mol has incorporated such ideas into his EMT framework, he has 
eschewed adopting in full their constructive position. Mol’s work aims to highlight that EMT 
is an observable process that later-staged modern nations experience, rather than merely an 
ideology that societies have adopted to guide their environmental reform. 210  It is these 
theoretical indicators that ecological modernisation theorists have used to draw out general 
patterns of China’s ecological restructuring.  
However, EMT has generated significant controversy and attracted numerous critics 
throughout its relatively short history. Some of this criticism has centred on the ‘broad’ or 
‘vague’ nature of EMT. Despite the work of Mol and others, some critics argue that ecological 
modernisation theorists have yet to unify it into a single coherent theory which, for some, 
makes ‘empirical research problematic and much of the [EMT] debate confusing’.211 The 
environmental sociologist Fred Buttel believes that for EMT to advance as a theory it needs to 
integrate itself more into macro-sociological theory, with which it shares ‘very close 
affinities…[such as] embedded autonomy, civil society, and state-society synergy theories’. 
He argues that it cannot operate solely on its own theoretically, despite the valiant efforts of 
ecological modernisation theorists led by Mol.212 Others have criticised its ‘myopic’ focus on 
the causes of environmental problems. For instance, Michael Carolan has taken issue with its 
emphasis on production at the expense of incorporating consumption factors within the EMT 
framework.213 This is a point that Mol and Spaargaren have acknowledged, but they insist that 
this criticism is more focused on the first wave of EMT literature characterised by Huber and 
Jänicke rather than their later iterations.214 Lastly, due to its intellectual origins, EMT has also 
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been accused of being a Eurocentric theory that does not reflect the environmental situation 
outside Western Europe.215 
However, the most strident criticism of EMT has originated from the more radical 
environmental sociology perspectives raised earlier that ecological modernisation theorists 
sought to confront.216 York, Rosa and Dietz have rejected many of the underlying assumptions 
that ecological modernisation theorists, specifically Arthur Mol, David Sonnenfeld and Gert 
Spaargaren, have made regarding EMT. In their view, Mol and other ecological modernisation 
theorists have yet to provide adequate empirical justification to support their ‘normative’ claim 
that ‘the only possible way out of the ecological crisis is by going further into the process of 
modernisation’. 217  They also take issue with the ‘death penalty fallacy’ aspect of EMT. 
Specifically, they believe EMT conflates two separate arguments: ‘(a) simply, that the 
institutions of late modernity change in response to environmental challenges, or whether it is 
(b) the stronger argument that institutional changes in late modernity help resolve 
environmental problems and lead to sustainability’.218 For them, ecological modernisation 
theorists have yet to make a convincing case for the second argument, because EMT has yet to 
demonstrate that ‘modernisation does lead to reductions in energy and resource 
consumption’. 219  Quantitative studies such as their STIRPAT 220  (Stochastic Impacts by 
Regression on Population, Affluence and Technology) framework suggests the opposite in 
some cases.221 Moreover, they stress that EMT needs to consider the ‘Netherlands fallacy’, i.e. 
that many modern nations export their resource use and environmental impact to other (often 
less developed) countries. 222  Overall this literature acknowledges that EMT focuses on 
‘relative’ improvements in environmental governance and reform, but it is this aspect that leads 
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them to believe that EMT should scale back many of its claims regarding the importance of 
modernisation in overcoming environmental degradation.  
Mol and Spaargaren have responded to York et al.’s critique that they need to be more 
cautious with their empirical evidence by stating that ‘the relation between theory and 
empirical evidence cannot be done away with via a naïve positivist “verify or falsify” claim: 
the black swan is never the falsification’.223 However, York et al. retort that ‘the contested issue 
is not about whether there are metaphorical black swans at all but rather about the relative 
frequency of black and white swans’.224 In other words, the issue is about the ‘general pattern 
of environmental consequences stemming from modernisation’. Despite its critics, EMT 
remains a highly influential theory within the discipline of environmental sociology, especially 
from the Molian perspective.225 
Mol, Ecological Modernisation and China 
To return to the discussion that started this section, the Molian version of EMT has been 
applied to the question of whether ecological modernisation underpins China’s environmental 
reform.226  While Mol is the principal author in this field, other researchers have utilised 
ecological modernisation as a theoretical framework to explore China’s changing attitudes, 
both politically and societally, towards tackling environmental problems. 227  Also, many 
Chinese academics have utilised EMT as a theoretical lens to help understand Chinese 
environmental reform, and some of them have collaborated with Western environmental 
sociologists. 228  Moreover, in 2007, a research branch within the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences 229  devoted their annual modernisation report to ecological modernisation. 230 
However, Mol and his colleagues remark that their theoretical interpretation was more in line 
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with the first generation of EMT, i.e., the report was more concerned with issues of production, 
technology and institutional change rather than consumption and globalisation factors.231  
Mol and his colleagues argue that China has yet to reach a similar ecological modernisation 
path or stage as that experienced in Western Europe, and that there are many differences based 
on particular social and political contexts within China. However, they argue that these 
differences do not suggest that ecological modernisation has yet to commence; merely that it 
is at an earlier stage. They do concede though that there are particular aspects of Chinese 
politics and society that jar with the tenets of EMT. One such point they recognise is the role 
of civil society organisations in Chinese environmental reform (see earlier section). While Mol 
and others note that China’s civil society has played a more prominent role more recently in 
China, they accept its lack of influence when compared to its Western counterparts.  
The nature of the political regime in China also warrants consideration. On the one hand, 
ecological modernisation theorists accept that ‘flexible and consensual styles of governance’ 
have yet to be embedded within Chinese society, because the CCP still retains significant 
political control and the ability to quash environmental movements or debates if they deem 
them threats to their political legitimacy. In this case, China’s environmental governance seems 
more akin to what Bruce Gilley later termed ‘environmental authoritarianism’.232 On the other 
hand, Mol highlights that some environmental transformations in China are explained by EMT. 
China has undertaken decentralised environmental protection work through the formation of 
local EPBs (even if he acknowledges that these local EPBs can sometimes achieve uncertain 
environmental outcomes). Furthermore, he points to the fact that government-organised NGOs 
(referred to earlier as ‘GONGOs’) are starting to develop greater autonomy from the state, even 
if they are relatively ineffective compared to Western NGOs.233 Mol also maintains that the 
influence of market dynamics is becoming a more decisive factor on environmental processes 
in China’s companies, by highlighting the example of PetroChina’s joint-venture operations 
with Western oil multinationals. PetroChina, he states, is ‘acutely aware of the need to acquire 
internationally-recognized environmental management knowledge, and to meet standards and 
emission levels, allowing it to compete on a global market’.234 It is these and other aspects that 
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give Mol and his colleagues the confidence to use the term ecological modernisation in the 
context of China. 
In particular, Mol claims that ‘most environmental reform initiatives are firmly based on, 
make use of and take place within the context of China’s modernization process. In that sense, 
it seems justified to use the term “ecological modernization” to describe China’s attempts at 
restructuring its economy along ecological lines’.235 Moreover, Carter and Mol have noted that 
‘if OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] innovations in 
environmental governance can be captured by the concept of ecological modernisation, then 
China’s environmental reforms can be labelled as a variant, or different style, of ecological 
modernisation’.236 Other writers have supported these claims. In a study applying EMT to 
China, Hong et al. concur with Mol, pointing out that the ‘the case of China can be linked to 
ecological modernization theory as developed within Western environmental sociology and 
there is much to be learned in China from the experience of environmental reform 
elsewhere’.237 
However, critics are less optimistic about the appropriateness of labelling the Chinese 
experience as ecological modernisation. Victor Li and Graeme Lang suggest an ongoing 
‘tension between ecological modernisation and the imperatives of the treadmill of 
production’.238 Moreover, Chinese environmental sociologist Huan Qingzhi ɣõſ, a neo-
Marxist from Peking University, argues that ecological modernisation 
mainly generalised from the experiences of the developed countries, is an appropriate phrase or theory to 
frame where China is moving ahead or should be headed. My major objection is that, even if ecological 
modernisation in its minimum standard is realisable, there is no guarantee that it will lead China to a 
sustainable future. For China, ecological modernisation might be the only realistic road, but it is definitely 
not the green one.239  
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These statements show that the EMT literature on China’s environmental reforms has reached 
something of an impasse. One the one hand, ecological modernisation theorists believe that 
there are enough noticeable environmental changes in China to warrant the link with ecological 
modernisation. Moreover, these theorists can draw on ongoing empirical evidence to further 
illustrate their case.240 However, others believe that China has yet to reach a watershed moment 
whereby it steps off ‘the treadmill of production’, even if Chinese society and industry have 
experienced relative environmental improvements. Scholars such as Huan Qingzhi also believe 
that the normative basis of ecological modernisation in German and Dutch reforms and 
ecological restructuring do not provide much confidence in a Chinese context.  
Therefore, beyond measuring relative improvements, the question remains: can the concept 
of ecological modernisation shed any further light on environmental reforms in China? One 
approach is to ask the following, more constructivist, question that Huan Qingzhi hints at when 
he states that ‘ecological modernisation might be the only realistic road’ for China: could 
ecological modernisation help explain what motivates Chinese officials to undertake certain 
types of environmental reforms? 
A Discursive Reading of ‘Ecological Modernisation’ 
The constructivist interpretation of ecological modernisation has the potential to answer the 
question raised at the end of the previous section. The discussion above noted that beyond a 
theory of societal and institutional change, some scholars have employed ecological 
modernisation as a concept to characterise a normative political and societal ‘discourse’, 
‘ideology’ or ‘belief system’ which originated within Western Europe during the 1970s.241 This 
political ideology incorporated ecological reasoning as well as economic reasoning. From this 
perspective, ecological modernisation ceases to be a theory, because rather than view 
ecological modernisation as a late-modernity environmental transformation that can be 
observed, measured and verified, these constructivists instead consider ecological 
modernisation as a concept born out of a particular set of socio-historical and political 
circumstances pertinent to Europe and the United States. Therefore, the question for these 
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theorists changes from what ‘produces’ ecological modernisation to what ‘constitutes’ (and 
who constructs) ecological modernisation.242  
After examining German environmental reform in the 1980s, Albert Weale concludes that 
the concept of ecological modernisation emerged due to the failure of ‘end-of-pipe’ measures 
to cope with environmental pollution. It was also influenced by the Brundtland report and the 
notion that environmental protection and economic growth were not a zero-sum game.243 The 
Dutch constructivist Maarten Hajer agrees that the Brundtland report was a significant 
influence on reinterpretations of ecological modernisation, but he notes that the idea instead 
originated from a blend of three different texts: Limits to Growth, Blueprint for Survival and 
Small is Beautiful in the early 1970s.244 Hajer also differs from Weale on the issue of the set of 
historical circumstances that facilitated the development of ecological modernisation. He 
suggests that ecological modernisation emerged due to the ideological split within radical green 
movements in the 1970s. This split resulted in some environmental groups advocating a more 
moderate environmental policy discourse. This discourse recognised that while ‘the ecological 
crisis was evidence of a fundamental omission in the working of the institutions of modern 
society’, societies could solve these ecological crises ‘in accordance with the workings of the 
main institutional arrangements of society’. 245  Hajer remarks that this green notion that 
pollution prevention could pay was too irresistible for policy-makers not to adopt and embed 
itself within government institutions. 246  Regardless of their different conclusions on its 
conceptual origins, both Hajer and Weale argue that ecological modernisation is ‘constructed’ 
from a historical set of societal and political circumstances, rather than some suprahistorical 
stage of societal development. 
So, what characteristics define the discursive take on ecological modernisation as opposed 
to Molian EMT? In many ways, its definition shares strong similarities with EMT. For instance, 
Weale argues that within an ecological modernisation belief system ‘the character of 
environmental problems was well understood; that the environmental problems could be 
 
242 Milanez and Bührs 2007, 569. 
243 Weale 1992, 31. 
244 Hajer 1995, 33. See also Seippel 2000, 289. 
245 Hajer 1995, 3. 
246 Ibid, 4. 
 
 48 
handled discretely; that end-of-pipe technologies were typically inadequate; and that in the 
setting of pollution control standards a balance had to be struck between environmental 
protection and economic growth and development’. 247  Hajer shares Weale’s optimistic 
definition, stating that ecological modernisation is ‘a policy strategy that is based on a 
fundamental belief in progress and the problem-solving capacity of modern techniques and 
skills of social engineering’.248 He also notes that ecological modernisation recognises that 
modern institutions have created contemporary environmental problems, but assumes that 
existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalise the care for the environment 
through science and ‘pollution prevention pays’ techniques.249  
The Australian academic John Dryzek has also explored ‘ecological modernisation’ in his 
work on ‘environmental discourses’. He states that the ‘storyline’ of ecological modernisation 
is that ‘the capitalist political economy needs conscious reconfiguring and far-sighted action 
so that economic development and environmental protection can proceed hand-in-hand and 
reinforce one another’.250 Leveraging off the work of Weale and Hajer, he believes that the 
‘idea of ecological modernisation’ rest on four key elements: (1) the business case for reducing 
waste dovetails with more efficient production; (2) postponing solutions for present 
environmental problems is considered a potentially expensive decision for future generations; 
(3) ‘unpolluted and aesthetically pleasing environment means healthier, happier, and more 
productive workers, who may even willingly sacrifice wages and salaries for these 
environmental rewards’; (4) green industries are profitable (whether it is green consumer goods 
and services or pollution abatement products).251  
In addition, Australian environmental sociologist Peter Christoff splits the ‘normative 
version of ecological modernisation’ into a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ version.252 Christoff views 
weak ecological modernisation as ‘narrowly technocratic and instrumental’, ‘neo-corporatist’, 
‘hegemonic’ and Western-centric. Christoff contrasts this strand of ecological modernisation 
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with a stronger version that is more communicative, incorporates democratic aspects which 
maximise public participation, and considers the transnational character of environmental 
problems and the multitude of pathways towards ecological modernisation, with the view that 
environmental considerations trumped economic concerns in the ecological restructuring of 
modern institutions. 253  The stronger version, he believes, has the greater possibility of 
‘promoting enduring ecologically sustainable transformations and outcomes across a range of 
issues and institutions’.254 (In fact, Zhang, Mol and Sonnenfeld employed Christoff’s terms to 
characterise the aforementioned CASS report as a ‘weak version’ because it focuses on the 
‘technological economic dimensions of sustainable development, without entering too much 
into relations with equity, equality, citizen empowerment and the like’). 255  Overall, the 
literature cited in this section illustrates that ecological modernisation, from a constructivist 
standpoint, can potentially provide new insights into the motivations that shape environmental 
reform.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Some pertinent research questions have emerged from this review of the literature 
surrounding China’s environmental problems, environmental governance, and the authority of 
ecological modernisation to explain ecological restructuring and environmental reform in 
China. The key question centres on: have ecological modernisation ideas been incorporated 
into China’s environmental policy agenda? If ecological modernisation ideas 
have influenced Chinese policymakers, then we will find evidence of those ideas in both the 
statements of Chinese officials and Chinese policy and legislation concerning key 
environmental reform measures. We will also find evidence of a convergence between 
economic development and environmental concern in both the statements of Chinese officials 
and Chinese policy and legislation dealing with key environmental reform measures. 
Beyond that, other questions that are raised by this literature include: which institutions and 
officials have been the key advocates for the inclusion of ecological modernisation ideas within 
the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda? What concerns have been the key 
drivers for the inclusion of ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s 
environmental policy agenda? To what extent have ecological modernisation ideas evolved 
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within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda? What techniques can 
researchers use to discover whether ecological modernisation ideas have been included within 
the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda?  
Conclusion 
This chapter started by tracing the origins of China’s environmental problems to the Maoist 
and early Reform eras. From that foundation, studies have shown that in recent decades, 
market-based rapid industrialisation has placed intense pressure on China’s environment. Yet 
Chinese authorities have been unable to effectively manage such ecological pressure, 
especially once China acceded to the WTO and undertook even further economic expansion. 
The chapter then examined the literature which explored how Chinese authorities responded to 
these burgeoning environmental problems. Since the early 1970s and the ‘birth of Chinese 
environmental consciousness’, the Chinese state has constructed an impressive array of 
environmental protection institutions, laws and policies. Moreover, it also has allowed new 
actors to emerge within the environmental protection sector, such as civil society, the media, 
citizens and foreign stakeholders. Despite these efforts, many China watchers still argue that 
the Chinese government needs to undertake further environmental reform to achieve positive, 
long-lasting environmental outcomes in China. 
The third section of this chapter turned to a parallel sociological debate relevant to China’s 
environment and governance: do China’s environmental reforms provide evidence of 
ecological modernisation? The observations and debates generated from the earlier literature 
mentioned in this chapter laid the empirical groundwork for ‘ecological modernisation’ 
theorists to turn their attention to China. These theorists, who typically focused on 
environmental transformations in Western Europe, stressed that the Chinese ‘environmental 
state’ still needed to undergo further environmental reform. Yet, there were enough positive 
changes for some researchers to suggest that ecological modernisation is congruent with 
China’s ongoing modernisation. The chapter ended by proposing that the constructivist 
interpretation of ecological modernisation has the potential to provide a useful conceptual 
framework for examining the motivations and mindset of China’s environmental policymakers. 
Now that this chapter has identified the research problem of this thesis, the discussion will 
move to how researchers can determine whether ecological modernisation ideas have been 
included within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda. 
  
 51 
Chapter Three: A Sinology for Ecological Modernisation 
The last chapter discussed how ecological modernisation theorists cast their eye towards 
China because of the Chinese government’s policy responses to that country’s deteriorating 
environment. China, they argued, was experiencing a unique version of ecological 
modernisation. The chapter concluded with the suggestion that a discursive, constructivist 
reading of ecological modernisation could potentially provide a useful framework to 
understand the motivation behind China’s environmental policy reforms and could shed light 
on the theoretical controversies over the value of ecological modernisation within the Chinese 
context. From this discussion, a set of research questions emerged: 
• If ecological modernisation ideas have been incorporated into the policy agenda, to what 
extent have these ideas evolved? 
• Which institutions and officials have been the critical advocates for the inclusion of 
ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy 
agenda?  
• What concerns have been the key drivers for the inclusion of ecological modernisation 
ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda?  
This chapter outlines the methodology that I adopted in answering those questions. It begins 
with a personal reflection on how my research evolved into its current state, noting how my 
difficulties with applying ecological modernisation theory (EMT) to China’s power generation 
industry led me to realise that a discursive understanding of ecological modernisation could 
potentially present a more useful lens to explore changes in China’s environmental policy 
agenda. From that discussion, I integrate the ‘themes’ of Molian EMT into the existing 
constructivist literature on ecological modernisation to generate the discursive indicators for 
my research. The rest of this chapter outlines my case studies and how I operationalised my 
research questions and hypothesis to gather the evidence needed to explore the role of 
ecological modernisation ideas within China’s environmental reform measures. 
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Applying Ecological Modernisation Theory to China’s Power Generation Industry 
When I first commenced my research, I wanted to evaluate Arthur Mol’s claim that 
ecological modernisation was occurring in China.256 Based on my review of the literature, I 
believed that early evidence existed to justify the use of EMT as a theoretical framework to 
examine in more depth the environmental shifts occurring in China’s power generation sector. 
I chose this industry because of my interest in its critical significance for China’s ongoing 
modernisation. I also broadened my focus beyond the renewable energy industry because I 
wanted to explore whether the process of ecological modernisation affected industries that 
utilise traditional generating technologies, such as coal-fired power and hydropower. That 
choice seemed appropriate because hydropower and coal-fired electricity comprised the vast 
majority of China’s installed electricity capacity.257 However, I eventually discovered that this 
approach opened up a set of difficulties as to how I could measure the process of ecological 
modernisation within China’s power generation industry. The main difficulty I faced centred 
on operationalising EMT. Although the EMT literature had established a set of ‘themes’, or 
theoretical indicators, in reality the interpretation of these themes seemed arbitrary and heavily 
influenced by the subjective values of the researcher (an example is the hydropower industry, 
discussed immediately below). Because of this methodological ‘fuzziness’, it was difficult to 
find categorial evidence to support the claim that the process of ‘ecological modernisation’ was 
occurring. Here the looseness that neo-Marxists identified in EMT emerged as a real 
problem.258 
China’s hydropower industry provides an excellent example of the methodological concerns 
that materialised in the preliminary stages of my research. (A similar case could also be made 
for the coal-fired power industry and renewable industry). To give a brief context of 
hydropower in China, it has undergone significant expansion since Chinese authorities first 
released the sluice gates of the Three Gorges Dam hydropower plant in 2003.259 Since then, 
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China’s generation of hydroelectricity has grown from 283.7 Terawatt-hours (TWh) to 1155.8 
TWh in 2017 (just under 18 percent of total production).260 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and government officials are strong advocates of hydropower because of its ‘abundance’ in 
China’s southwest – a coal-poor region. Over one-quarter of all electricity generated in China 
comes from hydroelectricity.261  
On a broad level, China’s rapid hydropower expansion could provide evidence that the 
process of ecological modernisation is occurring. More hydroelectricity means less coal and, 
consequently, less emitted carbon and air pollutants. Chinese officials have understood this for 
several decades. In 1983, then minister of the former Ministry of Water Resources and Electric 
Power262 Qian Zhenying ɭŰȒ stated that ‘hydropower is comparatively economical and 
clean energy’. 263  When calling for more expansion in the hydropower industry, Chinese 
officials often extolled the benefits of hydroelectricity, specifically, whether it is small- or 
large-scale hydropower.264  For instance, Chen Lei ʃʌ , the longstanding minister of the 
Ministry of Water Resources265 (MWR), argued that China’s small hydropower of 80 GW in 
2000 involved a saving of 30 million tonnes of coal, equivalent to 72 million tonnes of carbon 
dioxide.266 Jiao Yong ǈp, a vice-minister and chief engineer at the MWR, also noted in a 
2009 paper that the Three Gorges Dam’s 22.5 GW installed generating capacity reduced the 
consumption of 74.8 million tonnes of coal each year, thereby reducing China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions.267 Although an argument could be mounted concerning the ‘Jevons Paradox’268, 
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these statistics support China’s officials backing of hydropower: less carbon and pollution are 
emitted into the atmosphere because of China’s new hydroelectricity expansion. 
Hydropower can also have positive influences that extend beyond reducing coal-derived 
carbon emissions and air pollution. Hydropower development, especially small hydropower or 
‘rural hydropower’ (QŝŶƳ), provides electricity to homes that traditionally had to resort to 
biomass for their heating and cooking. Resorting to such fuel has been a lead contributor to 
deforestation in China. In 2002, minister of the MWR, Wang Shucheng żĖȴ, stated that 
‘rural hydropower was the “leader” in water projects for mountainous regions’ and that ‘15 
years of rural electrification has resolved the problem of 120 million people without power’.269 
The result of this electrification, he claimed, was the reduction in approximately 300,000 acres 
of felled forest each year, or 9 million cubic metres of wood products harvested.270  His 
successor, Chen Lei, expressed the same sentiment several years later. Writing in Small 
Hydropower in 2011, Chen announced that because of the ‘construction of 236 small 
hydropower replacing fuel combustion projects’ over the preceding 5-year period, over 
‘460,000 rural homes had their fuel problem resolved’, which resulted in the ‘protection of 
roughly 900,000 acres of forests’.271 Chinese companies have also undertaken locally-designed 
innovation to improve the efficiency of hydroelectricity generation through developments in 
generator technology and advances in hydrology.272 China has also invested in technology to 
reduce the environmental impact of large-scale dams. Dams unnaturally block fish migrations, 
so some Chinese engineers have implemented fish ladders and artificial breeding in an attempt 
to ensure that concrete dams do not negatively impact fish species. Moreover, innovations have 
occurred concerning how reservoirs are managed to reduce dry stream beds and better manage 
dam and river temperature levels.273 These examples illustrate that an argument could be 
mounted that ecological modernisation is occurring in China. Hydropower has modernised 
parts of China’s society that previously relied on traditional forms of energy. Moreover, 
Chinese companies are implementing technology and better management practices to reduce 
the environmental impact of dams. 
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Despite these perceived benefits, hydropower expansion has negatively impacted China’s 
environment. This fact I could not disregard. The anti-dam NGO International Rivers states 
that ‘while water is a renewable resource, the rivers and the ecosystems that they sustain – 
including floodplains, wetlands, estuaries and marine environments – are not renewable. Given 
the serious, irreversible ecological impacts of dams, dam-based hydropower cannot be 
considered a renewable source of power’.274 Chinese language research exists that focuses on 
the environmental (and social) problems caused by China’s hydropower expansion. For 
instance, International Rivers funded a report by a group of Chinese scientists on hydropower 
development in China which argues that:  
rivers are ancient complex ecosystems, the value of these systems and the resources they provide are much 
more than mere power generation. Rivers maintain the health of the ecosystems and as they shaped ancient 
civilisations in the past, today they provide services that support the whole economy… [d]ams alter the 
natural flow of rivers, resulting in the reduction and extinction of rare fish species. Upstream hydropower 
development dries up rivers and lakes in the downstream, Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake being the most 
shocking examples in China. Dams in the southwest regions inundate fertile valley land, and compromise 
self-purification capacity of rivers, which causes serious pollution in reservoirs. The cumulative effect of 
cascade dams can cause ecological losses and dry up rivers, which ultimately will affect human beings at 
the top of the food chain. Moreover, the ecological remedy measures designed to decrease dams’ impact 
have failed repeatedly. The dams on Jinsha River and Shuiluo River, as well as Xiaonanhai Dam have 
significantly compromised river ecosystems. The damage is not just caused by construction of the dams, 
but also by mismanagement and irrational decision-making linked to ignoring existing laws to protect 
rivers.275  
In this report, the ecological consequences of hydropower are interpreted negatively. Rather 
than viewing hydropower as a contributor to minimising climate change and limiting 
deforestation, critics view dams as human-made structures that disrupt and damage river 
ecology.276 These ecological impacts raised some crucial methodological questions in my 
research: should I emphasise examples where technological innovations or improved 
management of dams have made hydropower generators more environmentally sustainable? 
Should I centre my attention on cases where power generators have continued to use less than 
best-practice technology? Linked to this, how many of China’s 50,000 dams would I need to 
scrutinise before I could be confident that I had a representative sample that would afford me 
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the confidence to conclude that ecological modernisation has reached a watershed moment 
concerning hydropower? 
A further issue was how my research should scrutinise hydropower projects that were 
cancelled on purported ecological grounds. The example of the Nu River (Ēź, also known as 
Salween River) in Yunnan provides an excellent example of this conundrum. In the early 
2000s, the Chinese government had initially allowed the SOE Huadian (uƳ) the right to 
construct thirteen cascade dams with a planned overall capacity of 21.3 GW without an 
environmental impact assessment. 277  The project soon drew heavy criticism from 
environmental NGOs, scientists and local environmental bureaucrats because of the lack of an 
environmental impact assessment and because they believed the project would negatively 
impact the ‘Three Parallel Rivers’ (źóƅ) region, which the United Nations had recently 
declared a World Heritage Site.278 In particular, civil society stakeholders, such as China Rivers 
Network (a consortium of seven NGOs in China), played an essential part in mobilising 
attention towards the environmental impacts of hydropower and the need for rigorous and 
transparent environmental impact assessments. The critique of the hydroelectric project 
culminated in February 2004 when Premier Wen Jiabao ƒ×Ò stated that ‘such a large 
hydropower station project that draws high social attention, and has environmental 
controversy, should be cautiously studied, and scientifically decided’.279 Two months later he 
placed a moratorium on damming the Nu River.280 Studies have shown that the NGOs played 
a significant role in drawing Wen’s attention to the environmentally problematic nature of the 
project.281 Again, the role of civil societal (and non-state or quasi-state) stakeholders in driving 
environmental reform could present as evidence for ecological modernisation. Mol and others 
have explored how civil society has influenced ecological restructuring in late-modern 
nations.282 
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However, my research also led me to question how much emphasis should be placed on the 
influence of perceived adverse environmental outcomes within the government’s overall 
decision to halt dam construction. Although protecting the biodiverse flora and fauna of the Nu 
River was a consideration, social costs also heavily influenced the political leadership. 
Installing the proposed thirteen dams would have inundated villages within the Nu River valley 
and led to the forced relocation of at least 50,000 people.283 (Chinese environmental impact 
assessments take into account social impacts).284 The Nu River presents just one example, 
albeit prominent and significant, of large-scale dams being halted on environmental grounds. 
Conversely, the Lancang River ƕŽź (also known as the Mekong River), also in Yunnan, has 
undergone significant transformation, with over twenty dams proposed to be built along the 
waterway and seven large dams already built.285 Once completed, the dams along the Lancang 
River will have an installed capacity of over 30 GW of hydroelectricity, considerably larger 
than the planned overall capacity for the Nu River. Although the specific environmental 
impacts of damming the Lancang River vary compared with the Nu River because of differing 
geography, the overall environmental impacts remain the same with problems for biodiversity 
and river systems.286 Overall, I was left with more questions than answers with respect to 
whether ecological modernisation was underway within the hydroelectricity industry. 
From my preliminary research, I could have concluded that the hydropower industry was a 
weak case study to examine ecological modernisation in China and tried to find a more 
appropriate case study. However, EMT’s proponents presented their theory as a universally 
applicable approach to understanding the manner in which societies ecologically restructure.287 
Although Mol principally derived the theoretical aspects of ecological modernisation from his 
evaluation of the chemical industry in the Netherlands, he did not preclude any industries from 
the theory’s purview. Moreover, technological advances in hydropower suggested that the 
industry had progressed and, in some instances, become more environmentally sustainable. I 
could have also determined that ecological modernisation was in its infancy in China, and yet 
to reach a breakthrough moment. However, the point at which I could label an event or project 
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as an instance of ecological modernisation was unclear. The result of this initial groundwork 
is that I could also have tentatively resolved that the process of ecological modernisation was 
either lacking or stymied in China’s hydropower industry. With more questions than answers 
emerging from my preliminary investigation, my research had reached an impasse.  
By contrast to the difficulties I encountered in operationalising EMT, my exploration of the 
discursive aspect of the theory was more productive. The last of the theory’s themes centres on 
an ecologically-grounded discourse, or ‘environmental rationality’, that challenges the 
economic-based discourse, or ‘economic rationality’.288 No longer does economic rationality 
dominate the ecological. I was able to find policy statements from senior Chinese government 
policymakers that shed light on how they interpreted hydropower development within the 
broader context of China’s environmental problems.  
Reflecting on their statements caused me to re-examine my focus on this process of 
ecological modernisation. I could have decided to continue my exploration of ecological 
modernisation in China as a social process, even if that emphasis meant that the bulk of material 
uncovered in my research was centred on discursive material. However, it seemed more 
relevant in light of this new evidence to explore in greater depth the idea or discourse of 
ecological modernisation in China and see whether Chinese policymakers viewed 
environmental reform and economic development from an ecological modernisation mindset. 
This new research focus would allow me to undertake an intellectual history and explore the 
environmental policy ‘first principles’ of these officials, by examining the institutions and 
officials that promote what sound like ecological modernisation views. 
Research Case Studies 
With this new approach, I formed the realisation that the power sector was unduly restrictive 
of my research aims to study the value of ecological modernisation in the Chinese context. 
However, while exploring the discourse of Chinese ministers and policy researchers, I would 
often find them referring to ideas such as ‘sustainable development’ (ĨǷã), ‘cleaner 
production’ (ƐƂư#), ‘circular economy’ (ČƩǳƇ), ‘green GDP’ (ǹȏ GDP), ‘environmentally 
friendly society’ (ƩµÄ®ǒ/), ‘low-carbon economy’ (4ǑǳƇ), ‘green economy’ (ǹȏǳƇ) 
or ‘ecological civilisation’ (ưđĻŅ) when justifying environmental projects and legislation 
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relevant to the power generation industry. Through further exploration, I noticed that these 
concepts went into more depth than political slogans such as ‘conserve energy and reduce 
emissions’ (ȑȊUĮ), avoid the path of ‘pollute first, clean up later’ (DŻťſƭ) or ‘give 
priority to prevention’ ()ɽ).289 Beyond that, prima facie evidence existed in the statements 
of these officials for me to believe that these concepts aligned with ecological modernisation.290 
(This was not a surprising revelation as Arthur Mol had noted that ecological modernisation 
was congruent with circular economy, green GDP and cleaner production, see Chapter One). I 
also noticed after a broader investigation that these concepts were not just applicable to the 
power generation industry. They were used in a broader sense to frame China’s overall 
environmental reform.  
Consequently, I broadened my focus from the power generation industry to include five 
general concepts of environmental reform that have occurred since the early 1990s in China: 
‘cleaner production’ in Chapter Five; (2) a ‘circular economy’ in Chapter Six; (3) a ‘green 
GDP’ in Chapter Seven; (4) a’ low-carbon economy’ in Chapter Eight; and (5) an ‘ecological 
civilisation’ in Chapter Nine. For reasons of space and accessible material, I chose not to 
explore ‘environmentally friendly society’ and ‘green economy’. Based on similar space 
constraints, I also chose not to explore the policy discourse of ‘sustainable development’ in 
depth, deciding to weave it through all of my data chapters. This seemed like an appropriate 
choice as Chinese officials referred to sustainable development as an overarching guiding 
principle to guide China’s environmental reforms. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates why I decided upon the chronological structure of this thesis. Many of 
these ideas I identified overlapped, but I detected a chronological pattern starting with cleaner 
production and finishing with ecological civilisation. The preliminary discussions of these 
concepts were also largely characterised by a chronological configuration – except for low-
carbon economy and ecological civilisation. 
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Figure 3.1: Thesis Concepts and Chronology 
 
Overall, I found these concepts allowed me to explore the following questions: 
• If ecological modernisation ideas have been incorporated into the policy agenda, to 
what extent have these ideas evolved? 
• Which institutions and officials have been the critical advocates for the inclusion of 
ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy 
agenda? 
• What concerns have been the key drivers for the inclusion of ecological modernisation 
ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda? 
A Useful Heuristic? Ecological Modernisation Discourse and Chinese Environmental 
Reforms 
To answer the above questions, I employed what could be termed a ‘discourse analysis’ to 
examine whether ecological modernisation ideas have been incorporated into China’s 
environmental policy agenda. Marteen Hajer defines ‘discourse’ as ‘an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, 
and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices’.291 For him, the 
value of discourse analysis is that it allows for a: 
 
291 Hajer 2006, 67. 
 
 61 
better understanding of controversies, not in terms of rational-analytical argumentation but in terms of the 
argumentative rationality that people bring to a discussion. Hence discourse should be distinguished 
analytically from discussion so as to allow for the differentiation of plural discourses. Discourses consist 
of structures embedded in language. Discourses are therefore ‘found’ or traced by the analyst. Discourses 
might not be immediately obvious to the people that utter them, although respondents should recognise a 
discourse when pointed out to them by the analyst.292 
I focused my attention on an ‘ecological modernisation discourse’ to see whether such 
indicators appear in China’s environmental policy agenda. Adapting Hajer, I use the term 
‘discourse’ interchangeably with ideas, narrative, perspective, mindset, beliefs, notion, views, 
among other terms.  
Furthermore, my research also treats ecological modernisation discourse as just one of a 
range of environmental discourses that emerged from the 1960s onwards. As John Dryzek, in 
The Politics of the Earth: environmental discourses, notes: 
environmentalism is composed of a variety of discourses, sometimes complementing one another, but often 
competing. A discourse is not like a tribe. Particular individuals may partially inhabit competing discourses 
that make claims upon them. An individual working in a government environmental agency may be an 
administrative rationalist at work, a green radical in conversations with friends, an economic rationalist in 
buying and selling. The individual may sometimes have to think long and hard when these discourses pull 
in different directions, opening space for reflection.293 
Although there are other environmental discourses that I could potentially explore such as 
administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism, I have focused 
on ecological modernisation and its antithesis, development discourse, or ‘economic 
rationality’. 294  According to Dryzek, ‘the impetus of economically rational systems is to 
maximise production’, and the ‘prime value is economic efficiency’.295 Because the PRC has 
operated under differing economic systems in its relatively short history, economic rationality 
is defined more broadly. In particular, in a capitalist market system, economic rationality 
manifests as a mindset or set of beliefs that value expansion of production efficiently and 
profitably. For a centrally planned – or command – economic system, the rationality reveals 
itself in the objective to maximise production. I will situate the economic rationality of China’s 
leaders within the context of China’s post-1978 economic reforms in Chapter Four. 
The principal methodological task for answering the questions framing this thesis involved 
defining the conceptual characteristics of an ecological modernisation discourse. Arthur Mol 
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(and his colleagues) primarily looked at ecological modernisation from an empirical standpoint 
in order to reveal the existence of the process of ecological modernisation. Despite my 
scepticism over the possibility of coming to some agreement on such characteristics (as shown 
in my example on hydropower) I argue that their work can contribute to the ‘discourse of 
ecological modernisation’. In Chapter Two, it was noted that Molian EMT contains five key 
themes that characterise the process of ecological modernisation based on the examination of 
ecological restructuring in Western Europe. In this thesis, I have re-evaluated them as 
discursive indicators of ecological modernisation and integrated their work with the 
constructivist literature of Dryzek, Hajer, and Weale.296 During the early stages of my research, 
I was struck by how the ideas of Mol emerged in statements by Chinese officials. This made 
me consider whether Mol’s work could contribute to the constructivist literature. A perspective 
that integrates the constructivist and realist readings of ecological modernisation has the 
potential to provide an insightful conceptual lens to determine whether Chinese policymakers 
have incorporated ecological modernisation ideas into their environmental policy agenda. 
Drawing from the work of Weale, Hajer, Dryzek and Mol et al., I generated seven discursive 
indicators of ecological modernisation297: 
1. The belief that development should balance ecological298 and economic rationality; 
2. The belief that science and technological innovation will reduce, rather than 
increase, environmental impact;  
3. The belief that environmental reforms based on capitalist economic principles will 
not only reduce environmental impact but also foster profitable green industries;  
4. The belief that postponing policy solutions for existing environmental problems is 
a risky economic decision for future generations; 
5. The belief that ‘decentralised, flexible and consensual styles of governance’, as well 
as the inclusion of ‘non-state actors’ that assume ‘traditional administrative, 
regulatory, managerial, corporate, and mediating functions of the nation-states’ can 
manage and solve some environmental problems better than governments;  
 
296 See Chapter Two. 
297 Weale, 1992; Hajer 1995; Mol 2010b; Dryzek 2013. 
298 Ecological rationality is defined as the valuing of the ‘productive, protective and waste-assimilative 
[functions]...of eco-systems’, see Dryzek 1987, 34.  
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6. The belief that the increased involvement of social movements in environmental 
reform and policymaking, whether through civil society or political parties, can 
assist in better management of environmental problems; 
7. The reflexive belief that modernisation will be more environmentally sustainable if 
it eschews past polluting and damaging practices of development and 
industrialisation. 
I then sought to identify whether these conceptual indicators of ecological modernisation 
emerge in the policy discourse of Chinese officials and institutions. I considered that by doing 
this, I would be able to determine whether ecological modernisation ideas have been 
incorporated into China’s environmental policy agenda.  
I considered what research methods could assist in identifying an ecological modernisation 
discourse. Marteen Hajer has identified several methods that should form part of discourse 
analysis:  
1. Desk research: general survey of the documents and positions in a given field; newspaper analysis, 
analysis of news sections in relevant journals. This all to make a first chronology and come up with a first 
reading of events; 
2. Helicopter interviews: interviews with three or four actors (‘helicopters’) that are chosen because they 
have the overview of the field be it from different positions. They might comprise a well-informed 
journalist, a key advisor to the government, an expert-policymaker; 
3. Document analysis: analysing documents for structuring concepts, ideas and categorisations; 
employment of storylines, metaphors, etc. This should result in a first attempt at defining structuring 
discourses in the discussion. At this stage one would get a basic notion of the process of events as well as 
the sites of discursive production; 
4. Interviews with key players: on the basis of the proceeding steps interviews can be conducted with central 
actors in the political process. The interviews can be used to generate more information on causal chains 
that will always be the assumed core of the meeting on [the] part of the interviewees, but the interviews 
might also be used to get a better understanding of the meaning of particular events for the interviewees.  
5. Sites of argumentation: searching for data not simply to reconstruct the arguments used but to account 
for the argumentative exchange. Examples might be parliamentary debates, minutes of inquiries (a very 
rich source), presentation and interpretation of evidence presented to a particular research commission, 
panel discussions at conferences. 
6. Analyse for positioning effects: actors can get ‘caught up’ in an interplay. They might force others to 
take up a particular role, but once others are aware of what is going on, they might also try to refuse it 
(indicators: ‘No, that is not what I meant’, ‘That is not what it is about at all’). This positioning not only 
occurs on the level of persons but can of course also be found among institutions or even nation-states; 
7. Identification of key incidents: this would lead to the identification of key incidents that are essential to 
understand the discursive dynamics in the chosen case. As much as possible these key incidents are then 
transcribed in more detail allowing for more insights in which determined their political effects; 
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8. Analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation: rather than assuming coherence on [the] part 
of particular actors, at this stage one goes back to the data to see if the meaning of what is being said can 
be related to the practices in which it was said. 
9. Interpretation: on this basis one may find a discursive order that governed a particular domain in a 
particular time. Ideally, one should come up with an account of the discursive structures within a given 
discussion, as well as an interpretation of the practices, the sites of production that were of importance in 
explaining a particular course of events. 
10. Second visit to key actors: discourses are inferred from reality by the analyst. Yet when respondents 
are confronted with the findings, they should at least recognise some of the hidden structures in language. 
Hence to revisit some key actors is a way of controlling if the analysis of the discursive space made 
sense.299 
Document analysis constitutes a crucial part of this thesis’s methodology. I examined several 
hundred Chinese-language policy documents, speeches, articles, and interviews with Chinese 
institutions and government officials to determine whether China’s environmental policy 
agenda contained ecological modernisation ideas. As Hajer notes above: ‘discourses are 
inferred from reality by the analyst’.300 Consequently, I was not looking for instances where 
the concept of ecological modernisation was explicitly discussed in documents. Instead, I was 
more concerned with those documents that indicated ecological modernisation through the 
policy statements of China’s officials and institutions. In guiding my analysis, I used the seven 
discursive indicators of ecological modernisation listed above.  
Initially, it was necessary to demarcate what constitutes appropriate ‘policy discourse’ or a 
suitable ‘discursive actor’. Due to China’s large population, the sheer amount of Chinese-
language discourse generated is immense, even in the field of environmental policy. It comes 
from a diverse range of stakeholders across Chinese politics and society – some relevant such 
as from Party and government organs, some of lower value, such as from most academics and 
journalists. Because of the large volumes of material, as a researcher I needed to determine 
what was relevant evidence and make judgements concerning the weight they place on certain 
voices. Accordingly, I ensured that my research focused on the influential policy discourses in 
China, such as institutions and officials from the CCP, PRC Government, and National 
People’s Congress. Chapter Four will explain the essential context of these three institutions in 
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further detail, but, for now, I will explain how each institution contributed to the data collection 
for this thesis. 
First of all, any study that scrutinises topics relevant to China’s political-economy needs to 
take into account the central importance of ‘The Party’.301 Due to its central position within 
Chinese politics, I targeted the policy discourse created by the most powerful Party officials in 
China such as CCP General Secretaries and members of the Politburo 302  and Politburo 
Standing Committee303 (PSC), dating back to the 1950s. Often high-level politicians remain 
above specific or in-depth discussion of environmental policy, so their use of ecological 
modernisation ideas in any policy commentary (speeches, articles, and interviews) can 
demonstrate the persuasiveness of these ideas. For example, if a high-level Party cadre such as 
a member of the PSC had delivered a speech endorsing ecological modernisation ideas as a 
core element, then I determined that the speech provided evidence of the importance that this 
cadre had placed on incorporating such ideas within China’s environmental policy agenda. I 
also focused my attention on the relevant Party officials who, while lower in rank than the PSC 
members, nevertheless held positions relevant to the environmental policymaking, either in a 
government position or a leading small group.  
Beyond Party officials, I also examined relevant Party statements dating back to the 1950s 
from Party websites and online databases to see whether they included indicators of ecological 
modernisation. The importance of examining CCP documents for this research is that, because 
of the authority of the Party within Chinese politics, they allow me to determine the extent to 
which ecological modernisation ideas have influenced China’s environmental policy agenda. 
For example, if the Central Committee of the CCP304 issues a Party document that incorporates 
ecological modernisation ideas then this document reflects the ideological and national 
significance of these ideas for the Party and the Party’s leadership. If they view environmental 
reform as a relatively minor policy issue, then they will leave it to the government (see below). 
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 Government policy documents also served as a core source of information for this thesis. 
The State Council presides over government organs and it often signals policies to subordinate 
bureaucratic units through the release of ‘documents’ (KĻ) that outline its policy position 
with varying degrees of policy importance. 305  Through government websites and online 
databases, I examined State Council documents to determine whether policy documents 
discussing key environmental reforms contained ecological modernisation values. I also 
examined policy documents created by various ‘ministries’ (ɤ), ‘commissions’ (Å/), 
‘administrations’ (ĕâ), ‘bureaus’ (â), and ‘leading small groups’ (ʗÝÞǰ) along with other 
bureaucratic organs, that have regulated, administered, formulated and coordinated 
environmental policy. I primarily focused on these institutions because existing literature has 
confirmed that they have played an essential role in environmental reform: National 
Environmental Protection Leading Small Group (1974–1982), Ministry of Urban and Rural 
Construction and Environmental Protection (1982–1987), National Environmental Protection 
Commission 306  (1984–1998), State Environmental Protection Bureau (1987–1998), State 
Environmental Protection Administration (1998–2008), Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(2008–2018), and Ministry of Ecological Environment (2018–present). However, because 
China had recently experienced what some scholars have termed a ‘greening of economic 
agencies’307, I decided to broaden my investigation to include government organs from the 
economic sectors of China’s bureaucracy, such as the State Planning Commission308 (1954–
1998), State Economic and Trade Commission (1993–2003), State Development Planning 
Commission309 (1998–2003), National Development Reform Commission (2003–present). My 
rationale for this broadening of my universe of discourse was based on the Molian premise that 
under ecological modernisation conditions, economic and ecological rationalities should 
merge, rather than be treated as opposites. 
Because my research sought to trace the source of environmental ideas, this necessitated 
that I focus on the policymakers within government ministries. I therefore surveyed the policy 
commentary of officials in government institutions, drawing on online databases. I explored 
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their speeches, articles and media interviews relating to the environmental reform concepts that 
constitute the empirical chapters of this thesis. I centred my attention primarily on the senior-
level officials within the government, for example, ‘chairman’ (+), ‘vice-chairman’ (f
+) ‘minister’ (ɤɹ), ‘vice-minister’ (fɤɹ), ‘director’ (âɹ), and ‘deputy director’ (fâ
ɹ), because their views carried more weight than their subordinates. However, because I 
sought to determine which particular institutions embraced a particular concept, such as 
‘cleaner production’ or ‘circular economy’, I also focused on researchers and policymakers at 
lower levels to see whether they discussed the term prior to more prominent public 
announcements by their superiors. This allowed me to understand the congruency of arguments 
between lower and upper levels of China’s government institutions, as well as understanding 
the genealogy of these concepts within the Chinese context. 
Lastly, I also examined Chinese legislation passed by China’s NPC, referred to as the 
‘supreme State organ of power and legislation.310 As China’s primary legislature, it votes on 
legislation after its various committees review the proposed laws. The importance of the NPC 
for my research is that it permits me to establish whether ecological modernisation ideas have 
been embedded in the legislation of the PRC. If Chinese authorities decided to pass legislation 
that contains ecological modernisation views, then this provides the clearest evidence that such 
views have influenced China’s environmental policy agenda. 
I also supplemented an examination of documents from the above institutions with an 
exploration of academic discussions. These provided a critical early history for the concepts 
that I explored in this thesis. Academic discourse in China is subject to restrictions. The 
Western notion of ‘academic freedom’ is incongruent with the political control that the CCP 
wishes to exercise over governmental institutions (see Chapter Four). Nevertheless, academics 
are typically permitted to publish what they want as long as they abstain from attacking the 
legitimacy of the Party or they refrain from touching on topics that embarrasses governing 
authorities. 311  Because authorities legitimised the notion of ‘environmental protection’ in 
China in the early 1970s (see Chapter Two), the discussion of environmental policy solutions 
has become less ideological, especially after the Mao and ‘Gang of Four’ years. Therefore, 
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Chinese academics have been relatively free to discuss environmental policy reform measures 
as long as these discussions do not encourage changes in environmental governance that 
weakens the control of the CCP or publish empirical evidence (statistics, interviews, photos) 
that demonstrates or suggests government maladministration.  
I also reviewed relevant official media reports to indicate when environmental policy reform 
discussions entered the media domain. Similar to academics, China’s official (and non-official) 
media are not free to discuss any topic of public interest.312 The CCP can try to restrict any 
information entering the public domain that questions the actions of Chinese politicians. They 
do this through the CCP Central Committee’s Propaganda Department 313  which gives 
directives to media outlets on material they can or cannot disseminate to the public. This arises 
as a potential issue as some of the environmental issues that this thesis examined were or 
remain, to an extent, politically sensitive. One example is the government’s policy stance on 
industrial pollution. Policy action on the environment is inextricably linked to the continuation 
of China’s remarkable economic development as the Party sees continued economic growth as 
the source of its political legitimacy in the post-Maoist era (see Chapter Two and Chapter 
Four). In 2015, the environmental documentary ‘Under the Dome’ (ǝʓ	) by former China 
Central Television journalist Chai Jing ŧʐspread across Chinese social media as its material 
concerning the costs of mounting environmental pollution and perceived local government 
inaction resonated with the public. In a matter of days, it had amassed hundreds of million 
views.314 Initially, China’s central government officials were supportive of the documentary. 
The newly-appointed minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), Chen Jining 
ʃË , likened Chai Jing to Rachel Carson, noting that he sent her a text message to 
congratulate her on the documentary.315 However, because the release of the documentary 
coincided with the ‘Two Conferences’ (/), when the yearly NPC and Chinese People’s 
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Political Consultative Conference 316  are held, Chinese authorities wanted to limit the 
discussion of the documentary in print and online in case the discussion conflagrated into more 
pointed questions concerning the CCP’s handling of China’s environment. Thus, the CCP’s 
Propaganda Department released an edict to all media outlet stating that ‘they must absolutely 
discontinue coverage of the documentary “Under the Dome” and its creator, as well as reports, 
commentaries, interviews, and special topics that concern or extend to this film and its 
creator’.317 Nonetheless, the Party’s control over the media only provides a minor constraint 
on this research, because I only want to examine when ecological modernisation ideas enter 
into the official media. This will allow me to detect changes in how Chinese authorities view 
previously sensitive environmental topics, such as climate change, and whether such changes 
are indicative of an ecological modernisation discourse. 
Lastly, I reviewed English and Chinese-based secondary source material. The bulk of 
discursive material for this thesis is drawn from the primary source material that I indicated in 
previous paragraphs of this chapter. However, the discursive material published by China’s 
policymakers can only provide a partial picture regarding how they view environmental 
reform. They may wilfully or unwilfully omit information that provides a fuller illustration of 
how they view environmental issues. As a result, I supplement discursive material with past 
English-language or Chinese-language research that can better explain the degree to which 
ecological modernisation ideas influence China’s environmental policy agenda. 
Now that I have discussed the institutions that I targeted to gather the evidence for this 
thesis, it is crucial to explain where I sourced my material. The vast majority of the discursive 
material for this thesis has originated from published material in Tsinghua University’s China 
National Knowledge Index (CNKI, £Ǉǻ), Peking University’s Fabao Beida (ƀÒs¼), 
and, to a lesser extent, the CCP-administered People’s Data (%ųĹĭ). These Chinese-
language electronic databases contain a wealth of material relevant to the examination of 
Chinese environmental policy discourse. CNKI is administered by Tsinghua University under 
the aegises of the Ministry of Education, Propaganda Department of the CPC Central 
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Committee, and the Ministry of Science and Technology.318 It contains periodicals, theses, and 
newspaper articles published in Chinese from the level of the CCP General Secretary down to 
the level of a graduate student. As of April 2019, its journal database contains over 8,548 
journal titles and 54,186,335 journal articles dating back to 1915. The bulk of publicly available 
policy discourse created by officials across China’s vast bureaucracy, whether speeches, 
articles or interviews, can be found in this database. 
A key strength of this database is the ability to search for information based on ‘subject’ (
ʘ), ‘title’ (Ǧ) ‘whole text’ (JĻ), ‘keywords’ (Mɶȱ), ‘abstract’ (ıȡ), ‘work unit’ (w
3), ‘author’ (8Ȃ), and ‘publication’ (]). The other advantage of the database is the 
function to separately search based on ‘institutions’ (Śţ), ‘authors’, and ‘published year’ (
ȟòø). I utilised each of these search functions using keywords related to my case studies and 
the above search functions in a variety of different permutations. For example, I would search 
on an author whom I knew was a senior environmental policymaker and add relevant keywords 
related to one of my case studies, such as ‘cleaner production’, ‘circular economy’ or ‘green 
GDP’. I would also search on the position titles of senior policymakers already identified, in 
order to uncover other relevant policymakers. 
I limited my CNKI searches to the more prominent journals. Chinese academics in 
interviews introduced me to many of the journals in which senior government officials publish 
their work beyond key Party journals, such as Seeking Truth or Party Construction. For 
instance, ministerial and research institute periodicals such as Environmental Protection, 
Environmental Management, Environmental Science and Trends, China Population, 
Resources and Environment, Macroeconomics, Energy of China, among others, provided 
much of the discursive material for this thesis. The strength of these ‘official publications’ (]
ƣŚM) is that environmental policymakers often publish their opinions on future policy 
directions in these journals. For example, if a respected Party journal such as Seeking Truth, 
publishes an article that argues for the implementation of policies that epitomise ecological 
modernisation views, then this reveals the importance either of the official or the policy in 
question. Moreover, if the Ministry of Ecological Environment (and its bureaucratic 
predecessors) authorise an article on environmental reform measures and ecological 
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modernisation in its flagship journal Environmental Protection, then this suggests that it 
approves of such reforms. This does not suggest that senior-level officials act as editors, but 
rather that the editorial staff of these journals would not publish ideas that contradict the stated 
aims of their bureaucratic masters.319 A limitation of this database is that some sensitive and 
controversial policy discussions are kept within ‘internal reference material’ (OɤȁɅĽ) 
channels for officials above a certain bureaucratic rank.320 
The other primary databases I used were Peking University’s Fabao Beida and People’s 
Data database of the People’s Daily (%ųłĥ). I used the former database to uncover new 
Chinese legislation, changes to China’s constitution, and government policies and regulations. 
It archives an abundance of official documents from the Party and the Chinese government. Its 
search functionality is more limited than CNKI, but it allows searches based on ‘bureaucratic 
rank’ (ǭb) and the ‘department’ (ɤɺ), and states whether it is a Party or government organ 
that issued the official document. It also allows users to search within its database for 
documents ranging from the level of the Central Committee down to the level of a government 
bureau. It also stores Chinese legislation passed by the NPC. A further strength is that it allowed 
me to see whether and how elements of ecological modernisation were becoming 
institutionalised within Chinese legislation. Additionally, I used the People’s Data database 
because of its archive of the People’s Daily (%ųłĥ) articles that date back to 1949. Its search 
function is the most limited out of the three, but it allowed me to see when ecological 
modernisation ideas entered in the public media discourse. Navigating these databases and 
determining the authority of certain sources requires a Sinological understanding of Chinese 
policymaking.  
There have been some limitations concerning my research’s methodology. Marteen Hajer 
identifies ‘sites of argumentation’ as an element of discourse analysis, noting that researchers 
should ‘search for data not simply to reconstruct the arguments used but to account for the 
argumentative exchange’.321 In examining China’s policy discourse, isolating these sites of 
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argumentation is more difficult than for Western discourse. As China energy analyst Erica 
Downs notes:  
Policy debates in China are different from those in the West. They are often hidden, and the participants 
frequently do not acknowledge that differences of opinion exist…This lack of dialogue between the 
stakeholders comes from the Chinese Communist practice of not directly citing and challenging the 
arguments of one’s opponents and to the bureaucratic tradition of “stove-piping”’.322  
Downs drew her argument from the energy sector, but it can equally be applied to 
environmental policy. Policy disagreements over environmental reforms are akin to ‘a series 
of “competitive campaigns” whereby competing institutions promote their preferred policy 
solutions’ but they ‘generally do not acknowledge the existence of alternative viewpoints, let 
alone explain why their policies are better than those proposed by their opponents’. 323 
Therefore, when I analysed the policy discourse noted earlier, I sought incongruencies in the 
statements of particular officials having regard to statements that they had made in the past. 
Hajer also identifies interviews as a critical element of discourse analysis.324 The lack of 
interviews with key policymakers presents as a methodological limitation, albeit less important 
in the case of my research due to its focus on the published discourse of Chinese policy 
officials. I was unable to supplement my document analysis with semi-structured interviews 
with government officials as Hajer would suggest.325 In the context of China, gaining access to 
key decision-makers in Beijing raises major access issues for researchers. Although some 
senior and respected Sinologists can gain access to senior-level government officials, PhD and 
early-to-mid-career researchers cannot correspondingly access those similarly-ranked officials 
to help answer their particular research question.326 Many government officials are either too 
busy or unwilling to speak to junior researchers. There is also a distrust among policymakers 
of non-Chinese analysts.327 I faced these problems when conducting my fieldwork in Beijing, 
China, between February and December 2012. During this time, I conducted 26 interviews 
with relevant Chinese and foreign stakeholders in the government, SOEs, academia, research 
institutes, and NGOs over a period of five months. However, except for interviews with mid-
level policymakers in the National Development Reform Commission’s (NDRC) Energy 
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Research Institute and junior researchers in state-owned energy companies, many requests for 
interviews with government officials were either ignored or politely refused. Based on these 
interviews, I was only able to gain anecdotal evidence as to how some senior officials thought 
about particular issues – insufficient and inadequate evidence for a research project of this size. 
Yet this has only presented as a minor limitation ultimately because of the wealth of documents 
I was able to uncover through my sources mentioned above. Moreover, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that even if I had personally accessed Chinese policymakers, they would not have 
enlightened me beyond what was contained in their speeches, articles and media interviews.328 
This thesis predominantly draws on Chinese-language policy discourse that I have sourced 
and translated myself. This material allows me to gain access to important policy discourse 
previously inaccessible to those who cannot read Chinese. This discourse is important for the 
study of ecological modernisation and China. If we do not have access to this translated 
material, then we can only examine ecological modernisation by examining outcomes, using 
empirical measures of economy, industry, society and environment. The Chinese-language 
policy discourse I have uncovered allows for an enhanced understanding of the underlying 
rationales and mindsets driving ecological modernisation decisions in China. It also allows for 
a greater awareness for how ecological modernisation discourse developed in China and who 
drove that development. I attempted to provide a literal translation except when the differences 
between Chinese and English grammar meant that I translated into the comprehensible English, 
while remaining faithful to the original meaning of the text.329 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methods for this thesis. The reflective section at the 
start of the chapter detailed my research journey. It sketched the issues that can arise when 
applying EMT to an industry that differs from those which initially provided the empirical 
justification for the theory. However, as a result of that preliminary research, I discovered the 
value of the discursive aspect of EMT and explored the theoretical-conceptual bridge between 
ecological modernisation theorists and constructivists which provided a useful conceptual 
framework to explore ecological restructuring and environmental reform in China. This 
framework allowed me to ascertain the principles that motivate Chinese officials to undertake 
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specific environmental reform measures and helped me assess whether ecological 
modernisation ideas have been incorporated into China’s environmental policy agenda. From 
that preliminary research, I also uncovered the environmental reform measures that would 
structure the empirical case studies of this thesis: cleaner production, circular economy, green 
GDP, low-carbon economy and ecological civilisation.  
The rest of the chapter has described how I would operationalise ecological modernisation 
and answer the central questions of this thesis. It detailed the discursive indicators for 
ecological modernisation, showing that Molian EMT can inform a constructivist reading of 
ecological modernisation.  
Finally, I have detailed how document analysis constituted the principal research method of 
this thesis. The relevant discursive material was located on online databases from institutions 
and officials linked to the CCP, PRC Government, and the NPC. The next chapter will situate 
these institutions in the context of China’s unique political regime. It will also detail the 
background of China’s post-Maoist economic reforms that have altered the economic 
rationality of Chinese institutions and officials so dramatically. 
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Chapter Four: Political and Economic Context of Environmental 
Reform 
Chapter Three detailed the research methods that guided this thesis. It outlined how a 
document analysis of the policy discourse of Chinese officials was used to examine whether 
ecological modernisation ideas have shaped China’s environmental policy discourse. The 
chapter also highlighted some of the key institutions that this research has targeted to answer 
the key questions of this thesis. In other words, an important factor in studying China is an 
appreciation of Sinology. Therefore, before studying key Chinese environmental policy 
measures, this chapter situates that examination within the broader political and economic 
setting of China. This context is a necessary historical foundation to explore China’s policy 
elite, its government’s environmental policy agenda and ecological modernisation ideas.  
The first section will examine China’s political landscape, emphasising that while China 
has changed since 1978, it still operates as a ‘Marxist-Leninist authoritarian regime’. It 
discusses China’s political system and governance, providing further context to the theoretical 
and methodological considerations outlined in Chapters Two and Three. The second part of 
this chapter examines the institutional and organisational changes that transformed a 
‘backward’ inefficient economy into the second-largest in the world in the short period of thirty 
years. This discussion emphasises how the piecemeal and cumulative effect of these reforms 
has been an altered economic mindset within China’s elites and its political, economic and 
societal institutions, even if the legacies of the Maoist period remain firmly embedded within 
some of these institutions. 
The Politics of Chinese Policy Discourse 
Chinese Communist Party and Party institutions. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
CCP is the key political institution in China. Due to the political and administrative 
transformations made in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CCP was able to intertwine and 
embed itself into the politico-socio-economic fabric of Chinese society and its economy. Its 
influence in China is immense. Since the retreat of the Nationalist Government in the late 1940s 
to Taiwan, the CCP has had an unchallenged status as the ultimate political arbiter in China, 
with no legitimate opposition. China does have ‘opposition’ parties, but since 1953 they have 
been quarantined within the advisory and perfunctory Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference after it was downgraded from the primary legislature in China in favour of the 
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current National People’s Congress (NPC). The CCP’s control is so pervasive that scholars 
often refer to China as a ‘party-state’ because the Party ‘commands, controls, integrates, and 
completely intertwines with all sectors of the state: the government (the executive), congress 
(the legislature), courts (the judiciary), political consultative conference, the military, mass 
organisations, and all other political organisations’.330 
The control that the CCP possesses can be traced back to the relationship it had with the 
Soviet Union from the early 1920s. The Soviet Union, through the Comintern, had a close 
relationship with the CCP in its early decades, and the result was a party with Leninist – or 
Stalinist – organisational principles borrowed from the Soviet’s governance structure.331 Like 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the CCP fashions itself as a vanguard organisation, 
with only around six per cent of Chinese citizens acting as this ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ (Ł
#ɿǭeɲ).332 The CCP retains strict control among its membership of 88.75 million people 
through the Leninist organisational principle of ‘democratic centralism’ (ųʊc) where 
individual members remain subordinate to the majority decisions of the Party. 333  This 
deference by its members to the party line allows the CCP through its membership base to 
control and influence the lives of non-Party Chinese citizens from the central level down to the 
village level where there might be only a handful of Party members.334  
As to analysing how the Party organs shape environmental policy discourse, it is necessary 
to move beyond administrative understandings of the CCP. Administrative charts can obfuscate 
rather than illuminate where effective power is situated within the Party.335 In particular, an 
organisational chart and the Party constitution would convey that the National Party Congress 
– not to be confused with the National People’s Congress – sits at the apex of political power 
in China. It would also suggest that the National Party Congress ‘selects’ party members for 
higher positions, as shown in Figure 4.1. Its 2280 delegates meet for roughly one to two weeks 
every five years to pick the full and alternate members of the Central Committee (202 full-time 
 
330 Guo 2013, 131-32. 
331 Grasso, Corrin and Kort 2015, 81-85; Walder 2015.  
332 Saich 2004, 113; Guo 2013, 8. 
333 Saich 2004, 91. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Ibid; Li 2014. 
 
 77 
members, 172 alternate members in 2017). The National Party Congress’s quinquennial 
summits determine significant policy shifts in China. Many reforms that have influenced 
China’s economic and environmental policy have originated in the macro policy guidelines (ŀ
ɫ) announced by China’s leaders at these quinquennial Party congresses. The next most 
crucial Party organ is the Central Committee which picks the more exclusive Politburo (22 
members in 2017), and ultra-exclusive PSC.336  
 
Figure 4.1 Central Organisation of the CCP (Simplified), 2017337 
 
It is the latter of these institutions, the PSC, that is indeed the most powerful political 
organisation in China. The PSC now consists of seven members led by a ‘paramount 
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individual’ (őʠʗÝ%) who, in recent years, has held the leadership positions of CCP General 
Secretary and Chinese President – this paramount leader represents a ‘primus inter pares’ (first 
among equals) position in relation to the other PSC members. The PSC meets roughly every 
week, and it is said to be a forum of frank policy exchange.338 Unlike other high-level official 
conferences and meetings, the state media does not report the ideas discussed at these meetings. 
As a result, much Sinology is consumed with deducing the outcomes of such meetings, given 
their importance for national and international policy. Party votes, such as electing CCP 
members to the Central Committee and PSC, are made within the upper echelons of the Party 
by PSC and Politburo officials and are then conveyed to the National Party Congress delegates 
who vote accordingly. These senior political leaders also shape environmental policy discourse 
in China. 
State Council and government institutions. Despite the prominent role of the CCP, it is 
government organisations, rather than Party organs, that the PRC Constitution tasks with 
enacting economic and environmental policy through the State Council and its ministries, 
commissions and other institutions of lesser bureaucratic rank. The State Council operates as 
the ‘executive branch of the central government in China’.339 It consists of the Premier, vice-
premiers, state councillors, Secretary-General and ministers from the various ministries in 
China.340 While it does not have a legislative function, it can formulate policy, especially 
concerning economic and environmental matters. As political scientist Tony Saich explains, 
the State Council: 
can submit proposals on laws to the NPC or its Standing Committee as well as formulate administrative 
measures in accordance with the laws; to exert leadership over the non-central levels of administration as 
well as the ministries and commissions; to draw up and put into effect the national economic plan and state 
budget; and to oversee public order and safeguard the rights of citizens.341 
The State Council communicates policy signals to the various ministries who then enact that 
policy. It does this through releasing ‘documents’ that communicate policy positions with 
varying degrees of policy importance: e.g. ‘orders’ ((), ‘replies’ (ğ¹), ‘notifications’ (ɜ
Ǉ), ‘reports’ (ĥ), ‘opinions’ (ęȢ) and ‘announcements’ (Kĥ).342 Since 1978, the State 
Council’s policy pronouncements have increasingly provided broad policy guidance for 
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matters of environmental protection. This point will be highlighted throughout the data 
chapters of this thesis. Through ministries, commissions and other bureaucratic agencies, the 
State Council regulates, administers and assists in the areas within the relevant policy 
portfolios, including economic reform, health, defence, education, foreign affairs and civil 
affairs. Chapter Three outlined some of the government organisations that play a vital role in 
shaping China’s environmental and economic policy.  
However, as is evident from the nature of the party-state, the CCP guides the policy direction 
of the government. The Party does this through various mechanisms: dual appointments, the 
‘nomenklatura system’ and Party groups. In recent years, nearly all the senior positions within 
the State Council and its ministries and commissions have been held by CCP members. Senior 
government officials who decide not to ‘join the Party’ (IH) are very rare.343 Therefore, 
government officials operate with ‘dual lines of authority’, i.e. they are responsible to the Party 
as well as the institution in which they work. For example, Xie Zhenhua Ȧīu, the NDRC’s 
vice-chairman and lead Chinese climate change negotiator for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, has been a member off and on of the Central Committee since 
the late 1970s, including stints in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. 344 
Moreover, soon after Li Ganjie Ŝðš was promoted to a ministerial position in the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP), he was also elected to the 19th Central Committee of the 
CCP. Typically, once an official is promoted to the Politburo, they are transferred out of their 
government position, reflecting the higher workload that comes with their new Party status.345 
This phenomenon results in government policy that is intertwined and subordinate to the policy 
motives of the Party. Party and government cannot be separated in practice, as the term ‘party-
state’ suggests. 
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Second, government institutions also have ‘Party groups’ (HjÞǰ), where officials hold 
meetings regarding Party affairs. Administratively, these groups help ensure that government 
departments operate according to fundamental Party principles.346 The CCP also retains its 
control over ministries within the government through its powerful Organisation Department 
of the CCP.347 This Central Committee Party organ assigns Party appointments to positions in 
the government through what is known as the ‘nomenklatura’ system. This system is ‘a list 
containing those leading officials directly appointed by the Party as well as those officials about 
whom recommendations for appointment, release or transfer may be made by other bodies, but 
which require the Party’s approval’.348 There was a period during the 1980s when influential 
liberal reformers believed that the Party should devolve some of its control to government 
agencies. Led by Deng Xiaoping and then PRC Premier and CCP General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang ɉǫɾ, these reformers reduced the role of the Party and the Organisation Department 
in the day-to-day operations of the government through ‘separating the functions of the party 
from the government’ (HĶ[ý).349 Deng stated in the early 1980s:  
it is time for us to distinguish between the responsibilities of the Party and those of the government and to 
stop substituting the former for the latter. This will help strengthen and improve the united leadership of 
the Central Committee, facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at various levels of the 
government from top to bottom, and promote a better exercise of government functions and powers.350  
Deng’s plan was that the CCP would still retain control over macro-level decision making and 
manage ministerial-level cadres, but the Party would devolve its power over government 
appointees, government decision making and the everyday operations of government. With his 
backing, Zhao started to reduce the number of ‘party groups’ (Hǰ) in many government 
departments after the 13th Party Congress in 1987.351 The Ministry of Personnel also took 
many functions previously handled by the Organisation Department with the aim that the 
Central Committee would handle ‘top civil servants’ – just a small fraction of total cadres.352 
Party departments that served ‘similar [administrative] functions as those in the state sector 
were to be abolished’.353 However, the events of Tiananmen in 1989 stymied liberal efforts to 
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separate the Party from the day-to-day function of the government. Zhao Ziyang was placed 
under house arrest in May 1989, due to his perceived inaction in curbing the then month-long 
protests, and a year later the Organisation Department expanded the nomenklatura to include 
universities (a source of liberal foment).354 
It is within this context that the State Council and the ministries beneath it remain 
inseparable from the Party. The present context represents a change from the early years of the 
PRC when Mao Zedong had adopted a ‘bipartisan’ approach to governance with other parties 
of the ‘United Front’ as China emerged from its disastrous civil war.355 In the context of 
economic and environmental policy, the strengthened nomenklatura system means that while 
senior-level officials within the government may deliver speeches and publish articles that 
reflect their particular bias on specific policy issues, their opinions represent in a broad way 
the views of the Party. To return to the Leninist organisation principle of democratic centralism, 
senior government officials will not openly disagree with the core Party policy positions. 
Disagreement only occurs when key policy positions are unsettled or in flux. These points are 
crucial in light of how researchers understand the significance of pronouncements coming from 
Chinese officials, and this has been reflected in the evidence gathered and used in this thesis 
concerning the influence of ecological modernisation ideas on environmental policy 
discourse.356  Environmental policy statements by government officials reflect the general 
policy direction of the CCP. 
Another important factor to consider with regard to the policy statements of Chinese 
officials is Deng’s decision to retire many Party cadres in the 1980s. His decision led to an 
increasingly ‘professional’ government workforce in China. In the 1980s, China suffered from 
a dearth of specialised government officials (and state-owned enterprise managers) to help 
guide China’s economic growth and liberalisation, as many of the officials previously in charge 
had been appointed purely on the basis of their party loyalty. Many officials had also had their 
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schooling interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Deng sought to change this 
recruitment norm with the introduction of the ‘cadre four modernisations’ (ðɤr). This 
guiding principle included three new indicators – age, education, and speciality – that would 
form the basis for party-state cadre promotion beyond revolutionary credentials.357 The legacy 
of Deng’s policy is evident in the curricula vitae of current government ministers and vice-
ministers related to environmental and economic policy. Many senior officials within PRC 
ministries have a bachelor education, typically in economics or engineering. Two such 
examples are current MEP Minister Li Ganjie, and the present chairman of the NDRC, He 
Lifeng 6Ǟæ. Li studied nuclear engineering at Tsinghua University, while He graduated with 
a finance and economics degree from Xiamen University.358 Other officials have backgrounds 
in journalism or law. For instance, the former vice-minister of the MEP Pan Yue Ɣå was a 
cadet in the Economic Daily and Xie Zhenhua, who was mentioned earlier, studied 
environmental law at Wuhan University.359 These educational profiles illustrate that China’s 
leading government officials are not merely communist ideologues who slavishly adhere to 
Marxists doctrines. China’s modernisation drive since the 1980s has encouraged the 
government to employ officials who specialise in their portfolios. In other words, these reforms 
mean that the policy discourse of China’s new ‘technocratic elite’ is influenced more by varied 
educational experiences than Marxist theory.360  
National People’s Congress. The other state organ that is relevant for this study of 
environmental policy discourse is the NPC, which functions as China’s primary legislature.361 
The laws passed by the NPC govern how the economy and the environmental sector work. 
Chapter Two documented the various environmental legislation that Chinese authorities 
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enacted from the 1980s onwards. Like other state institutions, it is essential to note the central 
role of the CCP with respect to the NPC. Not all of its 2987 delegates, who meet once a year, 
are CCP members, but about 72 per cent are. The other delegates are drawn from China’s 
‘united front’ parties which formed an alliance with the CCP against the old Nationalist 
Government regime before the 1949 Revolution.362 The NPC is often disparagingly labelled a 
‘rubber stamp’ parliament and its delegate positions considered ‘ceremonial rather than 
substantial’, since the Party elite already predetermine many of its votes.363 The NPC passes 
all proposed legislation prior to voting in the Great Hall of the People, even if some delegates 
have eschewed the principle of democratic centralism for some controversial legislation.364  
 Furthermore, the NPC – through its various ‘special committees’ (ɺÅ/) – also 
scrutinises draft legislation before these proposed laws go to a vote in the NPC, providing 
technical comments and advice for further drafts. The NPC has reviewed environmentally-
based legislation since 1993 through its Environment and Resource Protection Committee.365 
Many members of this committee once held senior-level positions in the Central Committee, 
usually with provincial leadership experience or government backgrounds in engineering or 
heavy industry. Some have a government background in the environment, while others have 
progressed through party organs. For example, the former chair of the NPC’s Environment and 
Resource Protection Special Committee Qu Geping Ōūñ – a man dubbed by Chinese media 
as the ‘father of Chinese environmentalism’ (Ʃ>Ɵ ) – was a former environmental 
bureaucrat whose political patron was former Premier Zhou Enlai. He was the inaugural 
chairman of the State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) and was a member of the 
NPC’s standing committee for two national congresses during the 1990s.366 Moreover, the 
present head of the NPC’s environmental-focused committee is Lu Hao ʂƈ. Chemistry-
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trained, he rose primarily through party channels to his position within the Central Committee 
in the last three National Party Congresses, as well as retaining his present position in the 
NPC.367  
Nearly all members of these committees are Party members, and the chairman always has 
been a member of the CCP. As far as understanding the questions raised in Chapters Two and 
Three concerning environmental policy discourse, this complex administrative decision-
making process means that in order to gather evidence concerning whether Chinese officials 
have incorporated ecological modernisation ideas into China’s environmental policy discourse, 
it is important to take claims from a range of government and Party spokespersons seriously. 
All public statements from government officials signify to a large extent the Party’s policy 
position. Yet it is vital to recognise that China’s senior government and legislative officials are 
increasingly acquiring expertise concerning economic and environmental policy solutions, and 
this means that there is always the possibility that social and scientific debates within the party 
are reflected in differing public statements.  
‘Fragmented governance’ and environmental policy discourse. Regardless of the 
influential role that the CCP retains over the state and government organs, scholars have 
detailed how political authority below the level of the Politburo can exhibit ‘disjointedness’ 
whereby lines of authority are not clear-cut, resulting in a ‘fragmented’ political system (see 
Chapter Two). 368  The disjointed nature of Chinese governance has implications for how 
researchers study government decision-making, including economic and environmental policy. 
Rather than a purely authoritarian system whereby the top leadership has control over all 
government decision-making, government organs, especially within the economic sphere, 
operate within what political scientists Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg 
conceptualise as ‘bureaucratic fragmented authoritarianism’. 369  In particular, bureaucratic 
institutions of equal status cannot unilaterally direct their counterparts to implement measures 
in the absence of guidance from more senior-level politicians. Political leaders may choose to 
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stay out of a policy disagreement ‘because they lack the knowledge to decide, they do not care, 
their resources are insufficient to enforce a decree, or the leadership is itself divided’.370 
Therefore, bureaucratic stakeholders, such as ministries, resort to a range of ‘bargaining’ 
measures to elicit agreement from their counterparts. This type of bargaining can focus on such 
governance issues as ‘revenue sources, budgets, personnel, organisational jurisdictions, market 
shares, production rights, subsidy levels, investment allocations, and jobs’.371 The Chinese 
government has resorted to supra-cabinet-like groups, called ‘leading small groups’ or 
‘committees’, to overcome this fragmentation and ensure that China’s bureaucratic organs act 
in policy unison (see Chapter Three for the leading small groups and committees related to 
environmental policy).  
Role of factions. Before this chapter shifts its focus to the economic reforms that have 
altered the economic rationality of China’s policymakers, it is essential to note that while China 
has experienced a reduction of personalised leadership (or ‘the rule of man’), and a gradual 
bureaucratic institutionalisation of politics and governance, it still experiences what scholars 
have labelled ‘informal politics’ or ‘factionalism’. 372  In addition, while China has 
institutionalised term limits373 and retirement ages, the ‘factional’ (ÏƄ) aspect of elite Chinese 
politics can render its study more akin to ‘tasseography’ as researchers seek to examine policy 
changes on the perceived motives and assumed members of each faction.  
Factions in China can centre to some degree around policy and ideology, but more typically 
they coalesce around opaque and complex networks termed ‘guanxi’ (‘relationships’, MǪ). 
US scholar Xuezhi Guo explains that ‘guanxi has been embodied in the behaviour of the Party 
elite since the early days of the CCP and has become a significant part of the organisational 
culture’. 374  Guanxi networks can develop through shared history derived from ‘family 
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relationships, native place, school ties, military unit, or networks of shared friends’.375 The 
Western conceptual equivalent for guanxi would be the ‘old-boys network’. Owing to the deep 
socio-cultural origins of this concept, guanxi in China, especially within China’s elite politics, 
exhibits multiple interwoven facets, or ‘dimensions’, each with varying degrees of 
‘instrumentality’ or ‘emotion’.376 On the one hand, some guanxi networks base themselves 
merely on the exchange of ‘material obligations’ and are purely an ‘exchange relationship’. On 
the other hand, some relationships derive their bond from norms such as etiquette and morals, 
usually through respect and deference towards a political patron or military commander. The 
importance of the latter is highlighted by the example of Chairman Mao reshuffling regional 
military commanders after former Defence Minister Lin Biao’s Ťă plane crash during his 
flight to the Soviet Union in 1971. Mao wanted to separate military leaders and their 
subordinates as he feared that the leaders inspired enough respect to mount a coup.377 
Factions still shape contemporary Chinese politics and this needs to be considered in any 
discussion of environmental policy. In other words, researchers cannot divorce policy shifts 
and reforms from an understanding of factional disputes. In recent years, the notable factions 
have been the ‘Youth League Faction’ ( Ƅ) and the ‘Shanghai Clique’ (Ɖî). The former 
faction is drawn from former Chinese Communist Youth League members and headed by 
former CCP General Secretary and Chinese President Hu Jintao ȈɴƋ. The latter group is 
comprised of former officials from Shanghai and led by Jiang Zemin źƁų (also a former 
CCP General Secretary and Chinese President). 378  The relevance of these factions for 
environmental policy can be seen in the discussion among scholars in recent years of the 
existence of a ‘petroleum faction’ (Ǌžî) led by now-jailed former PSC member and China 
National Petroleum Corporation General Manager Zhou Yongkang ŷú.379 The discussion 
of factions remains taboo in China and the CCP does not typically acknowledge their existence, 
but researchers need to be conscious of the possibility of their informal influence on policy 
discourse, including environmental policy.380 
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The Evolution of China’s Economic Rationality: Economic Reform in China (1979–the 
present) 
This political and policymaking background for exploring environmental policy discourse 
in China provides the context to the economic reforms that transformed China from a Maoist 
communist state to one that embraces market forces under a version of socialism labelled a 
‘socialist market economy’. It is necessary to detail this context because China’s environmental 
policy discourse has coexisted and evolved in conjunction with these economic reforms. 
Moreover, as outlined in Chapters One and Two, it was these economic reforms that placed 
increased stress on the environment. Therefore, it is vital to specify and explain the ‘economic 
rationality’, or economic mindset, of China’s politicians and government officials as economic 
considerations are fundamental importance to ecological modernisation (see Chapter Two). 
During the early years of the post-Mao era, China’s politicians adjusted their economic 
rationality away from one that previously operated according to socialist principles. Maximum 
production had been the driving economic force under Mao Zedong with little regard for 
efficiency. However, as already noted in Chapter One, the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee in 1978 provided a turning point for the future economic reorientation of China 
through the announcement of the policy of ‘reform and opening up’. Dissatisfied with the 
relative poverty that had gripped the country for nearly three decades, China’s political leaders, 
led by Deng Xiaoping decided that future economic development should embrace market 
forces, and this meant a diversion from Maoist socialism. Primarily because of Deng’s political 
imprimatur, the CCP only tentatively and gradually embraced market forces with the aim to 
enhance economic productivity and raise the livelihood of the Chinese people.381 Another 
critical moment occurred in 1982 when the Party altered its Constitution to reflect a shift in its 
core focus to economic production and development rather than ‘class struggle’ (ɿǭļ). 
This new ‘non-ideological’ goal represented a significant change for Chinese politics as class 
struggle had overwhelmingly characterised the Maoist era. Under Mao, many Party officials 
who strayed from the fundamental tenets of class-struggle socialism had been labelled 
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‘capitalist roaders’ (ɈɅƄ) and purged, as Deng Xiaoping experienced in 1968.382 However, 
in this new post-Maoist epoch, ideology would no longer trump pragmatic economic policies.  
The political decisions made at that 1978 Third Plenum and the 1982 constitutional changes 
soon gained momentum as Chinese authorities embarked upon an experimental, cautious and 
gradual reform strategy commonly referred to as ‘crossing the river feeling for stones’ (ĲǄǊ
Àɕ).383 This gradual strategy over the next decade or so would stand in stark contrast to the 
‘big bang’ approach which marked the Eastern European post-Soviet reform experience.384 
The result of the Chinese reforms was that in just under two decades the CCP no longer 
presided over a collectivised workforce and centrally-planned economy where bureaucrats in 
Beijing allocated resources and set production quotas (even if it still titularly refers to itself as 
a ‘communist’ L# party). This new economic mindset appears to have paid dividends for 
China’s politicians. China’s economy flourished under these new arrangements as reported 
extensively in the global media.385 While foreign analysts perennially predict ‘bear market’ 
conditions for China, its ‘bullish’ economy has averaged nearly 10 per cent annual economic 
growth for nearly four decades since ‘reform and opening up’, to become the second largest 
economy in the world.386 It has a modern economic enterprise system with stock markets and 
corporate governance that, while unique to China’s political and historical circumstances, has 
created some of the most economically powerful corporations routinely appearing within 
Forbes Global 500 List.387 
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An appreciation of this economic transformation in China demands a reflection on the first 
phase of reforms that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The economic history of post-
Maoist China shows the remarkable shift that took place within the economic ethos of China’s 
policymaking elite. With the new reforms, the government ratcheted down government 
restrictions on agricultural producers to allow farmers to accumulate surpluses once again. In 
the 1950s, Mao had nationalised agrarian land and collectivised workers into state communes, 
of which there were around 50,000 by the late 1970s. 388  Under Mao, all produce from 
nationalised agriculture was transferred to state warehouses. This generated no incentive for 
farmers to boost productivity through increasing labour inputs or adopting innovative 
agricultural methods.  
However, after China’s 1978 economic reform, a ‘rogue’ provincial pilot study in Sichuan 
opened the way for farmers to enter into supply contracts with the state, known as the 
‘household responsibility system’ (×ùȅ#Ġqȿ+c).389 While phrased in vague Communist 
Party terminology, this measure represented a significant shift in Chinese economic policy 
because it no longer constrained independent economic initiative for China’s hundreds of 
millions of farmers. Agricultural producers would still have to supply a certain quota of grain 
to the state, but any surplus harvest above that quota could then be sold at market prices. These 
policies were a boon for the Chinese government and farmers as agricultural production rates 
markedly increased each year up to 1987. In response to the early achievements of the policy, 
the NPC in 1982 formally abolished the 50,000 communes throughout China, bringing to a 
close Mao’s dreams of a collectivised and communist China.390 
It was the success of these measures that provided Chinese authorities with the confidence 
to focus their attention on allowing market-orientated public and private economic entities in 
other sectors of the economy to enter and then ‘outgrow’ the planned economy.391 The 1982 
decision by the NPC to formally abolish communes helped not only the agricultural sector, but 
also associated communal workshops and stores that were converted into ‘semi-socialist’ 
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township village enterprises (TVEs) owned by local governments.392 Free from the restrictions 
of central planners in Beijing, these TVEs now had the autonomy to produce goods for 
whatever locality in China they wanted and the flexibility to operate according to consumer 
demand. 393  Some of these former communes embarked on manufacturing, while others 
remained in primary industries, such as coal mining.394 Typically, the operational choices these 
TVEs made were based on the equipment they inherited.395 Chinese authorities, led by Deng, 
were surprised by the emergence and the subsequent success of TVEs, but in keeping with 
Deng’s pragmatic philosophy they decided to allow these markets ‘to expand as long as they 
did not interfere with [state] plans’. 396  TVEs contributed significantly to early economic 
success in China, and from 1978 onwards the TVE contribution to overall industrial output 
grew from 9 per cent to 42 per cent just sixteen years later.397 
The reforms discussed above demonstrate how China’s reform politicians were fostering a 
new economic rationality based on market forces in the agricultural sector and former socialist 
brigades. Around the same time as these reforms, Chinese authorities were also permitting 
private entrepreneurs, known then as ‘individual household enterprises’ (5Ğ), to operate in 
China’s emerging market economy.398 The government could have shut down what Mao would 
have considered a bourgeois influence, but they instead allowed private entrepreneurs to gain 
a stronger foothold in China’s economy. These new economic actors filled the void for what 
had been, up until market reforms, a repressed demand for goods and services (such as 
restaurants and repair shops). Like TVEs (and township village mines), they also absorbed 
many surplus workers after the abolition of the rural communes, keeping ‘unemployment’ (ć
,) at manageable levels and social unrest at a minimum. Many of these private entrepreneurs 
took advantage of foreign capital in special economic zones in Shenzhen Ə§, Zhuhai ƫƉ, 
Shantou ŹÀ, and Xiamen ~ɺ, which fostered export-led development. China no longer 
relied on an autarky (or economic ‘self-reliance’ ȋǞōư) as they had proudly boasted under 
Mao, and external economic actors became a more important part of the local economy.399 
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China’s early SOE reforms. By the late 1980s, China’s economic reforms were reshaping 
China’s society along the lines of market principles. While Chinese authorities were attempting 
to facilitate the growth of the non-state sector, they also undertook parallel economic reforms 
within the state economic sector to reform China’s under-performing state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) by gradually reducing central government control over their daily operations. These 
reforms entrenched the notion of efficiency and profit into a new economic mindset in China’s 
SOEs. Since the early 1950s, SOEs had underperformed economically. Even with favourable 
state subsidies, such as ‘low-interest loans and other policy protections’, over 40 per cent of 
SOEs in 1978 were still running at a loss.400 This underachievement was due to a range of 
factors, but it occurred primarily because of the multiple functions they were required to carry 
out on behalf of the state. As Li and Putterman note, during the Mao era ‘Chinese SOEs fulfilled 
the traditional role of enterprises in a command economy, being assigned responsibility for 
meeting specific output targets with an agreed number of employees and payroll, and with 
assigned allocations of both capital goods and intermediate inputs’.401 Because they borrowed 
their socialist economic model from the Soviet Union, economic levers were placed firmly in 
the hands of government bureaucrats who, owing to their ideological predilections, typically 
wanted to ensure a ‘cradle-to-grave welfare system’ regardless of the cost.402  
Concern surrounding the inefficiency of SOEs dates back to the late 1950s and 1960s. In 
the early years of the PRC, some ‘outspoken Chinese economists’ focused on these concerns 
and raised early criticism about ‘the lack of efficiency endemic to SOEs’.403 For instance, Gu 
Zhun ʕT, a leading intellectual who had been purged in the anti-rightist campaigns of the 
early 1950s, argued that state planners were too ill-equipped to involve themselves in enterprise 
management. He argued that markets rather than planners needed to guide SOEs, and more 
autonomy should be afforded to managers. Other critics raised similar concerns during this 
period.404 Despite these objections, little meaningful reform materialised during the Maoist 
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period. The ideological fervour at the time meant that ‘capitalist roader’ ideas opposed to 
Maoist thought were often immediately criticised and censured.405  
However, once China entered its post-Mao phase of economic development, the SOEs’ 
traditional operations produced a growing budgetary burden on the state. This provided the 
opportunity for a new economic mindset to materialise in China. The SOEs were seen by some 
critics to be consuming much needed capital that the state could use to grow other parts of the 
economy.406 There was a growing realisation among China’s leaders that operational decisions 
within SOEs would have to take account of profitability and market forces if these companies 
were to survive and compete with TVEs and private entrepreneurs.407 It was this hard budget 
reality that provided the political impetus for state-enterprise reform in China.  
The early reform period (1978–1984) therefore also provided the foundation for changes to 
China’s SOEs and a shift in their economic mindset. This period was characterised by 
decentralised experimentation, or what Sebastian Heilmann calls ‘experience first, laws later’, 
as entrepreneurially-minded provinces implemented policies in an ad hoc fashion in order to 
make their state enterprises more profitable. Chinese authorities also pursued a nascent reform 
strategy, albeit without an ‘ex-ante blueprint’ that was formulated in advance of these reforms, 
that would strike that balance between planned and market economies.408 Any attempt to 
abolish the planned economy so soon after the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era using a 
mass privatisation ‘big bang’ technique of China’s state-owned industries was ‘simply 
unthinkable’.409 Therefore, the first few years following the Third Plenum of the 11th Party 
Congress in 1978 witnessed a series of experimental SOE reforms that would last through to 
the late 1980s. The piecemeal nature of SOE reforms reflected the battle between liberals and 
conservatives.410 Echoing their response to the emergence of TVEs and private entrepreneurs, 
conservatives tried to push back against SOE reforms. These conservatives argued that more 
accurate planning was the solution rather than less planning. Despite this, by 1984, reformers 
led by Zhao Ziyang were able to muster enough political support to forge on with reforms.411 
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Major reforms during the 1980s focused on expanding SOE managerial autonomy and 
decision-making. Reforms also centred on allowing state-run companies to retain profits 
(known as ĵśȫa) and provide bonuses for their workers. Liberal reformers within China’s 
political leadership considered these measures crucial for the ongoing viability of state-run 
enterprises within China’s socialist modernisation. No longer would everyone within a work 
unit be treated the same, a situation referred to as the ‘big rice pan’ (¼ɱʜ). Reformers broke 
with this commune ethos by allowing employees who worked longer hours to receive more 
remuneration than their workmates. In particular, the Chinese government shifted away from 
using enterprises purely as a source of budgetary revenues, through the introduction of ‘profits 
for taxes’ (aĴǛ) whereby they would remit a stipulated amount of taxes rather than all their 
profits to the government.412 Chinese authorities formalised this new managerial autonomy 
through the State Council’s 1984 pronouncement On Regulations of Further Expanding 
Autonomy of State-Owned Enterprises. This regulation allowed managers to control wage and 
employment decisions, encouraging them to use profitability as an indicator to guide wages 
and employment. Furthermore, the introduction of ‘dual-track pricing’ (ɏc ) in 1985 
allowed managers to sell surplus production at non-planned prices. Mirroring the ‘household 
responsibility system’, managers entered into contractual arrangements with the state. In effect, 
they leased the factory equipment in return for providing the planned economy with subsidised 
goods.413 These plans started with yearly contracts, but after the 13th Party Congress in 1987 
they were translated into multi-year contracts, providing SOE managers with more stability.414 
The government initially mandated that the prices of these goods would be within 20 per cent 
of planned prices, but over the years that requirement was relaxed once the planned economy 
faded in relevance.415 
The resurgence of a socialist economic rationality in China. These economic and 
enterprise reforms were politically controversial within the top echelons of China’s political 
leadership and, for a period during the 1980s, it seemed that China might return to the economic 
outlook of its Maoist past. While economic reforms encouraged rapid economic growth, they 
also caused inflation, which exceeded 25 per cent by the late 1980s.416 Yet, Deng and CCP 
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General Secretary Zhao Ziyang sought to be prudent, sensible and pragmatic. They remained 
steadfast in the view that China should liberalise its economy even if they were cautious about 
large-scale market liberalisation and privatisation. However, conservative economic planners, 
led by the powerful Party elder and economic tsar Chen Yun ʃ, opposed Deng’s policies 
and advocated for more significant restrictions on TVEs because they were considered wasteful 
and diverted much-needed resources and labour away from SOEs. 417  Furthermore, 
conservatives also pointed out that the economic reforms of China’s enterprises had led to an 
increase in corrupt officials who embraced this new profit ethos through channelling subsidised 
goods from the planned economy to the lucrative market economy. 
It was the combination of high inflation and corruption that led to the widespread protests 
across China in May-June 1989, culminating in the bloodshed of June 4 in Tiananmen Square. 
The failure of liberals to prevent these protests provided an opportunity for the conservative 
faction led by Chen Yun to push through ‘regressive’ socialist economic policies and 
temporarily stymie further economic liberalisation.418  Conservatives wanted to reinstate 
stronger state control by keeping the economy within a ‘birdcage’ (ʢǢ) whereby markets 
would have restrictions placed upon them to ensure that the economy did not grow too fast and 
authorities could arrest inflation.419 Specifically, they reasserted control over the economy 
through macroeconomic austerity, increased planning and preferential policies for SOEs, and 
reinstitution of the old ‘iron rice bowl’ (ɮʜǐ) employment system that provided ‘cradle-to-
grave job security’ for China’s hundreds of millions of state-owned workers.420 Moreover, 
managers lost autonomy, authority and incentives, which had steadily grown since the early 
1980s. This loss of autonomy resulted in factories being ordered to produce goods for political 
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reasons regardless of demand. 421  Apart from controlling inflation, these ‘retrenchment’ 
reforms provided little economic benefits, and the economy slowed significantly.422 For SOE 
managers, the post-Tiananmen policies proved ‘disastrous’ as wage costs and interest payments 
increased rapidly with no commensurate demand for produced goods to offset these costs.423 
Moreover, although these measures reduced inflation, this outcome was partly attributable to 
reduced economic growth.424 
The political credentials of the conservatives were tarnished by the sluggish economic 
response to their policy measures, which revealed that there could be no restrengthening of 
state planning and a return to the socialist economic rationality of the past. To provide a 
renewed impetus for the resumption of market reforms, Deng Xiaoping embarked on a 
clandestine ‘Southern Tour’ (xç) of China’s southern special economic zones during 1992 
without informing his conservative colleagues. Through his skilful use of state media to 
highlight the past success of special economic zones, Deng was able to garner the required 
political attention to reinstate the imperative of reform. This was carried on by Jiang Zemin 
once Deng stepped away from the political limelight. 425  The Southern Tour marked an 
important juncture in China’s recent economic history. Afterwards, as John Wong phrased it, 
‘the direction was clear to all: no quitters, no doubters, and above all, no going back’.426 The 
results of Deng’s efforts and accompanying political manoeuvrings were successful; in 
November 1993, the Third Plenum of the 14th Party Congress, led by Jiang Zemin, finally 
endorsed the shift from a ‘socialist commodity economy’ (ǒ/ǳƇ) to a ‘socialist 
market economy’ (ǒ/ì¨ǳƇ). The nomenclature for China’s SOEs was altered from 
China’s ‘state-run enterprises’ (£ȕ,,) to ‘state-owned enterprises’ (£Œ,,), reflecting 
the new economic rationality in China.427 Put simply, China’s politicians had discarded one of 
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the major economic vestiges of its Maoist past. They now acknowledged that future 
development would be based primarily on capitalist economic levers. 
These economic reforms also influenced the ideological and membership bases of the CCP. 
A decade later, at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, after China had experienced extraordinary 
economic growth, the CCP approved what would have been unthinkable in the Maoist era: the 
Party would ‘allow’ private entrepreneurs to ‘join the party’. Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’ 
('ȟ) helped provide the ideological justification for the admittance of ‘Red Capitalists’ 
into the Party428, on the grounds that the Party had refashioned itself to represent the ‘most 
advanced scientific and productive forces and a broader constituency than the traditional 
working class’.429 The nature of the ‘vanguard’ had diversified. The CCP no longer saw market 
competition, private capital and profit as taboo. To return to the analogy of China’s economic 
tsar Chen Yun, China’s ‘bird’ was allowed to irrevocably break free from its ‘cage’.  
As has been shown, from the late-1970s a new economic rationality had emerged in China. 
Based on market principles, the advocates of this new rationality sought not only increased 
production but also increased efficiency and profit. Subsequent chapters will examine how this 
new economic rationality intersected with particular instances of China’s environmental 
reform. An examination will now be made of the economic reforms that Chinese officials 
undertook in the 1990s to turn perennially loss-making ‘state-run’ enterprises into profitable 
‘state-owned’ companies able to compete in China’s new socialist market economy. 
Understanding these SOE reforms is also crucial to understanding how Chinese officials sought 
to balance the contradiction between environmental protection and socio-economic 
development. 
The new vanguard and new contradictions. While the reforms in the 1980s and early 
1990s were significant, they were unable to render China’s SOEs competitive in China’s new 
‘socialist market economy’. Despite the infusion of profit-orientated managers, the institutional 
structure and organisational responsibilities of these SOEs were still directed towards operating 
in a socialist economy. Indeed, studies into the Chinese economy at this time show the growing 
unprofitability of SOEs. For example, US economist Nicholas Lardy noted that ‘[i]n 1985, 9.6 
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per cent of all “within budget” industrial SOEs declared losses, such losses amounting to RMB 
2.7 billion’. Ten years later, around 44 per cent of such firms were declaring losses totalling 
RMB 40.9 billion. Lardy claimed that the situation was so dire that Chinese authorities publicly 
admitted for the first time since the creation of the PRC that China’s SOEs posted a total net 
loss.430  Despite their unprofitability, the Chinese government continued to support SOEs 
through state subsidies from the central budget along with, increasingly, loans from state-
owned banks, rather than allow these enterprises to close down. This is a clear manifestation 
of the tension between China’s new economic rationality and political objectives in post-reform 
China.  
However, by 1995, China’s political leaders, including Jiang Zemin, had acknowledged that 
many small to medium SOEs were ill-equipped to compete with the new non-state and semi-
state enterprises that had multiplied since the early 1980s. The Chinese government decided to 
let these unprofitable enterprises ‘change their ownership structure [through] contracting and 
leasing…as well as selling the firm or transforming it into an employee-held company or 
cooperative’.431 The aim was to ‘grasp the big [enterprises], let go of the small [enterprises]’ 
(Ģ¼ĵÞ). In 1997, the 15th Party Congress ‘gave the official green light to privatisation’.432 
Because privatisation was a sensitive word, the Chinese government referred to this process as 
‘restructuring’ (Ĵc). The restructuring of these companies paved the way for potential 
management buyouts of tens of thousands of inefficient and loss-making enterprises managed 
by the soon-to-be-disbanded Ministry of Light Industry and Ministry of Textile Industry.433 
For example, in 1997, small SOEs constituted only 18 per cent of state-owned assets but 
accounted for the majority of losses from the SOE sector. In addition to privatisation, the 
government allowed these smaller companies to go bankrupt, rather than continue to subsidise 
them with state-financed loans.434 
As the initial part of the ‘grasp the big’ dictum suggests, the aim was not to sell all state 
companies. For SOEs within sectors of the economy that were considered too strategic to 
privatise, the government chose instead to ‘separate the functions of government from 
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enterprises’ (Ķ,[ý). The state would retain between 500 and 1000 larger SOEs, but 
corporatise them, thereby creating enterprises owned, but not directly controlled, by the 
government. The government hoped that this would provide SOEs with greater access to 
foreign capital and further increase managerial entrepreneurship, leading to increased 
efficiency and profitability. With these corporatisation reforms, the Party pursued the creation 
of powerful chaebol- and keiretsu-like enterprises in the hope that they would become as 
economically profitable and internationally competitive as their South Korean and Japanese 
counterparts.435 The government retained ownership because SOEs were still perceived as 
contributing heavily to the strategic economic plans for China’s ‘comprehensive national 
power’ (Ǹ£g). These SOEs also provided tax revenues and allowed the Party to control 
the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy in areas such as energy, banking, shipping and 
military industries.436 To encourage the development of these modern enterprises, in 1998 then-
Premier Zhu Rongji řɸ² disbanded many industrial ministries that had formerly controlled 
SOEs. The aim in these early years was to have between 30 and 50 ‘national champions’ as 
part of a ‘national team’ (£×ɼ) that would dominate their respective industries but also 
compete globally.437  
These reforms illustrate how China’s new economic rationality continued to evolve 
incrementally. The advantage of this incremental change over a ‘big bang’ approach was that 
China’s leaders could learn from experience and act accordingly. As later chapters will show, 
these lessons would later include the need to inject more ecological rationality into the evolving 
economic rationality that emerged from the 1978 reforms. 
In economic governance reform, the State Council created the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission438 (SASAC) in an attempt to establish firmer 
control over SOEs. Between 1998 and 2002, the State Council tasked several government 
departments with the responsibility of controlling SOEs, such as the State Economic and Trade 
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Commission 439  (SETC), the Ministry of Finance 440  and the Central Enterprise Work 
Commission.441 These departments all previously had a degree of control over SOEs, but their 
power was spread across all three bureaucratic agencies. This situation changed though with 
the creation of SASAC, with this newly-created commission taking on the ownership and 
management of non-financial SOEs. This new organisation inherited personnel from the 
ministries and commissions mentioned above and became ‘an explicit state body that would 
have “legal person” status to push SOEs forward to reorganise, restructure and renovate’.442 
The State Council mandated a dual-part responsibility for SASAC: to facilitate the growth of 
‘national SOE champions’, but also to ensure these SOEs acted in the national interest.443 
Former SASAC Chairman Li Rongrong Ŝȓț communicated the government’s ambitions for 
its SOEs to operate according to an economic rationality when he exhorted at an SOE planning 
event that ‘if you [central enterprises] cannot influence others, then others will influence you, 
and you should just get out’.444 His statement illustrates how issues of economic profitability 
and efficiency had now become intertwined with China’s national interest. The functional 
activities of the SOEs were now separated from the former Maoist ideological functions, and 
SOEs were now free to address increasing efficiency and making profit. 
Since SASAC was created in 2003, it has overseen the growth of state-owned assets as well 
as a reduction in the number of SOEs it administers in its ongoing efforts to create ‘national 
champions’. It has reduced the number of SOEs under its management from its original 196 
companies in 2003 to 102 companies in 2018. This period has also witnessed the rise of 
‘conglomerate companies’ (ʊ K), often with hundreds of subsidiaries operating below the 
level of an overarching parent company.445 For instance, in 2011, when SASAC managed 121 
firms, SASAC noted that there were 23,738 subsidiary companies.446  
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Overall, the wealth and profits of SASAC’s assets under management have grown. In 2018, 
China’s centrally-owned companies amassed 29.1 trillion yuan in ‘operating revenue’ (ȕ,ĳ
I) and 1.23 trillion yuan in ‘total profit’ (aƌĕʙ).447 Furthermore, SASAC’s SOE assets 
under management have grown from 5.8 trillion in 2003 to 80.39 trillion yuan in 2018.448 The 
revenues amassed by the leading corporations represent a staggering increase from the early 
2000s and have registered on the international financial scale. For instance, in the top-ten of 
the 2019 Forbes Global 500 list – a ranking based on revenues – SASAC-managed SOEs 
occupy second, fourth and fifth position.449  China’s new economic rationality has clearly 
achieved success in terms of modifying the behaviour of its companies to reflect international 
capitalist standards even if scholars only confer so much credit on SASAC for these 
accomplishments.450 
Finally, China’s new economic mindset also allowed China’s state-owned and private 
companies to seek economic opportunities from abroad rather than relying on Maoist notions 
of self-reliance and national development. In 1997, Jiang Zemin stated that ‘we must not only 
actively attract foreign enterprises to invest and set up factories in China but also to actively 
guide and organise powerful domestic enterprises to “go out” (ɈZ)’.451 Through the Ministry 
of Commerce452, Chinese authorities from the late 1990s gradually promoted their outward 
expansion to take advantage of global investment opportunities. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 
Two, in 2001, after fifteen years of negotiations, the PRC formally acceded to the World Trade 
Organisation. China is now the largest exporter of merchandise in the world, exporting over 2 
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trillion worth of manufactured goods in 2017.453  China’s politicians acknowledge that 
economic globalisation has benefited rather than hindered China’s economic development. For 
instance, in 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping began championing the ‘one-belt, one-road’ 
(íɍ) or New Silk Road initiative that seeks to link up 65 countries from China to Western 
Europe with several hundred billion dollars of investment slated for infrastructure projects.454 
The stated aim of this initiative is to further weave China into the fabric of the global economy.  
The SOE reforms outlined in this section have shown that Chinese authorities increasingly 
view the modernisation of the PRC within a market-based economic rationality. No longer do 
they accept loss-making enterprises as the price of a ‘cradle-to-grave welfare system’. Instead 
they have privatised (or ‘restructured’) those enterprises that they believed were ill-suited to 
China’s new socialist market economy. Chinese authorities have allowed and encouraged the 
remaining central SOEs to exploit their monopolistic positions in their respective markets, with 
some of China’s SOEs becoming the largest companies in the world in terms of operating 
revenue. China’s leaders have also sought to encourage Chinese companies to further exploit 
new growth avenues provided by the global market economy. What this illustrates is that 
Chinese authorities’ commitment for economic success is now based on a new post-Mao 
economic rationality of market growth and profitability. 
Conclusion 
This chapter started by outlining the political institutions that shape economic and 
environmental policy in China. It showed that the CCP, the government and the NPC shape 
environmental policy discourse in China, with the Party occupying a dominant position over 
the latter two institutions. Yet despite their dominance, it is Chinese government institutions, 
rather than the Party, that formulate and enact policy through the State Council and its various 
government agencies. Additionally, China’s new breed of government bureaucrats has become 
professionalised following Deng’s decision to retire many Party cadres whose experiences and 
outlook were shaped by the class struggles of Maoist China. Moreover, it is the NPC that passes 
and reviews China’s environmental laws. The first half of the chapter also detailed the 
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fragmented and factionalised nature of Chinese governance, providing further context to the 
research methods outlined in Chapter Three. This institutional background provides the 
necessary context for the discursive material drawn in Chapters Five to Nine inclusive. 
The second half of this chapter demonstrated how China’s gradual economic reforms altered 
China’s economy, through new economic actors, behaviours and motivations, despite overall 
continuity by way of political governance. The CCP still runs China, according to self-styled 
‘Marxist-Leninist’ organisational principles. However, because of these reforms, the Party now 
presides over an economy that functions according to the capitalist rationalities of profitability 
and efficiency. China has largely overcome its Maoist economic mindset that prioritised 
politics and ideology over economic rationality, and through reforms to agriculture, private 
industry and SOEs they appear to have changed China’s economy and society irreversibly, 
especially when viewed within the overall context of China’s economic success. These 
transformations were not achieved without painful social, political and economic tensions, as 
this chapter has illustrated. Under the Chinese political regime, these tensions were played out 
within the ‘party state’ organs, with reformers eventually emerging victorious. However, as the 
remainder of this thesis will illustrate, ongoing economic rationality continues to raise new 
challenges and contradictions for the Chinese economy, polity and national interest. One of the 
growing sets of contradictions involves the impact that this new economic growth has had upon 
the environment. The remainder of this thesis explores the evolution of these concerns, and 
details how Chinese authorities have addressed them. The next chapter will explore the first 
environmental reform measure of this thesis, ‘cleaner production’, to examine where this policy 
idea emerged from, what underpinned it, and whether it is consistent with notions of ecological 
modernisation. 
  
 103 
Chapter Five: Cleaner Production in China 
Chapter Four described China as a nation in economic flux. Over four decades, Chinese 
authorities have implemented a series of gradual reforms that have altered the political, societal 
and economic makeup of the PRC. The CCP still rules China in an authoritarian manner. It has 
retained the right to select and veto appointments to the highest levels of the government and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but as a result of these economic reforms, the senior leadership 
has allowed a capitalistic economic rationality to develop, albeit with unique ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ (£ƥȏ). Rather than rely on socialist planners in Beijing to grow the 
economy, China’s politicians have gradually allowed China’s citizens to base their economic 
behaviour on market forces. 
This chapter and the following four chapters examine how the Chinese government have 
attempted to reconcile competing economic and environmental objectives. Have Chinese 
policymakers chosen to incorporate ecological modernisation ideas within their environmental 
policy agenda? If they have chosen to incorporate these ideas within their environmental policy 
agenda, what environmental concerns have been the key drivers for their inclusion? Moreover, 
which institutions and officials have been the notable advocates for the inclusion of ecological 
modernisation ideas within this policy agenda? These are important questions for the study of 
Chinese environmental policy because they seek to determine the rationale and personnel 
behind certain environmental reforms. 
This chapter draws on evidence from Chinese policymakers as well as relevant government 
policy and legislation. It starts by examining the history and development of an ‘ecological 
rationality’ in China towards industrial, specifically air, pollution up to the early 1990s. The 
chapter will then examine the concept of ‘cleaner production’ (ƐƂư#). The chapter will 
argue that Chinese policymakers’ call for cleaner production manifests itself as an example of 
ecological modernisation beliefs through their reflexive reasoning, the call for market 
mechanisms to foster cleaner production and the convergence of economic and ecological 
rationality within China’s environmental policy agenda.  
The Emergence and Evolution of Ecological Rationality in Maoist China 
This chapter starts by examining the origins of China’s environmental awareness, or its 
ecological rationality. It is necessary to look back at the early unease that emerged among 
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China’s elite over industrial pollution and waste during the Maoist era to understand why the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) unanimously passed the Law of the PRC on the Promotion 
of Cleaner Production in 2002.455 In the early years of the PRC, there were small numbers of 
high-level officials who slowly became aware that China’s Soviet-style industrialisation 
generated harmful levels of industrial emissions, namely air, water and solid waste pollution, 
or what the Chinese state termed ‘the three wastes’ (÷). The first senior Party official to 
express disquiet concerning these industrial emissions in the 1950s was Premier Zhou Enlai. 
While many of his comrades kept their focus on growing the nation’s fledgling socialist 
economy, Zhou’s comments during this period indicate that he believed China’s socialist 
modernisation was far from a benign phenomenon. For example, during a 1958 inspection tour 
to Guangdong Province, he was reported to have stated that China was producing too much 
pollution, and it needed to ‘engage fully in comprehensive utilisation and make full use of the 
“three wastes” to create benefit from harm and to benefit the people’.456 
However, the drive of Maoist socialist development hampered the development of early 
concern towards industrial waste. This was due to the fact that China’s modernisation was 
intertwined with socialist ideology, fervently championed by ‘leftist thinking’ (éɍǯ)  officials. 
During this period these officials argued that China, because it was a socialist nation and such 
nations served the people, could not harm its people through environmental pollution, unlike 
capitalist countries.457 They asserted that such harmful characteristics were incongruent with 
the modes of production inherent to socialist nations. Socialist nations could produce pollution 
but at negligible and non-harmful levels, especially when compared to capitalist nations. 
Instead, severe ‘industrial pollution’ (è,Żť) was better explained by capitalism and its 
skewed profit motives.458 In some ways, this leftist thinking in China was not dissimilar to 
some elements of the ‘treadmill of production’ concept expounded by neo-Marxists from the 
1980s onwards.459 Premier Zhou adopted this neo-Marxist belief in that, in general, he blamed 
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environmental degradation on the motive force of capitalist production: ‘capitalist countries 
cannot solve industrial pollution because of their private ownership, anarchic production and 
the pursuit of maximum profits’.460  
Despite maintaining this ideological stance, Zhou also understood that China had 
experienced escalating levels of environmental pollution. He might have believed that China’s 
industrial emissions had different underlying causes to those of capitalist nations, yet Zhou 
conceded that China could no longer assert that its brand of socialism had a light impact on the 
environment. In a 1971 speech, he referred to Britain’s past afflictions with ‘smog’ (Ɯʍ) in 
its large urban cities, declaring that ‘China’s urban environmental issues were not lighter than 
those in Western countries’.461 With this point in mind, he announced that China ‘must solve 
industrial pollution’ because it was a socialist nation and any economic development that it 
undertook ‘absolutely must not do any harm for future generations’.462 Furthermore, at China’s 
1971 National Planning Meeting, he returned to his 1950s theme of ‘three wastes’: 
At present, public hazards (KÖ) have already become a huge global problem. The danger of water waste, 
exhaust waste, and solid waste in the United States is considerable. We must eliminate the three harms. 
We cannot avoid comprehensive utilisation [of these wastes]. We must energetically eliminate these 
wastes, converting the ‘three harms’ (Ö) into the ‘three benefits’ (a).463  
Zhou Enlai’s view of waste pollution at this time was that it was a ‘health issue’ (zưɻʘ). 
He had little regard for notions of environmental protection that characterised the Western 
discussion of environmental degradation during the 1960s.464 
Nonetheless, Zhou’s comments illustrate a nascent ecological rationality at the highest 
levels of China’s Maoist political leadership. It stemmed from Zhou’s awareness of the 
destructive impact of industrial development. He understood that China’s socialist 
industrialisation had significantly contributed to harmful levels of air, water, and solid waste 
pollution. He also understood that pollution was a cross-generational problem. Yet, he was 
unable to link it to broader concepts in ecology, let alone appreciate that industrial development 
could have destabilising effects on the ecosystem. The knowledge of ecological concepts up 
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until 1972 in China remained underdeveloped (see discussion below). This fact is unsurprising 
given that Chairman Mao governed over a closed and autarkic nation. The ideological 
dogmatism surrounding the population debate, whereby authorities led by Mao shunned 
population control in the 1950s and 1960s because of the anti-Malthusian arguments of Karl 
Marx and Fredrich Engels,465 strongly suggests that if a Chinese-version of Rachel Carson had 
emerged during this period with an ecological perspective on China’s industrial emissions it 
would have been silenced quickly.466 
Nevertheless, despite their limited comprehension of ecology, from 1971 onwards Chinese 
officials slowly began to view pollution as an ‘environmental issue’ (Ʃµɻʘ). The inter-
national community provided the catalyst for this change when the United Nations allowed the 
PRC to replace the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the sole United Nations representative for 
China. Just a few months after the PRC was accepted as a member of the United Nations, it 
received an invitation to attend a global conference on the environment in Sweden. The 
Chinese government under Zhou Enlai’s direction accepted that invitation and subsequently 
sent three delegates to the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 
Stockholm. This global conference provided the catalyst for environmental change by 
introducing the notion of ‘environmental protection’ (Ʃµ>Ĥ), a concept that would lay an 
essential foundation for an ecological rationality within China’s government.467 Leading up to 
the conference, one of the three delegates to the conference, Qu Geping, stated that Zhou Enlai 
was starting to view China’s pollution as more than just a health issue that should be supervised 
by the Ministry of Health. China would have to ‘formulate environmental protection measures’ 
when the delegates returned.468 Indeed, from 1973 onwards, China began to establish new 
organisations with a mandate to tackle environmental pollution and degradation.469 Moreover, 
the conference introduced Chinese officials to new ecological concepts, such as ‘environmental 
protection’ and ‘acid rain’ (ɥʋ) allowing a higher level of understanding of ecosystems and 
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their complexity. Qu Geping has recollected in interviews that he and his other colleagues were 
introduced to these environmental concepts at this conference.470  
In the years following the Swedish conference, the idea that China must protect the 
environment against pollution became more widespread among government officials. In 1973, 
the State Council convened the first National Environmental Protection Conference in 
Beijing. 471  This two-week meeting, which Zhou Enlai ordered to be convened, included 
representatives from across China’s political apparatus, including Party and military delegates, 
as well as government representatives from planning commissions, research institutes, 
factories, mines and China’s various provinces.472 Over 10,000 delegates attended various 
meetings throughout the fortnight.473  From the conference proceedings, the State Council 
published Certain Provisions on Protecting and Improving the Environment trial draft. The 
importance of this policy document was the ‘32 character principle’ (32 Çŀɫ): ‘overall 
planning, rational distribution, comprehensive utilisation, turn harm into benefit, rely on the 
masses, involve everyone, protect the environment, and benefit the people’, which framed how 
China would protect its environment.474 This principle, as Chinese scholars have stressed, 
introduced China’s ‘first environmental protection guidelines’.475 From this point on, China’s 
ecological rationality would have a policy basis to challenge the established economic 
rationality in China.  
There was little public commentary on environmental concerns from senior officials up until 
the end of the 1970s. Regardless, this period was marked by the creation of new environmental 
publications that provided a policy forum for officials to make a case for environmental reform. 
The most important of these early publications was Environmental Protection. In the foreword 
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to its first edition, the editors of Environmental Protection outlined how they saw the 
environmental challenges brought forth by China’s socialist economic development: 
While we are engaged in the construction of industry, we must also consider protecting the environment 
from pollution. This primary task embodies the superiority of the socialist system. The big issue is what 
line to implement and what path to take. Engaging in just production and not managing the three wastes 
cannot be tolerated by a socialist system.476  
There were other environmental publications created during the 1970s. The Chinese Academy 
of Sciences published Environmental Science in 1976, providing a platform for China’s 
growing community of environmental scientists. Both publications still exist today, and they 
remain among the leading environmental policy and environmental sciences journals in China. 
The reference list of this thesis and the discussions in the following chapters are an important 
means of measuring the extent to which ecological modernisation ideas have been included 
within China’s environmental policy agenda. 
The chapter so far has demonstrated that during the Maoist era, senior Party officials became 
increasingly concerned with mounting pollution. However, the rapid economic growth of the 
Reform era (1978 onwards) led to heightened apprehension over the issue. Even though Party 
elder Deng Xiaoping would keep his focus on macro-level economic reforms (see Chapter 
Four), he also noted the seriousness of environmental pollution. In a 1979 visit to Guangxi 
Province, Deng observed that factories had severely polluted ‘the good landscape of Guilin and 
it must be stopped’.477 Furthermore, in the first revision of the Party Constitution since Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, China’s leaders inserted environmental provisions, stipulating that 
‘the nation will protect and improve living and ecological environments and prevent pollution 
and other damage’.478 Within China’s political leadership, China’s coal-reliant energy system 
became the main focus of this concern. Premier Zhao Ziyang told attending delegates in a 1983 
speech to the Fifth Session of the Fifth NPC that ‘more and more coal is being used in China, 
and it is unacceptable to ignore the environment’. 479  So, within this context, the reform 
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conditions in the early 1980s were ripe for nascent ecological rationality to challenge economic 
rationality.480  
Qu Geping: China’s first environmental bureaucrat. Once senior Party leaders had 
acknowledged environmental pollution as a significant issue by the early 1980s, a new-breed 
of professional Chinese bureaucrats started to direct their attention to environmental problems 
and their policy solutions. The most notable of these new bureaucrats was Qu Geping, whose 
views were raised briefly in the previous section.481 Qu trained as an engineer, and his career 
coincided with several critical environmental reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. Qu was part of 
the three-person delegation that went under Zhou Enlai’s instruction to the United Nations 
1972 environmental conference in Sweden. Qu then served between 1974 and 1982 as the 
inaugural director of the State Council’s Environmental Protection Leading Small Group 
Office and in 1976 the State Council appointed him as the first Chinese representative to the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Kenya. In the 1980s, Qu then become 
the inaugural vice-director of the National Environmental Protection Commission and by the 
late 1980s he became the first director of the State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) 
(1987–1993).482 As Chapter Three noted, Qu Geping is held in such high regard in China that 
its media often refers to him as the ‘father of Chinese environmentalism’.483 Qu’s insights on 
China’s range of environmental issues would place him at the forefront of Chinese 
policymaking discourse. The following chapters will show how he advocated policy responses 
to China’s environmental problems that embodied many principles inherent to ecological 
modernisation. 
In the 1980s, Qu Geping provided some of the most candid statements yet provided by a 
senior government administrator regarding China’s growing pollution problem. Writing in a 
1980 issue of Environmental Protection, Qu Geping characterised China’s experience of air 
pollution as ‘shocking’ (ȧƽĘĎ). He also argued that the worrying state of pollution in China 
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would only worsen, based on his ‘rough calculations’ (ǨƵƆǤ). Qu directed the thrust of his 
paper at those in influential government positions who still saw China’s ‘superior socialist 
system’ (.ɋƺǒ/cø) as environmentally benign, such as those ‘leftist thinkers’ 
influenced by the ‘Gang of Four’ (%î). Linking past mistakes with the now discredited 
Maoist Gang of Four was an astute political move. He stated that those ‘arguments did not 
match the actual situation in China’.484 Instead, he forecasted that by 1985 China’s levels of 
‘soot’ (Ɯà) and ‘sulphur dioxide’ (ŵrǍ) emissions would ‘more than double’, arguing 
that ‘now is the time to enhance environmental protection measures’.485 Qu followed up those 
comments with a 1982 speech to the National Ecological Economics Symposium in Beijing. 
In this speech, he further detailed China’s growing levels of air pollution, describing to the 
attendees the problems concerning China’s reliance on coal for its primary energy. He said that 
China mined over 600 million tonnes of coal each year, and its subsequent combustion led to 
‘over 14 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide being discharged into the atmosphere each year’.486 
Such coal combustion led to 150 million tonnes of ‘ash’ (Ɨ[) emitted into the atmosphere in 
1981, and he remarked that these increased emissions had given rise to ‘acid rain’ which had 
emerged in many provinces across China. 487  In the first few years of China’s economic 
reforms, Qu’s comments reflected how he was already viewing China’s economic 
transformation from an ecological perspective. 
Moreover, in his speeches and essays, Qu not only quantified China’s growing pollution 
problem but also explained its root causes. He argued that the liberalisation of China’s 
economy profoundly impacted its environment. Township village enterprises (TVEs) were a 
prime target of his policy discussion. TVEs, as the last chapter detailed, were loosely-regulated, 
semi-socialist enterprises which emerged and then flourished after the Chinese authorities 
disbanded China’s former Maoist communes. They operated outside of the government’s 
socialist planning regime, and this lack of control concerned China’s environmental officials, 
especially since TVEs inherited out-dated equipment built during the early years of the PRC – 
an era that predated notions of environmental protection. Qu stressed in a 1983 article that even 
if the rapid expansion of TVEs would bring short-term economic and social benefits to some 
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of the poorest regions of China, over the long-term TVE expansion would potentially prove 
ruinous for the environment: 
With the development of the rural economy, the county commune industry [i.e. township village 
enterprises] will grow dramatically. On the one hand, we must appreciate the positive effect of this 
development on economic prosperity and the improved living standards of rural citizens. At the same time, 
we must also understand the possible harm to the rural ecological environment [from pollution]. Therefore, 
it is necessary to adopt appropriate guidelines, policies, technological and economic measures to correctly 
handle the relationship between the development of industry and the protection of rural ecology. The 
relationship between immediate interests and long-term interests should lead to the unification of economic 
benefits and environmental benefits.488 
The theme of TVE development and environmental protection would interweave through many 
of Qu’s policy arguments over the coming years. For instance, in a 1986 speech summarising 
the environmental protection policy measures for the upcoming Sixth Five-Year Plan, Qu noted 
that TVEs contributed to ‘one-fifth of China’s “three-wastes” emissions’; a contribution that 
was ‘still growing’.489 Qu’s remarks illustrate how Chinese officials were beginning to grapple 
with the severe contradictions that their nation’s economic development presented. On the one 
hand, the growth in TVEs encouraged the ‘development of rural economies’ in a fashion 
hitherto unseen in the history of the PRC. That development brought forth ‘prosperity’ (Ǭȓ) 
and improved ‘standard of living’ (ưƃŶñ) for those underdeveloped regions that had 
languished during the Maoist era.490 China’s post-Mao economic rationality would suggest 
further encouragement of TVEs. However, ecological rationality was starting to shape how 
Chinese officials like Qu Geping saw post-Maoist industrialisation. Qu appreciated that in the 
enthusiasm for economic development, many new market actors would pursue immediate 
economic benefits with little or no regard for the environment, and this would lead to 
environmental harm.  
Perceiving the loosely regulated aspect of TVEs as a concern, Qu argued that improved 
‘environmental management’ (Ʃµǥƭ) was the best way to manage growing pollution. In a 
1983 speech to the Developing Nation Environmental Impact Assessment Academic 
Symposium, he argued that environmental impact assessments (Ʃµąȯ*)491  linking 
environmental and economic benefits could reduce environmental pollution: 
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The environmental impact assessment system is a significant reform of traditional modes of economic 
development. For traditional economic development, what is often considered is immediate economic 
benefits with little or no consideration of environmental benefits. As a result, environmental pollution and 
destruction inevitably occur, leading to sharp opposition between economic development and 
environmental protection. Implementation of the environmental impact assessment system has changed 
this situation. It has achieved the unification of economic and environmental benefits and the coordinated 
development of economy and environment. The process of environmental impact assessments is the 
process of recognising the interdependence and mutually-restrained relationship between the ecological 
environment and human economic activities.492  
Although tasked with cleaning up the environment, environmental management in China at the 
time consisted more of command and control measures rather than any economic incentive 
reforms based on ecological modernisation-inspired policy. For instance, China’s 
environmental protection measures up until the late 1980s consisted of concentration-based 
discharge limits, the aforementioned environmental impact assessments and a pollution-levy 
system.493 Apart from the pollution-levy system, these measures resorted to ‘command and 
control’, relying on the government to set rules that defined lawful social or economic 
behaviour. 
The consensus view among China’s officials in the 1980s was that these command and 
control measures should characterise how the Chinese government responded to environmental 
pollution. This outlook remained consistent with the socialistic rather than capitalistic ethos 
propounded by the CCP. As the discussion has suggested so far, and the following sections and 
chapters of this thesis will further demonstrate, some signs in this period hint at China’s later 
adoption of ecological modernisation policies. Officials were starting to include ecological 
notions into their policy discussion, and this new rationality was challenging embedded 
economic ways of thinking.  
However, at this stage a number of questions can be raised about the progress of ecological 
rationality: why was there such reticence to adopt ecological modernisation measures? Why 
not encourage the rapid adoption of clean technology to supplement environmental 
management? To answer these questions, it is necessary to review the policy arguments of 
former Premier Li Peng Ŝʤ while he was a senior official in the Ministry of Electric Power494 
and the head of the National Environmental Protection Commission. These arguments 
embodied the prevailing economic rationality behind China’s then-environmental policy 
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decisions and why China ultimately would not embrace cleaner production technologies until 
the 1990s.  
Li Peng and the pervasiveness of economic rationality. Li Peng’s policy views reveal the 
persistent strength of economic objectives and its predominance over ecological concerns. Li 
Peng, like Qu Geping, was an engineer by training, but, in contrast with his soon-to-be deputy, 
he served in government and Party positions within the energy sector. He moved up through 
the Party and government system, and, by 1979, he was a vice-minister in the Ministry of 
Electric Power under its then-minister Qian Zhengying ɭŰȒ – a position he would hold for 
four years. In 1984 Li was promoted to vice-premier within the State Council, in conjunction 
with his appointment to the National Environmental Protection Commission.495 As a career 
path like this would suggest, Li Peng in the 1980s was more concerned with economic 
objectives than environmental concerns, viewing them for a period as mutually-exclusive 
objectives, especially concerning pollution-prevention technology. 
However, even during his career managing China’s thermal coal power plants, Li appears 
to have accepted that China’s environmental problems resulted from its ‘reliance on coal’ ()
ƞ). In a speech to the Second National Environmental Protection Conference (December 
1983–January 1984), he conceded that coal combustion ‘undoubtedly created air pollution, 
bringing about harmful effects for the environment’.496 Moreover, in the same speech, he also 
noted how, due to this reliance, ‘in recent years…there has been an increasing number of acid 
gases such as sulphur dioxide discharged into the atmosphere. Acid rain hazards have occurred 
in many areas south of the Yangtze River and parts of the north’. Li also presided over the 
incorporation of environmental protection as a ‘fundamental policy’ (²ŗ£ǣ) of the PRC, 
placing it in the same league as economic reform and population control.497 In a 1985 speech 
to the first annual meeting of Chinese and foreign specialists held at the Chinese Academy of 
Environmental Sciences498, Li repeated his view that China ‘must avoid taking the old route of 
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polluting first, cleaning up later’ (ɟGɈDŻťſƭƺȀɍ). He also remarked that if China 
did not change its approach, it would be ‘likely to cause serious economic losses and costs that 
were too large’.499 
Like Qu Geping, Li directed his opprobrium towards the rapid development of the TVEs. 
Lauding socialist economic logic rather than market logic, he argued that their development, 
rather than that of state-run enterprises, was the leading cause of environmental pollution. In 
that same 1985 Chinese Academy of Environmental Sciences meeting, he outlined that 
although TVEs were ‘small scale’ (ȤůÞ), the pollution they emitted across all parts of the 
biosphere was ‘very serious’ (Ĉɧ).500 Li escalated his attack on TVEs in a speech he gave 
to the 1989 Third National Environmental Protection Conference in his new position as 
Premier of the State Council. Li put forward the view that TVEs not only caused economic 
problems such as inflation and resource misallocation, but they also placed ‘tremendous 
pressure on the environment’, and their pollution was ‘an acutely growing trend’, especially 
with regard to their ‘blind projects’ (ƾƽʔƽ) that had little or no concern for environmental 
regulations.501 He noted in particular that:  
many of these projects consume large amounts of energy, have low efficiency, waste resources, and cause 
severe pollution. One of our goals with rectification and control is to adjust the economic structure, 
industrial structure and production mix to enhance the efficiency of enterprises and reduce consumption.502  
‘Improvement and rectification’ (ſƭĺʖ) included such measures as ‘halting production, 
closing down enterprises, transferring operations to new products or moving operations to 
different regions’ (known as MAóɐɔ ). This signalled Li’s on-going preference for 
command-and-control measures over ecological modernisation strategies.503  
Beyond ecological rationality, Li’s comments also foreshadowed the re-emergence of 
socialist economic rationality by challenging the merits of market-led TVE development. The 
political-economic tensions of the 1980s could also provide an added context to interpret 
Premier Li’s remarks. Li was aligned with the conservative faction in China, led by leading 
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State Planner Chen Yun ʃ , who wanted authorities to reassert their control over the 
economy after many years of decentralisation and liberalisation.504 Thus, Li’s environmental 
focus was directed more at the non-socialist sector of the economy. For example, he noticeably 
omitted mention of SOEs when raising environmental governance matters. Yet, while SOEs 
were being ‘outgrown’ by the non-planned sector, they still generated significant amounts of 
pollution.505 Li’s reluctance to move beyond command-and-control measures stemmed from 
his ongoing loyalty to socialism and socialist planning. As the following sections demonstrate, 
the allure of ‘cleaner production’ is predicated upon a belief in the power of market forces to 
provide a technological path for enterprises to move towards sustainable development, 
something then inimical to Li’s ideological stance. Consequently, political tensions over the 
direction of the economy and ecological awareness would remain until the early 1990s. 
Even though Li Peng understood that China’s rapid industrialisation was causing 
despoliation of its environment, he viewed investment in pollution-abatement technology too 
costly for China’s infant stages of post-Mao economic development. Li held this view before 
he took up his chairmanship of the National Environmental Protection Commission. In a 1982 
essay, he claimed that ‘pollution management accounted for one-third of power plant 
investment’ in developed nations.506  He believed that this investment was too expensive 
because China ‘did not have such amounts of money to spend’. As a result, China needed to 
chart ‘its path’ (ȋëƺɞɍ) through constructing taller chimney stacks and shifting power 
plants to rural areas where ‘population density’ (%Ùø) was much lower and therefore could 
accommodate ‘relaxed [emission] standards’.507 Li remained more concerned with developing 
China’s power-generating capacity, which could not keep up with the growing demand from 
China’s flourishing special economic zones, as his other articles at the time would attest.508 
After Li Peng was promoted to the position of Vice Premier of the State Council in 1984, 
he continued to maintain that pollution abatement was too expensive to become a crucial 
element of China’s environmental protection strategy. In that speech to the Second National 
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Environmental Protection Conference in Beijing, he insisted that China could ill-afford 
investing in pollution prevention technology. In an article summarising that speech by Cheng 
Zhenhua ǚīu, who was the Chief Engineer of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction 
and Environmental Protection, Cheng revealed comments that had been withheld from Li 
Peng’s officially-released speech. In particular, Cheng noted that Li raised with the conference 
delegates the argument that ‘our pollution control must be compatible with our country’s 
economic conditions and development level, and we cannot afford to spend large amounts        
of money on pollution control’. 509  Overall, Li’s speech demonstrated that economic 
considerations predominantly influenced how he still saw the range of feasible solutions to 
environmental pollution, even though he considered environmental issues important. 
Furthermore, Li was reported to have stated in his speech to the 1985 National Urban 
Environmental Protection Working Conference, that ‘it was impossible for China to spend 
significant amounts of money on environmental protection’, although if ‘environmental 
management was done well’ then it would reduce the amount of money spent on environmental 
protection. It would have the effect of reducing money spent and achieving better 
environmental management outcomes: 
For example, some capitalist developed countries, in the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution, 
require not only the control of total soot emissions but also the control of emissions from sulphur dioxide 
and other harmful pollutants. This [investment] requires lots of money. We can only control soot emissions. 
Of course, we also need to control sulphur dioxide and other harmful pollutants. However, for economic 
reasons, these standards cannot become too excessive. Therefore, we, on the one hand, will persist with 
the three benefits (ķƻ), but also at the same time acknowledge our national circumstances and not 
consider excessively high requirements which do not conform to those conditions.510 
As Li’s statements show, during the early to mid 1980s economic objectives dominated 
ecological considerations within the Chinese Communist Party. He did recognise that China’s 
power plant expansion was creating higher levels of soot and sulphur dioxide emissions, but 
the technology was seen as too expensive given China’s then stage of development. Li Peng 
would promote the adoption of advanced technology in other articles and speeches, but he kept 
his focus on technology that boosted economic production through enhanced industrial and 
agricultural output measures.511 He still saw economic and environmental concerns as mutually 
exclusive. These twin rationalities had yet to converge at the highest levels of China’s political 
leadership. However, as the next section will demonstrate, despite Li’s economic policy 
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mindset, by the mid-1980s, an increasing number of Chinese environmental officials were 
realising that environmental management measures alone could not stem the rising pollution 
caused by rapid economic development. 
The institutional turn towards pollution-prevention technology. The realisation that 
environmental management was ill-equipped to prevent China’s mounting industrial pollution 
gathered momentum in the mid-1980s. A 1986 speech by Qu Geping reviewing China’s 
environmental protection work over the previous five-year plan provides an example of this 
realisation. Qu’s speech revealed that he and his colleagues had made significant advancements 
with environmental protection work over that period through closing down or relocating 
factories.512 There had been much progress concerning environmental reform, and Chinese 
officials had acknowledged the importance of the ‘polluter pays principle’ (ȸŻťȸſƭ).513 
However, Qu Geping also realised that there was only so much that environmental management 
had achieved: 
Environmental management needs strengthening. During the “Sixth Five-Year Plan”, progress has been 
made in environmental management. But, overall, China’s management of the environment is only 
beginning, and there are many problems still to be solved. First, the construction of the environmental legal 
system is still imperfect. There are still practical problems with no laws or rules to follow. Second, 
environmental planning work is very weak, there is no practical five-year plan, and environmental planning 
in many places has not been incorporated into the national economic and social development plans, and 
the work is blind. Third, the environmental management organisations have not yet formed a complete 
management system from the central government to the province, city, county and township. 
Environmental management agencies in many places have not yet become a robust supervisory authority 
of the government, and it is difficult to exercise the functions of planning, coordination, supervision, and 
guidance. Fourth, the funding channels for environmental protection are not yet smooth, and the sources 
of environmental protection funds are still challenging, affecting the progress of environmental 
governance.514 
Although Qu Geping’s comments reflect the view that the Chinese government had to 
strengthen environmental management, his enumerated list of weaknesses also indicates his 
critical view of the effectiveness of environmental management as a universal goal of China’s 
environmental policy agenda. Although his comments were not as pointed as those of the 
contemporary China watchers canvassed in Chapter Two, they still highlighted many of the 
institutional flaws surrounding environmental management in China.  
This point emerges more clearly when viewed in conjunction with his policy discourse on 
the decisive role that technology could play in an ecological restructuring of industry. The view 
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that pollution abatement technology could answer China’s pollution problem started to surface 
in the 1980s before Li Peng entered the environmental protection sector. Qu Geping was again 
the prominent official who advocated for the increased adoption of this type of technology. In 
one of his earliest policy commentaries, Qu argued that such technology should serve as a 
critical element in any strategy to limit or prevent industrial pollution. He drew his inspiration 
from the experience of Western countries. In many of his early publications, he stressed that 
China should learn from Western countries and how they responded to environmental pollution 
because, although they had experienced severe ecological damage, especially during the 1960s, 
‘from the 1970s their situation had improved significantly’.515  
In the 1980 essay cited above, Qu drew on the experience of Japan and other Western 
countries to maintain that technology, while initially expensive, would pay off in the long term. 
This 1980 essay also claimed that the dominant arguments that China’s superior socialist 
system had a light environmental impact was ‘inconsistent with reality’ because economic 
planners had ‘only considered direct economic impacts, regardless of long-term ecological 
consequences’.516 Qu had recently returned from his appointment to the UNEP in Kenya, and 
his articles and speeches suggest that he had become convinced that Western ‘capitalist 
nations’ should be viewed as a policy lodestar for China rather than an ideological adversary. 
He argued that the reduction in their pollution was a result of ‘strict environmental laws, 
regulations, high environmental taxes and fines, and labour costs’.517 Because of these strict 
measures, industries were forced to ‘vigorously promote technological innovation processes, 
thereby improving the environment, saving raw materials, and power and improving overall 
production efficiency’. Their experience of better regulations and pollution-prevention 
technology ‘provided an example for China to emulate’.518 Although his remarks ostensibly 
appear similar to the command-and-control mindset, his remarks show evidence of ecological 
modernisation views. Qu believed that these strict policies could synthesise environmental 
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protection and profit within China’s enterprises just like they had in Western countries and 
Japan.  
 To support this overtly ecological modernisation view, Qu detailed how Japan had ‘spent 
the equivalent of 19 billion yuan in managing pollution and improving its environment’.519 He 
acknowledged that replicating Japan’s strategy would involve ‘spending comparatively large 
amounts of money’, but – unlike Li Peng – he believed that the experience of Japan and other 
countries had demonstrated that environmental protection was worthwhile for the economy. In 
China, the ‘economic benefits’ of environmental protection ‘would accumulate and be 
displayed more clearly over a short period’. 520  Qu maintained this view concerning the 
economic benefits of pollution-prevention technology for developing nations in a 1981 article 
published in Environmental Protection. He sought to make the case that developing nations, 
such as China, should invest in such technology, noting that the UNEP’s technology policies 
took into account the ‘economic, social and environmental benefits’ and could benefit not just 
the developed ‘Western nations’, but also ‘developing nations as well’.521 With these remarks, 
Qu was demonstrating his early ecological modernisation credentials, viewing technology as 
the means to reduce the environmental impact of industrial development. He believed that for 
China to combat industrial pollution, it needed to borrow ideas from Western nations that had 
successfully and cost-effectively implemented pollution abatement through clean technology. 
Moreover, he believed that the ecological restructuring of Chinese industry presented a ‘win-
win’ choice for China as a developing nation, one which would yield improved economic 
productivity and an ‘improved environment’.522 
Qu’s career progression since the 1970s provides a useful context to understand why he 
became one of the earliest senior Chinese officials to see the benefits of pollution prevention 
technology. His role as the Chinese delegate to the UNEP exposed him to many of the leading-
edge technologies and ideas emanating from advanced Western nations. During this period, 
many international organisations, such as the UNEP, started to examine ecological 
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modernisation solutions.523 For example, in 1980, the UNEP provided financial and technical 
assistance to the International Union of Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource’s 
landmark report World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable 
Development, introducing the notion of sustainable development and the call for the increased 
adoption of cleaner technology.524 This report would provide the conceptual basis for the 1987 
Brundtland Commission’s report Our Common Future. Qu’s comments show that he also saw 
clean technology as the path on which to achieve the ‘three benefits’ and reconcile economic 
and ecological rationalities, an idea close to Brundtland’s notion of ‘sustainable development’. 
Even though Qu initially professed these views, he would conform with Li Peng’s views 
towards technology once the latter became the inaugural chairman of the National 
Environmental Protection Commission in 1984, illustrating the relative dominance of the 
latter’s position in Chinese environmental policymaking. The consensus position as outlined 
above was that while ‘technological transformation’ (ġŘĴɝ) was commendable, the 
widespread adoption of clean technology would need to be postponed until China’s economy 
reached ‘appropriate national conditions’.525 Therefore, Qu would only obliquely raise the 
benefits of technology without going into detail or recommending policy. Instead, he deferred 
to the view that environmental management through environmental impact assessments (i.e. 
the ‘three simultaneous’ ń) or discharge limits and controls should constitute the bulk of 
environmental protection measures. These measures would provide better outcomes for the 
environment and ‘spend little amounts of money’. 526  This view influenced critical 
environmental legislation. For example, the Law of the PRC on the Prevention and Control of 
Air Pollution passed in 1987 did not address the contribution of coal-fired power plants to air 
pollution, the broad and extensive problems caused by acid rain, or specific measures to combat 
rising sulphur dioxide emissions.527 
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Despite Li Peng’s economic rationalist perspective towards environmental reform, by the 
turn of the decade, a concern for pollution, especially air pollution, was increasing within 
China’s policymaking circles.528 This concern would soon challenge the ingrained view that 
pollution control technology was too expensive. Qu Geping would again lead these arguments 
in his new position as director of the SEPB. He gave an important speech at the China Power 
Industry and Environmental Protection Working Conference in 1991 in Beijing, using this 
platform to make a case for technology to play a critical role in combating China’s growing air 
pollution problem. The significance of his comments can be seen in the language he used to 
describe this, as well as the forum in which he delivered his speech. This conference was the 
first to discuss environmental issues caused by the coal-fired power industry. Qu revealed in 
his speech that throughout the 1980s many officials had remained oblivious to, or disparaging 
of, the threat presented by air pollution, claiming that it was a ‘myth’ (Ǖȵ).529 Drawing on the 
experiences of Canada, the United States, and Western Europe, he noted how acid rain from 
coal-fired power plants had ‘killed’ (ű!) national forests, as well as acidified lakes and soil. 
Qu also mentioned a visit he had made to a Swedish lake which was ‘a clear lake without any 
living creatures’ because of acid deposition created by coal-fired power plants across Western 
Europe.530 He also noted that:  
Ten years ago, when China discussed acid rain, it was like discussing a myth. Now it has become such a 
significant issue because of the harm caused by acid rain. According to estimates, in several parts of the 
Southwest [of China], 10 per cent of agricultural production has been reduced, there has been a loss of 
$2.4 billion [yuan] plus indirect annual losses of 10.4 billion yuan. In the United States and the West, acid 
rain problems have been brought somewhat under control. In contrast, China’s development needs to 
invoke a high degree of attention [towards this issue].531  
Qu’s speech denotes a significant shift from his previous acquiescence to Li Peng’s views; 
namely that China should focus more on environmental management than pollution prevention 
equipment. He did acknowledge that China was ‘still a poor country’, there were ‘many things 
to do urgently’, and it might seem ‘optimal not to spend large amounts of money’ on technology 
to reduce pollution. He drew on the example of Luo Huang Power Plant in Guangxi Province 
and its investment of $US40 million for desulphurisation equipment to show that this type of 
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expenditure did involve ‘large sums of money’.532 However, Qu argued that such investment 
was crucial. He said acid rain in China had become ‘more serious’, and its ‘damage was 
comparatively extensive’, and that China needed to invest in power plant technologies such as 
flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) in order to reduce its increasing sulphur dioxide emissions.533  
Whether intentionally or inadvertently, Qu’s comments seemed aimed at blunting past 
economic arguments from senior officials, such as Li Peng, who had argued that technology 
was too expensive for China at its present stage of development. Notably, Qu turned to the 
potential economic policy instrument of a sulphur dioxide emissions fee to accumulate the 
funds needed to invest in FGD technology. He forecast that if the Chinese government levied 
a two-yuan tax (about 37 US cents in 1991) on each tonne of coal consumed then it would raise 
‘over 2 billion yuan’ (or $US 375 million in 1991) each year. This sum could help fund the 
costs of such technology: ‘if this money was placed into an acid rain fund, then managing 
sulphur dioxide would achieve comparatively good outcomes’.534 In the year following the 
conference, the State Council would approve a ‘sulphur dioxide emission fee pilot programme’. 
Three years later, the NPC would pass an updated revision to the Law of the PRC on the 
Prevention and Control of Air Pollution that included FGD within ‘control zones’ (İt) to 
curb sulphur dioxide. 535  Such measures show that the Chinese government’s outlook on 
technological strategies was beginning to change towards ecological modernisation-based 
policies and legislation. 
The zeitgeist surrounding Qu Geping’s remarks was the global shift towards the idea of 
‘sustainable development’ (ĨǷã), popularised by the Brundtland Commission in 1987. 
By 1991, Chinese officials were preparing for the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro to be held in June 1992. In the lead up to this, the State 
Council released Ten Countermeasures for China’s Environment and Development. Within 
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this policy, the State Council used the concept of sustainable development for the first time in 
order to harmonise China’s developmental ambitions and environmental responsibilities: 
At present, China’s economic development still basically follows the traditional development model 
characterised by massive consumption of resources and extensive management. This model will not only 
cause considerable damage to the environment but also make development itself challenging to last. 
Therefore, changing the development strategy and taking the road of sustainable development are the 
correct choices to accelerate China’s economic development and solve environmental problems.536  
This policy also embraced technology and the environment in a new discursive framework 
which suggested that Qu’s time to successfully promote ecological modernisation ideas had 
finally arrived. The State Council conceded that ‘outdated industrial equipment and backward 
technology were the main reasons’ that pollution and environmental degradation was growing. 
For any new plants, ‘the starting technical level needed to be high’.537 The Chinese government 
went to the Rio Conference with an established consensus that technology was a means to 
achieve sustainable development. After the three-day Earth Summit, the Chinese government 
signed the non-binding action plan for sustainable development known as Agenda 21.538 Then, 
a year later, China released its China’s Agenda 21 strategy that positioned technology as a 
crucial element of sustainable development (see Chapter Two).  
The lead government official who both designed and implemented China’s Agenda 21 was 
the former missile scientist Song Jian ÎB . He was the chairman of both the National 
Environmental Protection Commission (a position he inherited from Li Peng) and the State 
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC).539  In a 1995 article in China Resources, 
Population and Environment, which detailed China’s sustainable development strategy, Song 
conveyed how he viewed the relationship between technology and environmental protection. 
In particular, he boasted that China: 
now possesses more advanced scientific and technological management methods. For example, some new 
desulphurisation technologies, which have already been used or are being developed at home and abroad, 
are much cheaper than initial investment placed in conventional desulphurisation technologies and 
equipment, and they do not produce secondary pollution. High-tech, advanced and applicable technologies 
can do much to build a new generation of environmental protection industries. For example, biotechnology, 
new material technology, new energy technology, and digital information technology can all play a 
significant role in different spheres and industries. This leapfrogging development… will bring into play 
the role of science and technology as a primary productivity function. As long as we stick to this direction, 
it is possible to narrow the gap between us and the developed countries considerably.540  
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Song’s comments reflect an ecological modernisation approach to China’s future development. 
Firstly, he saw technological innovation, such as ‘new desulphurisation technologies’ and other 
‘new energy technologies’, as critical elements in raising the productivity of China’s 
enterprises across multiple industries in a manner that would protect, rather than degrade, the 
environment. Moreover, he saw such technological innovation as feasible because China would 
leverage, or ‘leapfrog’ (ɎɌ), off the technologically-advanced nations. This optimism in 
technological leapfrogging would provide an essential element for ecological modernisation 
policy concepts such as ‘cleaner production’ and ‘circular economy’, providing the hope that 
technological progress would facilitate economic development along with environmental 
protection (see later section and Chapter Six). 
So far, this chapter has charted how China’s ecological rationality had progressed 
significantly ever since Zhou Enlai during the Maoist era had steered the Chinese government 
increasingly towards incorporating environmental issues into the policy agenda. By 1992, 
several transitions had occurred that would have far-reaching effects on how Chinese officials 
viewed the impact of economic development on the environment. Firstly, Chinese officials, led 
by Qu Geping, increasingly saw technology as a viable means to reduce the ecological impact 
of industrial development. Secondly, while Li Peng in the 1980s had argued that pollution-
prevention technology placed a substantial budgetary burden on the government and 
enterprises, by the early 1990s the prevailing view held that technology must serve as a critical 
element in reducing environmental damage from industrial activity. This change in position is 
evidenced by the State Council’s Ten Countermeasures for Environment and Development and 
the State Planning Commission and SSTC’s China’s Agenda 21. With the formulation of its 
Agenda 21 strategy, the Chinese government bound its officials within the strictures of 
sustainable development such that policymakers were obliged to formulate sustainable 
development strategies. No longer would the sole pursuit of economic objectives inherent 
within ‘traditional development’ (0ǵã)  remain a dominant policy position.541 This progress 
within the environmental sphere soon intersected with another crucial development in the early 
1990s: China’s reaffirming further market reforms after a period of ‘retrenchment’ in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident (see Chapter Four). The question for China’s 
officials in the early 1990s became how they could continue with their market reforms in a 
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manner that conformed with sustainable development. Their initial answer to that question was 
‘cleaner production’ (ƐƂư#). That answer, as the rest of this chapter argues, constituted 
China’s first ecological modernisation policy concept. 
The ‘Cleaner Production’ Policy Debate in China 
Conceptual origins of cleaner production. Before discussing the origins and evolution of 
‘cleaner production’ in China, this section provides a brief history of the concept and how it 
relates to the discourse of ecological modernisation. The idea of cleaner production originates 
from industry and policy discussions outside China during the late 1980s. Support for cleaner 
production gained momentum internationally due to a series of ‘high level’ UNEP workshops 
in the late 1980s. These workshops acted as ‘industry’s response’ to the World Commission 
on Environment and Development’s report, Our Common Future, that called for ‘sustainable 
development’ in the late 1980s.542 With the international community working towards the 1992 
United Nations environmental summit in Rio de Janeiro, industry needed to provide 
technological solutions which allowed commercial operations to continue only so long as they 
integrated an understanding of ecological limits. The position that economic goals outweighed 
a healthy functioning biosphere was no longer acceptable. Cleaner production leveraged off 
the notion that ‘pollution prevention pays’ (or 3P). Key industrial giants such as 3M propagated 
the view that companies could eliminate or drastically curtail pollution within the production 
process profitably if they used clean technological processes.543 The view was that beyond the 
environment, cleaner production would also achieve economic efficiency because it would use 
resources more efficiently and consume fewer inputs. With the aid of input from policy experts 
and engineers, as well as a series of UNEP workshops, the UNEP formulated a definition of 
cleaner production in the lead up to the Rio de Janeiro United Nations conference. This 
definition has remained similar to standard contemporary definitions of cleaner production: 
namely, that ‘cleaner production is the continuous application of an integrated preventive 
environmental strategy applied to processes, products and services to increase overall 
efficiency, and reduce risks to humans and the environment’.544  
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While the UNEP workshops defined cleaner production, the Rio Earth Summit enshrined 
cleaner production within the United Nations’ non-binding action plan for sustainable 
development: Agenda 21. The concept became an essential element of sustainable development 
strategies worldwide. In particular, Chapter 30 of the United Nation’s Agenda 21 stated that:  
Through more efficient production processes, preventive strategies, cleaner production technologies 
[emphasis added] and procedures throughout the product life cycle, hence minimising or avoiding wastes, 
the policies and operations of business and industry, including transnational corporations, can play a 
significant role in reducing impacts on resource use and the environment. Technological innovations, 
development, applications, transfer and the more general aspects of partnership and cooperation are to a 
considerable extent within the province of business and industry.545 
With this statement, the global community collectively understood technology as an integral 
element of cleaner production. The Rio signatories also agreed that technology would become 
the panacea for economic development as well as past environmental degradation and 
pollution. In the wake of the United Nations conference, the European Commission, the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation and the World Bank further popularised the 
concept in a series of publications and conferences.546 The seductiveness of cleaner production, 
and therefore its ongoing appeal, has been its promise of a potential ‘zero emissions’ future 
where continued economic growth and wellbeing would be decoupled from industrial waste. 
These characteristics have garnered the attention of ecological modernisation theorists who 
have discussed cleaner production technology within their discussion of ‘ecological 
modernisation’.547  
It is these aspects of the concept that demonstrate its discursive compatibility with 
ecological modernisation. The internalising of environmentally sustainable notions within 
industry offered the pathway to sustainable development. Therefore, rather than reduce 
production and economic growth until pollution fell within ecological limits, capitalist 
economies could continue along an ecologically informed, but business-as-usual, trajectory. It 
was these attractive qualities that would also appeal to China’s environmental policymakers 
such as Qu Geping who had experience working with, and had linkages with, the global 
environmental epistemic community. 
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Chinese environmental bureaucrats and cleaner production. The discussion of cleaner 
production in China emerged out of the growing ecological rationality towards pollutants and 
resource use and the view that technology could mitigate the seemingly inevitable creation of 
pollution. As the discussion within China’s policymaking circles started to favour 
technological investment at the start of the 1990s, the idea that China’s industry should adopt 
‘clean technology’ (ƐƂèȐ) began to become more prominent within China’s science and 
environmental policy journals.548 Policy discussion soon emerged from China’s SEPB, led then 
by Qu Geping, whose policy research departments focused on formulating environmental 
policies that acted in harmony with China’s economic development objectives. 
Researchers from the SEPB called for the government to move away from ‘traditional 
development’ to adopting cleaner production as its core environmental protection strategy. Cao 
Fengzhong ŎW and his colleagues from the SEPB wrote influential articles concerning 
possible policy measures to ‘encourage clean technologies in China’ to cope with its severe 
environmental pollution.549  In a 1991 article, Cao conceded the strength in adopting the 
‘penalty’ (ǽ) measures (ie. command-and-control measures) in its environmental manage-
ment. However, he said that currently China’s industrial enterprises were little more than 
‘passive managers of pollution’ (ȠlſŻ), and their passivity towards pollution control 
needed to shift.550 Cao evaluated examples of tax exemptions, subsidies, and low-interest loans 
from abroad to try and find the best measure to move Chinese polluters away from the mindset 
of ‘I am required to manage pollution’ (ȡĜſŻ) to ‘I want to manage pollution’ (ĜȡſŻ). 
With the use of ‘rewards’ (Â) rather than fines, Cao argued that China’s enterprises would 
become ‘voluntary managers of pollution’ (lſŻ). Moreover, state subsidies to ‘encourage’ 
(ʦo) the adoption of cleaner production technology made economic sense in his opinion. He 
believed that although in the beginning there would be economic costs, it would reduce 
spending on environmental management in the long-run, meaning that ‘funds would be used 
more effectively’.551 Cao closed his article by demonstrating the convergence in economic and 
ecological rationality and how this guided his support for cleaner technologies:  
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Establishing an environmental protection incentive mechanism would promote enterprises to carry out 
environmental pollution control work actively, reduce the emission of harmful substances, turn harm into 
profit, turn waste into treasure, open up new ways for industrial raw materials and material sources, and 
bring profits to enterprises. It also brings vitality [to the economy]. Establishing an environmental 
protection incentive mechanism can promote enterprises to actively rely on the advancement of science 
and technology, reform and eliminate backward technologies, adopt advanced technologies, implement 
clean processes, make full use of resources and energy, and maximise the elimination of pollution in the 
production process.552 
Cao’s article expressed an the ecological modernisation interpretation of China’s future 
environmental protection. He believed that, through offering incentives, the government would 
facilitate the broader use of pollution-abatement technology. Policy incentives would also 
allow Chinese enterprises to make a profit, thus hopefully removing their hitherto passive 
stance towards pollution control. Cleaner production’s focus on profit thus dovetailed with 
China’s path to a socialist market economy. His comments therefore implicitly reflected the 
view that Chinese authorities needed to hasten the development of ecological modernisation 
through the use of such policy instruments. 
Unsurprisingly, considering SEPB researchers were under his leadership, Qu Geping 
became the first senior official to openly advocate cleaner production. From the early 1990s 
onwards, he reiterated the view that Chinese investment in technology designed to reduce or 
eliminate industrial waste was ‘far from enough’ (əə
»), especially when taking into 
account the extraordinary growth that China’s industry experienced across the 1980s. China 
needed to ‘vigorously promote and utilise all kinds of new technologies, processes and 
equipment that were free from waste’.553 Qu began advocating for ‘cleaner production’ after 
he had left the SEPB to become the vice-chairman of the NPC Environment and Resource 
Protection Committee. 554  In his new position, Qu oversaw the review of legislation that 
touched on environmental matters in China, strengthening his influence over China’s 
environmental policy in a direction that conformed with an ecological modernisation 
perspective.  
Indeed, once Qu was in his new position, he published an essay calling for the introduction 
of cleaner production into the policy agenda of the Chinese government. His article conveyed 
 
552 Ibid, 10. 
553 Qu Geping 1992, 5. 
554 Qu Geping 1994a. 
 
 129 
the criticism of China’s economic development that had characterised his environmental policy 
discourse of the 1980s. Qu stated that ‘China’s environmental conditions’ were similar to those 
experienced by developed countries in the 1960s. Once China started to ‘accelerate [its] 
industrialisation and urbanisation’, its environmental pollution ‘would reach an unacceptable 
level’.555 However, Qu saw hope in cleaner production: ‘as long as clean production is placed 
on the agenda of industrial policy, after a period of hard work, I believe that the industrial 
environment of our country will undergo tremendous changes’.556 Although Qu continued his 
critical stance on China’s development, he maintained his earlier optimism of the early 1980s 
(see earlier section), especially concerning learning from the experience of foreign nations. For 
China to achieve cleaner production, it needed to ‘adopt measures that have proven to be 
effective…in developed nations’. 557  In a 1994 essay, he again drew attention to external 
inspiration for cleaner production. He acknowledged how cleaner production emerged from 
the UNEP conference on preventive environmental management in 1991, as well as the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation and World Bank. For example, he mentioned 
that these organisations ‘had vigorously promoted “clean technology” and “clean 
production”’.558  
In another 1994 essay published in the Party journal Seeking Truth, Qu further elaborate his 
ideas on cleaner production. He framed cleaner production within the broader narrative of 
sustainable development. He described the importance of cleaner production as: 
The fundamental transformation away from traditional models of development. It is the inevitable choice 
that leads to a new path of industrialisation and to realise sustainable development. Cleaner production is 
an important measure to increase company competitiveness … source reduction occurs through improved 
technologies and processes that reduce energy and material consumption, thus reducing pollutant 
emissions. Since the 1980s, these types of measures in developed countries have had substantial 
developments and not only have become effective measures to control pollution and improve the 
environment but also have become a positive pathway to reduce energy consumption and raise economic 
efficiency.559  
Even though FGD technology was considered an integral part of China’s environmental 
protection policy, Qu’s remarks during this period represent a divergence from simple ‘end-of-
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pipe management’ (Ŗǡ¸ƭ) to focus also on ‘source reduction’ (ƓdU).560 He focused on 
rising levels of pollution to make his case, reporting that China’s enterprises in the 1980s had 
made great ‘efforts’ (ng) to reduce pollutants, but even with these efforts the levels of sulphur 
dioxide, nitrous oxide and hydrocarbons had risen to ‘serious’ (ɧ) levels.561 With pollution 
levels predicted to experience significant surges as China continued its modernisation, Qu saw 
cleaner production as the only way that China would be able to handle its rapid economic 
development in primary industries such as ‘steel, electricity, cement, petroleum, coal, 
transportation and chemicals’. He stated that environmentally-centred investment in these 
industries would incur costs in the early stage, but those costs would grow even higher as the 
years progressed unless early action was taken, and in the future the environmental investment 
costs ‘may be higher than originally estimated’.562 With an optimistic ecological modernisation 
outlook that emphasised the economic gains that would result from restructuring industry along 
more sustainable lines, he believed that the improvements in economic efficiency and reduced 
resource inputs would yield the requisite profits to offset the initial cost of pollution abatement. 
Therefore, China needed to invest in cleaner production technology immediately and reap the 
benefits of further economic growth.  
This review of Qu’s early advocacy for cleaner production reveals how the intersection of 
his ecological rationality and economic rationality led to the promotion of ecological 
modernisation ideas. In other words, Qu accepted that China would need to continue its 
industrial development but that it could do so in a manner that both strengthened environmental 
protection and increased economic competitiveness. His argument was a return to his views of 
the early 1980s that developed nations could provide an example for China to follow. This can 
be interpreted as a measure of the waning economic rationality promoted by Li throughout the 
1980s. 
Other prominent senior officials joined Qu in support of cleaner production. Song Jian, the 
chairman of the SSTC and lead author of the China’s Agenda 21 strategy, regarded cleaner 
production as a necessary means for China to achieve its sustainable development objectives. 
In a 1994 speech, Song argued that if China did achieve sustainable development, it would 
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need the ‘the widespread promotion and application of environmentally sound technologies 
and clean production technologies that unified economic development and environmental 
protection, placing economic development within the interests of protecting resources and the 
environment’. With sustainable development and the adoption of clean technologies, ‘the 
industrial sector no longer needs to regard resources and environmental protection as a legal 
burden’.563 Similar to the comments by Qu Geping and Cao Fengzhong, Song saw ‘cleaner 
production’ as an economic opportunity. 
Qu Geping’s successor at the SEPB, Xie Zhenhua, continued to make a case for cleaner 
production once Qu had transferred to the NPC’s Environment and Resource Protection 
Committee.564 For example, in 1996, he referred to ‘cleaner production’ in an article which 
explored the best means to ‘implement a sustainable development strategy and promote 
coordinated economic and environmental development’.565 In this article, he detailed how 
China’s ‘economic growth’ had so far been supported by a ‘traditional planned economic 
system…that was characterised by high input, high consumption, and high pollution...[with] 
low economic efficiency and major economic and technical indicators that have lagged far 
behind developed countries’. However, in this new socialist market economy era, Xie argued 
that to combat ‘worsening environmental pollution’ China’s traditional modes of production 
needed to ‘transform production’ and implement ‘a selection of production methods and 
consumption patterns that were beneficial for conserving resources and protecting the 
environment’ through adopting ‘cleaner production’.566 Xie’s comments, coupled with Qu’s 
earlier remarks, demonstrate a reflexive ecological modernisation interpretation of China’s 
development based on market economic rationality. Based on this economic mindset, growing 
environmental impact was a reason in itself to seek out a balance between economic and 
environmental objectives using the market rather than traditional command-and-control 
environmental strategies.  
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 Cleaner production enters the policy agenda. Between 1992 and 1997, cleaner 
production started to enter China’s environmental policy agenda formally and become a 
concept that was ubiquitous within key policies and legislation.567 For instance, the 1995 Law 
of the PRC on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste stated 
that ‘the state encourages and supports the adoption of cleaner production technologies that 
reduce the generation of solid waste’ (discussed further in Chapter Six).568 The State Council 
also released the Resolution on Several Issues Concerning Environmental Protection in 1996 
that emphasised ‘the promotion of cleaner production’.569 Then in 1997, the SEPB released its 
Policy Suggestions and Action Plans for the Promotion of Cleaner Production. This policy 
provided the most explicit policy position at that time concerning cleaner production. It 
summarised cleaner production as: 
The use of clean energy and raw materials to produce clean products through a clean production process. 
Cleaner production continuously applies comprehensive preventative environmental strategies to 
production processes and products, thereby reducing risks to humans and the environment; it is a necessary 
means to promote the transformation of economic growth patterns and achieve the goal of total pollutant 
control.570 
The policy document also stated that: 
Enterprises are the mainstay of cleaner production. According to the cleaner production goal of “increasing 
efficiency, reducing consumption, saving energy and reducing pollution” (¶ķʄȄȑȊUŻ), 
enterprises should implement cleaner production in combination with strengthening enterprise 
management, technological transformation, resource conservation and comprehensive utilisation and 
establishing a modern enterprise system. They should implement cleaner production as a necessary means 
to achieve pollutant discharge standards and pollutant emission control indicators.571 
With this passage, the SEPB expressed the ecological modernisation beliefs that underpinned 
their support of cleaner production. This ecological modernisation stemmed from a perspective 
whereby clean technology, enterprise efficiency and the market were the path towards 
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sustainable development, rather than solely relying on state control through environmental 
management as the only means for companies to achieve pollution abatement. 
Then, in October 2002, the NPC passed the Cleaner Production Promotion Law to ‘improve 
the efficiency of resource utilisation, reduce and avoid pollutant generation, protect and 
improve the environment, safeguard human health, and promote sustainable economic and 
social development’.572 The law addressed ‘encouragement measures’ such as government 
subsidies, low-interest loans, and tax exemptions or reduction, as well as ‘legal liabilities’ such 
as fines for companies that ignore cleaner production regulations, for example non-compliance 
of auditing and information disclosure.573 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
critique the reality of cleaner production in China, analysts have noted that ‘many barriers exist 
in China’s CP [cleaner production] promotion procedure, such as the lack of co-benefit 
calculation demonstration, low awareness and misconception of CP, inadequate institutional 
framework, constraints in technological facilities and financial support, limited market of CP 
services, internal conflicts of implementing agencies, and so on’.574 Nonetheless, the fact that 
Chinese authorities further revised the cleaner production law in 2012 to integrate objectives 
of ‘energy consumption’ reductions suggests that the ecological modernisation concept was 
becoming entrenched within China’s environmental policy discourse.575 
Cleaner production, ecological modernisation and China’s economic bureaucracy. To 
leave the discussion of cleaner production at the promulgation of the eponymously titled law 
would neglect an essential aspect of the early ecological modernisation story in China: the 
discursive expansion of ecological modernisation ideas to include economic sectors of the 
Chinese government. Thus far, this chapter has shown that the majority of commentary 
concerning environmental reform stemmed from senior environmental bureaucrats such as Qu 
Geping and researchers under his supervision at the SEPB. Therefore, the inclusion of the 
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concept by the research institutes of the developmentally-oriented State Planning Commission 
(SPC) and Chinese Academy of Sciences in the mid-1990s marked a significant development 
in the evolution of ecological modernisation ideas.576 For example, Sun Honglie Éʣƛ in his 
position as a policy researcher from the joint SPC-China Academy of Science Committee for 
the Comprehensive Survey of Natural Resources577 argued that cleaner production was the 
‘key’ (Mɶ) to combatting environmental pollution. In his opinion, China’s enterprises needed 
to ‘utilise clean technology, rather than relying on end-of-pipe technology’ if they were to 
arrest the growing pollution problem caused by China’s rapid ‘urbanisation and 
industrialisation’.578 He stressed that TVEs largely contributed to the vast bulk of industrial 
pollution. Although TVEs had ‘solved the rural labour surplus problem’ and contributed to 
‘one-third of China’s economic output’, their pollution, if ignored, would result in 
‘unimaginable consequences’. Sun noted that because of TVE’s smaller economies of scale, 
they ‘lacked the capacity to build end-of-pipe processing facilities’. Therefore, more scientific 
research was needed to find ‘clean production technological systems suitable for small-
scale…TVEs’. 579  Moreover, because these small TVEs could not undertake innovative 
scientific research, the government needed to step in and provide that investment. Sun’s paper 
shows how even developmental agencies now saw the merits of cleaner production technology 
and how ecological modernisation discourse was influencing even the government’s economic 
organs.  
The involvement of economic agencies in environmental policy further progressed after a 
major administrative reshuffle of government departments in late 1997. The State Council 
created the State Economic Trade Commission (SETC), entrusting it with taking the lead in 
finalising cleaner production legislation. The State Council created the SETC out of the old 
SPC with the other functions of the SPC transferred to the newly established State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC).580 This move, as noted above, would have far-
reaching effects on the ongoing incorporation of ecological modernisation solutions within 
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China’s environmental policy agenda. As scholars have previously noted, economic agencies 
traditionally had more bureaucratic clout than environmental protection agencies such as the 
SEPB, even granted that the latter’s bureaucratic level was also upgraded to that of an 
‘administration’ (ĕâ) in the 1998 reshuffle.581  
This strengthening clout was revealed in comments by the inaugural deputy director of the 
SETC, Li Rongrong, in an article for China Population, Resources and Environment.582 Li was 
a chemical engineer who graduated from Tianjin University just before the Cultural Revolution 
commenced. From 1968, he worked in a chemical factory in Jiangsu, rising from a factory 
worker to the head of the factory. In 1986, he transferred into policymaking, taking up a series 
of economic policy leadership positions in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province before being promoted to 
the role of deputy director of the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation in the State 
Council’s Economic and Trade Office583. He transferred to other economic reform departments 
within the government before taking up his position as deputy director of the SETC in 1997.584 
Despite his rise through economic channels, Li showed enthusiasm for cleaner production, 
noting that it would allow China to achieve both ‘environmental and economic benefits’ and 
that it held ‘the key to preventing industrial pollution’ in addition to being ‘an important 
measure to achieve coordinated development of the environment and economy’.585 In 1999, Li 
helped oversee the SETC’s Cleaner Production Demonstration Projects Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Chongqing, Shenyang, Taiyuan, Jinan, Kunming, Lanzhou and Fuyang across the 
petrochemical, smelting, chemical engineering, light manufacturing and shipping industries.586 
Comments by Li in a 2003 article once he became the first director of the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission further illustrate how the developmental 
side of China’s bureaucracy had incorporated cleaner production, and thus ecological 
modernisation ideas, into their developmental thinking. SASAC, as explained in Chapter 
Three, was the bureaucratic agency created by the State Council in 2003 to oversee China’s 
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SOEs as they underwent further reform to the ‘modern enterprise system’ (ƪ',,cø). Li 
remarked how ‘cleaner production was a new policy prevention strategy that has been 
introduced in order to overcome the environmental abuse of end of pipe management’.587 Li’s 
other remarks in the article deserve to be included in full because they also convey how China’s 
developmental bureaucracy had incorporated the idea of cleaner production within an 
ecological modernisation framework that intertwined economic and environmental benefits. 
He remarked that: 
the implementation of cleaner production is a necessary transformative path that takes industrial pollution 
from simple end-of-pipe management to preventive pollution. Traditional end-of-pipe management and 
production processes are divorced from “pollute first, clean up later” (DŻťſƭ) to instead be based 
on “management” (ſ). From the source, cleaner production is implementing production process controls 
and reducing or eliminating the production of pollutants to be instead based on “prevention” (ɽ). With 
traditional end-of-pipe management, the investment is costly, the management is difficult, and the 
operating costs are high. Moreover, environmental benefits and economic benefits are not integrated, with 
companies lacking the enthusiasm for preventing pollution. Cleaner production maximises the use of 
resources and eliminates contaminants in the production process. Thus it not only radically improves 
environmental conditions, but it also reduces energy, raw materials and production costs, improves 
economic efficiency, and achieves “a win-win situation” (Ɇ) for the economy and environment. The 
most significant difference between clean production and traditional end-of-pipe management is finding 
that juncture between environmental and economic benefits capable of encouraging companies to adjust 
to prevent pollution.588  
Li’s remarks align with many of the ecological modernisation ideas drawn from literature in 
Chapter Two: technology, economic benefits, win-win outcomes, and new modes of 
development. By injecting a business perspective into the rationale behind cleaner production, 
he was also able to promote the benefits of the concept to a broader audience, outside the 
environmental policy portfolios.  
Li was not the only economic official who advocated for cleaner production methods. For 
instance, the new minister of the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), Ma Kai 
ʞX, in discussing the Cleaner Production Promotion Law, called for the ‘promotion of 
cleaner production’ in a 2003 article.589 Ma Kai’s ideas concerning a circular economy are 
explored in Chapter Six. The SDPC also weighed in on cleaner production. In a 1999 article, 
SDPC Chairman Zeng Peiyan ŏ±ƙ called for the ‘strengthening of international cooperation 
in the field of climate change’ that would help ‘promote clean production and technological 
progress as well as facilitate the adjustment of its industrial structure and energy structure’.590 
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These views concerning cleaner production show that by the beginning of the twenty-first 
century ecological modernisation beliefs had diffused from the environmental policy sectors 
of China’s government into the economic fields of China’s bureaucracy. Finally, these 
economic stakeholders joined the SEPB and its predecessors to promote ‘environmental 
protection work’ (Ʃµ>Ĥè8) that conformed with their nascent ecological modernisation 
beliefs.  
Conclusion: The Policy Objective of Cleaner Production in China and Ecological 
Modernisation 
This chapter has charted the development of ecological rationality towards industrial 
pollution in China. Premier Zhou Enlai understood that China’s socialist modernisation was 
not as harmless as Maoist acolytes believed. Then, from the Reform era onwards, 
environmental officials led by Qu Geping believed that China should transition towards 
pollution-prevention technology. Their views were stymied by other more powerful economic 
officials such as Li Peng who believed, from an economic development perspective, that China 
could ill-afford expensive technology at the early stages of China’s industrialisation. 
Environmental management, or command-and-control measures, were viewed as more cost-
effective for preventing pollution. However, the adoption of a ‘socialist market economy’ and 
‘sustainable development’ as twin guiding principles for the CCP presented the Party with a 
‘policy straight jacket’. Any further policies would have to achieve the twin objectives of 
growing the economy and reducing environmental impact from industrial pollution. The 
convergence of economic and ecological rationality had arrived for Chinese policymakers. 
Therefore, with the further loosening of state controls as China embarked upon more market 
reforms, Chinese officials sought out technology, rather than further environmental 
management measures, as a critical element of their environmental protection strategy. From 
this point on, researchers within the SEPB and senior environmental policymakers such as Qu 
Geping and Xie Zhenhua started to advocate for cleaner production. 
Ecological modernisation also emerged in Chinese policy discourse through the arguments 
for cleaner production and the way in which economic considerations gradually submitted to a 
steadily evolving ecological rationality amongst China’s officials. In the Li Peng era, economic 
objectives held the ascendency amongst China’s elite policymakers, but by the early 1990s, the 
ecological rationality in China’s government grew to the point where it challenged, at least 
rhetorically, China’s economic rationality. This challenge has led to a greater convergence of 
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economic and ecological rationality within environmental policy reform in China. This 
convergence is demonstrated by officials from economic departments such as the SETC and 
SDPC, not just the SEPB, promoting cleaner production. Moreover, the State Council also 
entrusted the SETC with cleaner production work, demonstrating the importance that it placed 
on getting ‘economic benefits’ in synchronicity with ‘environmental benefits’ and having the 
economic managers in charge of the direction of key environmental reforms. 
The idea of cleaner production in China is based on strong faith in the role that market actors 
perform in ecological modernisation. Song Jian’s comments when promoting the China’s 
Agenda 21 action plan indicated that he saw cleaner production as a mechanism that would 
allow China to undertake ‘leapfrogging development’ and experience boosts in its 
‘fundamental productivity’. This belief in market actors goes to the crux of China’s market 
reforms, whereby China loosened state control on its enterprises to grow the economy (see 
Chapter Four). Chinese officials understood in the early 1980s that the main driver of economic 
growth and prosperity in China, TVEs, also generated large amounts of pollution. Once China’s 
leaders adopted a ‘socialist market economy’ as one of the new guiding principles at the Third 
Plenum of the 14th Party Congress in 1993, they also had to reconcile how they would 
undertake necessary environmental protection work in a manner that would not harm the 
rapidly growing economy. Upgrading equipment with cleaner technology would allow these 
TVEs not only to increase their productivity through more efficient operations but also 
minimise adverse impacts on the environment. The government could assist with upgrading 
equipment through tax subsidies and exemptions for smaller TVEs with limited resources to 
undertake research and development for cleaner production. With cleaner production, the 
government wanted to facilitate the market as a means to protect the environment. The crucial 
role of the market in cleaner production explains the new position that economic agencies 
occupied within environmental protection policymaking. The SEPB had played the lead role 
in environmental protection work up until the mid-1990s, but even with that history the State 
Council entrusted the SETC to take over the handling of cleaner production legislation and 
cleaner production demonstration projects. 
Lastly, this chapter has also shown how the environmental concern that drives cleaner 
production has stemmed from the reflective view that ‘traditional development’ had resulted 
in significant levels of pollution. This view recognised that pollution would present China with 
long-term problems if its development continued at its present pace and form. In this way, 
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cleaner production constitutes a reflexive interpretation of their modernisation, which is 
another component of an ecological modernisation discourse (see Chapter Three). With this 
reflexive understanding, the rhetoric used by senior officials illustrates the ecological 
modernisation path which they see as a solution to China’s current adverse environmental 
circumstances. Rather than treat these adverse environmental circumstances as a reason to de-
modernise the economy or even dismantle China’s burgeoning market economy, as 
demodernisationists E.F. Schumacher or neo-Marxists such as Allan Schnaiberg would argue 
(see Chapter Two), senior officials believed that the only way out of the present environmental 
predicament was through further (environmentally-centred) modernisation. This reflexivity 
and the strategies to foster cleaner production suggests that, while the policymakers canvassed 
in this chapter never used the term ‘ecological modernisation’ (ưđƪ'r), they sought to 
manufacture such a process within Chinese industry.  
Now this thesis will move on to exploring the concept of the ‘circular economy’. Circular 
economy provides an important environmental reform concept to examine because it 
materialised near the end of the 1990s while the legislative deliberations on cleaner production 
were underway within the NPC. An examination of the circular economy debate in China 
provides the opportunity to compare it to cleaner production to determine its similarities and 
differences. The following chapter will ask the same questions that framed this chapter: where 
did the notion of a circular economy come from? Which environmental problems strengthened 
the rationale for the implementation of a circular economy? Which individuals and institutions 
promoted a circular economy? In doing this, this thesis will be able not only to examine the 
extent to which ecological modernisation ideas have influenced China’s environmental policy 
agenda, but also the degree in which these ideas have evolved within that said agenda.  
 140 
Chapter Six: Circular Economy in China 
Chapter Five outlined the evolution of concern in China toward pollution, and how the 
growing unease over pollution resulted in the enacting of the Cleaner Production Promotion 
Law in 2003. In the wake of growing interest in the concept of sustainable development and 
China’s Agenda 21, cleaner production marked a significant milestone for Chinese 
environmental protection because this policy idea became the first ecological modernisation 
concept to be incorporated into official Chinese environmental policy discourse. Cleaner 
production drew on many of the core principles of an ecological modernisation belief system: 
a reverence for science and technology, a balance of ecological and economic considerations 
and a belief that cleaner production would promote new economic growth in a mutually 
reinforcing virtuous circle.  
This chapter shifts to a discussion of an environmental reform concept that developed 
around the same time as cleaner production: ‘circular economy’ (ČƩǳƇ). While this chapter 
will touch on many of the themes discussed in the last chapter (industrial pollution), it focuses 
more on the policy commentary of officials that drew attention to the environmental impact of 
population growth, high resource use and growing waste. From that historical foundation, it 
introduces the intellectual history of circular economy and its academic and policy discussion 
in China, focusing particularly on the policy discourse that surfaced from officials within the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC). The chapter concludes by arguing that ‘circular economy’ reveals itself, 
like cleaner production, as a reform measure that is characterised by ideas of ecological 
modernisation, namely technological and market optimism.  
The Origins of the Circular Economy Policy Discussion in China 
Population growth in China and ecological rationality. It is necessary to begin with an 
examination of the population policy debate in China and how this debate intersected with 
growing ecological rationality in China in order to understand why the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) incorporated circular economy into China’s environmental policy agenda in 
2007. As Chapter Two discussed, population growth was considered a positive development 
in the early years of the Maoist era. However, Chinese authorities, especially under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, soon realised that unchecked population growth would hinder 
China’s modernisation. After education measures failed to slow the population sufficiently, 
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from 1978 onwards the Chinese leadership started to consider the idea of a one-child policy to 
slow China’s population growth. In 1979, the People’s Daily reported that Chen Muhua ʃĚ
u, the then chairman of the State Council’s Family Planning Leading Group591, stated that 
moving ‘the focus of birth control work to having one child is the best approach’.592 In 1980, 
the Chinese leadership instituted the one-child policy that would limit families to one child, 
with two children allowed only in exceptional circumstances.593 
The most prominent advocate against continued population growth was Song Jian, the 
former missile scientist and future chairman of the National Environmental Protection 
Commission. The previous chapter touched on his ideas concerning cleaner production. Song 
first publicly raised the spectre of population growth in a 1980 article published in China 
Science jointly with his Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) colleague You Jingyuan 
ŉC. Their article presented a series of projections concerning China’s population growth 
and declared that if the birth rate grew from its current level of 2.8 births per woman to 3 births 
per woman, then China’s population would rise to 4 billion by 2050.594 By the early 1980s, 
China’s population had already reached over one billion people, thus heightening the fear of a 
‘population explosion’ (%Ɩ¶).595 Song argued in an article for the Guangming Daily that 
China’s optimal population was between 650 and 700 million.596 The main reasoning for this 
population target was influenced by an economic rationality that interpreted uncontrolled 
population growth as a severe complication for China’s socialist modernisation, a key goal of 
Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese leadership at the time being the creation of a ‘modern China’. 
Song linked population policy to that goal, arguing in a 1981 book that population growth 
would harm China as it ‘pursued the goal of the four modernisations – i.e. agriculture, industry, 
defence, and science and technology – aiming to build a modern, strong socialist country’.597 
In particular, he stressed that population growth would hinder industrial and agricultural 
planning. 
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Crucially, for the exploration of ecological modernisation discourse in China, Song Jian 
went beyond mere economic arguments and made a case for why a large population in China 
would threaten vital ecosystems, revealing an ecological rationality that saw population growth 
as an existential threat to China. He stated that, thus far, in order to feed China’s population 
‘virgin land was opened up, and lakes were reclaimed and converted into fields’. These 
developments were a problem, he argued, because they ‘threatened to ultimately destroy the 
ecosystem which supports human life’. They also failed to take into account the fact that the 
‘capacity of the land was limited’.598 Interviews by China scholar Susan Greenhalgh with Song 
Jian revealed that he was influenced by the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth while on a study 
tour to Europe in the 1970s. Its catastrophist forecasts and quantitative reasoning resonated 
with Song Jian, who was familiar with its analytical methods because of his cybernetics 
research.599 Overall, Song’s remarks in the 1980s convey an economic rationality through his 
interpretation of population growth as a threat to China’s reform era modernisation. However, 
they also suggest an ecological awareness in the sense that a large population in China would 
provide a destabilising influence on the ecological system that the Chinese people depended 
upon for their future socio-economic development. As this chapter will reveal, these ideas 
would form the basis of an ecological understanding that Chinese officials used to advocate for 
a circular economy nearly two decades later.  
Qu Geping carried on the policy discussion started by Song Jian in his position as head of 
the State Council’s Environmental Protection Leading Small Group Office. The last chapter 
detailed how Qu played an integral role in fostering environmental awareness towards 
industrial pollution. He would perform a similar role regarding population growth, but due to 
the fact that economic arguments intertwined with the population debate, he was far from a 
lone voice in drawing attention to the environmental threat of a burgeoning population 
(discussed further below). In a series of papers in the early 1980s, he argued for population 
control because of the cumulative pressures that a large population placed on the environment. 
For instance, in a 1980 article exploring environmental protection measures and industrial 
growth, Qu focused on the negative environmental impact of China’s burgeoning population: 
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The destruction of natural ecology, the loss of land, and the impoverishment caused by population pressure 
not only reduce the resource base but also degrade the rural environment. Improper industrialisation not 
only wastes significant resources and pollutes the environment, but also causes populations to flood cities, 
creating one of the most severe environmental problems of the contemporary era: the congestion of the 
city and the deterioration of the environment.600 
Qu’s and Song’s comments reflected a new ecological awareness of the environmental 
disequilibrium caused by China’s population growth. In a two-part essay published in 
Environmental Protection in 1981, Qu further argued that population growth negatively 
impacted the environment to such a large extent that demography and environmental studies 
needed to become more intertwined, so that China’s policymakers could become better 
equipped to ‘formulate correct strategies’ to manage this vexed policy issue.601
A year later, Qu also argued for the continuation of China’s new population control policy, 
the one-child policy (ƦưÆÃĶǣ), which had only been in place for a year. He cautioned 
that ‘letting the population grow uncontrollably was not in the interest of present or future 
generations’ as the ‘human environment’ would find it difficult to ‘accommodate and sustain’ 
that number of people.602 In part two of his Environmental Protection articles on ‘population 
explosions’, Qu generally supported Song Jian’s optimal population target (or what he termed 
the ‘representative opinions’ 'ȟĔƺęȢ) of between 650 and 700 million. He remarked that 
with China’s population set to exceed this target population by ‘500 million’ in 2000, the 
Chinese government ‘should take firm measures to gradually lower the natural growth rate of 
the population to zero or even negative’ even if it took ‘hundreds of years of hard work’.603 
Qu’s reflections represented a grave concern for the ecological impact of population growth.  
The arguments for taking into account the impact of population growth on the environment 
were also gaining traction with other senior environmental officials. The minister for the 
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection, Li Ximing Ŝɳɯ, 
in a 1982 essay for Environmental Protection, mirrored many of Qu’s points about population 
and the environment:  
Rapid population and economic growth have exacerbated the consumption and depletion of resources, 
resulting in the pollution and destruction of the environment. The destruction of the natural ecological 
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balance and population pressures also has damaged rural environments. Irrational industrial development 
has caused the population to surge towards cities which also have caused the deterioration of contemporary 
urban environments.604 
Here Li touched on the notion of ‘ecological balance’ (ưđñȝ) to stress the need for 
government controls, such as the one-child policy, in order to reduce the imbalance caused by 
overwhelming population pressures. 
Furthermore, Li also exhibited a growing ecological rationality towards the effect that 
population had on the environment after he had been appointed to the State Council and been 
made the chairman of the National Environmental Protection Commission. Discussing the 
‘population issue’ (%ɻʘ) in a speech to the Second National Environmental Protection 
Conference held in Beijing (from December 1983 to January 1984), Li raised the spectre of 
population growth, saying that it had the potential to cause ‘ecological damage’ (ưđǌ«).605 
This was the same speech where he noted that more attention needed to be paid to the 
‘environmental pollution’ (ƩµŻť) caused by China’s economic modernisation.606  
The debate over a circular economy also had regard to one of the economic reasons behind 
further ‘controls’ (İc) on population growth: resource usage, specifically the high and 
inefficient use of energy resources. Senior officials were aware of China’s energy insecurity, 
and how population growth exacerbated that insecurity. In the earlier 1982 article published  
on China’s population explosion, Qu raised the ‘impact’ (ą) of a growing population on 
China’s energy resources. He noted that although there were many factors explaining why 
societies experienced ‘energy shortages’ (ȊƓǉǺ), the ‘pressure from a surging population 
was an important reason’.607 These shortages were having a ‘major impact on natural resources 
and the environment’ in rural areas. Qu noted that in developing countries:
Ninety per cent of the trees felled were burnt as fuel. In many areas, trees are cut, plants and straws burnt, 
and even livestock manure is used as fuel to burn. The burning of manure and straw has aggravated the 
decline of farmland fertility, reduced food production and made life even more impoverished.608 
These problems were also witnessed in China because its energy resources ‘were also very 
scarce’ if viewed in their ‘per capita amounts’ (%ªɨ), even if China had considerable 
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resources of coal and oil. This ‘per capita’ emphasis heightened the population variable in 
discussions over resource stocks.
Qu was speaking before China’s energy shortages became more prominent from the late 
1990s onwards, yet he seemed acutely aware of the future population and energy pressures that 
would face China. He noted that China could ‘vigorously develop and increase coal, oil, natural 
gas, hydropower, biogas, and fuelwood forests’, but due to its ‘large investment constraints 
and long construction period’ China would find it difficult to ‘overcome energy shortages for 
a long time’.609 Given this projection, it was ‘necessary to control the growth of the population’ 
to help ‘ease energy scarcity’. He pointed out that since 1980, when the government initiated 
the one-child policy, the natural population growth rate in 1980 had fallen from 19 per cent to 
12 per cent, while the population had only increased by 7 million in one year. Qu roughly 
calculated that this reduction in population growth also reduced the consumption of 6 million 
tonnes of standard coal.610 Later sections will show that such economic reasons formed the 
basis of ecological modernisation justifications for the implementation of a circular economy.
Population growth and the growth of waste. As China underwent its rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation, the steady accumulation of solid waste also drew concern 
from Chinese politicians and officials. It is necessary to discuss this official unease, because 
such anxiety would lead to calls for a circular economy by senior government officials in both 
the environmental and economic sections of China’s government by the late 1990s. 
Early on in the Mao era, senior Party officials were aware that, as well as pollution, China’s 
industrial enterprises were creating too much solid waste. For example, in 1964, Zhou Enlai 
remarked to an Albanian delegation that ‘concerning waste gas and waste material that can be 
used, attention should be paid to its reuse and full utilisation’.611 Chinese officials argued that 
‘comprehensive utilisation’ (ǸaƱ) of resources provided the best method to slow the 
accumulation of waste. Their idea of ‘comprehensive utilisation’ at the time rested on three 
elements. The first was to ensure that resources were used for a variety of products. For 
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example, researchers at the time argued that beyond thermal coal, raw coal could also be used 
for ‘synthetic rubber, sulphuric acid, synthetic fibre and plastics’.612 Comprehensive utilisation 
also extended to increasing the ‘utilisation rate’ (aƱƧ) of resources such as using wood 
material not only for the prime lumber but also using wood shavings for wood chipboards and 
particleboard. Lastly, comprehensive utilisation involved particular industries utilising by-
products from other industries. For instance, coal gangue from thermal coal power plants could 
be used as building material.613 
Throughout the 1980s Li Peng would make several brief references to solid waste in his 
speeches614, but again it was Qu Geping who would become the most vocal critic of solid-
waste stockpiles in China, seeing the growing stockpile of waste as a ‘serious problem’.615 
Following Zhou, he believed that the problem lay with the implementation of ‘comprehensive 
utilisation’. Although Qu saw the strengths in such a policy, he recognised that its efficacy 
amounted to little in its present form. In an earlier 1980 article, Qu remarked that even though 
China gave significant publicity to comprehensive utilisation of the three wastes ‘its actual 
progress was not great’. Comprehensive utilisation in China contained ‘no requirements, no 
indicators, nor any binding elements’.616 Moreover, he believed that the unsatisfactory progress 
with comprehensive utilisation stemmed from a significant gap in ‘knowledge’ (ȪȰ) among 
China’s industrial enterprises. The government would need to create ‘appropriate economic 
policies’ through ‘tax relief, tax exemption and price policy’ to engender ‘enthusiasm’ (ǙŢ
Ĕ) so that these companies could have the required funds to undertake meaningful utilisation 
of ‘waste gas, wastewater, and solid waste as key raw materials’.617 In this article, Qu was 
outlining an ecological modernisation vision for waste reduction policies that would form part 
of the arguments for circular economy close to two decades later (see later section for more 
detail). He argued that any profits these companies made through these subsidies would be 
‘used by companies to manage pollution and improve the environment’ rather than transferred 
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to the government.618 Formulating ‘appropriate economic policies’ that created profits for 
companies would allow a large amount of waste in China to be viewed as ‘treasure’ (Ò) rather 
than something to simply ‘discard’ (þ).619 Even though he did not explicitly use the term, Qu’s 
comments reflect his wish to internalise the concept of ‘sustainability’ within these industrial 
enterprises. 
Qu further remarked in a 1983 article in Environmental Protection that the country needed 
‘to undertake a good job in the comprehensive utilisation of natural resources and realise that 
the recycling of industrial emissions is one of the basic environmental protection 
countermeasures’.620 By the end of the 1980s, Qu became even more outspoken about China’s 
growing industrial waste. In a speech to the Third National Environmental Protection 
Conference in 1989, he noted that: 
discharges of industrial solid waste and urban waste were increasing with disposal and utilisation rates 
low. In 1988, the nation produced 560 million tonnes of industrial solid waste, and its comprehensive 
utilisation was only 26 per cent. Industrial and urban waste that has not been treated nor utilised mostly 
piles up in suburban residential areas, with a cumulative waste totalling 6.6 billion tonnes occupying 536 
square kilometres. It has become a serious source of secondary pollution. In addition, according to recent 
emission statistics of nine medium- to large-sized cities, more than 150 significant accidents of toxic and 
hazardous waste leakages have occurred, causing pollution of water, land and air, and seriously affecting 
human health.621 
Qu continued his advocacy for China to tackle its solid-waste problem at the Ministry of 
Energy’s 622  Power Industry Environmental Protection Work Conference in 1991. This 
conference was the same forum where he called attention to acid rain.623 Regarding ‘hazardous 
waste’ (ŒÖ÷ƣ), Qu noted that ‘its levels were steadily accumulating’.624 To reinforce the 
environmental significance of this point, he pointed to the Love Canal incident in the USA, 
noting that due to a chemical plant burying waste in a residential area of New York State, 
‘various diseases have occurred in this place’ with the ‘incidence of malignant tumours and 
deformed children particularly high’. He also noted how the US Government declared a ‘state 
of emergency in the area’, and how they were forced to relocate the residents at a cost of around 
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$4 billion, which Qu noted was ‘a very painful lesson’. He described to the conference 
attendees his trip to Northern Europe where he discovered that ‘the laws of these countries 
stipulate that waste should be sent to waste treatment centres for disposal’. He also stressed 
that the ‘factories are responsible for sending on this waste’ and paying appropriate fees 
sometimes amounting to ‘several thousand dollars per ton’. Qu Geping concluded this section 
of his talk by mentioning that ‘China’s issues with hazardous waste has not yet been 
discussed’.625 This discussion of toxic waste abroad demonstrates how Qu had absorbed some 
foreign lessons regarding environmental waste (mal-)management and through this came to 
ecological modernisation-based policy conclusions. 
The legislative culmination of these policy discussions was the Law of the PRC on the 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste, which the NPC passed in 
1995. This law sought to ‘encourage and support clean production to reduce the creation of 
solid waste…the comprehensive utilisation of resources, the full recovery and rational use of 
solid waste, and the adoption of economic and technological policies and measures conducive 
to making comprehensive use of solid waste’.626 This law classified solid waste into three 
distinct categories: municipal, industrial and hazardous. It also laid out the institutional system 
for waste management by defining institutional responsibilities.627  
The importance of the new solid waste law for this chapter’s focus is that it laid the 
legislative foundation for the idea of the ‘circular economy’, and the next section will examine 
that concept. It will suggest that this new environmental reform measure bore some of the 
hallmarks of ‘cleaner production’ in its focus on technological and market-based solutions. 
However, the concept of a circular economy expanded the ecological modernisation credentials 
of cleaner production by incorporating ecological-economics principles to solve China’s 
growing waste problem. Policymakers believed that China could ill-afford a continuation of 
linear development (or ‘traditional economic development’) that went from resources to 
production to consumption, and then on to waste. Therefore, they needed to implement a new 
circular developmental model for China that operated within ecological limits. 
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The Policy Discourse of a Circular Economy in China 
Conceptual origins of a ‘circular economy’. Before examining how circular economy 
took hold in China, this section will briefly examine the history of the concept. The idea of a 
circular economy arose from broader international environmental debates from the late 1960s 
onwards. This period marked a turning point in advanced capitalist countries where heterodox 
economists sought to integrate ecological principles into the discipline of economics. Kenneth 
Boulding was one such economist. Writing during the 1960s space race, he reflected on the 
steady build-up of waste, some of it radioactive and toxic, and argued that humanity needed to 
reconceptualise its remaining habitat and think of it as a ‘spaceship’. He stressed that humans 
inhabited a ‘closed sphere’ rather than a ‘virtually illimitable plane’. Therefore, its economies 
needed to operate more akin to a ‘spaceship economy’ rather than a ‘cowboy economy’, the 
latter being ‘reckless, exploitative, romantic, expansive and violent’ towards the 
environment.628 Two years later, his notion of a spaceship economy was given a stark and 
symbolic illustration when Apollo 8 astronaut William Anders took his iconic ‘Earthrise’ 
photo.629
Boulding and other like-minded economists drew on the laws of physics, in particular the 
first two laws of thermodynamics to buttress their case: first, energy and matter can neither be 
created nor destroyed, and second, in an isolated system entropy never decreases.630 These twin 
laws of thermodynamics meant humans could no longer treat economic systems in a linear, as 
distinct from circular, manner, ignoring the waste that accumulated at each step of the 
production process. This waste would eventually use up available resources and spread them 
throughout the economic system as useless and harmful waste materials. Some waste materials 
would become either prohibitively expensive or impossible to recycle, such as coal gangue, 
carbon dioxide, and sulphur dioxide from coal combustion.631 As the ecological economist 
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Herman Daly phrased it, ‘technology is unable to rise above the basic laws of physics. You 
cannot keep burning the same gasoline over and over’.632
Leveraging off these ideas, two other economists, David Pearce and Kerry Turner, invoked 
the laws of thermodynamics to conceptualise a ‘circular economy’.633 They argued that modern 
economies generate waste material at each step of the production process, while circular 
economies incorporate waste materials back into the productive economic process. Moreover, 
with the knowledge that exhaustible resources such as oil, coal and minerals can only be 
renewed over a geological scale and renewable resources have a ‘natural regenerative 
capacity’, environmentally sustainable economic systems needed to recycle exhaustible 
resources and have ‘sustainable yields’ for renewable resources. Energy resources should draw 
from the sun as that is the only non-terrestrial source of energy from which the earth draws.634 
Renewable energy could include solar energy, wind energy, and hydro energy.  
Nowadays the concept has become popularised due to the work of the non-profit Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation, which has funded circular economy (and other closely-linked 
concepts) in both research and practice.635 The rest of this chapter shows how the conceptual 
underpinnings for a circular economy entered into the discourse of Chinese officials and 
academics. 
The academic discussion of a circular economy. A handful of Chinese academics and 
researchers started to discuss the idea of a circular economy in the 1980s. One such researcher 
was a CASS researcher, Cheng Fuhu ǚǖǔ, who explored the origins of ecological economics 
in a research paper published in Economic Research that called for ‘further research in 
ecological economics’.636 In this article, Cheng detailed how the idea of the ‘circular economy’ 
(ČƩǳƇ) emerged out of Kenneth Boulding’s idea of a ‘spaceship economy’ (ÌÐʛȍǳƇ). 
Writing in the context of China’s recently instituted one-child policy (and the 1983 campaign 
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to reinforce that policy), Cheng also noted how Boulding in the 1960s had argued that 
‘unceasing population and economic growth will soon eventually use up the limitations of this 
“small spaceship” (Þʛȍ)’.637 He also linked this idea to other environmentalists, such as 
Edward Goldsmith who founded The Ecologist to stress the importance of a circular economy 
and ecological-economic ideas.638 Cheng was inspired by the fears that drove many of the neo-
Malthusians throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, such as population growth and high 
resource usage.639
However, it would take until 1998 before the idea of a ‘circular economy’ started to gain 
traction among Chinese authorities.640 That momentum commenced when Zhu Dajian ȶ¼ü, 
an academic in business management studies from Shanghai’s Tongji University, wrote the 
most widely-cited article in 1998 on a circular economy, which he considered as the ‘economic 
embodiment of sustainable development’ and ‘a strong policy initiative’ for China.641 Zhu 
noted in his article that traditional economies operated according to a linear economy, or 
“cowboy economy” (ƢǟǳƇ), consisting of “natural resources – product and supplies – waste 
discharge” (ȋƝɅƓ–#Ʊ–÷ƣĮĵ). Here he borrowed from the ideas of Kenneth 
Boulding, as well as David Pearce and Kerry Turner. He argued that China’s present 
environmental crises were the result of this cowboy economic way of thinking: ‘the three 
current major crises, such as population expansion, resource exhaustion, and environmental 
degradation, are the disastrous result of the “cowboy economy” which humans have created 
themselves’.642
Like Qu Geping, who looked abroad to justify his support of cleaner production, Zhu 
stressed that China should look to Germany as the best exemplar of a circular economy. He 
noted how in the early 1990s, Germany had instituted a series of package and waste 
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management legislation for German industry by placing the responsibility on the 
‘manufacturers’ and ‘retailers’ to avoid the build-up of ‘used packaging’ by requiring them to 
‘recycle it’.643 The German legislation set targets whereby ‘56 per cent of German packaged 
items should be recycled’. Zhu remarked how this had achieved significant waste reduction 
within Germany in a short space of time with a metal and glass recycling rate of 90 per cent 
and a paper, plastic and wood recycling rate of 80 per cent. Moreover, by 1995, ‘the usage of 
retail packaging from German households and small industries had fallen from 7.6 to 6.7 
million tonnes’.644 Zhu identified Germany’s 1996 Circular Economy and Waste Management 
Law as the latest iteration of a circular economy, which sought to ‘extend the circular economy 
of closed-loop resources and packaging to all production sectors’.645  Zhu saw this move 
towards a circular economy in Germany as part of a much larger global environmental policy 
trend, stating that ‘since the 1990s, the European Union, the United States, Japan, Australia, 
and Canada have successively established waste management regulations in accordance with 
the idea of closed-loop resources and avoiding waste generation’.646  According to China 
National Knowledge IndexZhu Dajian’s articles on a circular economy remain the most-cited 
articles on the subject in China and, as the following sections will demonstrate, this statistic is 
unsurprising considering how frequently his ideas appeared in the official discussions on the 
topic. 
An environmental bureaucracy for a ‘circular economy’. The promise of a circular 
economy for China was quickly taken up by a group of researchers from the SEPA’s Economic 
Policy Research Centre in a 1999 article. Following their initial support for cleaner production, 
these SEPA researchers, led by Cao Fengzhong Ŏʚ, stressed that adopting a circular 
economic model would help transition China away from its ‘traditional economic development 
model’ to one that was ‘resource-saving’. They recognised the environmental damage that 
pollution caused to China’s economy, albeit non-specifically, noting that ‘according to foreign 
experts, pollution losses in developing nations account for approximately 7 to 15 per cent of 
GNP’. A circular economy would ‘control the generation of waste in human production 
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activities, establish a recycling mechanism that reuses nature, incorporate human production 
activities into the natural circulation and maintain an ecological balance with nature’. Most 
importantly, channelling ecological modernisation language, it would generate ‘win-win’ 
outcomes for both the environment and the economy as China reduced pollution and waste 
through the use of fewer resources.647
Moreover, a circular economy could help prevent the potential economic problems that 
would befall China if it did not transition away from its traditional economic model. China 
could potentially face ‘international boycotts’ (£ʁĦc) from ‘consumers in post-industrial 
nations’, such as the United States and Western Europe because their goods cannot maintain 
specific environmental ‘ethical standards’ (ɞčŨT).648 These comments can be seen as a 
further reflection of the ecological-modernisation view that global forces beyond governments 
were driving environmental reform, and that attitude shifts in post-industrialised nations, such 
as green consumerism and environmental ethics, could hurt China’s economy. 
Yu Dehui 7čɓ from the SEPA’s Science and Technology Standards Division and Wang 
Jinnan ƨɩx  from the China Academy of Environmental Science’s Planning Research 
Institute provide another example of SEPA’s embrace of a circular economy in China. In 2001, 
they published an article in Environmental Protection that called for a circular economy to 
combat ‘rapid industrialisation and urbanisation’ as well as ‘continuous population growth’.649 
They noted how Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands had achieved 
‘waste recycling rates’ (÷þƣČƩ9ƱƧ) of between 50 and 80 per cent through their 
‘development of circular economies’.650 
SEPA policy researcher Xu Shufan ȉũV then followed up this line of argument in an 
article which stated that China needed to institute a circular economy in order to ‘establish an 
economic development model as per the principles of ecology’. No longer could China rely on 
the ‘linear economic developmental model’ of ‘resources – product – waste’. It consumed large 
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amounts of material, generated high levels of pollution and was inefficient. Instead, China 
needed to adopt a ‘material circulation production process of “resources – product – non-
renewable resource – recycled product”’. Waste needed to ‘become the raw material for the 
next production process’ if China was ever to reduce its environmental waste.651 Xu predicted 
that ‘China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’ and the continued 
‘improvement of the economic market system’ would inevitably promote a series of ‘changes 
in China’s environmental management thinking and methods’, and this would help ‘establish 
an eco-industry’ with the following cleaner production and circular economic production 
transitions:  
1. Environmental pollution moves from end-of-pipe control to full process control; 
2. Environmental management is transformed from the simple control of pollution concentration 
to a combination of controlling pollution concentration and controlling overall emissions; 
3. Environmental protection is transformed from government administrative regulation to 
market regulation and government regulation; and  
4. Cleaner production is transformed from a single enterprise to regional clean production.652  
Xu further stated:
The establishment of eco-industries would enable industrial enterprises in specific regions to form 
interactive industrial chains, eliminating pollutants in the production process. This would not only achieve 
clean production processes but also minimise the generation of pollutants and maximise the use of 
resources.653
Unlike the China scholars discussed in Chapter Two, who cast China’s WTO accession in a 
negative light, Xu believed that WTO accession and further market reforms would push 
China’s industry towards eco-industrial practices through forcing fundamental changes to 
global compliance regimes. In other words, he predicted that China’s WTO accession would 
necessitate a shift in China’s environmental management strategy. In particular, the Chinese 
government would need to utilise ‘market regulations’ (ì¨ȹİ) to protect the environment. 
This faith in the power of the market to effect positive change is another demonstration of 
Chinese adaptation of ecological modernisation discourse. More broadly, the overall discourse 
used by SEPA policy officials shows that the circular economy implicitly fell within the same 
ecological modernisation policy narrative as cleaner production. Given that SEPA officials 
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were also active in promoting cleaner production policies to supplement environmental 
management, it could be said that SEPA was at the ecological modernisation vanguard. 
Former SEPA official and senior Chinese environmental legislator, Qu Geping, also started 
to give attention to a ‘circular economy’ before the NPC commenced its final deliberations of 
the draft Cleaner Production Promotion Law in 2002.654 He actively promoted the concept in 
his position as chair of the NPC’s Environmental Protection and Resources Committee in 
articles and speeches from 2001 onwards. In a 2001 article, he called for a circular economy, 
noting: 
The difference between traditional economies and circular economies is that: traditional economies are a 
type of economy that is constructed according to a one-directional resource – product – consumption – 
waste pollution emissions’ (ɅƓ–#–ƊɄ–ŻťĮĵ) linear flow of materials… [D]epending on 
technological progress and energetically adopting non-harmful or low-harmful new technologies will 
significantly reduce raw materials and energy consumption, realising lower investment, higher output and 
lower pollution, eliminating as much as possible the emission of environmental pollutants in the production 
process.655
As alluded to earlier, Qu’s comments borrowed heavily from Zhu Dajian, in particular, with 
respect to the unidirectional view of waste within a traditional economy. 
Qu, like many of the scholars cited so far, also drew on Western experiences to show that a 
‘circular economic plan would integrate economic, social and environmental benefits by 
obtaining environmental and economically beneficial outcomes’.656  For instance, he drew 
inspiration from Germany, which had doubled its GDP in the 1970s but reduced its major 
pollutants by 75 per cent, demonstrating that countries could ‘receive “win-win” economic and 
environmentally beneficial outcomes’. Moreover, in 1996, the German Bundestag had passed 
the Circular Economy and Waste Management Act to ‘avoid production – recycling – final 
disposal’. Japan had also proved that countries could integrate circular economy into their 
legislative agenda.657
Qu drew inspiration from other practical Western examples of a circular economy. He 
extolled the Danish ‘Kalundborg Eco-Industrial Park Model’ (y1³ưđè,¡tůÿ), 
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believing that it showed the potential for industrial parks to operate on circular economic 
principles. The main companies within the Kalundorborg Eco-Industrial Park were a power 
plant, refinery, pharmaceutical plant and gypsum board factory. These companies ‘used the 
waste and by-products produced from other companies’ production processes as the raw 
material in their operations through trade’.658 Qu noted, for example, how the refinery would 
sell the desulphurisation gas to the power plant for coal combustion. Then the coal-fired power 
plant would sell the gypsum residue from its flue-gas desulphurisation operations to the 
gypsum factory. The fly ash from the dust removal machines would then be used in ‘road 
construction and cement production’. Most importantly, Qu stressed, this trade between 
companies ‘not only reduced the amount of waste generated and the cost of treatment but also 
produced excellent economic benefits and formed a virtuous cycle of economic development 
and environmental protection’. 659  In using this example, Qu was adopting an ecological 
modernisation argument based on both economic and environmental reasoning. This faith in 
ecological modernisation allowed him to believe that China could move away from its 
traditional development path.
SEPA Director Xie Zhenhua also joined Qu Geping in advocating for a circular economy. 
A CCP member since the late 1960s, Xie’s education was disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, 
but he graduated with a degree in engineering and physics from Tsinghua University in 1977. 
In 1982, after serving as a teaching assistant and Party Secretary of the Communist Youth 
League committee at Tsinghua University, Xie moved into the environmental protection 
sphere, working as an engineer under Qu at the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and 
Environmental Protection’s Environmental Protection Bureau. Xie would remain working 
under Qu in the new State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) until 1993 when he 
succeeded him as the Bureau’s director. Xie had powerful Party credentials, having served 
from 1997 in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Central Committee.660  
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In a 2001 article in Seeking Truth, Xie discussed the broader significance of the concept of 
a circular economy: 
From a global perspective, out of the necessity to preserve resources and protect the environment, a circular 
economy and a green economy have become an essential orientation in world economic development. 
Environmental technologies that promote a circular economy and green economic development are some 
of the world’s most advanced technologies, becoming the object of competition among countries all over 
the world.661
Xie’s comments reveal his ecological rationality through the need to ‘protect the environment’, 
but they also demonstrate his economic rationality through the awareness that there was a 
global trend towards economies adopting circular economic principles. China needed to 
improve its ‘productivity’ (ư#g), he argued, but it could no longer do that through ‘man 
conquering nature’ (%ǧĆœȋƝ).662 Showing his Marxist dialectical pedigree, Xie linked his 
ideas to Fredrich Engels’ quote from Dialectics of Nature that each step to improve 
productivity from nature would result in unintended consequences.663 Humanity, Xie stressed, 
‘cannot surpass or violate the laws of nature’, and that ‘in the process of developing 
productivity, we must promote the coordination and harmony between man and nature, 
coordinate social productivity with natural productivity, coordinate economic reproduction 
with natural reproduction, and achieve the virtuous cycle of ecological environment and natural 
sustainable supply’. 664  Xie’s comments reflected a significant development in ecological 
modernisation ideas in China. Reflecting the forum of his article, China’s leading socialist 
Party journal, Xie positioned circular economy with the progress of socialism in China. A 
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circular economy would allow China to achieve a socialist market economy in a manner that 
conformed with, rather than contradicted, sustainable development. The CCP could only 
remain a vanguard if it was cognisant of the laws of nature as well as social relations.
In another 2003 article published again in Seeking Truth, Xie leveraged off Qu Geping’s 
essays from two years earlier on a circular economy. Xie stated that China had to transition 
away from its traditional economic model that ‘realises economic growth by continuously 
turning resources into waste, neglecting the organic connections and symbiotic relationships 
among various industries within the economic system’.665 Like Qu, Xie believed that under the 
principles of a circular economy, companies could synchronously achieve environmental 
outcomes with profits achieved for all companies. He also noted in another article in the same 
year that many production companies would be unable to handle the recovery and disposal of 
waste, expanding the scale of supporting industries in environmental protection and resource 
recycling.666 In addition he predicted that ‘employment opportunities’ (á,Ś/) would accrue 
from adopting a circular economy.667 
He conceded that ‘in light of the relatively weak environmental awareness of residents in 
China, especially in rural areas, some local governments were forced to ignore environmental 
protection due to economic growth and employment pressure’. However, the rise of profitable 
‘centralised waste management’ (¸ƭƺ÷þƣʊ) facilities would offer an ‘expansion in 
employment’. 668  He drew on a paper from Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, Circular Economy Concept, to highlight that circular economy policies would enable 
Japan’s new environmental protection industry to ‘create nearly 37 trillion yen in output value 
and provide 14 million jobs’. 669  Xie’s articles and speeches fuelled the ecological 
modernisation enthusiasm that was permeating official Chinese discourse at the turn of the 
century, in particular the optimism in the economic benefits that would accrue with new 
sustainable industries. 
As the discussion has shown so far, the promotion of a circular economy had primarily 
originated from senior officials from within China’s governmental and legislative organs that 
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focused on environmental issues, such as the SEPA. However, as the next section will 
demonstrate, mirroring the experience of ‘cleaner production’, China’s economic 
developmental agencies soon became an active voice in the ecological modernisation narrative. 
China’s economic bureaucratic organs and a ‘circular economy’. In the early 2000s, 
researchers from China’s economic agencies also began to discuss the feasibility of a circular 
economy. As the discussion in Chapter Five regarding cleaner production suggested, their 
entrance into the circular economy debate reflected how ecological modernisation ideas were 
permeating into institutions that had previously focused on narrower economic development 
perspectives. The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) drove the early discussion 
by these economic agencies. As Chapter Five demonstrated, the State Council had entrusted it, 
over the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and SEPA, with formulating 
cleaner production policy and legislation in China. In 2002, a researcher from the SETC’s 
Resource Conservation and Comprehensive Utilisation Division, Feng Liang RȎ, wrote one 
of the first publicly-released articles by a SETC official on the idea of a circular economy. The 
central theme of Feng’s article was that China needed to undertake significant development in 
both     a ‘knowledge economy’ (ǇȰǳƇ) and a ‘circular economy’.670 He defined ‘knowledge 
economy’ as an economy marked by ‘increased investment in research and development, 
improved technology levels, and enhanced international competitiveness through technological 
innovation so that development has an inexhaustible drive’.671 He said that a circular economy 
placed ‘emphasis on the comprehensive utilisation and recycling of resources and waste, 
reducing and detoxifying waste, and minimising the generation of environmentally hazardous 
waste’. Feng argued that these twin economies both ‘promoted’ (=ɘ) and ‘complemented 
each other’ (ǀɒǀě), and that ‘this was an area in which the government should actively 
utilise its functions and actively promote’ such development. Drawing on articles discussed in 
the previous section, he also argued that China should look to Germany and Japan as their 
‘legal system for the development of a circular economy’ was ‘well developed’ (ĈÄƺ
ã).672 
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Feng also signalled that ecological modernisation ideas underpinned his support of a 
‘circular economy’ when he argued that the government needed to improve its economic 
‘incentive mechanisms’ (ƖoŚc). He explicitly supported the value that seeking ‘profit’ (a
ƌ) had as a means to achieve environmental protection:  
Without the implementation of environmental protection laws and standards, companies will not actively 
use waste and [will instead] directly discharge into the environment. Similarly, if there is no economic 
benefit, enterprises that maximise profits will reduce their investment in waste disposal, even if the 
government forces them to do it, they will find all kinds of excuses not to use preferential policies, or they 
will secretly discharge into the environment.673 
He argued that developing the ‘circular economy by economic means was an organic extension 
of the defence used by developed countries to protect the environment’.674 He admitted that 
although China’s policy of ‘whoever creates pollution is responsible for its treatment’ (ȸŻť
ȸſƭ) was similar in many respects to the ‘polluter pays’ (ŻťȂ&Ʉ) principle, China’s 
implementation of the policy was ‘poor’ (
Ä), and ‘seriously dampens the enthusiasm of 
comprehensive utilisation of resources’ in China. Therefore, China should look towards the 
experience of developed nations in implementing ‘financial subsidies’ (ɅɩȞm) for waste 
generators who transferred their waste to resource utilisation companies. In China, Feng noted 
that waste generators often made these companies pay for their waste, such as industrial waste 
or fly ash, often to the point that comprehensively utilising waste was ‘unprofitable’ (Ła
¤). China needed to improve economic incentives for waste generators and waste utilising 
companies through ‘price, taxation and fiscal policies to stimulate the development of a circular 
economy’.675 Feng’s comments clearly dovetail with the ecological modernisation solutions 
explored in Chapters Two and Five, such as the economic incentives that drove calls for 
research and development in cleaner production methods.  
Later that same year, senior officials from the SETC also started to advocate for a circular 
economy publicly. Vice-director of the SETC, Huang Shuhe ʥƎ, discussed the circular 
economy in a speech he presented on ‘promoting sustainable development’ at the National 
Conference on Supply and Marketing Cooperative for Renewable Resources. Huang argued 
that due to the massive amounts of waste produced each year, China needed to ‘accelerate the 
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recycling of renewable resources’. Each year ‘five million tonnes of scrap steel, more than 
200,000 tonnes of non-ferrous metallic waste, 14 million tonnes of waste paper and large 
amounts of waste plastic and glass’ were left non-recycled, amounting to ‘thirty billion yuan’ 
in 2001.676 Huang further stressed that ‘accelerating the recycling of renewable resources was 
an objective requirement for both pollution control and environmental improvement’ because 
the country’s ‘accumulated waste had reached more than 6 billion tonnes, occupying 500 
million square metres of land’ and causing ‘serious and potential pollution to soil, groundwater 
and the atmosphere’. Huang noted that ‘how to effectively recycle and prevent secondary 
pollution in the environment… had aroused widespread concern in society’.677 He argued:
Vigorously carrying out recycling of renewable resources not only would reduce the exploitation of 
primary resources, but also save a lot of resources. It also can promote the transformation of economic 
growth modes and promote the development of a circular economy with “resource – product – renewable 
resources” as its main content.678
Huang’s argument was consistent with ecological modernisation reasoning. It combined 
concern for the ecological damage caused by excessive waste while employing an economic 
rationality towards the ‘economic value’ of unrecycled products in China and reduced resource 
usage. 
These conversations laid the groundwork for a wider acceptance of a circular economy 
within China’s economic agencies. However, the moment where the circular economy truly 
developed as a concept occurred in 2004. The government official who drove this development 
was Ma Kai, the inaugural head of the NDRC.679 In his new role, he delivered speeches and 
published articles on China’s need to transition to a circular economy. 680  The following 
paragraphs show how he built on many of the environmental fears of the 1980s, such as 
population growth, resource usage and waste accumulation. Like Xie Zhenhua, Ma Kai’s 
education had been interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. He was 36 years old when he 
graduated with a political economy degree from the People’s University in 1982.681 From there, 
Ma Kai progressed from the Beijing Pricing Bureau682 to become a deputy director in the 
 
676 Huang Shuhe 2002, 4. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid. 
679 Ma Kai was briefly mentioned in Chapter Five. 
680 See, for example, Ma Kai, 2004a, 2004b. 
681 Chinese name is %ų¼Ê. 
682 Chinese name is s$ìƣ*â  
 
 162 
National Pricing Bureau683 and then became a vice-director in both the State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economy 684 , State Planning Commission and SDPC. In 1998, he was 
appointed as a deputy secretary-general in the State Council and served under Luo Gan Ǽð, 
who was the then-Secretary-General of the State Council. Ma was a member of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (1997–2002) and a member of the Central Committee 
in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Party Congress, serving as a member of the Politburo in the 18th 
Party Congress.685 These positions reveal that Ma Kai had political influence, and as this 
section will show he used this to promote the incorporation of circular economy principles into 
China’s environmental policy agenda.
As director of the NDRC, Ma Kai spoke at the National Circular Economy Work 
Conference in 2004. He advocated that China move towards a circular economy, based on the 
principle of ‘reduce, reuse and recycle’, pointing out in an article in Macroeconomic 
Management that ‘natural resources are not inexhaustible’ and warned that ‘the carrying 
capacity of the ecological environment was not unlimited’.686 Ma’s article described a litany 
of problems that were afflicting China’s biosphere. In 2003, China had ‘discharged 46 billion 
tonnes of wastewater’, and that much of this wastewater was ‘directly discharged into rivers, 
streams, lakes and reservoirs’, threatening the safety of China’s scarce drinking water. He also 
stressed that China’s atmospheric pollution was worsening, highlighting that soot and sulphur 
dioxide emissions ‘ranked first in the world’ and were ‘greatly exceeding [China’s] 
environmental capacity’. Regions affected by acid rain also ‘accounted for one-third of the 
country’s land area’.687 In addition, solid waste was ‘becoming increasingly prominent’, both 
with industrial and domestic waste. The national discharge of solid industrial waste ‘added up 
to 19.41 million tonnes’ in 2003, of which, Ma noted, ‘3,000 tonnes of hazardous waste 
materials were discharged into the environment without any treatment, endangering the health 
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of the people’. Of domestic waste, only around 54 per cent went through any waste 
management.688 Furthermore, he noted:
Rural livestock and poultry manure, aquaculture pollution, and irrational use of pesticides and fertilisers 
have made rural environmental problems increasingly serious, and directly threatened the quality and 
safety of agricultural products. The deterioration of the ecological environment through the retreat of 
grasslands, soil erosion, and decline in the quality of forest ecosystems, and through the sharp reduction in 
biological diversity have all severely affected ecological security [in China].689
It was for these reasons that he believed that China should develop a circular economy to 
include ‘all walks of life’. An ecological rationality underpinned Ma’s support for 
implementing a circular economy. He argued that China’s development had ‘seriously affected 
ecological security’ and that China needed to move beyond treating economic development as 
a ‘one-way linear process’ (wÿƿǯɕǚ). A circular economy provided ‘a fundamental 
way to reduce and lighten environmental pollution’.690 Like other government officials quoted 
so far in this chapter, he viewed Japan, Germany, and also the United States as the supporting 
models of circular economic practice.691 
Examining Ma Kai’s rhetoric, it is clear that he understood the foreign intellectual and 
conceptual origins of a circular economy. He cited Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, noting that 
it ‘explained the dangers of insecticide use by humans’, and that ‘it sounded the alarm’ 
regarding an ‘industrial and social environment crisis’.692 He also mentioned the Club of 
Rome’s Limits to Growth, remarking that ‘although the views in this report were somewhat 
one-sided and pessimistic’, it raised the idea that ‘resource supply and environmental capacity’ 
cannot be met indefinitely, arousing ‘great concern worldwide’.693 Moreover, Ma traced the 
definition of a circular economy back to the work of Kenneth Boulding, noting how he ‘likened 
human life on earth to a spacecraft, suggesting that, if there was an irrational exploitation of 
natural resources, once it exceeded the carrying capacity of the Earth, it will lead to 
destruction’.694 Ma also framed a circular economy within the broader sustainability narrative 
of Our Common Future and the Rio Earth Summit. His literature review demonstrates that as 
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well as appreciating the empirical challenges faced by China, he intellectually situated China’s 
development and environmental challenges within the global modern awakening of 
environmental consciousness, or what Arthur Mol terms ‘the second wave of environmental 
awareness’.695
Following Qu Geping, Xie Zhenhua and other officials, the benefits of a circular economy 
(along with cleaner production) for Ma Kai involved the promise that circular economic 
principles would assist China in its transition away from ‘traditional economic growth’. He 
argued:
The pursuit of economic benefits [from introducing circular economic practices] emphasises ecological 
benefits as well as economic benefits. It not only also promotes economic growth, but it also continuously 
improves the people’s living conditions allowing people a productive life with an enjoyable environment 
that allows them to drink clean water, breath clean air, and eat food at ease.696  
In that earlier cited article in Macroeconomic Management Ma Kai also stressed that more 
traditional economic benefits would accrue from a circular economy through increased 
productivity, efficiency and competitiveness:  
Practice has proven that low levels of resource utilisation have already become a substantial obstacle for 
companies to lower production costs and increase economic efficiency and competitiveness. Significantly 
expanding a circular economy with high resource utilisation rates has already become one of the essential 
and pressing tasks that China faces to increase its international competitiveness.697
While China’s growing ecological rationality provided a key driver for the progression of 
circular economy as a concept, it was events within China during the early 2000s that provided 
the economic rationality needed for China’s developmental bureaucracy to promote the 
concept more vigorously. In a speech he delivered in 2004 to the aforementioned National 
Circular Economy Work Conference, Ma raised fears about China’s dwindling resources, 
arguing that ‘developing a circular economy is a fundamental way to ease resource 
constraints…[as] China’s resource endowment was relatively lacking with total quantities 
somewhat large, but low in per-capita levels’.698 These constraints would grow, he argued, with 
‘rapid economic development and an increasing population’. When viewed from a per capita 
perspective, China possessed 25 per cent of the global per capita average of water resources, 
just under 40 per cent of the global per capita average farmland, and 20 per cent of the global 
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per capita average of forests. For oil, natural gas, and copper, they respectively occupied 11 
per cent, 4.5 per cent, 18 per cent and 7.3 per cent.699 For Ma Kai the problem was that while 
‘China’s socialist modernisation had received global recognition for its achievements, and its 
economic growth transformation also had obtained tremendous achievements’ it had depended 
on a ‘high investment, high consumption, high emissions, uncoordinated, challenging to 
recycle, low efficiency’ growth model.700 By 2003, Ma noted, China’s economic size had 
grown to be four per cent of global GDP, but its ‘resource consumption in the world was very 
high, with oil consumption at 7.4 per cent, raw coal consumption at 31 per cent, steel 
consumption at 27 per cent, aluminium oxide at 25 per cent, and cement consumption at 40 per 
cent’. Yet, China’s economy was still one-eighth the size that of the United States (in terms of 
GDP), meaning that China’s resource consumption would grow as it surged towards reaching 
parity with the US economy (unless, of course, it could achieve ‘sustainable development’).701 
While Ma acclaimed this period as ‘a golden age of development’ (ʥɩãńŕ), he also 
warned that resource constraints affecting water, land, energy and minerals would become 
more and more prominent, making the period also an ‘age of contradictions’ (ǆǂYƪńŕ). 
He stressed that ‘faced with this situation, it was particularly important, in fact urgent, to 
vigorously develop a circular economy and accelerate the establishment of a resource-saving 
society’.702 His comments illustrate some of the strongest economic justifications expressed by 
a senior economic bureaucrat in support of environmental reform measures. 
The backdrop to Ma’s comments were Chinese authorities’ fears over dwindling resources 
and the inability to transport and supply critical economic resources to parts of China. For 
instance, as a result of its high resource consumption and low resource efficiency, China also 
was experiencing oil, coal, and electricity shortages across the winter of 2003 and 2004. The 
country had become a net importer of oil in 1993 and was steadily having to acquire more oil 
from the global market. China’s coal shortages were due to transportation problems associated 
with getting coal delivered to coal-fired power plants because of excessive snow. Ma Kai 
predicted that: 
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if we continue to follow the traditional development model and achieve industrialisation and modernisation 
with a large number of resources, it will be difficult to sustain. Since the second half of last year, the 
continuing tension in coal, electricity, and oil transportation has fully demonstrated this point, and once 
again sounded an alarm. In order to reduce the pressure of economic growth on the supply of resources, 
we must vigorously develop a recycling economy to promote the efficient use and recycling of resources.703 
As China’s leading economic planner, Ma envisaged a circular economy as a vital economic 
solution to overcome the ‘resource scarcity’ and transportation problems exacerbated by 
China’s economic growth model and geography. Combined with his earlier comments 
concerning the environmental problems afflicting China’s biosphere and the Club of Rome’s 
Limits to Growth, Ma presented an ecological modernisation reflection on China’s 
development. He believed that for China to move to its next phase of economic development, 
its industries needed to improve their ecological and economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
countries. They could no longer rely on a supply of cheap, abundant and secure energy and 
resource supplies to drive China’s economic development in the future. A circular economy 
provided optimal ecological and economic security. 
Beyond these resource-based fears, trade-related anxieties also contributed to Ma’s support 
of a circular economy. In another 2004 article he raised the importance of circular economy 
(as well as the associated concept of cleaner production) in helping China to overcome ‘non-
tariff barriers’ (ʑMǛ·¯), or what he termed ‘green barriers’ (ǹȏ·¯). Foreign countries 
that were more developed and greener than China, he argued, would eventually place higher 
barriers on China’s exports. This was a new line of argument not previously utilised by senior 
officials in their support for ecological modernisation ideas, although, as shown earlier, more 
junior officials had raised this point. Ma noted that ‘due to economic globalisation, the role of 
tariff barriers had weakened’, but he warned that in this new era of globalisation ‘non-tariff 
barriers, including “green barriers” have become increasingly prominent’.704 He feared that the 
European Union could place restrictions on products that were incongruent with circular 
economic principles: ‘some developed countries, in order to protect their interests, already had 
established many technical standards’ that were ‘difficult to meet for developing countries 
concerning their resources and environment’:  
They require not only the final products to meet environmental protection requirements, but also product 
development, packaging, transportation, use, and recycling. For example, the European Union requires that 
95 per cent of the packaging must be a substance that can be recycled. In February of last year, the European 
Union promulgated the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive and Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances Directive. The regulations state that from August 13, 2005, producers are responsible for 
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recycling and disposing of electronic waste and electronic equipment; since July 1, 2006, six kinds of 
harmful substances such as lead, copper and tin will be restricted in more than a hundred types of electronic 
and electrical equipment sold in the European Union. For example, as the international community pays 
increasingly more attention to the ecological environment and climate change, the energy efficiency 
standards and logos with energy conservation as the primary purpose have become new non-tariff barriers. 
These non-tariff barriers will have a severe impact on China’s development of foreign trade, especially the 
expansion of exports. At present, China has become one of the biggest victims of non-tariff barriers such 
as “green barriers”. For example, the scope of the two European Union directives not only includes the 
electronic and electrical equipment products of our country but also the parts and components and raw 
materials industries, which cover all the mechanical and electrical products exported by China to the 
European Union. In the face of increasingly severe non-tariff barriers, we must attach great importance 
and respond positively, especially to comprehensively promoting cleaner production, vigorously 
developing a circular economy, and gradually making our products meet international standards in terms 
of resources and environmental protection.705 
Ma’s views on global trade represented a new type of economic rationality underpinning the 
advocacy for ecological modernisation concepts such as a circular economy. Although Ma 
believed that a circular economy would help reduce China’s resource footprint through more 
efficient production, he also saw a circular economy as a critical measure that would prevent 
more developed countries from blocking Chinese exports, and thereby harming China’s 
ongoing economic development. In this sense, Ma’s focus on ‘green barriers’ stands in contrast 
to the SEPA researcher Xu Shufan, whose views were canvassed earlier in this chapter. Ma did 
not see China’s WTO accession purely in its capacity to promote ‘changes in China’s 
environmental management thinking and methods’.706 China had generated so much prosperity 
from global trade that any risk to that prosperity needed to be confronted head-on. Ma’s 
comments also show a deviation from Cao Fengzhong and Cao’s SEPA colleagues. Rather 
than see the threat from ‘consumers in post-industrial nations’ who could instigate ‘boycotts’ 
of Chinese goods based on specific ‘ethical standards’, he saw the threat from global regulators 
who could prevent Chinese exports from passing through customs in these nations.  
As this section has shown, ecological modernisation discourse was employed by different 
officials representing their own bureaucratic agency. On the one hand, environmental 
bureaucrats stressed fears based on notions of green consumerism and environmental ethics, 
rooted in the ideas of public environmental awareness. On the other hand, economic 
bureaucrats placed their focus on economic-based concerns, such as trade boycotts. Yet a 
consensus was emerging that the circular economy was a necessary component in the struggle 
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to overcome the new contradictions between economic growth and environmental 
sustainability.
The policy status of a circular economy in China. These discussions over the circular 
economy during the period from 2000 to 2004 began to be incorporated into policy measures. 
In December 2004, the NPC passed an updated Law of the PRC on the Prevention and Control 
of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste. The updated law called for the nation to ‘promote 
cleaner production and circular economic development’, affirming how Chinese authorities 
twinned these ecological modernisation concepts. Then, in 2005, the State Council issued a 
document on Several Opinions on Speeding up the Development of a Circular Economy. Its 
stated aim was to:  
strengthen [resource] reserve conservation and environmental awareness, reinforce legal system 
construction, perfect policy measures, bring into play market mechanism functions that promote circular 
economic development with enhancing resource productivity and reducing waste emissions as the primary 
objective and technological innovation and systemic innovation as the driving force’.707  
In 2007, the NPC passed the Law of the PRC on Promoting a Circular Economy.708 It stipulated 
the institutional and administrative framework that would allow China to ‘promote the 
development of circular economy, improve the efficiency of resource utilisation, protect and 
improve the environment, and achieve sustainable development’.709 It mirrored the language 
of the 2005 State Council Opinion on a circular economy. These laws and policies echoed the 
optimistic economic and technological language that is characteristic of ecological 
modernisation. 
Despite these measures, there are commentators who speculate that even though a circular 
economy has been ‘enacted’ in China, there remain significant obstacles to its implementation. 
Mathews and Tan argue that ‘China must overcome technological, financial, and institutional 
barriers to turn the current eco-industrial initiatives into a circular economy operating at a larger 
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scale’.710 Geng and Doberstein highlight that ‘China lacks the human institutional capacities to 
encourage public participation in a circular economy’. 711  Xue et al.’s survey of local 
government officials suggests that there is a ‘rhetoric reality gap’ between central authorities 
goals for a circular economy and practical action at a local level.712 Like the concept of cleaner 
production explored in the previous chapter, the policy flaws in a circular economy lie beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, the discursive evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
that Chinese officials believe that a circular economy deserves to be placed within their 
optimistic sustainability narrative for the future. A 2018 revision to China’s circular economy 
law shows that authorities acknowledge that improvements are needed in order to move 
China’s economy along the path towards circular principles.713 They remain of the view that it 
provides their most effective measure to reduce and eventually overcome the contradictions 
between ongoing economic development and the promise of sustainable development.  
Conclusion: China’s Pursuit of a Circular Economy and Ecological Modernisation
This chapter has shown that from the 1980s onwards, Chinese officials expressed anxiety 
about the environmental impacts of a growing population, burgeoning resource use, and 
accumulating solid waste. From these environmental concerns, China’s policymakers 
eventually started to advocate for the implementation of a ‘circular economy’ that would allow 
future economic growth while limiting the environmental impact of such growth through the 
reducing, reusing and recycling of resources. 
In that context, how does a circular economy in China align with ecological modernisation 
ideas? Chinese officials saw circular economy, like cleaner production, as part of a broader 
sustainability narrative that grew from the United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
in 1972 and culminated at the Rio Earth Summit and the global consensus for sustainable 
development. It emerged from the same anxiety that led the NPC to vote in favour of the 
Cleaner Production Promotion Law discussed in Chapter Five. In contrast to the earlier debate 
over cleaner production, there is less doubt expressed among leading officials over the merits 
of a circular economy. Chinese authorities had already accepted that their traditional 
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developmental path was dirty, damaging and wasteful. This ‘traditional economic 
developmental model’ was exacerbated by population pressures that were unsustainable and 
this became part of a sustainable development discourse which was touted as the only possible 
path that could lead to a convergence of future economic and environmental objectives. 
Remarks by key officials such as Qu Geping, the SEPB’s Xie Zhenhua and the NDRC’s new 
director Ma Kai demonstrate that the circular economy emerged from a reflective assessment 
of traditional development in China. They argued that China needed to adopt a circular 
economy if they were going to overcome the wide range of environmental problems 
threatening its ‘ecological security’, to repeat the words of NDRC Director Ma Kai. 
Furthermore, Xie’s support of a circular economy highlights how he sought to place it within 
the political narrative of socialism and China’s progression to a ‘socialist market economy’, 
which further shows the variety of political justifications used to promote such environmental 
reform ideas in China.  
The official discussion of a circular economy shared another ecological modernisation 
rationale with cleaner production: the promotion of science and technology and market-based 
measures to reduce the environmental impact of modernisation. That technological emphasis 
is seen in the official language set out throughout this chapter. The optimism towards 
environmental technologies justified a circular economy in the same way as it had supported 
cleaner production. In their discussion of a circular economy, Chinese officials also drew on 
the debate over cleaner production through their emphasis on targeted regulatory measures to 
help foster market-based solutions for China’s environmental issues.  
All the officials canvassed in this chapter held to the consensus that circular economic 
practices would allow China to achieve more sustainable development. They also 
acknowledged that the Chinese government would have to provide the impetus and catalyst for 
this transition through policy measures, such as incentive mechanisms to promote notions of 
environmental sustainability within Chinese enterprises. Yet these officials understood that 
these government measures had to conform with new economic rationalities, such as the profit 
motive, rationalities that had been promoted by the great reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping. 
Another similarity with the discourse surrounding cleaner production, was the manner in which 
Chinese officials drew on foreign examples of ecological modernisation to rationalise their 
support of specific environmental reforms (see Chapter Two). They drew on the same overseas 
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examples that ecological modernisation theorists used to justify their arguments. Chinese 
officials were fashioning ecological modernisation for Chinese conditions.  
This chapter has also highlighted the economic rationality that formed the foundation for 
support of Chinese ecological modernisation. The earlier part of the chapter demonstrated that 
fears regarding the inefficient use of resources dated back to the 1980s. However, the specific 
economic impetus to the circular economy policy discussion within the Chinese government 
was China’s economic resource constraints. These shortfalls had become acute in 2003-2004 
when China experienced a series of rolling blackouts as coal production and transportation was 
unable to match demand from China’s coal-fired generators. Senior government officials such 
as Ma Kai explicitly listed these concerns in their support for a circular economy. If the Chinese 
economy was to overcome these resource-based ‘contradictions’, then it needed to move 
toward a ‘resource-saving society’. This focus on economic efficiency is an essential aspect of 
the more general ecological modernisation theorising because it promises to raise profits and 
lower environmental impact. What this chapter has shown is that China’s officials have 
increasingly used such environmental discourse to frame their future economic development 
measures. 
The example of the circular economy policy discussion also shows how new economic 
objectives can materialise within these ecological modernisation reform ideas. The concept of 
a circular economy moved Chinese economic rationality beyond the threat of the depletion of 
valuable resources on which the economy depended. Instead, the economic threat that now 
emerged was the possibility that ‘more developed’ economies could raise ‘green barriers’ on 
inefficient or polluting Chinese products across the full life-cycle of the production process. 
This tied ecological concerns to economic rationality. Since China commenced its ‘reform and 
opening up’ from the late 1970s, its economic prosperity had been based on trading with 
developed economies, so the possibility that Chinese products could be prevented from 
accessing foreign markets unnerved Chinese officials. Ma Kai expressed this anxiety when he 
warned that European Union legislative measures to eliminate and reduce toxic waste and 
increase recycled packaging would hurt Chinese manufacturers. The circular economic 
solution to non-tariff barriers also reflected the optimism inherent within ecological 
modernisation, and the sub-text to Ma’s comments also revealed his ecological-modernisation 
faith in the eventual ‘inevitability’ of sustainable development. Rather than fight these global 
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regulatory threats, Ma understood that the Chinese economy needed to move with the global 
trend towards ecological modernisation ideas and adopt a circular economy.  
The thesis so far has shown that Chinese policymakers have increasingly looked to 
ecological modernisation policies to reform environmental governance in China. Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six have both shown how Chinese authorities have legislated measures to 
encourage the ‘promotion’ of cleaner production and a circular economy – two environmental 
ideas congruent with ecological modernisation. The next chapter moves on to another 
environmental reform measure, ‘green GDP’, to examine whether it conforms with ecological 
modernisation. The discussion of this new environmental accounting tool entered the policy 
discourse around the same time as a ‘circular economy’, while Chinese policymakers were 
experiencing somewhat of a policy fervour towards ecological modernisation ideas. Its 
supporters sought a new environmental indicator that could quantify the costs of economic 
development. Through the study of green GDP, the next chapter not only provides another 
chance to examine the influence of ecological modernisation in China, but it also allows for an 
analysis of the type of ecological modernisation ideas that are politically permissible in 
contemporary China.  
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Chapter Seven: Green GDP in China 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six have described the circumstances that led China to legislate 
the Cleaner Production Promotion Law and advance measures to promote an economy based 
on circular economic principles. These examples of cleaner production and circular economy 
have illustrated how Chinese authorities began adopting an ecological modernisation discourse 
in setting China’s environmental policy agenda during the 1990s. These chapters also 
highlighted that foreign stakeholders have influenced the Chinese government in framing its 
environmental policy. Through the ‘reform and opening up’ process (outlined in Chapter Four), 
Chinese officials could no longer rely on endogenous solutions. They were forced to look 
abroad for suitable policy ideas that could assist in China’s transition to sustainable 
development. In the case of cleaner production, these solutions emerged out of the United 
Nations Environmental Programme’s (UNEP) series of workshops in the lead up to the Rio 
Earth Summit. In the case of a circular economy, solutions originated from Western academic 
discussions in the 1960s that sought to situate economics within the natural boundaries of 
ecology. Since the 1980s, senior Chinese officials and their subordinates became increasingly 
aware of the possible environmental policy options that would help them chart a sustainable 
path for China’s economic modernisation.  
It is within the context of this turn towards a greater ecological consciousness that this 
chapter examines ‘green GDP’ (ǹȏ GDP, or ǹȏ£Oư#ĕ@).714 The chapter starts with a 
discussion of the origins of the concept. It then examines the early debates surrounding green 
GDP and the utility of GDP as an indicator of ‘sustainable development’. The third section of 
this chapter explores the official policy discourse surrounding green GDP. In particular, it 
explores the policy commentary from government bureaucrats in the State Environmental 
Protection Administration and National Bureau of Statistics. This policy commentary 
promoted green GDP as a way for the Chinese government to account for and achieve 
sustainable development. The final section then details the broader political context regarding 
green GDP, which illustrates how entrenched political interests can stymy the inclusion of 
ecological modernisation ideas into China’s environmental policy agenda. This chapter 
concludes by arguing that green GDP demonstrates the growing willingness of Chinese 
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policymakers to incorporate innovative ecological modernisation solutions that moves beyond 
the technological and market ideas of cleaner production and circular economy. However, the 
chapter also will show that the concept of green GDP eventually pushed at the margins of what 
was politically acceptable according to China’s prevailing economic rationality. 
The Green GDP Policy Debate and Ecological Modernisation in China 
The conceptual origins of green GDP. Like the other ecological modernisation concepts 
discussed so far in this thesis, the idea of ‘accounting for’ China’s environmental pollution and 
resource stocks through the creation of a ‘green GDP’ emerged from abroad. From 1978 
onwards, the Norwegian government had instituted an environmental accounting system that 
included the physical values of a nation’s environment (such as air pollution and carbon dioxide 
emissions), as well as a country’s natural resources (such as fish, oil, and forests). They used 
these values as the empirical basis for economic models that sought to ‘show how economic 
development affects the environment and how activities and measures to improve the 
environment (e.g. taxes) affect the development of both the environment and the economy’.715 
The Norwegians also promoted this idea internationally. The 1987 World Commission on 
Environment and Development report, chaired by former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, called for ‘changing the quality of growth’ through accounting for the 
‘exploitation’ of natural resources such as forests, air, water and soil resources that were 
typically not accounted for in national accounts.716 
Other international organisations sought to develop the implementation of this new 
environmental accounting concept. In the fervour of sustainable development ideas that took 
hold in the lead up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the World Bank and UNEP-sponsored 
workshops discussed the merits of such accounting frameworks.717 In particular, the World 
Bank partnered with the Mexican government to establish a set of integrated environmental 
and national accounts that would place monetary values on natural resources and the 
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environment that were adjusted through ‘satellite accounting’ to reflect the depletion of 
resources and the environment in a ‘Net Ecological Domestic Product’.718 At the Rio Summit, 
environmental accounting gained further international attention through the Agenda 21 
resolution and its recommendation that countries should ‘expand existing systems of national 
economic accounts in order to integrate environmental and social dimensions in the accounting 
framework, including at least satellite systems of accounts for natural resources in all Member 
States’.719 Following the Rio Summit, the United Nations Statistical Division released the 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting handbook. 720  The World Bank also 
released reports in the 1990s arguing that environmental accounting, as a tool, was needed to 
overcome ‘market failures’ and ‘policy failures’ caused by economic development.721 Two 
World Bank consultants, Kirk Hamilton and Ernst Lutz, claimed in a 1996 report that 
environmental policy failures resulted from the ‘under-pricing of natural resources, and 
subsidies on energy, fertilisers and pesticides that lead to negative impacts on the 
environment’. 722  Market failures, the report stated, were those ‘economic activities’ that 
‘impose[d] costs on others, in the form of pollutants carried downwind or downstream for 
instance, without any mechanisms for remediation’.723  
All these accounting initiatives can be described as ‘green GDP’. The ecological 
modernisation basis of green GDP derives from situating economic development within 
environmental parameters. The World Bank review of green GDP also reveals that by the late 
1990s the international foundation had been set for developing countries to explore green GDP 
as a measurement tool to set their environmental policy agenda. Indeed, in 1998, Statistics 
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Norway partnered with China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, £×ǵȩâ) on the Sino-
Norwegian Project on Environment Statistics and Analysis.724 
The early discussion of a green GDP in China. The first instance where the Chinese 
government showed its willingness to consider a concept such as green GDP occurred in 1992 
when the State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) first raised natural resource 
accounting in its Ten Countermeasures for China’s Environment and Development.725 In this 
report, which was released in preparation for the Rio Earth Summit, the SEPB called for the 
incorporation of ‘natural resource accounting’ (ȋƝɅƓŪǤ) within the ‘national economic 
accounting system’. The SEPB then argued that ‘when conditions are ripe, China must 
establish a complete national natural resource accounting system’ that calculated the levels and 
yearly changes of its resources.726 However, the report did not advocate at this early stage the 
inclusion of pollution indicators to adjust GDP, despite the fact that some officials had already 
pointed to the environmental impact of pollution and waste (see Chapters Five and Six). This 
omission was probably due to the status of GDP in China. While the NBS had trialled GDP in 
provinces from 1985 onwards, they only measured national economic performance through 
calculating physical production. The State Council had only decided to adopt GDP as China’s 
official economic and developmental indicator system in 1993 once the CCP had approved the 
guiding principle of a ‘socialist market economy’ at the Third Plenum of the 14th Party 
Congress.727 That year the Chinese adopted the United Nations’ System of National Accounts.  
In the late-1990s, once GDP had become the key economic indicator for policymakers, 
Chinese academic and research institutes began to pay more attention to green GDP. One of 
the more prominent essays written during this period was by Lin Pi Ť from the CCP’s 
Beijing Party School. His 1997 essay published in Expanding Horizons argued that China 
needed: 
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to change to a new national economic accounting system with green GDP as the core indicator. In simple 
terms, it is necessary to replace the main assessment indicators for economic construction and replace GDP 
with “green GDP” as the main “conductor” (ĩĪŮ) for future economic construction work’.728  
Lin took this view because GDP in its present state could not change cadre behaviour towards 
economic development. He framed green GDP as a necessary ‘new assessment index’ that 
would ‘force economic leadership agencies and leading cadres at all levels to abandon 
traditional high-consumption, high-pollution economic growth methods’.729 He reasoned that 
if the government ‘strictly implemented’ green GDP, and high-levels of green GDP were 
rewarded by ‘political superiors’, then cadres would:  
take further scientific and advanced economic and technological measures to protect natural resources and 
ecological balance better, minimise environmental pollution, and truly establish economic development’s 
rational use and take the lead in implementing low-consumption, low-pollution economic growth’.730 
Lin’s comments were an early demonstration of how ecological modernisation ideas were 
starting to influence some policymakers in their support for green GDP. This influence stems 
from a belief that decentralised environmental governance encourages improved 
environmental performance.731 As noted in Chapter Two, since the early-1980s China had 
created various local environmental protection bureaus, but they all suffered from lax 
enforcement, which led to poor environmental outcomes that ran counter to the policy wishes 
of environmental protection authorities in Beijing.732 In this way, green GDP was seen by Lin 
as a means by which central authorities could improve their environmental governance systems 
at the local level. Lin saw green GDP as a necessary tool that would force local Chinese 
officials to behave in a more environmentally sustainable manner because their political 
achievements would be linked to an ecological-economic indicator such as green GDP. 
Chinese academics also entered into the discussion over how to quantify green GDP. In a 
widely-cited article in Statistical Research, Renmin University economist Liao Mingqiu ûŅ
Ƭ canvassed new ideas for measuring green GDP. Liao believed that green GDP could deduct 
‘the losses caused by the depletion of resources and the degradation of the environment’. It 
could take into account the economic ‘losses’ (Ĭ¿) for air, water, and solid waste emissions 
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as well as noise pollution.733 His article presented formulae to account for possible costs, 
including governance and treatment costs. 
These academic discussions over green GDP occurred in the post-Rio environment while 
senior Chinese officials were openly questioning whether the newly-instituted GDP (and Gross 
National Product) indicators should act as the sole measures of progress and well-being. It had 
not taken long for China’s environmental bureaucrats and legislators to find fault with the 
myopic nature of GDP as a measurement. Qu Geping, in his new position as the chief legislator 
for environmental policy in the National People’s Congress (NPC), understood that the narrow 
accounting variables in GDP rendered it too simplistic for environmental policy. In a 1995 
article that criticised ‘traditional development’, Qu noted that GDP ‘used industrial growth as 
the only symbol of development and regarded the industrialisation of a country and its resulting 
industrial civilisation as the symbolic realisation of modernisation’.734 If GDP were the only 
guide for development, he argued, then ‘the ardent pursuit of GNP and high-growth goals’ 
would be the fundamental objectives for national economic development. However, such a 
‘one-sided GNP growth development strategy’ would ‘result in serious consequences’ such as 
‘a rapidly deteriorating environment, increasingly scarce resources, and the real decline in 
people’s welfare’; development would become ‘unmanageable and get bogged down in 
difficulties’. 735  Here, Qu presented an implicit ecological modernisation interpretation of 
China’s economic development. Reliance on institutional instruments such as GDP would 
present continued policy obstacles for future environmental protection in China. China’s 
leaders required a more realistic metric to ascertain the status of sustainable development. Like 
his earlier debate over cleaner production canvassed in Chapter Five, the issue was whether 
Qu’s ecological rationality would prevail over the traditionally dominant economic rationality. 
The State Environmental Protection Administration and green GDP. With the overall 
institutional focus in China starting to focus on the perceived flaws of employing GDP as a 
measure of Chinese development, SEPA researchers turned their attention to green GDP. As 
the last two chapters outlined, the SEPA was integral in promoting the early ecological 
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modernisation discourse that underpinned cleaner production and a circular economy. As well 
as internal pressure within environmental bureaucracies and academics, the World Bank also 
supported the impetus for this new interest in green GDP through partnering with the SEPA on 
several projects centred on the environmental costs of development in China. 736  Cao 
Fengzhong from the SEPA’s Environment and Economic Policy Research Centre was a 
prominent SEPA researcher who published articles on green GDP. In a 1999 article published 
in Environmental Science Trends, he conceded that government planners needed GDP-like 
metrics in order ‘to analyse and to judge the actual operation of the economy when 
implementing macroeconomic regulation and control’.737 However, Cao also argued that China 
should no longer ‘rely solely on traditional GDP indicators’.  
In a co-authored article published in Macroeconomic Management three years later, he 
further elaborated on the problem with GDP indicators, stating that they only ‘pay attention to 
the direct costs and added value of one’s development’, a situation he believed would ‘bring 
about a so-called “market failure” (ì¨¿Ƙ)’. Instead, Cao and his colleague argued that 
China needed to ‘gradually consider utilising “green indicators”’ (ǹȏĩŨ): 
Taking “green GDP as a measure of economic growth” could effectively restrain the expansionary 
impulses of various economic actors and provide a sustainable internal driving force for economic growth. 
Increasing “green indicators” is conducive to accelerating the transformation in modes of economic 
growth. The transformation in modes of growth does not only mean technological progress but, at a deeper 
level, a more harmonious relationship between man and nature. The concept of green GDP reflects this 
tendency.738 
Cao’s remarks adopted a reflective ecological modernisation reading of China’s development. 
He saw green GDP as an integral element in providing ecological rationality for policymakers, 
because ‘traditional accounting indicators’ had ignored the negative externalities of 
industrialisation and development.739  
 Senior officials within the SEPA also began championing green GDP in their public 
commentary. In particular, Pan Yue supported the policy case for green GDP in 2003 in his 
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new position as deputy director at the SEPA.740 Pan Yue’s early career was different from many 
senior-level bureaucrats featured in this thesis. As noted in Chapter Three, Pan trained as a 
newspaper journalist before transferring into government policymaking positions. His most 
senior position before transferring to the SEPA was deputy director at the State Council’s 
Reform Office. While he focused on economic issues during his time at the State Council’s 
Reform Office, his interest in environmental issues dated back decades. In 1986, as a journalist 
for the Economic Daily, Pan wrote a critical report on the polluted Dianchi Lake in Yunnan.741 
He would remain at the SEPA and Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) until 2015 
when he left to take up a position in the Central Academy of Socialism.742 In 2017, he was 
selected as an alternate member in the CCP’s Central Committee, and thus his interest in 
environmental issues reached new politically influential audiences as he rose through the Party 
organs. The following discussion will focus primarily on Pan Yue as he was the highest ranking 
SEPA official leading the call for green GDP. 
Pan’s backing of green GDP stemmed from the view that China’s environmental pollution 
and degradation were worsening, and new policy ideas were needed to achieve sustainable 
development. In a 2005 speech at a Wealth and Globalisation Forum titled ‘Distorted 
Viewpoint of Development: The Origin of China’s Environmental Problems’, Pan enumerated 
many of the environmental problems caused by China’s development. Although this speech 
came a year after he first fully articulated his vision for establishing green GDP, it provided his 
most candid comments on the state of China’s environment.743 Pan lamented that while China’s 
economic development was a significant achievement, the environment had remained a 
secondary consideration. For example, he outlined a litany of environmental woes and 
pressures that China faced, such as its population doubling to 1.3 billion people; soil erosion 
destroying nearly half of China’s soil cover (reducing it from 6 million square kilometres to 3 
million square kilometres); its reserves of primary minerals reducing from 45 to just 6 over the 
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past fifteen years; China’s dependence on over 70 per cent of its oil from imports in the next 
five years; one-third of China’s land experiencing acid-rain pollution; 40 per cent of its rivers 
being unfit for drinking (referred to as k Vǧ); 300 million rural citizens unable to drink ‘safe 
water’ (ÍJƺŶ); 400 million urban residents breathing ‘seriously polluted air’; and 15 
million Chinese citizens experiencing ‘bronchial and respiratory cancers’.744 Pan’s list shows 
that he was well aware of the significant cost that China’s development was having on its 
environment. Moreover, as the following discussion illustrates, this list outlines that many of 
the environmental problems that had influenced Chinese policymakers to incorporate cleaner 
production and circular economy into China’s environmental policy agenda were influencing 
Pan’s support of green GDP.745 
Pan Yue also engaged in self-criticism, reflecting on his own past mistakes when he was 
involved in macro-economic policy reform in the State Council Reform Office. Pan confessed 
that while he championed how China had become the ‘world’s factory’ (ƴè|), he had 
failed to mention that the environmental cost of that role within the global economy was that 
China became the ‘world’s garbage dump’ (ƴ­©¨).746 Pan’s confession provides a stark 
example of how a growing ecological rationality was beginning to rival the established 
economic rationality. He noted that over the past 15 years, China’s GDP had ‘more than 
doubled’, while its ‘pollution load’ (ŻťȽȔ) had ‘probably increased by four to five times’. 
He singled out the energy industry, noting that coal combustion in 1997 caused the production 
of ‘eight kinds of air pollutants’ and that ‘over the past 20 years the air pollution situation had 
worsened’. Attempting to head off any complacency that some officials might display towards 
the environment, he stressed that China’s environmental problems were an ‘immediate crisis’ 
rather than a ‘vaguely approaching crisis’.747 In other words, this was not an act the government 
could postpone until China became more economically developed. 
Pan believed that a broad shift in the Chinese mindset was now critical to achieve 
sustainable development. As a result, he promoted a new ‘environmental morality’ and culture 
 
744 Ibid, 9. 
745 See Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
746 Ibid. 
747 Ibid. 
 
 182 
in China during his early days at the SEPA. In particular, Pan called for China to transition 
away from a ‘traditional industrial civilisation’ (0ǵè,ĻŅ), which had characterised 
Western-led development for ‘the past 300 years’, towards an ‘environmental culture’ (ƩµĻ
r).748 He reflected on traditional development in similar terms to Qu Geping: 
Traditional development had led to the rapid development of a scientific and technological economy, 
bringing about a tremendous increase in the level of human material livelihoods. However, its inherent 
flaws also have become increasingly exposed: it controls and plunders, consumes global natural resources 
at an alarming rate, emits large amounts of waste that the natural world cannot absorb, and breaks the 
natural circulation and self-balancing of the global ecosystem. The deterioration of the relationship 
between man and nature has created a growing environmental crisis that threatens the survival and 
development of humanity.749 
He viewed China’s environmental problems as existential: ‘economic crises are temporary and 
often impact for just short periods, rather than ecological crises which are long-term; once 
large-scale irreversible environmental damage occurs it will fundamentally threaten a nation’s 
existence’. Pan considered that China’s turn to sustainable development resulted from ‘re-
examinations’ (ɧĿÓȥ) and ‘reflections’ (ē) on past economic development.750 The 
language he used strongly indicates a convergence of economic and ecological rationality in 
his interpretation of China’s development. On the one hand, he appreciated how China’s 
traditional development had increased material livelihoods and provided social benefits, but on 
the other hand he considered that this traditional economic development unsustainably 
disrupted the delicate ecological balance in China.  
To support this shift in consciousness towards an ‘environmental culture’, Pan referred to 
classical Chinese philosophers, positioning China’s environmental problems within China’s 
broader intellectual history. He noted how ‘Chinese environmental culture inherited and 
evolved from Chinese traditional culture’, by noting that Confucianism, Daoism, Laoism and 
Buddhism can contribute to environmental thought. For instance, Confucians discussed 
‘harmony between man and nature’ (½%), and Daoists promoted the ‘follow the laws of 
nature’ (ɞƀȋƝ) principle.751 Pan believed that the Classical Era provided many examples 
which China’s contemporary decision makers could follow: 
China has long had its own “environmental culture.” In the Xia Dynasty 4,000 years ago, it was stipulated 
that trees should not be cut down in spring, and fishing was outlawed in summer. It was also forbidden to 
kill young beasts and obtain eggs. In the Zhou Dynasty 3,000 years ago, hunting birds, fishing, felling 
trees, and burning were strictly regulated according to climate seasons. In the Qin Dynasty 2,000 years 
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ago, it was forbidden to collect newly sprouted plants in spring, the capture of young beasts, and the 
poisoning of fish was prohibited. In the past dynasties of China, there were clear regulations and bans for 
environmental protection. The cause of China’s environmental protection today inherits and develops on 
the spirit of Chinese traditional culture’s harmony with nature. 
As noted in Chapter Two, Mark Elvin has highlighted how the imperial period in China was 
characterised by environmental deterioration, but the accuracy of Pan’s statements is not the 
focus here. The important point is that Pan believed that Chinese policymakers could draw on 
the ancient examples of ‘environmental culture’ to find solutions to the ‘contradiction between 
traditional industrial modes of economic growth and the environment’.752 
In the contemporary context, Pan believed that the diffusion of environmental norms and 
morality needed to enter into economic thinking. In a 2005 speech to a business leaders forum, 
Pan called for the Chinese industry to ‘take the green road of sustainable development’. He 
argued that now Chinese companies had benefited from the policy of ‘let some people get rich 
first’ (ȫɤ[%DÚɊşDÚílÚ), they had the ‘green responsibility’ (ǹȏȿ+) of 
creating a ‘harmonious society’ (Ⱥǒ/) through making their respective industries green.753 
His call for ‘green’ companies is consistent with the ecological modernisation position that 
market agents are integral to environmental reform. 
Moreover, he argued that for China to prevent future environmental crises, and reduce 
current environmental problems, it ‘must depend on the “greenification” (ǹȏr) of laws and 
morals’.754 The rationale behind this strategy of environmental morality, Pan claimed, was the 
enhancement of the government’s ‘green control capability’ (ǹȏİcȊg) through improving 
education, environmental legislation, environmental impact assessments and instituting a 
‘green national accounting system’.755 Drawing on questions of ‘morality’ (ɞč), Pan argued 
that officials and citizens needed to become more attuned with the needs of the environment: 
The construction of an environmental culture requires the realisation of similar legal and ethical systems. 
Viewing “morality” (č) from the perspective of environmental culture is consistent with the principle that 
natural laws are the guidelines for conscientious behaviour.756 
In setting forth this vision of ‘environmental morality’, Pan argued that the government needed 
to step in and foster a cultural transformation, since China’s politics, industry and society would 
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not spontaneously develop this. It required the government to hasten ecological awareness and 
help embed an ecological rationality within the broad collective psyche of the nation. This 
hastening would involve further strengthening of laws to prevent environmental law 
infringement. Pan remarked how, even after the promulgation of such laws like the Cleaner 
Production Promotion Law in 2003, China still experienced ‘the serious phenomena of legal 
non-compliance and lax enforcement’ of this law. This weak enforcement stemmed from the 
‘lack of a sufficient environmental moral culture’ to support this and other environmental 
protection laws.757 
The other element of Pan’s vision of an environmental culture involved lifting the secrecy 
that had typified Chinese politics and governance and introducing greater transparency: 
The public has the right to know about environmental issues, including the right to know about any 
environmental crises that occur, having the right to oversee public projects that affect the environment and 
having the right to participate in strategic decisions involving environmental security. Without the broad 
participation of the people, the cause of environmental protection will become a minority issue. As a result, 
nothing will be done. Therefore, environmental protection work must establish transparent and open 
mechanisms. It is necessary to establish a clear channel of public opinion and suggestions so that all actions 
which damage the environment are supervised, and so that all actors (whether enterprises or government 
departments, individuals or collectives) can only operate with a framework allowed by natural and societal 
laws.758 
This emphasis on open government was a legacy of Pan’s experience as a journalist at the 
China Environment Newspaper, where he saw the positive role that transparency played in 
reducing the environmental impact of rapid industrialisation during the 1980s. Reflecting on 
his time as a journalist, Pan noted that he ‘almost ruined’ his journalistic career due to his 
reporting of illegal discharges of industrial pollution into the Dianchi Lake. However, Pan 
revealed that he ‘did not regret this experience’ because it drew attention to the illegal fouling 
of a culturally and environmentally significant environment. 759  On the one hand, Pan’s 
comments reflect a utopian take on openness and transparency in modern China. Two years 
after he wrote this article, information concerning the chemical factory explosion on the 
Songhua River in Jilin was suppressed by the CCP Propaganda Department.760 On the other 
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hand, the actions of the SEPA761 in providing further environmental information disclosure 
over the past decade and a half demonstrates that many policymakers within SEPA believed 
that such measures formed an important part of an ecological modernisation-strategy to 
improve China’s decentralised environmental governance.762 
Pan Yue’s comments in the short time he was at the SEPA at the beginning of the new 
millennium clearly suggest that an ecological modernisation perspective guided his reasoning. 
First, he believed that environmental technology was an integral element of any future 
economic growth in an environmentally sustainable China. Second, he believed that China’s 
sustainable development strategies originated from its ‘re-examination’ and ‘reflection’ on 
their past modernisation. Third, Pan’s comments mirror the ecological modernisation view, 
touched on in Chapter Five, that the government could only do so much through command-
and-control measures, and that non-state forces, whether markets or morality, had a role to play 
in the restructuring of China along more environmentally sustainable lines. Fourth, he 
emphasised the need for a broader societal-cultural shift through the raising of environmental 
awareness. Fifth, the environmental reforms proposed by Pan illustrate that differences existed 
within China’s ecological modernisation discourse. While most officials featured in the two 
preceding chapters primarily focused on the technological and market aspects of ecological 
modernisation, Pan saw the crucial role that non-state actors can perform in a decentralised 
environmental governance system.  
Through examining the work of Pan Yue, it is also possible to gain greater insight into the 
foreign source of his inspiration for green GDP. He cited the original Norwegian experience in 
‘resource environment accounting’ (ɅƓƩµƺŪǤ), noting that Norway established an 
inventory system that accounted for ‘mineral resources, biological resources, water resources 
(hydropower), environmental resources, land, air pollution, and two types of water pollutants 
(nitrogen and phosphorus)’. Pan also stressed that Norway’s environmental accounting system 
‘laid an important foundation for the green GDP accounting system’. He suggested that 
Norway’s inclusion of oil in its accounting system presented a possible example to follow to 
help China account for its own resource reserves and consumption.763 Reviewing Mexico’s 
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experience with green GDP, as well as other developing nations such as Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Papua New Guinea, Pan noted that the ‘experience of developing countries was of greater 
reference for China’. The role of the World Bank and its 1995 report Expanding the Measure 
of Wealth also were lauded for employing the concepts of ‘natural capital’, ‘productive capital’, 
‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’ to provide a ‘broader meaning of “wealth” (ȾÚ)’.764 In 
fact, in 2003, China would partner with the World Bank on the Research Project on the 
Establishment of a Green National Accounting System of China (with funding assistance from 
the Italian government). The World Bank provided technical expertise that would assist the 
SEPA to undertake green GDP pilot projects across China.765 
Inspired by the examples of foreign environmental reform and his ecological modernisation 
outlook, Pan argued forcefully for adopting green GDP, and this encouraged the SEPA to 
partner with the NBS to create a ‘Green GDP Joint Task Force’ (ǹȏ GDP ȅȷʘÞǰ) in 
2003 to research the feasibility of a new environmental-economic accounting system. To 
reinforce his case for green GDP, Pan published several articles in 2004 across multiple 
journals that echoed Qu Geping’s earlier criticism of GDP; namely that it was ‘purely a concept 
for economic growth…that did not calculate environmental pollution or ecological destruction 
and did not reflect the sustainable nature of economic growth’. He pointed to the irrationality 
of GDP calculations that reward environmentally unsustainable behaviour, noting in the case 
of unsustainable logging that because it commanded a price, it was ‘incorporated into GDP 
statistics’. Such unsustainable logging led to deforestation, which severely impacted forestry 
ecosystems. Pan noted that the disruption of forest habitats could ‘lead to the extinction of 
mammals, fishes, and microbes’ that were integral to the ongoing functioning of those 
ecosystems (i.e. positive effects on ecosystem services).766 With the introduction of a green 
GDP system, China would have an index system that could account for ‘this loss’ and therefore 
would possess a more accurate picture of the status of China’s environment. In making his 
case, Pan linked green GDP to sustainable development, circular economy and cleaner 
production, seeking to place green GDP firmly within China’s turn towards ecological 
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modernisation reforms. Pan’s critique of GDP, and his belief that government policy could 
reshape society represented a powerful advocacy platform for ‘comprehensive indicators for 
cadre evaluation and the establishment of a green GDP accounting system’.767  
However, Pan realised that local officials would ‘resist’ this new green GDP indicator 
because it ran counter to the economic-based metrics they had experienced previously:  
In the past, the achievements of individual cadres’ performances were purely measured by GDP growth. 
Now we must combine economic growth with social development and environmental protection. Many 
cadres will be unable to understand this [change], and therefore, it will create resistance. However, any 
conceptual change has a gradual and challenging process… It is an innovation that makes both fairness 
and efficiency win-win. It also is a significant refinement to our theories of a socialist market economy.768 
To counteract potential resistance, Pan attempted to frame green GDP as mutually beneficial 
to the economy and the environment. He also sought to place it ideologically within the 
discourse of a ‘socialist market economy’. Administratively, he also foresaw that ‘it could be 
imagined that with the research and implementation of green GDP, the protection or destruction 
of the environment will become an essential criterion for the selection of cadres’.769 However, 
this optimistic perspective failed to consider the mindset of ‘actually-existing’ cadres. Their 
grounds for resistance will be examined in a later section of this chapter, as it reveals important 
limits to ecological rationality in China. 
The National Bureau of Statistics and green GDP. The SEPA was not the only Chinese 
government agency interested in this new ecological and economic accounting concept. By the 
mid-1990s, the NBS, China’s principal statistical agency, also started exploring how that 
agency could better measure the economic losses which resulted from environmental pollution. 
With this in mind, the Division of Resources and Environmental Accounting was established 
in 1996 within the NBS’s Department of National Accounting. Two years later, the NBS 
partnered with Statistics Norway on the Sino-Norwegian Project on Environment Statistics and 
Analysis. Soon after, the NBS started to publish material that quantified the environmental cost 
of economic development. Deputy Director Qiu Xiaohua ɢňu was one leading official who 
sought to quantify the economic losses that resulted from China’s industrial pollution. Qiu was 
an economist who graduated from Fujian’s Xiamen University in the early 1980s before 
studying international finance at Stanford University in the USA. After returning to China, he 
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took up a position within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and then later at 
the NBS. In a 1998 article, Qiu and a colleague reviewed a variety of theoretical assessment 
models of environmental pollution that calculated economic losses. Their review did not 
evaluate China specifically, but they concluded from their research that there needed to be 
‘unified evaluation procedures and calculation methods to better control pollution and promote 
better governance’.770 Qiu would go onto partner with Pan Yue at the SEPA to undertake a 
‘green GDP evaluation’ of China’s economy and environment to provide the statistical 
expertise that would make this new national accounting framework a reality.771  
From 2000 onwards, NBS policy researchers began commenting on green GDP publicly. 
For example, Cao Keyu ŎFƮ in a 2001 article in the Review of Economic Research claimed 
that ‘national economic accounting had not fully reflected the relationship between the 
economy, resources and the environment’.772 The problem with GDP, Cao argued, was that it 
treated ‘natural resources and the environment as completely separate from the economic 
system’, thus making its accounting methodology ‘biased’ and ‘unable to be objective’. He 
stated that this lack of objectivity had implications for policymaking because biased GDP 
statistics would ‘mislead decision-makers’. He believed that these policymakers needed to take 
into consideration how GDP-centred economic growth ‘mainly relied on natural resources, 
to…obtain employment, fiscal revenue, and foreign exchange income’. In his view, prioritising 
GDP growth would encourage policies that ‘led to excessive natural resource consumption and 
“external diseconomies” (ºɤ
ǳƇ)’.773 
Even former NBS cadres echoed this support for ‘green GDP’. The former NBS Director Li 
Chengrui ŜěƯ  remarked in an opinion piece in China Statistics that China needed to 
understand the ‘historical inevitability and important role’ that green GDP would have on its 
development strategy.774 The entrance of these economists and statisticians into the green GDP 
policy discussion reflected how ecological modernisation ideas had gained powerful support 
within economic agencies. It appeared that green GDP was on the rise within official discourse. 
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The political rise of green GDP in China. Although Pan Yue (and Qiu Xiaohua) drove the 
debate concerning green GDP, like the circular economy the concept had support in both the 
economic and environmental sectors of the government. For instance, in 2005 then SEPA 
Director Zhou Shengxian ưɀ and his predecessor Director Xie Zhenhua (who had been 
transferred to a vice-director position in the NDRC after the Songhua River chemical plant 
explosion at Jilin) both championed green GDP in 2005 as an essential principle for furthering 
China’s sustainable development in a series of speeches and articles.775 Officials within the 
powerful NDRC also saw the merits in green GDP. A year earlier, in a 2004 article, Director 
Ma Kai discussed the need to adopt circular economic principles and the ‘necessity of including 
an improved statistical accounting framework’ that included ‘resource costs and environmental 
costs’. However, Ma Kai still supported the measurement of GDP, believing that it was ‘an 
important indicator that reflected the economic scale and economic strength of a country; it 
also was an important foundation for the country to ‘formulate macro-control policies’.776 Yet, 
importantly, he also acknowledged it had some serious ‘limitations’ (ʅc):  
GDP mainly reflects the “output” (#Z), “total amount” (ĕɨ) and “quantity” (ɨ) of economic growth in 
a specific country (region) for a specified period. It does not or cannot reflect its “investment” (ģI) 
(mainly, the price of resource costs and environmental costs), the “structure” (Ǵţ) (including the 
distribution of social wealth) and “quality” (Ɂ) (include the quality of products, services, and social 
benefits, etc.). In the case of various shortcomings in GDP accounting, only using GDP to assess the 
development achievements of a region and assessing the achievements of leading groups is biased, and it 
is easy to cause some localities to pursue growth at all costs regardless of structure, quality, and efficiency, 
ignoring ecological construction and environmental protection.777 
Ma Kai’s views provide further illustration of how the developmental section of China’s 
bureaucracy was adopting a more ecological modernisation mindset to China’s economic and 
environmental challenges. 
With broad support in the Chinese government for the implementation of a green GDP, the 
SEPA and the NBS released their joint 2004 Study Report for Green National Economic 
Accounting, which was the fruition of their joint task force that they formed three years 
earlier.778 This report, compiled under the leadership of Pan Yue and Qiu Xiaohua, promoted 
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a new official direction for China’s national accounts that had traditionally placed importance 
solely on economic growth. According to the ‘public’ (K-Ơ) version of the report, following 
the example of Mexico, green GDP consisted of placing a value on various aspects of the 
environment, through ‘environmental physical accounting’, to provide a fuller description of 
economic activity that incorporated the value of producing, removing, and discharging 
pollution.779 The ultimate aim of this green GDP report was to adjust ‘GDP calculations’ to 
account for ‘environmental pollution’.780 Within the report’s limited scope of ‘economic loss 
due to environmental pollution’, ⁠ the report calculated the estimated economic losses at 
approximately 51.18 billion yuan – around 3.05 per cent of GDP. Moreover, the ‘hypothetical 
management costs’ (Țħſƭěŗ) of this environmental pollution was around 1.8 per cent of 
GDP at 28.74 billion yuan. In addition, green GDP would expand from environmental pollution 
to also include ‘ecological damage’ under the rubric of ‘environmental degradation costs’ (Ʃ
µɛrěŗ).781  
For example, the report included the electricity industry in its calculations of green GDP. 
The report detailed how ‘the industrial sector emitted 2173.2 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide, 
of which the sulphur dioxide emitted from the power industry accounted for 63 per cent’. 
Besides, it revealed that ‘a total of 8.866 million tonnes of smoke and dust were emitted from 
the industrial sector, [including] 5.594 million tonnes from the electricity industry…[and] the 
total emission of NOx [nitrogen oxide] in the industrial sector was 13.093 million tonnes, 
which was mainly concentrated in the power and steel industries’.782 The two leading authors 
of the report, Pan Yue and Qiu Xiaohua, acknowledged that the accounting techniques used to 
calculated green GDP were in their early stages and that there were ‘organisational, 
technological…[and] statistical limitations’ which would be overcome in subsequent 
reports.783 Pan had foreshadowed those problems in a 2005 article, noting that although GDP 
was simplistic in how it accounted for ‘market transactions’ (ì¨"ņ), green GDP with 
further research would overcome these ‘difficulties’ (¢ʉ).784 In particular, Pan and Qiu 
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argued that the statistical limitations would be overcome with a more ‘complete green GDP 
calculation’ through including the ‘resource depletion costs’ associated with the agricultural, 
forestry, mining, water and fishery sectors. In an article released to promote the report, Qiu 
again noted these limitations, stating that ‘if both resources and environmental factors are 
accounted for’ then the adjusted percentage of losses from development would ‘certainly be 
much higher than 3.05 per cent’.785  
The discussion so far has illustrated that green GDP signified an ambitious ecological 
modernisation concept for Chinese officials. Its proponents sought to converge economic and 
ecological rationality within a key national metric of development. In this way, green GDP 
represented a progression from the other ecological modernisation concepts discussed in past 
chapters. Pan Yue’s earlier promotion of an ‘environmental culture’ demonstrates that green 
GDP was an institutional attempt to create a new ‘morality’ fashioned according to 
environmental principles and which understood that China’s environment had strict ‘limits’      
(ʅc). Moreover, although many China watchers argue that the green GDP adjusted-figure in 
the 2004 Study Report for Green National Economic Accounting drastically underemphasised 
the environmental costs of China’s development 786 , its supporters included many of the 
influential senior bureaucrats in both the environmental and economic sections of China’s 
government, reflecting the power of ecological modernisation ideas to drive environmental 
reform in China. 
The political decline of Green GDP. When assessed alongside the passage of the Cleaner 
Production Promotion Law and the draft Circular Economy Promotion Law, it would seem 
that the bureaucratic support for green GDP would have been sufficient to establish it as an 
ecological-economic indicator for the Chinese government. However, even with the support of 
the senior officials within the NDRC, green GDP languished as an idea and the SEPA and the 
NBS never published another green GDP report. Indeed, the most critical green GDP studies 
would only be circulated to senior officials within restricted internal reference channels.787 The 
failure of green GDP to become institutionalised raises the question whether green GDP was 
different to other ecological modernisation concepts such as cleaner production and circular 
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economy. The ‘official’ line on the progress of green GDP states that provinces and local 
government officials had concerns over the methodology it used. Graeme Li and Vic Lang 
noted that many cities that partnered with SEPA and NBS’s green GDP pilot schemes 
‘complained about the validity and soundness of the measuring scheme’, with many of these 
cities threating to withdraw from the study or asking the SEPA and NBS to refrain from 
publicising their green GDP results.788 
Another interpretation of events focuses on the innovative aspects of green GDP within the 
context of China’s turn to ecological modernisation solutions. China’s policymakers focused 
on instituting a metric that would shape the morality or behaviour of government cadres. Green 
GDP was the most audacious attempt by China’s senior environmental protection agency to 
converge economic rationality with ecological rationality along its party-state chain of 
command. In seeking to understand the demise of this concept, Li and Lang place its demise 
in the hands of China’s political regime and their fears of stepping off the ‘treadmill of 
production’:  
the tension between ecological modernisation and the imperatives of the treadmill of production is well 
illustrated by China’s green GDP exercise. The ecological modernisers faced determined multi-level 
resistance from those firmly committed to the treadmill and, up to the present, high economic growth is 
more closely linked than ecological modernisation to regime-legitimacy and the main-stream collective 
visions of economic prosperity.789  
Alternatively, its failure has been attributed to bureaucratic infighting between SEPA and NBS 
over the content and format of the reports, resistance from powerful central institutions and 
provincial authorities, and the relative bureaucratic weakness of the SEPA.790 
The opaque-like qualities of Chinese politics render it challenging to provide a clear-cut 
answer. However, the discussion provided in this chapter suggests that the challenge of green 
GDP to economic rationality through an innovative ecological modernisation solution that 
sought to introduce an ecological rationality for government cadres would lead to its eventual 
political demise due to a backlash from those very cadres whom it sought to shape. A change 
in mindset was its objective. As the earlier examination of Pan Yue highlighted, one of the 
reasons why he supported a green GDP was due to his belief that this accounting tool would 
have forced cadres to more faithfully implement central initiatives such as the Cleaner 
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Production Promotion Law. New updates to green GDP could also have incorporated new 
indicators such as ‘environmental degradation’, allowing for a more accurate record of the 
environmental costs of China’s economic development.  
It is this innovation that meant implementing green GDP was a ‘bridge too far’ within the 
context of the environmental reform measures between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. 
Chinese legislation sought to ‘promote’ (=ɘ) cleaner production and a circular economy, but 
a green GDP would have provided the CCP Organisation Department with an annual account 
of which provincial, county and town officials had presided over a deteriorated environment. 
Moreover, it would have provided the Chinese public with a quantification of the 
environmental price of their modernisation, even if it was a sanitised ‘public version’. This 
point becomes more politically salient when internal research by the CASS published in 2015 
revealed that one-third of China’s GDP was ‘not real’.791 Green GDP would have opened the 
government up to more scrutiny. The evidence outlined in this chapter strongly indicates that 
Chinese policymakers in the SEPA wanted that transparency in line with ecological 
modernisation ideas. However, seeing as though informal studies of green GDP are kept with 
internal reference channels, this suggests that China’s leaders are less forthcoming and believe 
that this accounting tool would shed too much light on environmental costs in China. 
The policy status of a green GDP. Despite the failure of SEPA and NBS policymakers to 
implement green GDP, it has experienced in recent years something of a resurgence, suggesting 
that China’s institutions remain open to ecological modernisation concepts such as green 
national environmental accounting. In 2013, Xi Jinping was reported to have said at the 
National Organisational Work Conference: 
To improve assessment methods, we must look at both development and foundations. We must not only 
look at these achievements but also look out for potential achievements. We must take indicators such as 
improvements in people’s livelihood, social progress, and ecological benefits, and performance as essential 
assessments; no longer can we simply talk about heroes regarding GDP growth.792  
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evaluation leads to scientific development), 23 February, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-02/23/content_ 
5044812.htm. Accessed 18 June 2018. 
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With this apparent endorsement of green GDP from Xi Jinping, the MEP took the policy 
initiative and resumed research into ‘green GDP 2.0’ in 2015. In a media release, the head of 
the MEP’s Policy and Regulation Department, Li Qingrui ŜõƯ, mentioned that: 
restarting the research program on green GDP accounting 2.0 was a concrete move to implement the spirit 
of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s instructions, which is, to improve the social and economic development 
evaluation system, incorporate resource consumption, environmental damage, ecological benefits, and 
other indicators which reflect the progress in developing ecological civilisation, into the socio-economic 
development evaluation system, and make those indicators play an important, guiding and restraining role 
in promoting ecological progress.793 
To overcome the organisational difficulties associated with implementing green GDP 
nationwide, the MEP selected six provinces – Anhui, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shenzhen, 
Kunming – for a pilot program on green GDP in 2016. These pilot programs were to take into 
account ‘environmental cost and benefit accounting, environmental capacity accounting, 
ecosystem production accounting’.794 The renewed impetus for green GDP could reflect the 
idea of an ‘ecological civilisation’, an environmental idea that was accumulating political 
capital from the start of the Xi Administration in 2012 (explored further in Chapter Nine). 
Overall, the possibility that green GDP could emerge as an ecological modernisation concept 
parallel to the other concepts discussed in Chapters Five and Six remains a future possibility, 
but as of yet green GDP 2.0 has not been incorporated into China’s environmental policy 
agenda. 
Conclusion: China’s Failed Green GDP experiment and Ecological Modernisation 
Discourse 
This chapter has shown that a group of highly influential Chinese policymakers created 
‘green GDP’ in another attempt to integrate ecological modernisation ideas within China’s 
environmental policy framework. Chinese academics first started to discuss green GDP around 
the mid 1990s as another policy response to China’s deteriorating environment. The concept 
had been implemented in such countries as Norway and Mexico and their experience with the 
concept gave policymakers from the SEPA and NBS the confidence to consider implementing 
this new environmental accounting concept in China. Officials from these two government 
departments justified green GDP using language similar to that employed by other officials 
 
793 Quoted in Gov.cn. 2015. “Huanjing baohu bu chongqi lüse GDP yanjiu” (Ministry of Environmental 
Protection restarts green GDP research), 31 March, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-03/31/content_2840533. 
htm. Accessed 18 June 2018. 
794 Zhongguo jingji wang. 2015. “Anhui, Hainan, Sichuan deng 7 di shidian lüse GDP hesuan” (Pilot green GDP 
accounting in seven locations including Anhui, Hainan and Sichuan), 11 August, http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/ 
gdxw/201508/11/t20150811_6185604.shtml. Accessed 18 June 2018. 
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who had supported cleaner production (see Chapter Five) and a circular economy (see Chapter 
Six). In other words, it aligned with the reflexive narrative of the shift away from ‘traditional 
development’ (or a ‘traditional industrial civilisation’) and towards sustainable development 
that had characterised China’s environmental policy agenda since the Rio Earth Summit.  
Environmental bureaucrats criticised the oversimplified aspect of GDP that ignored 
negative environmental externalities caused by economic development. It was only a couple of 
years after China had officially adopted the United Nations’s System of National Accounts that 
Qu Geping openly questioned these statistics, stating that while GDP would result in ‘the ardent 
pursuit of GNP and high-growth goals’ it would also result in ‘a rapidly deteriorating 
environment’ and problems for future economic development.795 It received backing from 
bureaucrats in the NBS, as well as support from the NDRC’s Ma Kai, a key supporter of 
implementing a circular economy in China.796 
Although its primary backers at the NBS and the SEPA (and then the MEP and Ministry of 
Ecological Environment) failed to establish an ongoing green national accounting system, 
China’s experience with green GDP remains significant for understanding the role of 
ecological modernisation beliefs within China’s environmental policymaking community. Like 
its associated concepts of cleaner production and circular economy, the backers of green GDP 
sought to balance both economic and environmental objectives in their policy discussion. 
Officials within the SEPA and NBS believed that the policy strength of green GDP lay with its 
capability to include negative environmental externalities that accounting measures such as 
GDP ignored. Officials such as Pan Yue believed that the measurement of green GDP would 
only improve with experience, providing a fuller and more accurate picture of the 
environmental costs of China’s development. 
However, the ecological modernisation characteristics of green GDP went beyond the mere 
rhetorical balancing of ecological and economic considerations. Policymakers from the SEPA 
also wanted to use green GDP to help create a useful tool to refashion an ‘environmental 
culture’, reshape environmental governance and provide the central government with more 
confidence concerning its decentralised system of environmental governance. As highlighted 
 
795 Qu Geping 1994a, 1. 
796 See Chapter Six. 
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in Chapters Two and Three, decentralised environmental governance constitutes a critical 
element of ecological modernisation belief. In the early 1980s, the central authorities devolved 
substantial responsibility for environmental management to local and provincial environmental 
protection bureaus. Chinese officials were sometimes open about the governance problems of 
these moves. In the words of then vice-director of the SEPA Pan Yue, China had experienced 
‘the serious phenomena of legal non-compliance and lax enforcement’.797 The fear was that 
this lax enforcement would only get worse as China continued upon its ‘socialist market 
economy’ path and underwent further industrialisation. Through quantifying environmental 
issues, central environmental bureaucrats wanted to encourage local and provincial 
governments to take policy objectives beyond the economy into account. Pan Yue’s comments 
in support of green GDP strongly suggested that he believed green GDP could become ‘a 
comprehensive indicator for cadre evaluation’ and thus enhance China’s ‘green control 
capability’. He believed that green GDP would assist in creating an ‘environmental culture’ 
that would bolster the process of ecological modernisation.  
The thesis up to this point has shown that the Chinese government was willing to incorporate 
ecological modernisation ideas into China’s environmental policy agenda when it legislated 
the promotion of cleaner production and a circular economy. However, the failure of Chinese 
policymakers to incorporate green GDP into China’s environmental policy agenda shows that 
powerful barriers remain standing against the process of creating ecological modernisation in 
China. However, while these policy responses were being deliberated within the Chinese 
government, there had been, since the early 1980s, a slowly evolving policy discussion within 
Chinese policymaking circles as to the threats posed by anthropocentric climate change and 
the need for a ‘low-carbon economy’. The next chapter explores this policy deliberation and 
the Chinese policymakers response. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
797 Pan Yue 2003, 130. 
 197 
Chapter Eight: Low-Carbon Economy and Climate Change in 
China 
The chapters up to this point have demonstrated how rising anxiety within the Chinese 
government towards burgeoning air and water pollution, solid waste, population growth and a 
generally deteriorating environment, led progressively to new legislation with embedded 
ecological modernisation principles, which encouraged ‘cleaner production’ and ‘circular 
economic’ practices within Chinese industry. New laws conforming with some of the crucial 
aspects of what I have argued is a version of ‘ecological modernisation’ have focused on 
technology and science as the critical path towards a sustainable future. However, the last 
chapter on green GDP also demonstrated that despite the willingness of senior policymakers 
to implement ecological modernisation-based policies, embedded economic rationality and 
other politico-organisational forces among China’s political elites have still been capable of 
scuttling certain efforts. The failure of those promoting green GDP to garner support from the 
provinces suggests that the incorporation of ecological modernisation ideas within China’s 
environmental policy agenda is not a fait accompli. 
From the policy failure of green GDP, this chapter turns to the policy concept of a ‘low-
carbon economy’ (4ǑǳƇ) with the primary objective of examining whether fostering of a 
low-carbon economy in China also represents an adoption of an ecological modernisation 
concept. Although low-carbon economy emerged as a concept in the mid-2000s, this chapter 
will show that its preliminary discussion originates in the 1980s. The first half of this chapter 
charts the evolution in the ecological rationality that Chinese policymakers expressed from the 
1970s to the 2000s towards the potential threat of climate change and the ‘greenhouse effect’. 
From that historical basis, the latter half of the chapter examines the policy discourse 
surrounding ‘low-carbon economy’, focusing in particular on the perspectives of powerful 
senior Chinese politicians, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) and the National Development Reform Commission 
(NDRC). The chapter concludes by outlining the current status of this low-carbon concept and 
its linkage to ecological modernisation. Ultimately, this chapter argues that a low-carbon 
economy signifies a measured policy response to the threat of traditional carbon-based 
development. The ecological modernisation solutions proposed share similar technological and 
market traits to cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP.  
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The Early Ecological Rationality Towards Climate Change in China 
This chapter will start with an examination of the growing ecological awareness within 
China towards climate change and its environmental effects. It is necessary to trace the history 
surrounding this consciousness up to the 2000s in order to understand why China’s political 
leadership embraced the notion of a ‘low-carbon economy’ in 2007. During the 1970s, the 
discussion in China over climate change was dominated by foreign experts whose research was 
translated into Chinese for specialist journals, because China at that time had little capacity or 
expertise for undertaking climate change research.798 For instance, a report by a meteorologist 
from the American Institute of Physics Lester Machta799 to the 1973 World Metrological 
Organisation Commission for Atmospheric Sciences was considered significant enough for it 
to be translated and published in the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Science’s 
Meteorological Science and Technology. The report declared that ‘human activities probably 
cause climate change’ and that ‘this is a matter that concerns everybody’. The report also stated 
that carbon dioxide emissions were the leading cause of climate change: ‘most meteorologists 
believe that the increasing carbon dioxide and turbidity in the atmosphere [i.e. air pollution] is 
most likely a phenomenon in which humans unintentionally influence global or local climate 
change’. He supported his statements with data from observation stations worldwide that 
graphically illustrated the exponential rise in emissions.800 Later, a 1980 issue of the same 
journal translated a conference paper by Paul Harycak801 to a British Environmental Sciences 
Institute conference. The translated article claimed:
It was indeed probable that humans caused climate change; this has already occurred on a small scale. At 
present, the power of human beings to change their environment is increasing, the world is becoming 
increasingly crowded, and international cooperation is necessary for the future to prevent adverse climate 
change.802 
While foreigners wrote these published articles, the fact that Meteorological Science and 
Technology translated these articles demonstrates that there was at least some degree of 
ecological rationality amongst China’s scientists during the 1970s (at least after the 1972 
United Nations conference in Stockholm) concerning the role that carbon dioxide performed 
in altering the climate.
 
798 Economy 1997, 23. 
799 Chinese name was transliterated as L. ʞɇ´  
800 Machta 1974, 42. 
801 Chinese name was transliterated as P. ƉƯF. 
802 Harycak 1980, 2. 
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By the late 1970s, Chinese academics and researchers were also discussing ‘climate change’ 
(Ŵ?r). Writing in a 1978 issue of Environmental Protection, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences researcher Tao Shiyan ʇȳȨ stressed that ‘climate change is an important issue’ and 
he stated that ‘human activities’ (%ųưƃ) and ‘industrialisation’ (è,r) were exacerbating 
the issue. Moreover, industrial emissions from China’s factories not only caused ‘air pollution’ 
(¼ŴŻť) but also led to ‘climate change’. In particular, Tao argued that since the 1950s 
carbon dioxide emissions had grown exponentially with ‘over 50 per cent’ of those emissions 
remaining in the atmosphere. 803  Tao stated that such growth presented problems for the 
climatic system as it operated within a narrow band:
It is estimated that if the global average temperature decreases a few degrees Celsius, then the current 
snow-covered area in the Arctic and the Antarctic will expand to the whole earth; if the global average 
temperature warms a few degrees Celsius, the ice and snow in the Arctic and Antarctic regions will all 
melt simultaneously. Many flat areas on Earth, such as Beijing, Shanghai, London, and New York, will 
become submerged. There are many reasons for the climate becoming colder and warmer, but the impact 
of air pollution is an important reason. Because of the continuous development of industrialisation on the 
Earth, the accumulation of pollutants in the atmosphere will change the atmospheric composition. Changes 
in an atmospheric composition can cause changes in atmospheric radiation balance, which can cause 
changes in the climate on Earth. Among the various atmospheric pollutants that may cause climate change, 
the most noticeable is the role of carbon dioxide.804 
Even though foreign researchers wrote most of the research in the 1970s concerning climate 
published in China, Tao’s article illustrates that there was a growing realisation among China’s 
scientific researchers concerning excessive carbon dioxide emissions and the influential role 
that industrialisation was having on the climate. 
Another Chinese researcher, Gu Yu Ȼʋ  from the Shaanxi Meteorological Research 
Institute also stated in a 1979 article that beyond solar activity, volcanoes, and atmospheric and 
oceanic circulation, the other leading cause of ‘climate change’ was the ‘impact of human 
activities’.805 Although ‘the research in this area [of climate change science] was preliminary’, 
he forecast increases in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 that could present potential problems 
for high-yield agricultural areas, raising the average temperature by between ‘0.5 and 2 
degrees’.806 Both Tao Shiyan and Gu Yu’s comments demonstrate an awareness within China’s 
 
803 Tao Shiyan 1978, 6-7. 
804 Ibid, 6. 
805 Gu Yu 1979, 12. 
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 200 
scientific community of the destabilising impacts that China’s industrialisation could have on 
the climate at the dawn of China’s economic reforms. 
After the publication of these articles, officials from central government bureaux would 
enter the policy discussion surrounding climate change. During the 1980s, researchers from the 
China Meteorological Administration (CMA)807 published articles outlining the potential risks 
from global warming. For example, Huang Chaoying ʥŔɖ  from the CMA’s Beijing 
Meteorological Centre published an article in the Journal of Catastrophology, highlighting the 
negative socio-economic impacts that could result from global temperature rises:
Since the 1960s and with the rise of temperatures in the Arctic, many climate anomalies across the world 
have become more frequent. Climate extremes in many parts of the world are now associated with rising 
food prices, trade disruptions, reduced stocks and famine…at present, the temperature in the northern 
hemisphere seems to be in a rising stage. The first five years of the 1980s were the warmest five-years 
since [the start of the] meteorological record. The broad temperature range in China is also slowly rising.808 
Despite describing these catastrophic implications, he also raised some positive socio-
economic impacts. For instance, he predicted that temperature rises in China could become an 
economic boon for forestry and agriculture industries with some tree species and crops able to 
grow in more northern climates. However, he also raised the possibility that climate change 
could reduce precipitation levels in China’s northern regions, ‘increasing water shortages’ in 
those places.809 
Qu Geping would once more become a prominent commentator within the policy discussion 
of climate change.810 During the same period that he wrote articles on the negative effects of 
township-village enterprise (TVE) development and broader industrial development, he also 
touched on global warming and excessive fossil-fuel consumption. In one essay on global 
environmental problems, he discussed the ‘greenhouse effect’ (ƒÕķƻ), noting that ‘along 
with the expansion of energy and industrial production, atmospheric emissions of carbon 
dioxide have become more and more excessive’.811 He had also claimed in an article a year 
earlier that the global levels of carbon dioxide in ‘ppm’ [parts per million] had risen since the 
1850s and that the increase in carbon and the reduction of large swathes of forest that had 
 
807 Chinese name is £Ŵȼâ. Other name was £×Ŵȼâ (National Meteorological Administration). 
808 Huang Chaoying 1986, 112. 
809 Ibid, 113. 
810 See Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. 
811 Qu Geping 1981d, 12. 
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previously acted as ‘large reservoirs for storing carbon dioxide’ had now ‘become a widely 
discussed international issue’.812 
Qu advanced his discussion on global warming in another article published a year later in 
Environmental Protection. This article formed part of a more extensive four-part series focused 
on what he considered were the most critical environmental issues facing the global 
community.813 The fourth article of his series focused on ‘the influence of human activities on 
the atmosphere’. Writing in the early stages of Deng’s ‘reform and opening up’, Qu Geping 
remarked that ‘in conjunction with energy development and industrial production, the quantity 
of carbon dioxide emissions entering the atmosphere has become increasingly large’. He 
forecast that rising carbon dioxide emissions would result in worrying consequences. For 
instance, ‘with the increase of carbon dioxide it will probably create a ‘“greenhouse effect” 
…this [greenhouse effect] could cause the South Pole’s south-eastern ice sheet to slide into the 
ocean potentially causing global sea-levels to rise 200 feet, submerging dry land under the sea’. 
To reinforce the ‘urgency’ (ɚ\) of responding to climate change, Qu also warned that ‘he 
who gives no thought to the problems of the future is sure to be beset by worries much closer 
to hand’ (%ŁəșďŒɗĐ). He argued that China should develop an environmental policy 
targeting climate change and should not put this off into the future.814 Another related Qu 
article published in 1982 predicted that ‘if carbon dioxide concentrations double, then the 
temperature will rise by an average of 2 to 3 degrees, which will greatly affect agricultural 
production and lead to the melting of polar ice caps, inundating many cities and regions along 
the coast and bringing unprecedented disaster to humanity’. Linking to population concerns 
raised in Chapter Six, Qu stressed that ‘the rapid increase of population’ would have ‘a wide-
ranging impact on the climate’ because of increased ‘human activities’.815 Qu Geping’s early 
comments demonstrate that, beyond the confines of industrial pollution and waste, he adopted 
a holistic approach to China’s future that included a broader climatic perspective. 
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As noted in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, Qu ranged across other non-climate change 
related environmental issues during the 1980s, but in 1987 he wrote an article on ‘Human 
Survival in the Biosphere’ which refocused attention on climate change risks. He noted that 
‘one of the serious consequences of climate warming is rising sea levels’. Referring to unnamed 
‘experts’ (×), he declared that if ‘[the global] temperature rises by two degrees, it will be 
sufficient to melt the gigantic glaciers in the Western Antarctic, which will increase the sea 
level by five metres, drowning many coastal and riverside cities and farmland’.816 He also 
explained the flow-on effects of a changing climate, remarking that it would ‘change global 
wind directions, rainfall, and the way the ocean circulates, all of which will harm the production 
of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries’.817 He was confident enough in his 
predictions to declare that ‘humanity will suffer enormous disasters’ from climate change, even 
if he accepted that there were ‘differences of opinion on the consequences of increased carbon 
dioxide levels’.818 Even if other similarly-ranked government officials did not share this level 
of concern, Qu Geping’s ideas at this time concerning global warming and carbon dioxide 
demonstrated a highly-developed ecological rationality towards the threat of a warming 
climate.
Qu Geping also drew attention to climate change within key Party and government 
publications in the late 1980s. In the CCP publication Party Construction, Qu wrote in 1989 
that ‘carbon dioxide provoking rising global surface temperatures’ was one of ‘the many new 
emerging environmental issues’ that China and the international community faced.819 In a 1990 
edition of Xinhua’s Outlook he reiterated that ‘increased global warming had become 
extremely obvious’, noting that over the past 100 years the six ‘warmest’ (Ŋ) were in the 
1980s. 820  Moreover, leading up to the Rio conference of 1992, SEPA researchers were 
increasingly focusing on climate change and its potential effects on socio-economic systems 
under his leadership.821 
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Qu Geping’s articles throughout the 1980s reinforce his ecological awareness of the impact 
of human activities. He understood that rising carbon dioxide emissions and the ‘greenhouse 
effect’ would destabilise ecosystems, significantly impacting the functioning of modern 
societies. Although Chinese researchers were increasingly exploring global warming and 
reporting on international climate change conferences, senior officials within the 
environmental sections of China’s bureaucracy, with the exception of Qu Geping, refrained 
from contributing to the broader public discussion of this issue.822 They avoided voicing the 
same concerns towards climate change that they directed towards industrial pollution at this 
time.  
However, by the turn of the decade, senior officials in the CMA and State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC) began mentioning ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ in 
their speeches, but in a more subdued and conservative manner than Qu Geping, eschewing 
the opportunity to emphasise some of the negative impacts from climate change, both 
regionally and globally.823 For example, the first time that former National Environmental 
Protection Commission Chairman and PRC Premier Li Peng Ŝʤ raised ‘climate change’ 
involved a few brief mentions at the 1991 Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Development in Developing Countries in Beijing and the 1992 Rio Conference.824 With respect 
to the environment, during this period Li kept his focus more centred on general environmental 
problems such as industrial pollution and population growth.825 
The question that arises from the above discussion is why Qu Geping was the only 
government official at this time to draw policy attention towards the threat of climate change. 
The career of Qu Geping suggests that he was fortunate to be exposed to much of the leading 
scientific research concerning climate change. He was, as previously discussed in Chapter Five, 
China’s first representative to the UNEP from 1976 to 1979. While serving in this three-year 
position, he would have been exposed to some of the emerging research in the 1970s that drew 
attention to the threats of a warming planet. 826  Chinese scholar Elizabeth Economy’s 
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investigation into the development of climate change policy in China has also emphasised the 
positive role that ‘epistemic communities’ have played in the development of scientific 
knowledge in China.827 It appears from his writings that Qu would have maintained contact 
with individuals in the international environmental policy community after his United Nations 
posting which would have kept him informed of newly emerging climate change research. This 
would almost certainly have contributed to Qu Geping’s awareness of the importance of rising 
carbon dioxide emissions. (However, one can only speculate on these contacts as Qu often 
shunned citations in his policy discourse). Climate change represented just one ecological 
concern that shaped Qu Geping’s ecological rationality, with other elements including 
pollution, waste, and population growth. 
Despite the lack of high-level commentary concerning climate change before the 1990s, the 
Chinese leadership had made a series of behind-the-scenes institutional moves by the early 
1990s that suggested that they took the potential risks of climate change very seriously. These 
moves, coupled with the 1992 Rio Conference, would place climate change on the 
government’s policy agenda. In 1987, the State Council had created the National Climate 
Committee828, situating its secretariat within the CMA. Then, in 1990, the State Council formed 
the National Climate Change Coordination Group 829 , modelling its structure on the 
organisation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change with interagency links 
between the SSTC and the SEPA. During this period, there were a series of internal reports 
circulated within these agencies that drew attention to the threat of climate change.830 The 
internal nature of these reports indicates, as others have noted, that climate change was a 
politically-sensitive topic, and that kept broader discussion by senior policy officials muted.831 
The discussion of climate change was politically sensitive because a meaningful response 
would have ramifications for China’s rapid economic development that was just over a decade 
old. Qu Geping’s political linkages to former Premier Zhou Enlai could have provided him 
with a degree of latitude to discuss the subject. Interviews conducted by Elizabeth Economy 
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reveal that former environmental policymakers under his charge ‘questioned his attention to 
the issue given the vast problems involved in China’s domestic environmental situation’, 
suggesting that Qu Geping was passionate about drawing attention to climate change regardless 
of the attention it drew to him.832 This context explains why Qu Geping remained an outlier in 
the Chinese climate policy discussions up until the early 1990s. 
Along with organisational changes, policy discussion on climate change opened up during 
the early 1990s. The first marker of that adjustment was the State Council-convened National 
Symposium on Climate Change and Environmental Issues held in Beijing during January 1991. 
The symposium was important because it gave the first indication of the scientific and policy 
consensus on climate change (i.e. its causes and likely impacts). The summary of the 
symposium, published in Environmental Protection, stated that the consensus surrounding 
global warming was that the planet had recently experienced remarkably warmer weather: 
‘1990 was the warmest year globally in forty-one years, and the 1980s was the warmest decade 
[this century]’. However, concerning ‘the role of the greenhouse effect’ in contributing to that 
‘global warming’ (JƬŊ), the conference participants were more uncertain about the 
science: 
According to the research of Chinese scientists, the world, the northern hemisphere and China have 
experienced significant warming since the beginning of the 20th century. However, the time and spatial 
distribution of this warming are not entirely consistent with the increase in greenhouse gases. The value of 
the greenhouse effect is difficult to explain for China’s climate change. We cannot wholly negate the role 
of the greenhouse effect, but we cannot deny that natural factors are still the dominant factor in climate 
change. The cause of global warming, whether it is the result of the greenhouse effect, the fluctuation of 
the climate itself, or the combination of the two, still has scientific uncertainty.833 
Although the statement from this symposium referred to the ‘scientific uncertainty’ (ǗÊƺ

ǎÑĔ) of climate science and the inconsistencies of temperature data, it also declared that 
the ecological concern towards global warming had reached a point where humans had 
potentially become the most significant variable in climate change. Yet the statement 
surrounding the uncertainty of the science showed that the ecological rationality of human-
caused climate change had to progress further for China’s policymakers to propose with 
confidence ecological modernisation policies.  
The ongoing prevalence of economic rationality was further demonstrated six months later, 
in June 1991, when the Chinese government organised a meeting in Beijing of foreign ministers 
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from forty-one developing nations to discuss issues of environment and development for 
developing countries (referred to as the ‘Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Development in Developing Countries’). The joint conference statement – commonly called 
the ‘Beijing Declaration’ (s$ÔȨ) – outlined ‘shared’ principles for their development in 
preparation for the international environmental negotiations at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro. Regarding the pressing international concern surrounding rising greenhouse gas 
emissions, the statement declared: 
We are gravely concerned about growing greenhouse gases that cause climate change and their potential 
impact on the global ecosystem, especially the developing countries with islands and lowlands. 
Responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions should be determined historically, cumulatively and in real 
terms. The solution should be based on the principle of equity, and the developed countries that cause more 
pollution should contribute more. Therefore, developed countries should shoulder their obligations to take 
measures to stop human-made climate change and establish mechanisms to guarantee the environmental 
safety and development in developing countries, including through the transfer of technology to developing 
countries for favourable or non-commercial conditions.834
The phrase ‘gravely concerned about growing greenhouse gases’ illustrates, on the one hand, 
an ecological rationality surrounding global warming. Yet, on the other hand, the statement 
remained couched in the economic rationality and economic opportunism of developing 
nations. Foreign ministers of those nations believed that the economic interests of their 
countries should not be unduly harmed because of the cumulative effect of prior carbon 
emissions produced by developed nations as they undertook their historical development. This 
mutual concern would result in China leading the bloc of developing nations in successfully 
advocating for the inclusion of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (L2Œtb
ƺȿ+) principle within the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
This principle stipulated that although all nation-states share an obligation to address the 
problems surrounding global warming, not all states share equal responsibility for the causes 
of that global warming.835 This principle would soon become a frequent watchword in Chinese 
climate change policy discourse, reflecting the ongoing importance of economic concerns 
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within any discussion of climate change policy.836 It represented an entanglement of ecological 
rationality within the dominant discourse of economic rationality.
The paramount importance of economic concerns over climate change in China was further 
revealed through Premier Li Peng’s speech to the United Nations summit in Rio de Janeiro:
While present attention is paid to such global environmental issues as climate change and biodiversity, it 
is particularly necessary to at the same time give proper consideration to the problems of ecological 
destruction faced by developing nations such as environmental pollution, soil erosion, desertification, 
vegetation loss, floods and droughts…resolving these issues would not only eliminate severe threats to the 
environment and the development of developing countries but also promote the global environment and 
global development.837
As Li Peng’s comments demonstrate, the only environmental issues within the senior 
leadership’s purview were ‘environmental pollution, soil erosion, desertification, vegetation 
loss, floods and droughts’. However, taken together, the Beijing Declaration and Li Peng’s 
speech are crucial to the development of ecological modernisation thought in China for two 
reasons. First, they indicate that ecological rationality within China’s top political institution 
still ranked below economic development objectives. China’s economic reforms were just 
under a decade and a half old, and while it had achieved impressive rates of economic 
development through rapid industrialisation over this period, there were still many areas of 
poverty within China that the authorities wished to tackle through providing industrial-based 
employment. 838  Second, although the concern surrounding climate change had grown 
significantly over the previous decade, it still ranked below other environmental issues, such 
as industrial pollution, and this focus would eventually lead to a prioritisation of cleaner 
production and the circular economy, as discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
The Ecological Rationality of China’s Post-Rio Climate Change Discourse 
Throughout the 1990s, China participated in a series of international climate change 
conferences as a result of its ratification of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change.839 These conferences culminated in the 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference 
in Japan where they signed the Kyoto Protocol, committing China to take action on climate 
change even if they did not allow themselves to be bound by specific reduction targets.840 
 
836 Bao Shishao and Li Zhiming. 1992. “Yixie fada guojia daibiao zai huan fa dahui shang biaoshi chengdan 
teshu zeren baohu shijie huanjing” (Representatives of some developed countries expressed their commitment at 
the UNECD to protect the world environment), Renmin ribao, 10 June. 
837 Li Peng 1992, 5. 
838 Ibid. 
839 Economy 1997; Hatch 2004. 
840 Hatch 2004, 53-54; Heggelund, 2007. 
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However, the policy discussion concerning climate change remained primarily within the same 
environmental bureaucratic organ that had up to that point discussed cleaner production, 
namely the State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB). Xie Zhenhua, who was the director 
of the SEPB, became the most prominent senior official, apart from Qu Geping, to actively 
draw public attention to climate change in China. 
Although the 1991 State Council conference had earlier maintained that there was 
‘uncertainty’ concerning climate science, by 1995 Xie Zhenhua was more adamant that 
‘greenhouse gas emissions mainly caused global climate change’. Moreover, those 
‘greenhouse gas emissions were principally the result of the large discharge of carbon dioxide 
from the burning of fossil fuels by humans in production and life’. He noted that, based on 
current and forecast carbon dioxide emissions, the average temperature was set to rise by 
between 1.5 to 4.5 degrees, leading to ‘sea level rises’ and ‘intensified storm surges’ along 
China’s coast. Concerning its socio-economic effects, he predicted that ‘climate change would 
also have a broad, long-term and profound impact on agriculture, forestry, water resources and 
the ecological environment’.841 These remarks were close to the ecological rationality espoused 
by Qu Geping, drawing attention to the broader socio-economic effects that a changing climate 
would have on China. 
Despite the emergence of this climate change policy discourse in the 1990s, it took until 
2002 for concern surrounding climate change to become a household issue. The catalyst for 
this growing awareness was the Chinese government’s position at the September 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. There, Premier Zhu 
Rongji řɸ²announced that China would ratify the Kyoto Protocol – a decision that received 
scant commentary amongst China’s media at the time. For instance, the People’s Daily news 
dispatch from the event reported the announcement without quotations from the Chinese 
Premier.842 However, despite this muted commentary, the event marked a crucial moment for 
China’s ecological rationality towards climate change. The speech by Premier Zhu chose to 
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only obliquely refer to global warming, discussing ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, ‘global environmental problems’ and ‘abnormal climatic changes’. 843 
However, the ratification of the Kyoto treaty suggested that China’s senior leadership was 
taking seriously the threats posed by climate change. Moreover, this treaty bound China to an 
international environmental climatic regime that would soon require it to take environmental 
reform initiatives to reduce its carbon emissions. 
Zhu’s soon-to-be successor, then-Vice Premier Wen Jiabao, wrote an op-ed in the Farmer’s 
Daily in late March 2002 which revealed how he saw the economic and social risks surrounding 
climate change. Wen’s discussion of climate change represented the first official discussion of 
the impacts caused by a warming planet:  
The weather and climate change heavily influence production and livelihoods. In recent years, global 
climate change has been abnormal, with rising temperatures, severe droughts, increased hurricanes, and 
heavy rains. Frequent weather and climate extremes have brought great harm to economic and social 
development.844  
Although he couched his ecological rationality in general terms, Wen’s comments reflect a 
clear advance over the views expressed by Li Peng at the United Nations Summit in Rio in 
1992, which had focused on issues of development and environmental pollution, and which 
placed less importance on climate change. 
The next important step in the evolution of ecological rationality in China towards climate 
change also occurred in 2002 when the Ministry of Science and Technology joined with the 
CMA and the Chinese Academy of Sciences to take the lead in China’s first National 
Assessment Report on Climate Change.845 Over 100 scientists from more than 20 leading 
government and academic institutions were involved in the drafting of the report. It covered 
climatic trends, present and future impacts from climate change, and evaluations of potential 
mitigating policies. After reviewing the temperature data for the past century, the first part of 
the report concluded: 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration in China has continuously increased and the sum of positive 
radiative forcing [or climate forcing] produced by greenhouse gases is probably responsible for the 
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country-wide climate warming for the past 100 years, especially for the past 50 years. The projections of 
climate change for the 21st century using global and regional climate models indicate that, in the future 
20-100 years, the surface temperature will continue to increase, and the annual precipitation also has an 
increasing trend for most parts of the country.846 
The second part of the report noted that sea-levels along China’s coast were rising, its marine 
ice was decreasing, its glaciers were retreating, and its permafrost was melting. There were 
also concerns that climate change could ‘compromise long-term food security in China’. Crop 
productivity was predicted to ‘decrease by 5 to 10 per cent’ by 2030 if no action was taken on 
climate change. Furthermore, the report forecast that ‘by the second half of the 21st century, 
climate change could cause a reduction in rice, maize and wheat yields by up to 37 per cent’.847 
Ironically, while climate change would increase ‘the frequency of exceptional floods’ in the 
South, it would also exacerbate present water insecurity in water-scarce regions such as the 
Northeast of China, with ‘some simulations’ indicating that ‘water shortages’ in the Northwest 
of China ‘could reach about 20 billion m3 per year’ between 2010 and 2030.848 The consensus 
among Chinese experts was that climate change would present existential problems for Chinese 
society.849 This consensus ensured that the Chinese government would be forced to address the 
problem of balancing ecological and economic rationality in order to meet the challenge of 
climate change.
These reports were followed in 2007 by the State Council’s first climate change white paper: 
China’s National Climate Change Programme.850 This white paper marked a significant step 
for Chinese authorities, representing the first mention of the threat of climate change within a 
high-level official document or law. For instance, the earlier 2005 Renewable Energy Law 
made no mention of climate change, even though many of the Law’s measures would indirectly 
tackle climate change.851 The climate change white paper reiterated many of the climatic 
changes that have affected China over the previous century, noting the sea-level rises and 
temperature changes. The document also declared that based on ‘preliminary estimates’, 
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China’s greenhouse gas emissions between 1994 and 2004 had grown by 4 per cent annually 
to be around 61 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. However, the white paper also pointed 
out that carbon dioxide intensity (per unit of GDP) had decreased by nearly half from 1990 to 
2004. This latter trend only emphasised the enormous task facing China.
Although China’s National Climate Change Programme revealed that Chinese authorities 
were adopting an ecological rationality towards climate change, a robust economic rationality 
still prevailed in the language employed within the document. For instance, it stated that 
‘climate change…is an issue involving both environment and development, but it is ultimately 
an issue of development’; and warned that ‘the possibility of the more frequent occurrence of 
extreme weather/climate events would increase in China, which will have immense impacts on 
the socio-economic development and people’s living’. It also avoided any specific carbon 
dioxide emissions caps or targets. Instead, the aim was to reduce energy consumption per capita 
by 20 per cent from 2005 base levels by 2010, which, according to that policy document, would 
‘consequently reduce carbon dioxide emissions’.852
The significance of China’s National Climate Change Programme for the ideational 
development of ecological modernisation in China lay in the fact that the State Council now 
identified climate change as an existential threat.853 The discussion thus far in this chapter has 
shown that the discursive journey to understand the significance of climate change took around 
three decades. However, once China’s leaders had crossed that political Rubicon, they would 
effectively have to create a strategy that responded to the ecological risks in a manner that 
avoided constraining their still developing economy. Like the considerations concerning 
cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP, the Chinese government resorted to 
adopting an ecological-modernisation concept that promised a win-win scenario for the 
economy and the climate: ‘low-carbon economy’ (4ǑǳƇ).854 The following discussion will 
show how this concept of a low-carbon economy became the favoured approach to climate 
change among Chinese academics and then China’s highest-level politicians. 
 
852 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui. 2007. “Zhongguo yingdui qihou bianhua 
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Climate Change and the Policy Discourse of a Low-Carbon Economy in China
Origins of a ‘low-carbon economy’. The origins of the concept ‘low-carbon economy’ 
help explain its Chinese adaptation. Low-carbon economy, like other environmental reform 
ideas discussed so far in this thesis, originated outside China. Its conceptual origins primarily 
stem from the growing international discussions from the 1970s onwards concerning the ill-
effects of climate change. It was also associated with the early debates over sustainable 
development which placed responses to environmental problems within the confines of 
economic development.855 However, the specific promise of a ‘low-carbon economy’ gained 
popularity when the Labour government in the United Kingdom released its 2003 Energy 
White Paper, Our Energy Future - creating a low-carbon economy. The report was the UK 
Government’s response to the growing threat of a changing climate. It was a political 
repositioning for the UK economy and how it would handle the then-upcoming EU emissions 
trading scheme, which was expected to commence operation in 2005.856  
The UK report focused the challenge of climate change using an ecological modernisation 
narrative: although climate change would incur economic costs in traditional industrial sectors, 
overall it would present the UK economy with many economic opportunities that would 
improve the efficiency of the economy. For example, the report raised the economic advantages 
of shifting the UK economy towards a less-carbon intensive model:
The opportunity to move the UK decisively towards becoming a low-carbon economy where higher 
resource productivity – producing more with fewer natural resources and less pollution – will contribute 
to higher living standards and a better quality of life. The opportunity to develop, apply and export leading-
edge technologies, [thus] creating new businesses and jobs. Also, the chance to lead the way, in Europe 
and internationally, in developing environmentally sustainable, reliable and competitive energy markets 
that will support economic growth in every part of the world.857
The UK Government presented this low-carbon economy concept as a technocratic win-win 
policy solution. It is this mutually beneficial vision that reflects its ecological modernisation 
underpinnings. A low-carbon economy provided an optimistic view of regulated market-based 
mechanisms such as emissions trading schemes. These mechanisms provide environmental 
outcomes with climate change mitigation, but also improved economic results due to the 
reshaping of market behaviour towards new sustainable growth industries. A low-carbon 
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economy, like cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP, was an ecological 
modernisation concept consistent with the direction in which China’s leaders were heading.  
Zhuang Guiyang, the UK Government and the early discussion of a low-carbon 
economy. In China, the release of the UK Energy White Paper soon provided the conceptual 
grist for researchers’ climate-change policy mill.858 The UK Government, through its Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office’s Global Opportunities Fund, subsequently helped finance the 
CASS’s ‘Promoting Low-Carbon Development with Incentives’ project. The result was a 
conference funded by the UK Government in Beijing in 2005.859 That conference provided the 
first significant policy discussion concerning a low-carbon economy in China. The lead 
researcher on that project was CASS researcher Zhuang Guiyang ôɂɾ. Zhuang argued at the 
conference that China needed to adopt a low-carbon developmental path because of both 
‘external drivers’ (ºɤʟl) and ‘internal requirements’ (OɤʎŸ).860 The external drivers 
were China’s Kyoto Protocol obligations. Although Zhuang acknowledged that the Kyoto 
Protocol had yet to impart any significant economic costs onto China at its present stage of 
development, China would have to ‘meet the post-Kyoto challenge’ when the international 
community next revisited a new international climate change agreement. He believed that the 
‘international community’ would make China commit itself ‘to obligations to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions’ in a manner that was commensurate with its position as ‘an 
important actor on the world stage’.861 A low-carbon economy would provide that path for 
China and help meet its responsibilities and challenges in a manner that would avoid 
compromising its ongoing economic development. Along these lines, the call for low-carbon 
economy shared a similarity to arguments for a ‘circular economy’ and concerns over ‘green 
barriers’. 862  Concepts rooted in ecological modernisation thought were again providing 
Chinese academics with the optimism to help navigate China’s path towards ‘sustainable 
development’. 
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Equally important were the internal requirements Zhuang raised, namely China’s carbon-
intensive industries and their limitations. As noted throughout this thesis, China’s economic 
development prior to 2005 had been energy and resource intensive as it undertook ‘rapid 
urbanisation and infrastructure construction’.863 Zhuang noted that ‘energy supply and energy 
security have become the main factors constraining China’s industrialisation’. Its ‘rapid 
economic growth’ had lent itself towards an economic structure heavily skewed towards 
carbon-intensive industries such as electricity, steel, and chemical industries.864 This economic 
structure had significant implications for China’s contribution to global greenhouse gas 
emissions. For instance, Zhuang revealed that ‘from 1990 to 2001, China’s net carbon dioxide 
emissions had increased by 823 million tonnes, accounting for 27 per cent of the world’s total 
growth’. Coal was identified as the chief contributor to carbon emissions, and it was the main 
force behind the need for a low-carbon economy. Zhuang declared that from 2000 to 2004 
standard coal consumption had risen from 1.35 billion to 1.97 billion tonnes. This sharp 
increase in coal led to ‘shortages’ (ǉǺ). A heightened fear of an energy crisis still lingered in 
China in the aftermath of the coal shortages experienced across the country in the winter of 
2003 and 2004, which had led to widespread blackouts (see Chapter Six).865 His comments 
concerning both the internal and external requirements for a low-carbon economy reinforced 
the economic imperatives that lay behind Chinese concerns with transforming its economy. 
Moreover, the comments show that the drivers behind a low-carbon economy were consistent 
with the economic concerns that drove a circular economy, such as high resource usage.866  
These economic concerns were also consistent with an ecological modernisation 
interpretation of a low-carbon economy. Zhuang interpreted all issues concerning climate 
change and fossil-fuel use as the potential for China to adopt a ‘first-mover’ advantage if it 
took the initiative of implementing low-carbon development. He drew inspiration from the way 
in which the UK Government framed climate change policy and how its adoption of a low-
carbon economy ‘was guided by government and commercial incentives’, as well as how the 
UK Government’s encouragement of ‘the latest low-carbon technologies would provide a clear 
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and stable policy framework for industry and investors that would promote the transformation 
of its entire economic structure’. With one eye focused on China’s economic development, 
Zhuang was concerned that its recent investment was ‘mostly a simple copy of conventional 
technology’.867 This type of investment presented problems, particularly a ‘“lock-in effect” (ɰ
Ñķö ) of investment and capital’ that would hinder China once it had to meet global 
greenhouse gas emissions.868 In a later article, Zhuang contended that China’s economy was 
too highly geared towards ‘exports’ with high ‘embodied energy’ (ʈȊƓ), with close to 
‘fourteen per cent of its emissions’ produced from creating goods for ‘US consumers’. The 
lesson was that China needed to move beyond its current position as the ‘world factory’ (ƴ
iè|).869 A low-carbon economy would provide that economic opportunity while enabling 
the country to meet its future global environmental obligations.  
Furthermore, the same article strongly suggested that Zhuang supported many of the 
positive economic claims put forth in the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 
chaired by British economist Nicholas Stern.870 Indeed, Zhuang cited Stern and used his claims 
to bolster calls for a low-carbon economy in China. Zhuang stressed the ‘economic losses’ (ǳ
ƇĬ¿) that could occur if China neglected a transition to a low-carbon economic model. He 
argued that China could avoid costly economic write-offs in the future if it invested more in 
‘technological research and development’. In particular, he argued that ‘low-carbon economy 
investment of one per cent of global GDP could avoid GDP losses of 5 to 20 per cent in the 
future’. China possessed the requisite funds for such a transition, he claimed, as it had a ‘high 
savings rate’, and these surplus funds needed to ‘perform more efficiently’ than currently.871 
Zhuang’s enthusiasm for a low-carbon economy represented the earliest Chinese statements 
on a ‘low-carbon economy’. They were presented as a means to converge ecological and 
economic views, tackling the threat of climate change while restructuring the economy. For 
instance, he warned that even modest investment in high-carbon infrastructure in the short-
term would result in high economic losses in the future. Zhuang’s comments also highlighted 
the intellectual (as well as financial) contribution of the UK Government in charting the low-
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carbon economy path. The lead author of the UK Government’s energy white paper Nicholas 
Stern collaborated with Chinese research institutions such as CASS through the 
Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe Project, which aimed 
to ‘facilitate further understanding of China–EU interdependence and the potential for 
collaboration on energy and climate security issues’.872 Zhuang’s policy discussion shows that 
Nicholas Stern’s ideas found a receptive audience among Chinese researchers. 
Low-carbon economy enters onto the political stage. Up until 2007, the concept of a low-
carbon economy, at least publicly, remained isolated to CASS, and a few academic networks. 
That isolation ended when President Hu Jintao ȈɴƋ first mentioned the concept in his 
September 9 speech to the 2007 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in 
Sydney, Australia. As the earlier discussion in this chapter indicates, the State Council had 
released China’s first climate change policy only three months before this speech. Therefore, 
Hu’s speech provided the first public opportunity for China to express its policy response to 
climate change to an international audience. That response was China transitioning to a low-
carbon economic structure. In his speech to the other international leaders, President Hu noted: 
Climate change is fundamentally a development issue which can only be adequately resolved based on the 
premise of sustainable development. Sustainable development requires the coordination of economic 
growth, social development and environmental protection. Stopping development in response to climate 
change or unilaterally pursuing economic growth without regard to climate change is undesirable. It is 
necessary to establish production methods and consumption methods that meet the requirements of 
sustainable development, optimise the energy structure, promote industrial upgrading, develop a low-
carbon economy [emphasis added], and strive to build a resource-saving and environment-friendly society 
to fundamentally address the challenges of climate change.873
Hu Jintao used the term ‘low-carbon economy’ a further three times in his speech.874 With the 
scientific case already made for the reality of the greenhouse effect, Hu championed low-
carbon development as the ‘necessary developmental path to travel towards a new kind of 
industrialisation’.875 He stated emphatically that a low-carbon economy was the only path out 
of China’s present climate change predicament while maintaining its economic modernisation. 
This argument was couched in the language of ecological modernisation. This narrative was 
also consistent with a sustainable development outlook that included cleaner production and 
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circular economy. Moving beyond the earlier Chinese rationale for pollution control, Hu 
argued that climate change mitigation was based on the ‘premise of sustainable development’. 
The convergence of ecological and economic rationality was now central to China’s climate 
change policy. 
After Hu Jintao and the CCP had given their ideological endorsement to low-carbon 
economy, various ministerial and vice-ministerial level officials began openly advocating the 
concept. The Ministry of Science and Technology Minister Wan Gang ɬ was one of the first 
government ministers to promote a low-carbon economy in a speech he presented one month 
after Hu Jintao returned from the APEC Conference in Sydney. Wan noted the vital role that 
‘technology’ (ġŘ) would have in implementing a low-carbon economy. Reflecting on the 
importance of this concept for his policy portfolio, Wan called for more ‘technological 
investment’ (ġŘģI) in low-carbon industries so China could ‘grasp the historical opportunity 
from the new technological revolution to vigorously develop a low-carbon economy’.876  
NDRC Energy Bureau Director Xu Dingming ĊɵŅ followed up this argument in a speech 
he gave to the 2007 China Energy Sustainable Development Forum. Xu highlighted the levels 
of embodied pollution and carbon that produced the energy China traditionally relied upon: 
Perhaps people do not know that creating a kilowatt of electricity releases 7 grams of sulphur and 1 
kilogram of carbon dioxide; producing 1 tonne of steel releases 1.68 tonnes of carbon dioxide; producing 
1 tonne of aluminium produces 21.8 tonnes of carbon dioxide; the full combustion of 1 litre of petrol 
releases 2.2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. Moreover, 10 kilograms of straw (crops) can reasonably absorb 
16 kilograms of carbon dioxide, and the increase of a cubic metre of forest trees can absorb 1.83 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide.877
Xu’s comments reinforce the reflexive nature of Chinese economic development and its 
relationship with the ideas inherent in ecological modernisation. Xu specifically raised this 
process of reflexivity when he stated that ‘in the process of human’s energy development, 
humanity itself also has a historical development process that has taken it from unaware to 
aware, from unconscious to conscious and from passive to active’.878 The same reflexive 
reading on China’s modernisation that led to cleaner production, circular economy and green 
GDP was now also applied to a low-carbon economy. 
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The Ministry of Environmental Protection and a low-carbon economy. From 2009, 
MEP researchers began to highlight the merits of a ‘low-carbon economy’ and included the 
concept in their policy articles. Their entrance into the low-carbon economy discussion was 
not unusual, because even though the NDRC had been the lead agency responsible for climate 
change policy since 2003, the head of the MEP/SEPA was on the cabinet-level leading small 
group for climate change policy.879 Although they lacked the ultimate bureaucratic clout in 
climate change policy, they could still influence policy discussions concerning a low-carbon 
economy. In a 2009 report, Peng Jinxin ĄɗĿ from the MEP’s Science and Technology 
Commission critiqued China’s coal-dependent energy system. While he recognised China 
needed to continue using coal to power its economic industrialisation, it was important to 
‘combine the development of a low-carbon economy with an adjustment of the energy structure 
to avoid repeating the high-carbon energy and high-carbon economics of developed 
countries’.880  
Furthermore, Cao Fengzhong from the MEP’s Environmental and Economy Policy 
Research Centre also highlighted the strengths of a low-carbon economy in the lead up to the 
2009 Copenhagen Summit, maintaining his enthusiasm for ecological modernisation reform 
measures. In a 2009 article in Urban and Rural Development, Cao accepted that China faced 
unique difficulties in responding to climate change when compared with those faced by 
developed nations. Because China was a ‘developing nation’, it ‘would seriously restrict the 
development of [its] energy industry and national economy’. If it ‘reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions like developed countries’, the long-term goal of China’s economic and social 
development ‘would be seriously challenged’.881 However, although Cao understood those 
economic concerns, he also argued that climate change would present even bigger problems in 
the future if policy action was avoided. For example, China’s ‘carbon dioxide per capita 
emissions were likely to exceed the United States’ to become the ‘first in the world’, and its 
‘energy consumption would account for around 60 per cent of the global total energy 
consumption’. China could no longer ignore ‘international pressure to reduce its emissions’ as 
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those ‘voices were getting higher and higher’ in calling for China to ‘reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions’. Like the ‘green tariff barrier’ fears that justified calls for a circular economy, Cao 
Fengzhong warned that China might face retaliatory action by the international community or 
developed nations through the erection of ‘climate barriers’ (Ŵ<·¯) if they neglected to 
reduce their carbon emissions. These potential barriers would cause ‘substantial damage to 
China’s economy’. 882  Echoing an ecological modernisation argument, Cao argued that 
‘developing a low-carbon economy would help alleviate the pressures China faced to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and protect environmental capital’.883 
Cao argued that it was an economic imperative for China to respond to climate change, and 
his analysis was consistent with ecological modernisation. A low-carbon economy presented 
China with the opportunity to pursue ‘green development’ (ǹȏã) and would promote 
environmental protection measures that extended beyond merely greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change. In another 2010 article in Environment Economy, Cao and his co-author 
expressed a technological optimism towards a low-carbon economy:
Although China faces some difficulties in developing a low-carbon economy, at the same time, China has 
great potential for improving energy efficiency and energy conservation, optimising energy structure, 
adjusting industrial structures, increasing carbon sinks, enhancing technological innovation capabilities, 
and improving consumption methods. Taking the green economy development model from “high-carbon” 
(ʠǑ) to “low-carbon” (4Ǒ) is an opportunity to promote the development of a low-carbon economy 
through economic means by utilising market mechanisms to slow down damage towards the climate from 
human activities.884
Cao and his colleagues clearly adopted the optimism of ecological modernisation in their 
support for a low-carbon economy. They saw ‘technological innovation’ (ġŘ`Ŀ) as the 
means to adjust China’s industrial structure along more ‘low-carbon’ lines. Moreover, ‘market 
mechanisms’ (ì¨Śc) could provide the stick to ‘slow down damage towards the climate 
from human activities’.885 
A question that arises from this discussion, however, is why SEPA entered into the policy 
discourse concerning ‘low-carbon economy’ at a later stage compared to discussions over 
cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP. With those earlier ecological 
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modernisation concepts, MEP researchers such as Cao Fengzhong positioned themselves at the 
vanguard of the policy debate.886 They acted as ‘environmental policy entrepreneurs’ driving 
environmental policy reform. 887  With respect to a low-carbon economy, however, MEP 
researchers could not assume a similar vanguard role because while Party leaders had little 
qualms acknowledging that pollution and environmental degradation threatened China’s 
environment and economic development, those same leaders were more reticent on, and 
conservative in, pronouncing their position on climate change policy, as the earlier discussion 
has highlighted. It would take until 2007 before the State Council stated its position on the 
science behind climate change and global warming with the release of China’s National 
Climate Change Programme. Prior to this, the ecological rationality espoused by SEPA 
researchers towards climate change was too politically sensitive to challenge the prevailing 
economic rationality. 
The specific bureaucratic responsibilities of the MEP could also explain its belated entrance 
into the low-carbon economy debate. Its environmental protection work directly applied to 
many of the environmental issues relevant for cleaner production, circular economy and green 
GDP, such as air, water and solid waste pollution. However, the State Council had taken 
responsibility for climate change from the CMA and had given it to the State Economic and 
Trade Commission and then the NDRC. Although it was on the National Responding to 
Climate Change and Energy Conservation and Reducing Emissions Leading Small Group, its 
responsibilities did not include formulating climate policy.888  However, as the discussion 
below will further attest, the decision by the State Council to place climate policy in the hands 
of the economic sector of China’s bureaucracy, like cleaner production, provides an 
organisational illustration of the convergence of ecological and economic rationality in China’s 
environmental policy agenda.  
Despite their secondary-status concerning climate change policy, the senior leadership 
within the MEP were quick to publicly embrace the idea of a low-carbon economy. For 
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example, the then-Vice-Minister Wu Xiaoqing ňʏ wrote an opinion piece in a 2010 issue 
of China Petroleum Enterprise that called for ‘a transition to a low-carbon economy’. Wu, a 
Yunnan native and member of the China Democratic National Construction Association, had 
graduated in the 1970s with a physics major from Yunnan University before commencing his 
career in the Kunming Iron and Steel Company. From there he transferred into the science and 
technology sector of the Yunnan provincial government before taking up a post in the Yunnan 
Environmental Protection Bureau in 1998. In 2005, he transferred to Beijing where he assumed 
a vice-director position in the SEPA.889 In his 2010 opinion piece, Wu argued that ‘it is an 
indisputable fact that the rising concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has brought 
about global climate change’ and that it had also ‘become a consensus among countries around 
the world that improving energy efficiency and reducing carbon emissions were the responses 
to climate change’.890 He stressed that even though reducing China’s carbon emissions would 
be ‘a long-term process’ and that it would be difficult for China to ‘get rid of its high degree 
of dependence on economic development that used high levels of resources and energy’, it 
needed to ‘transition towards a low-carbon economy’.891 
Wu further noted that China would need to implement the right ‘policy instruments’ as well 
as appropriate legislation if it was to overcome its low level of technology, which he claimed 
represented a ‘serious obstacle’ (ɧʀǏ ) to China’s implementation of a low-carbon 
economy.892 He also raised the ‘lock-in effect’ (or ‘path dependency’) concept that Zhuang 
Guiyang discussed in his earlier 2009 trailblazing articles:
The term “lock-in effect” refers to basic facilities, machine equipment, and large-sized durable consumer 
goods. Their service life is usually between 15 to 50 years, and it is not easy to discard them, so technology 
and investment will be “locked in” (ɰÑ). Take residential construction as an example, from [China’s] 
existing buildings, around 95 per cent are high-energy buildings. If the situation does not improve in the 
future and a more significant number of high-energy houses were not built, it would be difficult to renovate 
in the short term. To ensure an economically optimal transition to a low-carbon future, today’s investment 
decisions must avoid leading to the lock-in of high carbon emissions.893 
Like Zhuang, Wu’s comments supported a low-carbon economy, reflecting an ecological 
modernisation mindset in the sense that it merges economic and ecological rationality to tackle 
the threat of global warming. Wu believed that China’s developmental model had achieved 
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remarkable achievements, but past choices were locking China into a higher carbon future than 
if it had chosen to make more low-carbon economic decisions. He said that the opportunities 
that Chinese investors made now would have economic and ecological ramifications for close 
to half a century. This situation needed to be avoided if they were to transition to a ‘low-carbon 
future’.
Li Ganjie, a future minister of the Ministry of Ecological Environment, also advocated a 
low-carbon economy in a 2011 book review of CASS’s Blue Book of Low-Carbon Economy 
when he was a vice-minister of the MEP.894 Li’s comments on a low-carbon economy mirrored 
those of his colleague Wu Xiaoqing. For instance, Li emphasised the economic rationality 
behind the low-carbon economy. He said that transitioning to low-carbon development would 
provide China with a means to continue its industrial development by providing ‘energy 
security’ (ȊƓÍJ).895 He noted that China’s rapid industrialisation was dependent on an 
energy structure that drew close to 70 per cent of its primary energy from coal, over 42 per cent 
more than the global average, and this required reliance on coal imports. Although China faced 
other pressing environmental problems apart from implementing a low-carbon economy 
(noting that ‘a low-carbon economy is only one of the requirements for sustainable 
development’), Li believed that China should transition towards a low-carbon economy with 
the support of ‘developed nations’ that had already made significant achievements with low-
carbon innovation.896 
The support for a low-carbon economy among the MEP officials mirrored their support for 
cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP, in the sense that they stressed the 
positive aspects of market forces and technology. Although their concern towards rising 
greenhouse gases drove their support of a low-carbon economy, they responded with the same 
ecological-modernisation optimism that encouraged support for those other concepts, albeit at 
a later stage in the policy debate (after being given the ‘green light’ from the Party hierarchy). 
The threat of climate change necessitated a similar use of market mechanisms and 
technological innovation. As the next section demonstrates, the NDRC also provided backing 
for the concept, especially concerning the role that ‘market mechanisms’ would play in the 
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transition to a low-carbon economy. This bureaucratic alignment between environmental and 
economic government agencies was necessary for its promotion. 
The National Development Reform Commission and a low-carbon economy. From 
2008, senior officials from the economic-orientated NDRC also had started to adopt the 
concept of a low-carbon economy publicly. The role of Xie Zhenhua was raised in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven on cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP, where he called 
for ecological modernisation responses to China’s environmental challenges. Those views 
were expressed when he was the head of the SEPA (before he resigned in the aftermath of the 
Song Hua River chemical factory explosion in 2005). In his new position as China’s lead 
climate change negotiator, he began raising the issue of low-carbon economy in policy 
speeches in the lead up to the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. 
Like Zhuang Guiyang, Wu Xiaoqing and Li Ganjie, he believed that technology was a crucial 
aspect of transitioning to a low-carbon future, but he stressed that China needed the assistance 
of developed nations to help with that transition: 
The development and breakthrough of new technologies are indispensable for the final resolution of 
climate change issues. Similarly, the transfer and application of prior technology is a necessary condition 
for developing countries to move to a path of low-carbon economic development. According to the 
provisions of the Convention and the Protocol, developed countries have the responsibility and obligation 
to transfer technology to developing countries on preferential terms.897
Moreover, in a 2009 article in Macroeconomic Management, he noted that ‘low-carbon 
economy would provide a useful reference…to cope with climate change’.898 A year later he 
reiterated in Shanxi Energy and Conservation that: ‘I am convinced that more and more people 
have realised that we must transform traditional development methods and consumption 
patterns to a path of low-carbon economic development, and ultimately realise the harmonious 
development between man and nature’.899
Xie Zhenhua adopted innovative compound terms employing the concept ‘green low-carbon 
development’ (ǹȏ4Ǒã), ‘green circular low-carbon development’ (ǹȏČƩ4Ǒã), 
and ‘green development’ (ǹȏã), which combined the ecological modernisation concepts 
officials had been using since the 1990s: 
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Green development is a combination of a circular economy and low-carbon development; this new 
development approach and way of life is an effective way to resolve the end of resources and energy in 
China and improve the quality of economic growth. It is an inevitable choice for achieving economic 
development, saving resources, protecting the environment and coping with climate change. In a broad 
sense, green development covers conservation, low-carbon, recycling, eco-environmental protection, 
harmony between man and nature, etc. In a narrow sense, green generally means the connotation of eco-
environmental protection’.900
In contrast to Li Ganjie, Xie did not discuss a low-carbon economy in isolation. He believed 
that future environmental policy should interlink cleaner production, circular economy and 
low-carbon economy to avoid ‘unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development’. 
He said that pollution was having ‘serious adverse effects on the improvements in people’s 
quality of life’ while the ‘pressures of climate change were growing’.901 He also stated that the 
Chinese economy needed to rely less on fossil fuels and more on new energy sources such as 
wind power and solar power, and that this transition would result in decarbonisation as well as 
pollution abatement.902 Xie Zhenhua’s response to climate change required the same balancing 
of economic and ecological rationality as that needed for pollution and environmental 
degradation.903
Like CASS’s Zhuang Guiyang and the MEP’s Wu Xiaoqing, Xie wanted China to avoid the 
‘lock-in effect’ whereby its future energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions would contain 
a large ‘carbon content’ (ǑØɨ). Its rapid industrialisation and urbanisation had adopted a 
traditional technological route. This traditional route would present problems in the future:
Taking the road of low-carbon development is the essential requirement of China’s sustainable 
development. Although China’s economy has achieved rapid development, in recent years, there has been 
no fundamental change in the extent of development. The energy consumption per unit of GDP is still 
much higher than that of developed countries, resulting in a tight supply and demand for energy resources. 
As a country with a low per capita resource share, if we rely on large developmental methods to promote 
modernisation, not only will China’s domestic resource environment become challenging to support, but 
the global resource environment will begin facing pressure. Transforming the economic development 
model is imperative.904
Xie’s comments concerning a low-carbon economy were also part of a reflexive interpretation 
of China’s economic development. Like previous ecological modernisation concepts discussed 
in this thesis, Xie’s discussion of low-carbon development drew on a narrative that foresaw 
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China’s transition from ‘traditional development’ to ‘sustainable development’. He also 
appears to have understood, like Li Ganjie, that China’s low per capita levels of natural 
resources would generate future problems if China did not deviate from its historical 
unsustainable development path. It needed to avoid the historical weight of the lock-in effect.905
Yet, there was an economic rationality inherent in Xie’s support for low-carbon 
development. This was demonstrated through his emphasis on the economic opportunities that 
a low-carbon economy could achieve. Like others, he specifically drew inspiration from the 
UK’s ‘low-carbon development system’.906 Xie observed that through the use of ‘government 
policies and market mechanisms, based on the participation of enterprises and the public, the 
foundation had been laid for the UK to improve its core competitiveness in the future and 
achieve low-carbon development’. Xie claimed that if China was to avoid a high-carbon future, 
its government needed to facilitate low-carbon industries.907 Xie retained this view in later 
years, advocating the economic benefits of low-carbon development, arguing that its appeal 
went beyond decarbonisation. For instance, in a 2017 article, Xie observed that while China’s 
‘green low-carbon industry’ employed around 24 million people, it was predicted to rise to 
around 45 million people by 2030.908 For China to expand this industry, it needed to ‘seize its 
opportunities’ in order to best place itself vis-à-vis other countries to ‘seize the commanding 
heights of future technology and industrial development’. 909  In his view, China’s future 
economic growth was dependent on improving its comparative advantage in green low-carbon 
industries.
The economic rationality inherent in low-carbon development was also expressed in Xie’s 
support for a ‘carbon market’ (Ǒì¨). In a 2011 article in China Venture Capital concerning 
potential climate change policy responses, he introduced a proposal for ‘carbon emissions 
trading pilots’ in addition to ‘gradually building a carbon emissions trading market’ as one of 
‘ten strategies to promote green low-carbon development’.910 A year later, he argued that ‘the 
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creation of a carbon trading market would have a profound impact on the fundamental function 
of market mechanisms for energy conservation, efficiency reduction and carbon reduction, and 
the improvement of long-term mechanisms for energy conservation, efficiency reduction and 
carbon reduction’.911 Indeed, in order to achieve a low-carbon economy, the State Council in 
the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) set out a pilot program for carbon markets in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei and Shenzhen that would eventually be 
unified and expanded into a national market (this occurred in 2012). 912  Xie’s public 
commentary around this period again conveys the appeal among leading Chinese bureaucrats 
for the ecological modernisation belief in the role of ‘market mechanisms’ (ì¨rŚc) in 
their effort to balance ecological and economic considerations.913 For instance, he claimed that 
a carbon trading scheme would produce ‘synergies’ (vķö), enhancing the integration of 
‘different policies such as fiscal and taxation policies, legal means and market mechanisms, 
and form carbon reduction and energy conservation, and develop renewable energy’.914
A low-carbon economy and development represent a further progression of China’s 
policymakers’ support of ecological modernisation ideas, moving beyond cleaner production 
and circular economy, through linking it to climate change. Practical examples of this progress 
were evident as early as 2010 when the NDRC initiated pilot-projects for ‘low-carbon cities’ 
(4Ǒ°ì) (or low-carbon eco-cities 4Ǒưđ°ì), a year before the emergence of regional 
carbon markets. The pilot program sought to help ‘adjust industrial structures, optimising 
energy structures, energy efficiency and increasing carbon sinks’ in eight provinces and 
municipalities. It focussed on ‘the development of low-carbon buildings and low-carbon 
transportation’. A low-carbon economy also mirrored the concept of a circular economy and 
green GDP through the NDRC’s call to ‘actively advocate low-carbon green lifestyles and 
consumption patterns’.915 The NDRC emphasised that low-carbon development should focus 
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on both the supply side and the demand side of the low-carbon economy, a point that was 
integral to the circular economy. It also needed to change the mindset, or culture, of not just 
society but also cadres: 
In the pilot areas, training activities should be held for leading cadres at all levels and departments to 
improve the emphasis and understanding of climate change issues in decision-making and implementation. 
Vigorously carry out publicity and education popularisation activities, encourage low-carbon lifestyles and 
behaviours, promote the use of low-carbon products, promote the concept of low-carbon life, and promote 
broad participation and conscious action by all.916
Like Pan Yue, Xie believed that China’s response to climate policy needed to provoke 
government officials at all levels to assume a style of governance that prioritised climatic 
ecological rationality.917 
The current policy status of a low-carbon economy in China. The concept of a low-
carbon economy has remained an essential policy concept during the Xi Jinping administration 
ever since 2012. Soon after Xi Jinping took the leadership of the CCP from Hu Jintao, he started 
to employ the term in his Party speeches. For example, at the Sixth Study Session of the 
Chinese Politburo Standing Committee in 2013, as Chinese President and CCP General 
Secretary, Xi Jinping highlighted the extent to which he believed that low-carbon development, 
environmental protection and future economic growth were intertwined when he announced: 
Protection of the ecological environment is the protection of productivity. The improvement of the 
ecological environment is a concept of developmental productivity. There should be a more conscious 
promotion of green development, circular development, low-carbon development. There should never be 
the sacrificing of the environment at the expense of obtaining economic growth’.918 
Moreover, since 2010, the National People’s Congress (NPC) has deliberated the possibility of 
a ‘Low-Carbon Economy Promotion Law’ (4ǑǳƇ=ɘƀ ). The NPC’s Financial and 
Economic Committee919 raised the possibility of a low-carbon economy law in their 2010 
committee report:
A low-carbon economy refers to an economic model based on low energy consumption, low pollution, and 
low emissions. It is another significant step forward in the continuation of human society following 
agricultural civilisation and industrial civilisation. The essence of a low-carbon economy is the efficient 
use of energy, the development of clean energy and the pursuit of green GDP. The core is the fundamental 
change in energy technology innovation, institutional innovation, and the concept of human survival and 
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development… it is proposed to formulate a low-carbon economy promotion law in order to integrate 
climate change response and the development of a low-carbon economy into the legal system.920
However, despite the discussion of a low-carbon economy law emerging in 2010, it has yet to 
be formally approved or rejected. The NPC Environmental Protection Resources Committee 
did publish a motion in 2017 that recommended ‘increased study’ of a ‘low-carbon economy 
promotion law…[and] after the conditions for the legislation become mature, incorporating 
that study into the legislative plan’.921  
Nevertheless, as of 2019, it appears that the proposed law might have been shelved.922 The 
legislative deliberations did include some ecological modernisation ideas that had been 
politically divisive, such as ‘green GDP’. Green GDP’s inclusion could be the reason for its 
legislative lack of progression as this developmental metric lost its political appeal after local 
backlash (see Chapter Seven). The 2017 NPC motion suggests that the proposed draft has not 
yet been passed into legislation primarily because relevant departments feel that the law will 
not add anything that other laws have not already covered.923 For instance, the MEP felt that 
‘existing laws and regulations such as the PRC’s Environmental Protection Law, the Circular 
Economy Promotion Law, and the Cleaner Production Promotion Law all involve and contain 
the promotion of low-carbon economic development’.924 This interpretation is consistent with 
Xie Zhenhua’s compound terminology of ‘green circular low-carbon development’ (see earlier 
section), whereby the response to climate change is considered integral to solving 
environmental pollution and degradation. Without high-level ministerial support, the concept 
of a low-carbon economy might remain a policy slogan to decarbonise China’s economy, rather 
than a law, and this seems a strong possibility given that it has not yet been incorporated into 
 
920 Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui caizheng jingji weiyuanhui. 2010. “Guanyu di shiyi jie quanguo renmin 
daibiao dahui di san ci huiyi zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi de daibiao tichu de yi’an shenyi jieguo de baogao” (Report 
on the deliberation outcome of the motion proposed by the representative regarding the chair’s deliberation at 
the third session of the 11th National People’s Congress), Beida fabao, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form. 
aspx?Db=chl&Gid=412faca2583fe9dcbdfb. Accessed 28 May 2018. 
921 Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui huanjing yu ziyuan baohu weiyuanhui. 2017. “Guanyu di shi’er jie quanguo 
renmin daibiao dahui di wu ci huiyi zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi de zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi daibiao tichu de yi’an 
shenyi jieguo de baogao” (Report on the deliberation outcome of the motion proposed by the representative 
regarding the chair’s deliberation at the fifth meeting of the 12th National People’s Congress), Beida fabao, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid= d851dac101df8236bdfb. Accessed 28 May 2018. 
922 Ibid. 
923 Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui huanjing yu ziyuan baohu weiyuanhui. 2017. “Guanyu di shi’er jie quanguo 
renmin daibiao dahui di wu ci huiyi zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi de zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi daibiao tichu de yi’an 
shenyi jieguo de baogao” (Report on the deliberation outcome of the motion proposed by the representative 
regarding the chair’s deliberation at the fifth meeting of the 12th National People’s Congress), Beida fabao, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid= d851dac101df8236bdfb. Accessed 28 May 2018. 
924 Ibid. 
 229 
China’s environmental policy agenda to the same degree as cleaner production and circular 
economy. 
Conclusion: China’s Aspiration for a Low-Carbon Economy and Ecological 
Modernisation
This chapter has shown how the idea for a low-carbon economy gradually emerged with the 
recognition among academics and officials that climate change was a threat to China’s 
economic development. The term took on wider economic and ecological significance than the 
other ecological modernisation concepts analysed in previous chapters. On the one hand, the 
perceived need for a low-carbon economy is similar to the environmental pollution concerns 
that led to the acceptance of cleaner production and circular economy, in that the Chinese 
government responded to the spectre of global warming with a technocratic low-carbon 
economy concept that bore discursive hallmarks of ecological modernisation. On the other 
hand, despite the public comments from senior environmental bureaucrats concerning the 
potential consequences from rising temperatures, the low-carbon economy concept would 
emerge later than those primarily pollution-orientated concepts. Even though Qu Geping had 
argued that ‘carbon dioxide provoked rising global surface temperatures’, it would take until 
2005 for the CASS (with intellectual and financial assistance from the UK Government) to 
publish the first significant paper on the low-carbon economy. Then two years later, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao publicly announced the concept at the 2007 APEC Conference. This 
occurred three months after the State Council released China’s first climate change white paper. 
Economic and ecological rationality regarding climate change finally had converged within 
China’s environmental policy agenda.
China’s version of a low-carbon economy conforms with ecological modernisation in two 
significant ways: the rhetorical balance of economic and environmental considerations, and the 
embrace of the market. Firstly, a low-carbon economy provided the Chinese government with 
a concept that could chart their sustainable development in an era of climate change. In this 
way, the rhetoric used to support low-carbon economy echoed the storyline used to promote 
cleaner production, circular economy and green GDP, namely that China needed to transition 
away from traditional development to sustainable development. Like those concepts mentioned 
in previous chapters, Chinese officials called for more ecologically-aware development, rather 
than measures that would constrain their developing country. Again, this idea of low-carbon 
development supported the process of ecological modernisation in China. 
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Economic rationality also underpinned Chinese official support of a low-carbon economy. 
The concept offered officials a discourse that suggested transitioning away from its fossil-fuel 
dependence. In this way, the supporters of a low-carbon economy employed the discourse of a 
circular economy. As Chapter Six highlighted, China’s high-resource usage increased the 
desirability of a circular economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, China experienced resource 
shortages as its own mineral and energy production could not match demand from industry. 
These shortages were repeatedly felt because of China’s geographical resource distribution: 
hydropower resources were in the Southwest, coal reserves in the North and load centres on 
the coastal fringes. Reduced electricity transmission and coal transport often failed as conduits 
between these regions were interrupted. As Chapter Six noted, the experience of electricity 
shortages peaked in 2003 and 2004 heightening these resources fears as China experienced 
rolling blackouts because of inclement cold weather that brought China’s coal transportation 
to a standstill for many months. China was also now a net oil-importing nation, importing over 
53 per cent of its oil in 2007.925 Concerning low-carbon development, senior officials, such as 
the MEP’s Li Ganjie, understood that China’s resource security was at stake, with well above 
the global average of its primary energy derived from coal in 2011 (over 42 per cent more than 
the global average at that time).926 They saw that the move towards low-carbon development 
and solar, wind and other renewable energies would reduce fossil-fuel dependence risk.
The economic rationality that underpinned the ecological modernisation support of low-
carbon bore similar political undertones to the reasoning powerful government officials and 
researchers used to support a circular economy. Starting with Zhuang Guiyang, the view was 
expressed that China needed to undertake more action on climate change commensurate with 
its leading position in the international community. More specifically, there were concerns that 
the international community could raise ‘climate barriers’ on Chinese goods if the Chinese 
government did not have a low-carbon economic strategy in place that sought to decarbonise 
its economy. These economically-based fears mirrored the ‘green barriers’ that drove circular 
economy support in the lead up to China’s WTO accession. China’s economy had become 
increasingly integrated into the global economy and was thus dependent on manufacturing 
exports. This chapter has shown that policy experts speculated that developed countries could 
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use this dependence as trade-based leverage to reduce China’s carbon emissions. Economic 
rationality also increased the appeal for a low-carbon economy through the fear that the high-
energy industries would be left holding investments with high levels of embodied energy. 
China had embarked on a rapid industrialisation and infrastructure boom since the 1980s, and 
senior officials understood that these investments would suffer from a ‘lock-in effect’. As Wu 
Qiaoqing noted, China’s infrastructure investments had ‘service lives’ of up to 50 years, so it 
would become highly challenging to discard investments with short service lives. This fact was 
especially pertinent for residential buildings, of which around 95 per cent were ‘high energy 
buildings.927 
The low-carbon economy concept also moved beyond the ecological modernisation 
concepts of the past three chapters by strengthening the role of market forces through a carbon 
trading scheme. As the latter part of this chapter demonstrated, Xie Zhenhua, in his position as 
China’s lead climate change negotiator at the NDRC, called for the creation of a carbon trading 
scheme to help achieve a ‘synergistic effect’ and enhance the integration of ‘different policies 
such as fiscal and taxation policies, legal means and market mechanisms, carbon reduction and 
energy conservation, and development of renewable energy’.928 Drawing on his ecological 
modernisation mindset, he believed that carbon trading would allow market mechanisms to 
help reduce China’s carbon emissions. Overall this chapter has reiterated the argument that 
Chinese officials have included ecological modernisation ideas into their country’s 
environmental policy agenda. Yet their noncommittal surrounding climate change policy 
resulted in a concept that bore the ecological modernisation hallmarks of cleaner production, a 
concept that was passed into legislation in 2002. While Chinese policymakers were discussing 
the merits of a circular economy and a green GDP, as well as deliberating on the ill-effects of 
climate change, they were also exploring a new capstone environmental concept, called 
ecological civilisation, that would frame their future economic development. The next chapter 
will now examine the policy discussion surrounding ecological civilisation in China to see 
whether it also exhibits ecological modernisation with Chinese characteristics.  
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Chapter Nine: Ecological Civilisation in China – A Reflexive 
Ecological Modernisation with Chinese Characteristics? 
The last chapter examined the rising anxiety among Chinese government officials towards 
carbon dioxide emissions and explained how this anxiety eventually led to the adoption of 
‘low-carbon economy’ by the senior leadership in 2007. This concept provides another 
example of the Chinese government turning to ecological modernisation discourses as a means 
to make sense of balancing the twin objectives of economic growth and environmental 
protection. Chinese officials concluded, after a two-decade climate change debate, that the 
concept of a low-carbon economy provided a vision of a future Chinese economy with a 
reduced carbon footprint without constraining its continued growth. Low-carbon development 
would open up new sustainable industries and provide new employment opportunities for 
China’s workers. Moreover, low-carbon development would avoid the risk of ‘ecological trade 
barriers’ that Chinese officials feared developed nations would place upon Chinese producers 
if they concluded that the Chinese government was avoiding real policy action on climate 
change. 
This chapter will now turn its attention to the concept of ‘ecological civilisation’ (ưđĻŅ). 
The first and second section will explore the academic debate surrounding this environmental 
concept and situate ecological civilisation within the broader discussion of China’s ‘civilisation 
debate’. The chapter will then examine the policy discussion regarding ecological civilisation, 
focusing in particular on officials from the State Forestry Administration929 (SFA) and State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). The chapter will conclude by studying the 
policy discourse of China’s senior Party officials who started to use and develop the concept 
from 2007 onwards. Overall, this chapter argues that ecological civilisation represents, to date, 
the latest, most advanced and all-encompassing ecological modernisation concept yet adopted 
by the Chinese authorities. If, as suggested in the previous chapter, the concept of a low-carbon 
economy drew together earlier ecological modernisation concepts, then the idea of an 
ecological civilisation takes this process one cultural step further. In other words, its advocates 
wish to build on past ecological modernisation concepts such as cleaner production, circular 
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economy, green GDP, and low-carbon economy to advance a concept that aligned with China’s 
ideological and cultural history.  
The Policy Discourse of an Ecological Civilisation in China 
Ecological civilisation: the early academic discourse. The term ‘ecological civilisation’ 
first started to appear in the late 1980s within China’s universities. The Chinese academics who 
first employed the concept were grappling with the same economic and ecological 
‘contradictions’ (ǆǂ) concerning China’s rapid modernisation raised in the previous chapters. 
One of the first academics to discuss ecological civilisation in detail was Liu Sihua _ēu 
from Hubei University of Technology. In a 1988 issue of Guangxi Social Sciences, he 
discussed ecological civilisation within the context of ‘ecological economics’ (ưđǳƇÊ). 
Even though Liu stressed the perilous state of China’s environment in his article, he also 
conveyed an economic rationality based on the centrality of material production. He recognised 
that China possessed ‘economic backwardness’ (ǳƇȗ), and it was ‘imperative to develop 
the economy and quicken the process of building a “material civilisation”’ (ƣɁĻŅ).930 (This 
‘material civilisation’ that Liu referred to was social and economic development that ensured 
the basic needs for all citizens).  
However, Liu believed that the present bias towards economic development in China 
presented new environmental challenges, because ‘the proportion of investment in material 
civilisation construction and ecological civilisation construction was seriously out of tune’.931 
He argued that an ecological civilisation would become necessary for China’s future 
development. Given that ‘China’s pollutant emissions were some of the largest in the world’, 
and because of its rapid industrialisation its ‘pollution situation was now equivalent to the 
severe period of developed countries in the 1950s and 1960s’, he stressed that ‘as China’s 
economic and social development and economic strength continued to increase, it must 
gradually increase the investment in ecological environment compensation, protection and 
construction’.932 This type of investment, however, ‘would not affect the continuous expansion 
of economic reproduction’. If the construction of ecological civilisation and material 
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civilisation were promoted in harmony, then it would ‘ensure the continuous development of a 
material civilisation’ and restore China’s ‘ecological balance’. 933  Economic rationality 
dominated Li’s thinking, yet he realised that ecological rationality would become more 
important in the future.  
Writing amid China’s ‘retrenchment of economic reforms’934, Liu concluded that China’s 
future modernisation ‘needed to transition to a path that strictly followed the laws of nature 
and economic laws’ (i.e. undertake further economic liberalisation).935  In this sense, Liu 
situated this concept of ecological civilisation as a later stage along the path that liberals called 
a ‘socialist market economy’. The ecological modernisation undertone to his article was 
apparent in his understanding of the ‘backward management’ (ǥƭȗ) in China that ‘resulted 
in high consumption, high waste and poor efficiency’. Liu stressed that ‘the development of a 
commodity economy must improve the comprehensive utilisation of resources, improve the 
level of economic management, and strengthen environmental supervision and management in 
order to improve the development level of ecological-economic productivity’.936 He saw the 
lack of market discipline as a reason for many of China’s environmental ills. Liu’s comments 
also show how the same environmental problems that underpinned the calls for cleaner 
production and circular economy (namely, pollution and waste) were also contributing to 
broader calls for China’s society to shift towards an ‘ecological civilisation’. 
Li Shaodong Ŝǲ  from Sichuan’s Southwest Normal University also explored the 
concept of an ecological civilisation in two 1990 articles. Li argued that China’s ‘socialist 
revolution’ (ǒ/ʒ) had ‘not paid enough attention to’ the environment and was 
‘ineffective in solving ecological problems caused by its social and economic activities that 
violated the laws of nature’. These activities contributed to an ‘ecological imbalance’ (ưđñ
ȝ¿ȹ) that created ‘ecological crises’ (ưđ{Ś). Such crises were ‘becoming increasingly 
serious’ and, according to Li, were subjecting China and the world to ‘daily reprisals from the 
natural world’. 937  He cautioned that ‘the series of warnings presented by contemporary 
 
933 Ibid. 
934 Naughton 1995, 119-126. See also Chapter Four. 
935 Liu Sihua 1988, 47. 
936 Ibid, 48. 
937 Li Shaodong 1990, 104.  
 
 235 
ecologists and ecological economists could no longer be ignored’. For Li, transitioning to an 
ecological civilisation would create a society with ‘a certain basic level of scientific 
culture…[that] understood a bit of ecology with related knowledge about ecological systems, 
ecological balance, ecological design, and ecological benefits’.938 With this knowledge, China 
would move away from an ‘ecologically blind’ (ưđƾ) society that worshipped ‘economic 
utilitarianism and was “eager for quick success and instant benefit”’ (ǠƁȃƑ).  
Li also introduced the notion of ‘ecological morality’ (ưđɞčȣ), remarking that there 
were specific ‘standards’ (ŨT) and ‘behaviour’ (Ȝ) that Chinese citizens needed to follow 
in order to divert China away from its ‘pollute first, clean up later style of industrialisation’.939 
Li touched on the experience of Western nations that had moved towards ‘respecting nature’ 
and that now ‘challenge behaviour that damages the ecological environment’. Their experience 
was ‘instructive for China to enhance our ecological awareness and promote ecological 
civilisation’.940 Li’s use of ‘ecological morality’ bore a resemblance to the ‘environmental 
morality’ that accompanied calls for a ‘green GDP’ (see Chapter Seven), though his use of the 
term was more targeted at society as a whole rather than local and provincial cadres. Li’s 
conception of ecological morality, as later sections of this chapter will highlight, would appeal 
more to senior officials within the government. These two early academic examples 
demonstrate how the early discussion of ecological civilisation emerged out of the 
environmental problems of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Other Chinese intellectuals would build on this early idea of ‘ecological civilisation’ during 
the 1990s. Shen Shuguang ƲŋE was a leading exponent in this decade.941 His article on 
ecological civilisation is the most cited article on the topic in China National Knowledge Index. 
His argument drew on the preliminary conceptual foundations described above. Ecological 
civilisation represented a progression and higher form of civilisation in China that had 
materialised due to the contradictions in an ‘industrial civilisation’ (è,ĻŅ):  
Although the history of the industrial civilisation is only just over two hundred years, it has dramatically 
improved social productivity and created enormous material wealth. However, in the last two or three 
decades, industrial civilisation has fallen into a variety of complex crises, such as the decline in land, 
biological, mineral, forest, and energy resources. 
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Shen noted that the ‘Malthusian perspective’ (ʞßȖľƺȣƚ ) could present a bleak 
interpretation of the environmental ills caused by the industrial civilisation. However, he was 
more optimistic: 
On the whole, industrial civilisation is heading for decline. However, the trend of continuous progress in 
human society is irreversible. The crisis with the industrial civilisation shows its limitations and 
shortcomings, but it does not mean that humanity has embarked on a dead end. Any form of civilisation is 
only a phenomenon, a historical process, and will eventually die out and be replaced by a new civilisation. 
The day of the decline of industrial civilisation is the time when the new civilisation forms sprout and 
grow. We believe that the civilisation that leads the human society to continue to develop by replacing 
industrial civilisation is ecological civilisation… Relying on the continuous development of science and 
technology, we will carry out moderately-scaled social production and consumption to meet people’s 
material needs, spiritual needs and ecological needs, improve the overall quality of human beings, and 
realise the sustainable development of society, nature and humanity.942 
Shen saw the period of decline as a chance to reconceptualise the place of humanity within 
nature and alter the ‘philosophical underpinning’ (Ê;ĭ) of society. Humanity had operated 
according to the belief that it had the ‘capability to control and conquer nature’. However, an 
ecological civilisation adopted the ‘philosophical perspective’ (Êȣƚ) that ‘man was a part 
of nature’ (%ŇȋƝƺ). Even though he did not explicitly use the term, he pointed to the 
example of circular economies to show that ‘such ecological processes that can convert “raw 
material to product to waste back to raw material” (}Ľ#÷Ľ}Ľ). This process 
would change waste into raw materials, realise reproduction and fundamentally solve the 
pollution problem caused by industrial production’.943 Before exploring the official policy 
discussion of ecological civilisation, it is vital to understand how the concept became 
entrenched within Chinese political and government discourse. 
Situating ‘ecological civilisation’ within the broader ‘civilisation’ debate. Ecological 
civilisation was incorporated into the broader ‘civilisation discourse’ that characterised the 
debates surrounding China’s post-Mao social and economic modernisation. 944  The term 
‘civilisation’ (ĻŅ) was borrowed from the Japanese in the 19th century and was used by ‘self-
strengthening’ (ȋā) modernisers in the final throes of the Qing Dynasty at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the early 20th century.945 It was used as distinct from ‘culture’ (Ļ
r) and ‘referred largely to non-Chinese notions of progress and, by some, to signify the 
improvement of the imagined flawed Chinese cultural character’.946 Deng Xiaoping and his 
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supporters in the early 1980s resurrected the term and conflated it with notions of material and 
spiritual development in the early stages of the Reform Era. The specific terms they used were 
‘material civilisation’ (ƣɁĻŅ) and ‘spiritual civilisation’ (ǩǕĻŅ) (referred to as the ‘two 
civilisations’ ĻŅ). Deng used these twin concepts to frame ‘reform and opening up’ as a 
positive experience that ‘co-located capitalist wealth with spiritual wealth’.947 China’s reform 
leaders understood that capitalism would alter China, but they also believed that as long as they 
paid attention to maintaining specific moral codes, then capitalism would result in positive 
changes. For instance, then CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang Ȉǿɡ noted in 1987 that 
China sought ‘a spiritual civilisation, as manifested in a higher educational, scientific and 
cultural level and higher ideological, political and moral standards’.948  
These notions of ‘civilisation’ underwent a new iteration during the latter stages of Jiang 
Zemin’s term as CCP General Secretary (1989-2002). He broadened the ‘two civilisations’ to 
include a ‘political civilisation’ (ĶſĻŅ) with the Central Committee’s 1996 Resolutions 
Concerning a Certain Number of Important Questions Regarding the Strengthening of the 
Building of Socialist Spiritual Civilisation – referred to as ‘three civilisations’ (ĻŅ)          
or ‘three parts, one whole’ (35).949  Political civilisation referred to reforming the 
administration and governance of China in a manner that strengthened rather than weakened 
the rule of the CCP. President Jiang later sought to use his ‘three represents’ theory to position 
the role of the CCP as an integral element in China’s socialist modernisation. The inclusion of 
the term political civilisation provided an additional conceptual pillar to his theory, with the 
ideological (spiritual) and economic (material) pillars previously established by Deng.950  
The next iteration of the ‘civilisation concepts’ occurred during the early years of the Hu 
Jintao Administration when the then-Chinese president reformulated it to include ‘political’      
(Ķſ), ‘economic’ (ǳƇ), ‘cultural’ (Ļr) and ‘social’ (ǒ/) civilisations. Hu Jintao 
incorporated ‘social civilisation’ with the other concepts (referred to as ‘four in one’ 3
5) at a high-level cadre study meeting in 2005. His notion of social civilisation was adopted 
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as the ideological pillar to bolster his aim to create a ‘harmonious society’ (Ⱥǒ/) in 
China.951 This pillar was necessary due to the realisation that China’s socialist modernisation 
had created economic inequalities, which the Party promised to manage more carefully in the 
future.  
Finally, at the 2012 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao incorporated the idea of ‘ecological 
civilisation’ within what was now termed ‘five in one’ ( 35). In particular, President Hu 
stated in his last speech as CCP General Secretary that China should ‘fully implement the 
overall five-in-one layout of economic construction, political construction, cultural 
construction, social construction and ecological construction.952 From a policy perspective, 
however, the following section will outline how ecological civilisation developed 
simultaneously from both the SFA and the SEPA. Officials from each of these government 
agencies placed their own spin on the concept, reflecting their bureaucratic organ’s policy 
portfolio. Eventually, the Chinese political leadership would adopt this spin, signalling that 
their future development was in tune with ecological modernisation principles.  
New supporters of ecological modernisation: the State Forestry Administration and 
ecological civilisation. The discussion below will outline how government officials from       
the newly-created SFA began actively promoting ‘ecological civilisation’ around 1998.953 
Although the SFA had been placed in various bureaucratic guises since 1958, the State Council 
formally created it in 1998 during their broader administrative reshuffle of government 
departments. The SFA was tasked with managing and growing China’s forest reserves, which 
had been severely depleted by excessive-felling during the Maoist era. The State Council also 
tasked them with preventing soil erosion and desertification as well as conserving 
biodiversity.954 As this section will show, ecological civilisation provided SFA officials with a 
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conceptual framework that led them to believe that China could maintain and grow its forests 
in a manner that was both economically and environmentally sustainable.  
In 1998 Wang Chengzu ƨěǓ was one of the first SFA researchers to broach the concept 
of ecological civilisation publicly within his position as vice-director of the SFA’s Economic 
Development Research Centre. Two other researchers from the SFA’s Comprehensive 
Planning Department had also broached ‘ecological civilisation’ that same year, Shi Feng Ǌ
æ  and Yang Xudong ŠŃ .955  The following discussion focuses on Wang because he 
expressed the ideas and rationale behind ecological civilisation in more detail, even if he lacked 
a precise definition of ‘ecological civilisation’.956  
The underlying message of Wang’s 1998 article in Forestry Economy was that China needed 
to boost its forest stocks in a sustainable manner. He acknowledged that China’s forestry 
industry had ‘obtained remarkable achievements’ throughout the second half of the century 
with the ‘annual planting of 2.4 billion trees’.957 These achievements had resulted in ‘total 
growth of forest resources greater than consumption, exhibiting the development of “double 
growth” in forest area and stock volume’. However, he conceded that ‘as it approached the 21st 
century… its ecological environment was deteriorating’. 958  Despite the improvements in 
forestry management, the forests still suffered from the historical ‘poor management’ (ǥċê) 
under Mao when excessive felling of trees for lumber and firewood was commonplace. China’s 
population growth was a significant problem in this regard. Wang noted that China’s ‘per capita 
forest area and stock levels are only 15 per cent and 12 per cent of the world’s per capita level, 
respectively; the forest coverage rate is only half the world level (the world average is 25 per 
cent)’. He stressed that China’s forestry industry ‘could not compare with forestry in developed 
countries’ and, if taken in this context, it ‘still was a low forest nation’, meaning that its forest 
resources were scarce.959 On this basis, he argued that China’s agricultural areas were suffering 
from a crisis regarding the ‘survivability of the land’ (ưÈ¦). China could no longer rely 
on its land to support its modernisation and growing population. Due to population growth, 
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there was less arable land for China’s then 1.2 billion citizens – a fact exacerbated by increased 
soil erosion, desertification, and water supply issues. These ecological issues led to ‘economic 
losses’ (ǳƇĬ¿). For instance, he remarked how wind erosion and desertification led to ‘the 
direct annual economic losses of 45 billion yuan’.960 Wang’s comments reflect an ecological 
awareness of the problems that arise when forests are managed unsustainably. They also 
supported the use of green GDP measurements. 
Wang broadened out his discussion of China’s forests and ecological civilisation to a more 
extensive criticism of China’s style of development, while still exhibiting economic rationality. 
He understood that ‘the industrial revolution had created a new era of large-scale machine 
production’ and that ‘the emergence of modern industry represented by machines had 
fundamentally changed the face of the world and created and accumulated rich material wealth 
for the society’. However, he also claimed that this ‘industrial development had led to global 
resource shortages, energy crises, environmental pollution and ecological damage’.961 Wang 
linked these problems to the idea of ‘ecological civilisation’ by stating that the transition from 
an ‘industrial civilisation’ (è,ĻŅ) to an ‘ecological civilisation’ represented ‘an inevitable 
trend in human history’.962 
For Wang, ecological civilisation was a society that treated ‘the ecological environment as 
the lifeline of ecological agriculture, forestry and industrial development’, and presented 
‘ecological agriculture, forestry and industry as the survival line of development for 
humans’.963 For the forestry industry, ecological civilisation would result in less indiscriminate 
felling of trees and would boost conservation. He believed that ‘beautiful mountains and rivers 
were an important symbol of ecological civilisation’.964 He concluded with a call on ‘ecological 
industry’ (ưđè,) to accompany the ‘inevitable trend towards an ecological civilisation’.965 
Wang was articulating the emergent intertwining of ecological economics and ecological 
modernisation thought in China. This was enhanced through his belief in the efficacy of ‘green 
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markets’ (ǹȏì )¨ and ‘green industries’ (ǹȏ#,), which took into account the environment. 
He considered this ‘the only way for China’s new modern industrial civilisation’ because the 
‘the traditional development model had become unsustainable and new development strategies 
needed to be chosen’.966 
The head of the SFA’s Discipline Inspection group Yang Jiping ŠǶñ also published an 
article in 1999 that touched on many of the same environmental problems as Wang Chengzu 
such as deforestation, soil erosion, desertification and water scarcity. Yang also stressed the 
importance of forests within the broader ecosystem:  
Forests are a core part of terrestrial ecosystems. They store carbon dioxide in the earth. They are an 
essential buffer for controlling global warming. They are a lever of the global biogeochemical cycle. They 
protect the ecological security of the nation. They are a bond between man and nature and the basis for the 
sustainable development of human society. At the same time, they also have many functions, such as 
preventing windblown sand, maintaining soil and water, conserving water sources, purifying air, 
preventing pollution, beautifying the environment, curbing droughts and floods, regulating runoff and 
climate, ensuring the production of garments and the efficiency of water conservancy facilities, and 
meeting economic construction.967 
Yang’s comments reveal he was attuned to the fact that China had still yet to undertake the 
same economic developmental stages as developed nations and historical experience had 
shown that had ‘destroyed natural systems before restoring them’. 968  China’s ‘material 
standard of living’ (ƣɁưƃŶñ) was still behind ‘developed nations’ and needed to catch up 
to these countries. This posed a range of ethical dilemmas for China’s policymakers. 
Yang was not confident that China would ‘catch up’ to developed nations and avert these 
environmental calamities unless it initially became an ‘ecological civilisation’. Only in this 
manner could they avoid the historical forms of devastation visited on the ecology of the 
developed nations. He based this belief on an interpretation of the different timeframes of 
economic and ecological crises. Economic crises last for ‘eight to ten years’, but ecological 
crises could last ‘for hundreds of years or even longer’, emphasising that short-term thinking 
could result in environmental despoliation that lasts multiple generations. He used soil erosion 
on the banks of the Yangtze River and Yellow River to demonstrate his point, describing how 
the rehabilitation of these banks would take several decades. China’s forests also showed the 
long-term effect of ignoring ecosystems. Yang bemoaned the fact that ‘after 50 years of hard 
work’ China’s forests had only ‘increased by 1.4 per cent’. China’s economy would ‘double in 
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two decades’, but to double the current forest coverage rate would take hundreds of years. This 
meant that Chinese authorities and the forestry industry needed to treat the ecosystem as an 
environmental asset as well as an economic asset.969 Here Yang’s comments reveal a desire to 
sustainably balance the economic and ecological aspects of China’s forests. 
Senior officials within the SFA continued to promote ecological civilisation in published 
articles and speeches up until 2002. For instance, in the SFA’s research journal Forestry 
Economics, Lei Jiafu ʌiÚ, the deputy director of the SFA, maintained a reflective approach 
to development that intertwined with ecological modernisation discourse. He argued that 
‘humanity after experiencing primitive civilisations, agricultural civilisations, and industrial 
civilisations had entered into the twenty-first century of ecological civilisation construction’.970 
Lei saw ecological civilisation as a concept that would allow China to view its ecosystem, in 
particular its forestry resources, within a long-term perspective. An ecological civilisation 
would become an increasingly important concept for China’s forestry industry, because its 
resources were ‘insufficient’, ‘of low quality’, ‘excessively consumed’ and ‘slowly developed’. 
In particular, he pointed out that China’s ‘forest coverage rate’ was 63 per cent of the global 
average, but if taking into account China’s larger population, its forest coverage per capita was 
20 per cent of the global average.971 In this manner, ecological civilisation was also linked to 
the concept of sustainable development: 
Ecological civilisation’s overall, ecological and economic value emphasises “nature (ȋƝ) – economy (ǳ
Ƈ) – society (ǒ/)”. It promotes sustainable development of society, the maintenance of our global 
environment, and stresses that human development should not threaten the integrity of nature and the 
survival of other species.972 
Vice-director Lei believed that the ‘sustainable development of forests was an important part 
of the construction of ecological civilisation’ due to forests’ ‘dual mission of maintaining 
ecological balance and promoting economic development’.973  
 
Like other Chinese adopters of ecological modernisation, Lei looked abroad for inspiration 
to manage China’s forest. In particular, he argued that China needed to look to the examples 
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of sustainable use of forests in Western Europe. He believed that Western Europe had 
successively managed the ‘three benefits’ of economic, environmental and social benefits (see 
Chapter Five) through their established ‘close to nature forestry’ (ɗȋƝŤ,). However, they 
also ‘obtained operating profits’ from their forests.974 The lesson from Western Europe was 
that China needed to manage its forests for the long-term and avoid short-term ‘predatory 
operations’ (įÁÿǳȕ). However, Lei also argued that China could look closer to home for 
sustainable ideas, such as the example of China Jilin Forestry Industry Group975, which he 
believed provided an example of ecological civilisation due to its sustainable business model. 
In 1994, China Jilin Forestry Group was ‘separated from the government’ (Ķ,[ý) and by 
1998 listed on the stock exchange. From January to August 2001, the company had ‘achieved 
a revenue of 1.1 billion yuan despite a decrease of 100,000 m3 in timber sales with a sales 
income of 70.94 million yuan, an increase of 8.31 per cent over the same period in 2000’; and 
they ‘realised a profit of 204.8 million yuan, an increase of 54 per cent over the same period in 
2000, while achieving a reduction in production’.976 This example, Lei argued, showed that 
companies that operated on ecological industrial principles could achieve higher profits 
without a commensurate increase in their environmental impact. Lei’s example of China Jilin 
Forestry Group illustrated how the ideas of ecological modernisation could underpin support 
of ecological civilisation. Within the broader context of China’s forests, an ‘ecological 
civilisation’ in China would sustainably manage forests by utilising market principles to 
achieve higher profits and revenue as well as lower production, effectively achieving the 
‘decoupling’ expected from a circular economy. 
In 2002, Lei’s superior at the SFA, Zhou Shengxian ưɀ , also publicly promoted 
ecological civilisation, arguing that it was integral to achieving sustainable development. Zhou 
was the head of the SFA and vice-chairman of the National Greening Committee.977 He started 
his career as a middle school teacher in the 1970s after joining the CCP and then rose through 
the ranks of the Ningxia provincial government, assuming the rank of vice-governor before 
transferring to the SFA in 1998. Zhou would later become the minister in the Ministry of 
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Environmental Protection.978 It was in his position as director of the SFA that he wrote a 2002 
article calling for the concept of ‘ecological civilisation’ to help ‘realise socialist modernisation 
by the middle of the [21st] century’: 
China must recreate beautiful mountains and rivers, promote the harmonious development of man and 
nature, and realise the integration of economic growth and ecology. It must be noted that the long-term 
destruction of natural ecology in history has severely constrained economic development in many areas of 
China today, and some areas may even be difficult to survive because of poor ecological conditions. The 
course of action that sacrifices ecology for economic growth does not create wealth but creates disasters.979  
Like Lei Jiafu, Zhou viewed the need for ecological civilisation as pressing because of the 
imbalance between economic and ecological rationality that led to rampant ‘deforestation’ and 
less-than-optimal management. For China to continue its rapid economic development, it could 
no longer ignore environmental degradation as this would only ‘create disasters’. He further 
noted that 
in the 21st century, humanity has already gradually awoken from the punishment of nature caused by long-
term demands, damage and suffering. A new concept has emerged from the destruction of nature. From 
then on, humanity will enter a new stage of ecological civilisation following agricultural civilisation and 
industrial civilisation. Harmony between man and nature is the main feature of ecological civilisation. This 
is a vital part of modern civilisation and an essential part of an advanced culture.980  
With this statement, Zhou elucidated one of the more precise definitions of ecological 
civilisation by a SEPA official. He linked it to the Confucian concept of ‘harmony between 
man and nature’ to situate the concept within Chinese classical philosophy. While the critical 
aim of Zhou’s article was to outline his administration’s efforts and strategies for 
‘reforestation’ (ɝŤ), his broader argument about development was that China needed to adopt 
more environmentally-aware development strategies as well as alter its societal outlook 
towards the preservation of nature. In another 2002 article, he was more explicit on this latter 
requirement, arguing that the construction of an ecological civilisation would lead to the 
‘cultivation of morals’ for both society and individuals.981 He did not expand on this concept, 
leaving it as a general statement. However, SEPA official Pan Yue would expand on this idea 
of ecological civilisation and environmental morality and culture, as the following section will 
show. 
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Zhou did not neglect the economic function of forests, arguing that China needed to value 
them in a manner that ‘maximised the ecological and social benefits of forests while still 
meeting society’s need for wood as much as possible’: 
Natural forests have an essential function that cannot be compared with plantation forests. They regulate 
climate, conserve water sources, maintain water and soil, protect biodiversity, and maintain ecological 
balance. They are an irreplaceable renewable resource. China’s existing 100 million acres of natural 
forests, most of which are at the source of large rivers, play a significant role in maintaining national 
ecological security. Their ecological value is incalculable, and it is imperative to protect these precious 
natural forest resources by stopping the commercial harvesting of wood forests. The supply of wood will 
decrease, and the demand will increase with economic growth, the contradiction is quite sharp. To protect 
China’s natural forest resources, we must make significant adjustments to China’s forest utilisation 
structure, increase plantations, use less woodland to produce more wood, and gradually realise the 
replacement of natural forests by harvested plantations, solve the contradiction between supply and 
demand of wood, and truly protect natural forests.982 
Like other Chinese advocates of ecological modernisation, Zhou’s comments reflected an 
interlinking of economic and ecological rationality. He explicated this through a discussion of 
‘commercial forests’ (Ť). China’s forests, he argued, would benefit from ‘market 
behaviour’ (ì¨Ȝ). The Chinese government needed to ‘consciously utilise market 
mechanisms and economic methods to widely mobilise the enthusiasm and creativity of the 
whole society towards afforestation’.983 Zhou’s argument represented ecological modernisation 
in that it appreciated the pivotal role that ‘market behaviour’ has in protecting and sustaining 
natural resources.  
Overall, the policy discourse of SFA officials shows that their support of ecological 
civilisation stemmed from the view that China needed to balance both economic and ecological 
rationality in the management of its forests. This section has shown how the SFA drove the 
early policy discussion concerning ‘ecological civilisation’. Their contribution towards the 
ecological civilisation debate stemmed from bureaucratic opportunism, which allowed them to 
advance ecological modernisation ideas within the forestry industry, through supporting 
market principles. Looking at the experience of developed nations, SFA officials saw these 
ideas as a way to advance more sustainable use of their forest resources. Their involvement 
also reflected how ecological modernisation ideas had become more commonplace within 
China’s bureaucracy. However, despite their input, it would take the principal progenitor of 
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ecological modernisation ideas within China’s environmental policy agenda, the SEPA, for 
ecological civilisation to be fleshed out more conceptually and given greater prominence.  
The State Environmental Protection Administration and ecological civilisation. The 
SEPA, China’s lead environmental protection agency, also took notice of ecological 
civilisation around the turn of the millennium. Cao Fengzhong from SEPA’s Environmental 
and Economic Policy Research Centre was one of the first SEPA policy officials who publicly 
raised ecological civilisation in a 1999 article titled ‘Globalisation and Sustainable 
Development’. Cao’s initial contribution, and the discussion that followed from his colleagues, 
shows again the significant role of SEPA in advocating for an ecological-modernisation 
approach to the Chinese environmental policy agenda. Cao’s article stemmed from the 
‘ecological civilisation’ debate driven by Shen Shuguang (see earlier section) and he devoted 
a sub-section of his article to the concept.984 The empirical context of his article was similar to 
many of the other articles that he and his colleagues wrote at that time concerning 
environmental protection: China needed to transition from a ‘traditional modernisation 
development strategy’ to one that operated according to ‘sustainable development’ 
principles.985 These articles would form the basis for support of cleaner production, circular 
economy and green GDP.986 The added context of this article was ‘economic globalisation’, 
which he saw as a new phenomenon that would bring more economic prosperity as well as 
contribute to increased domestic and global environmental problems. The Chinese government 
was in the midst of negotiations for WTO membership. Environmental policy researchers were 
seeking to understand how China should respond as it further integrated itself into the global 
economy with WTO accession.  
Cao noted that many ‘global environmental problems such as ozone depletion, acid rain, 
desertification, marine pollution, species extinction, and climate warming had already broken 
through national borders and became major issues affecting the survival of all mankind’.987 
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The language that he used in his article also suggested that he believed ecological rationality 
had been lacking in ‘traditional development’. For instance, he explained that:  
from the development of traditional industrial civilisation to the development of modern ecological 
civilisation, traditional industrial civilisation is based on the idea that “man is the master of nature” (%Ň
ȋƝ% ). Therefore, development is demonstrated by economic profits obtained by the human 
subjugation of nature, ignoring the loss of natural capital and the maintenance of natural development and 
those who destroy the ecological environment to be justified and legal. This anti-nature development 
method can only deal with environmental resources and other problems faced by human beings in a 
tinkering manner, and it cannot solve the problem.988  
He further noted that a ‘modern ecological civilisation believes that this kind of development 
does not take into account the cost towards nature’, and that because it ‘sacrificed nature’ it 
could not be considered ‘real development’ (、Űƺã). However, because ecological 
civilisation saw ‘man as part of nature’ (%ŇȋƝ) and incorporated ‘natural, social, 
economic, and cultural factors’, it could achieve ‘truly sustainable development’. 989  The 
environmental ideas he raised in his article mirrored many of those he also raised in other 
articles about cleaner production and circular economy, reflecting the broader narrative of 
ecological modernisation ideas that bound his work. 
Later that same year, Cao collaborated with his colleague in the SEPA, Zhou Guomei £
Ŭ, to write a more in-depth account of the value of the concept of ecological civilisation. Their 
article stressed that China ‘must realise the leap from the industrial civilisation to ecological 
civilisation’ and that China needed to ‘abandon the trite view that one can simply pursue 
production value and volume without paying attention to consumption or efficiency’.990 They 
believed that ecological civilisation would help undertake ‘a major shift in values’ and ‘human 
cognition’ in China and lead to the abandonment of traditional economic values and the 
adoption of ‘ecological economic’ values: 
In short, ecological civilisation will readjust human behaviour… gradually improving the operational 
ecological value evaluation index system making the people’s ecological consciousness resolute. 
Ecological civilisation will allow social norms to take shape, establishing conservation-oriented ecological 
productivity and production methods, and a new ecological, economic order. It will achieve a positive 
ecological cycle and ensure sustainable development. The establishment of this new ecological, economic 
order depends on the guidance of ecological economics. Ecological economics is a combination of a new 
concept of survival and development. Focusing on the strategic heights, it carefully combines the overall 
interests of economic development with local interests. The combination of ecological and economic 
benefits achieves the optimisation of ecological and economic benefits. It can be said that ecological 
economics is political economy and the economics of survival in the stage of ecological civilisation.991 
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Cao and Zhou presented an integrated account of China’s environmental problems and its 
future economic development that bore many similarities with ecological modernisation, 
primarily through the convergence of economic and ecological rationality. Indeed, the rest of 
their article elaborated on these notions of ecological economics and ecological civilisation by 
theorising on how China would achieve future economic growth. The following excerpt 
suggests the strong ecological modernisation basis to their views: 
China’s modernisation… must take the concept of ecological civilisation as its direction and liberate and 
develop productive forces in the sense of ecological civilisation. To liberate productive forces is to promote 
institutional innovation. To develop productive forces is to vigorously promote scientific and technological 
progress, especially the development of new energy development and environmental protection 
technologies. The former rationalises relationships between people, and the latter regulates the relationship 
with people and nature. 
Regarding China’s economic growth, social development and progress, the key function of ecological 
valuing centres on the protection of resources and the rational and effective use of resources, because it is 
the basis for increasing and decreasing the rate of economic growth and evaluating developmental 
standards. To realise sustainable development, China needs to shift from an economic development 
strategy of extensive resource development and come up with an economic development strategy of 
rational protection and intensive development of resources. The essential part of implementing this strategy 
lies in the definition of environmental resource property rights. Only by assetisation (Ʌ#r) and pricing 
(*ūr) of ecological resources, can the social economy be allowed to operate and develop an ecological 
civilisation. Therefore, the ecologicalisation of scientific and technological innovation, the assetisation and 
pricing of ecological and environmental resources, and the ecologicalisation of the national consciousness 
are the only paths for China’s sustainable development.992 
Beyond their reflexive take on development and the need to change societal behaviour, they 
saw the market as the means to not only protect the environment but also to ‘liberate productive 
forces’. Moreover, for China to conserve its resources, it would have to value them as assets, 
property rights and prices. In other words, the market was needed to ensure that China 
‘rationally utilised’ its resources sustainably. They also hailed science and technological 
innovation as a pathway to sustainable development if it underwent ‘ecologicalisation’ (ưđ
r). However, what is striking about their comments is how notions of ‘progress’ provide the 
basis for their ecological modernisation outlook. They believed that ecological civilisation 
could occur as a stage of this progress. The critical policy point was how to hasten its arrival. 
These ideas concerning ecological civilisation floated by Cao and Zhao soon came to the 
attention of more senior officials within the SEPA. The political context to these discussions 
involved comments made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin on the 80th anniversary of the 
CCP in 2001 – the same speech in which he introduced the ‘three represents’.993 Alluding to 
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the environmental pressures that had plagued China’s development over the two decades of the 
reform period, Jiang stated that in future the Party ‘must promote harmony between man and 
nature and enable people to work and live in a beautiful ecological environment’. He also called 
for the Party to ensure that China ‘correctly handles the relationship between economic 
development and population, resources, and the environment to improve the ecological 
environment and beautify the environment…by opening up a civilised development path with 
productivity, prosperity in life, and good ecology’.994 While Jiang did not explicitly use the 
term ‘ecological civilisation’ in this speech, it laid the ideological foundation for China’s 
policymakers to discuss concepts that sought to change the nature of Chinese attitudes towards 
the relationship between ecology and society.  
Xie Zhenhua the director of SEPA, whose ideas on a low-carbon economy were discussed 
in the last chapter, latched onto Jiang’s speech at the 16th Party Congress in order to further 
promote ‘ecological civilisation’ in an issue of Seeking Truth. He developed the concept by 
positioning it within the larger narrative of China’s socialist modernisation. According to Xie, 
ecological civilisation was ‘a major innovation and important fulfilment of Marxist theory’ as 
well as ‘an important element in the overall development of mankind’. It would also help meet 
Jiang’s objective that ‘environmental awareness and environmental quality would become an 
important indicator for the degree of a nation’s civilisation’.995  
Xie devoted an entire section in this article to an ecological civilisation. Indeed, he was 
prepared to deal in greater depth than Lei Jiafu, Cao Fengzhong and Zhou Guomei on the 
importance of ecological civilisation for Chinese development: 
The industrial revolution has enhanced humans’ ability to transform nature, but in more than a century, it 
took to create unparalleled colossal material wealth, there also was a substantial environmental cost. The 
concept of ecological civilisation is a brand-new scientific concept of a civilisation formed from a profound 
understanding of the relationship between man and nature after thousands of years of agricultural 
civilisation and industrial civilisation within human society. It is not only an inheritance of the ancient 
natural concept of “harmony between man and nature”, but it is also a reflection and awakening of the 
natural view of heaven and man. It is a moral and ethical foundation of the strategy of sustainable 
development and represents the direction for an advanced culture. Integrating the concept of ecological 
civilisation into the construction of spiritual civilisation is conducive to strengthening the building of 
socialist ideology and morality. The popularisation of ecological civilisation will further improve the 
spiritual and cultural quality of workers and promote the development of advanced productive forces.996 
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Xie’s definition of ecological civilisation also reflected an ecological modernisation ethos. This 
manifested itself in a reflexive understanding of the environmental problems inherent to 
China’s previous industrialisation and the future need to realise sustainable development. This 
ethos is also apparent in Xie’s recognition of the role that capitalism would play in achieving 
an ecological civilisation. Although he neglected to mention many of the market-aspects 
touched on by Cao Fengzhong and Zhou Guomei, he did discuss ‘advanced productive forces’ 
(i.e. capitalism), as well as the importance of ‘market mechanisms’.  
Xie believed that if China was to achieve this sustainable development, then it needed to 
further build a ‘moral and ethical foundation’ for its ‘leading cadres’ and ‘youth’. The nation 
also needed to improve ‘environmental awareness for the whole society’ and further foster an 
‘active environmental culture’. His discussion of morality, ethics and a ‘spiritual civilisation’ 
added significant political undertones to his remarks. After all, these were the same views that 
formed the foundation of calls for green GDP (see Chapter Seven and below). Xie suggested 
that the success of ecological civilisation was predicated upon its successful integration into 
the Party’s Marxist canon, giving it a ‘scientific’ historical meaning.997 Xie’s comments were 
also a broad recognition that for sustainable development to be achieved then environmental 
governance needed to incorporate all aspects of society through the creation of an ecological 
civilisation. Xie argued that ecological civilisation needed to become further entrenched within 
the CCP’s materialist view of history. 
In 2003, Xie Zhenhua’s colleague at SEPA, Vice-Director Pan Yue, appended ‘ecological 
civilisation’ to his call for an ‘environmental culture’ in China. This was the same article in 
which he first called for China to establish a green national accounting framework.998 He stated 
that China’s environmental problems had forced people to: 
begin to re-examine the traditional industrial civilisation and rethink its various ills to get rid of the various 
crises it caused, to replace green with black, and to replace traditional industrial civilisation with a new 
ecological industrial civilisation. Therefore, the ecological crisis creates an environmental culture. The 
core of environmental culture is ecological civilisation. Environmental culture is today’s advanced 
culture.999  
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As noted in Chapter Seven, Pan also sought to link China’s ‘traditional culture’ (0ǵĻr) to 
China’s ‘environmental culture’. In that same article, he linked China’s traditional culture to 
‘ecological civilisation’: 
The inner spirit of Chinese traditional culture is strikingly consistent with the emerging environmental 
culture of today’s world. As we all know, Chinese traditional culture has always pursued harmony with 
nature…Based on this spirit, traditional Chinese philosophy of religion, literature and art, medicine and 
health, chess and tea ceremony all show the affinity between man and nature. They express a profound and 
wise ecological civilisation and are without exception soaked with a harmonious beauty of heaven and 
earth.1000  
Moreover, like his other colleagues at SEPA, Pan’s article reflected an ecological 
modernisation understanding of development. His use of ‘ecological crisis’ suggests that he 
supported a high degree of ecological rationality concerning the establishing effects of 
traditional industrialisation. Moreover, his argument revealed a high degree of reflexive 
thought concerning ‘traditional industrial civilisations’ and how its ‘various ills’ had led to 
‘ecological crises’. Yet, this crisis had also prompted an ‘advanced environmental culture’. 
This once again reflects how Chinese officials had sought to reflexively interpret China’s 
environmental problems within the larger narrative of China’s development. 
Pan’s speech at the 2005 Green China Forum sought to reinforce the ideological case for 
ecological civilisation and, like Xie Zhenhua in 2001, he linked the concept to China’s socialist 
modernisation. This argument was expressed in his statement that China’s socialist 
modernisation needed to straddle the balance between ‘extreme anthropocentrism’ (Ţǡ%ǧ
Ď) and ‘extreme ecocentrism’ (ŢǡưđĎ): 
China’s socialist modernisation needs to straddle the balance between two extremes civilisation reflects 
the basic principles of socialism. Socialist ecological civilisation first emphasises people-oriented 
principle. At the same time, it opposes extreme anthropocentrism and extreme ecocentrism. Extreme 
anthropocentrism has created a severe crisis of human survival; extreme ecocentrism has overemphasised 
the need for human society to stop the transformation of nature. Ecological civilisation principles believe 
that people are a core value, but not the masters of nature. Man’s all-encompassing development must 
promote harmony between man and nature. Besides, ecological civilisation is also basically consistent with 
the principles of contemporary socialism concerning sustainable development, fairness and justice.1001  
In outlining the key characteristics of ecological civilisation, Pan advanced the ecological 
modernisation principle that humanity is a central guiding principle of development while 
emphasising that humanity was ‘not the master of nature’.  
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Yet, more importantly for the purpose of this thesis, Pan showed how China’s officials could 
incorporate this concept into their particular socialist ideological circumstances. Ecological 
civilisation was taken to represent a higher stage of socialism. Therefore, with that ideological 
punctuation, it fell upon China’s officials to construct an official version of ecological 
civilisation. They needed to create the process of ecological modernisation, but this time they 
were constructing what can be considered a capstone ecological modernisation concept, one 
which embraced all the other concepts explored throughout the last five chapters. The next 
section illustrates this point also by showing how senior Party officials took the debate beyond 
mere slogans and gave it policy substance. This will suggest that ecological civilisation became 
a fundamental concept in the ongoing struggle to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP. 
Senior CCP politicians and ecological civilisation. With the forestry and environment 
sections of China’s bureaucracy providing the early foundation for ecological civilisation, the 
term finally was placed on the Party-political stage in 2007 when President Hu Jintao first used 
the term at the 17th National Party Congress. In his speech at the Great Hall of the People, Hu 
announced to the attending Party delegates: 
The basic shape of ecological civilisation is an industrial structure and growth and consumption patterns 
that conserve energy resources and protect the environment. Circular economies become comparatively 
higher in scope, and the proportion of renewable energy rises. The discharge of significant pollutants is 
adequately controlled, improving the quality of the environment. The concept of ecological civilisation is 
firmly established as belonging to the whole of society.1002 
Hu’s remarks paraphrased many of the claims that Xie Zhenhua had made in his article six 
years earlier and cited above. However, it was his use of the term at the Party Congress that 
provided the political imprimatur needed to entrench the term firmly within China’s political 
discourse. 
The importance of ecological civilisation is that it has survived the transition in Party 
leadership from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. It has now transitioned to become a ‘new guiding 
thought’ for the Chinese Communist Party. In 2018, the PRC Constitution was revised to reflect 
this conceptual transition: ‘promote the coordinated development of material civilisation, 
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political civilisation, spiritual civilisation, social civilisation and ecological civilisation’.1003 In 
2015, the State Council and Central Committee jointly released Opinions on Accelerating the 
Ecological Civilisation Construction, and five months later, they followed that up with their 
joint Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Civilisation.1004  
Highlighting its capstone function as a guiding principle behind sustainable development in 
China, the State Council also stated that ‘existing laws and regulations needed to be revised’ if 
they were ‘incompatible with accelerating the construction of ecological civilisation’.1005 
Using these policies, Chinese authorities have sought to integrate all the environmental reforms 
that China has experienced over the past few decades into a larger narrative of ‘progress’. The 
term ecological civilisation helps to place the Party at the vanguard of the forces of history.  
The key elements that constitute ecological modernisation materialise in these documents. 
For instance, the techno-optimistic narrative arises with the exhortation that China must 
‘further innovate in science and technology’.1006 Moreover, the belief in the decisive role that 
markets can play in environmental governance and ecological restructuring arises: ‘cultivate 
market players for environmental governance and ecological protection’ and ‘adopt 
institutional mechanisms and policy measures to encourage the development of energy 
conservation and environmental protection industries’. This State Council policy illustrates the 
capstone nature of ecological civilisation. It also incorporates most of the concepts that order 
the chapters of this thesis: ‘development must be green development, circular development, 
low-carbon development, and balance development and environmental protection’.1007 The 
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2015 Integrated Reform Plan also rhetorically supports the role that the public and civil society 
have to play in environmental protection:  
Improving the public participation system through timely and accurate disclosure of all types of 
environmental information, expanding the range of disclosure, protecting the public’s right to know; 
safeguarding the public’s environmental rights. We will improve systems for reporting, hearings, public 
opinion, and public supervision, and build a social action system that involves all citizens. We will establish 
an environmental public interest litigation system against polluting the environment and destroying 
ecological behaviour.1008 
While scepticism can be applied to the relationship between rhetoric and reality (especially the 
interaction between rhetoric and entrenched political interests), taken together with the 
previous discursive history, these policies do illustrate how Chinese authorities have sought to 
embed ecological modernisation ideas into the environmental reform of China. 
To further understand how ecological civilisation has become the capstone ecological 
modernisation concept in China, it is necessary to analyse recent policy discourse of senior 
Party leaders to see how they have adopted the concept. In his chairman’s speech at the 2012 
the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), 
Li Keqiang raised the concept. Although he had mentioned it in previous speeches to the 
CCICED, his 2012 speech went into much more detail concerning his understanding of this 
new overarching environmental concept. Passages from his speech strongly suggest that 
ecological modernisation provided the foundations of this understanding: 
Ecological civilisation stems from a reflection on development and is also an improvement in development. 
The history of human development is the history of civilisational progress and the history of the 
relationship between man and nature. Historically, some ancient civilisations flourished because of sound 
ecology, and then some civilisations declined due to ecological deterioration. In the past 300 years, 
humanity has created enormous material wealth in industrialisation, but it has also paid a substantial 
resource and environmental cost. In the second half of the century, the international community began to 
think about the “limits of growth” (¶ɹƺŢʅ) and “only one earth” (Œ¦Ƭ) and raised the 
concepts of a circular economy, green development, and ecological civilisation. The United Nations has 
held four conferences on environment and development, reaching the consensus on promoting sustainable 
development and tackling climate change… [I]t can be said that ecological civilisation is the inheritance 
and innovation of agricultural civilisation and industrial civilisation, which is in line with the development 
of human civilisation.1009 
These remarks provide another example of the reflexive interpretation of China’s development 
underneath ecological modernisation reasoning. Li also referred to a circular economy and 
green development.1010 He saw ecological civilisation as part of a broader global shift towards 
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‘promoting sustainable development and tackling climate change’. China might be 
experiencing this historical shift at a later stage than some other nations:  
Moving towards a modernised ecological civilisation is a new problem placed before us. Its proper 
meaning is comprehensively building a well-off society. We must continue to develop an industrial 
civilisation and, at the same time, vigorously promote an ecological civilisation. There is no precedent in 
human history for the modernisation of a country like China, with a population of more than 1.3 billion. 
Protecting the ecological environment in a vast country is also a global problem. We are faced with 
unprecedented development opportunities as well as risks and challenges. We must have the sense of 
urgency that we are “walking the tightrope” (Ɉɬ.) together with the confidence to “climb the highest 
peak” (ƹʠæ). The industrialisation and urbanisation that the developed countries have gradually realised 
in the past few hundred years are accelerating the contradiction between resources and environment in the 
developed countries in the past 100 years, and this contradiction is also concentrated in China. Drawing 
lessons from the successful experience of the international community, drawing lessons from failures and 
giving play to the advantages of emerging countries, we can avoid repeating the old road of “pollute now 
and clean up later” (DŻťſƭ) by exploring a new development path. China will further establish 
the concept of an ecological civilisation that respects nature, conforms to nature and protects nature, 
integrates ecological civilisation construction into the entire drive for modernisation, accelerates the 
transformation of economic development mode, and places protection within development and 
development within protection. Through the transformation of development, we will achieve economic 
development, improve people’s livelihood, and protect the ecological and win-win situation.1011 
Furthermore, Zhang Gaoli Āʠ, one of the Vice-Premiers within Li Keqiang’s cabinet and 
a member of the Politburo Standing Committee between 2012 and 2017, also wrote a 2013 
article in Seeking Truth Magazine on ecological civilisation after Xi Jinping had given his 
endorsement of the term at the 18th Party Congress. It reinforced how ecological civilisation 
has dovetailed with the concept of ecological modernisation. Zhang opened his article by 
referring to the more ‘traditional’ environmental concerns, such as the pollution problems that 
had plagued China during its economic development. He argued that the Party needed to 
‘ensure the physical and mental health of the people’. Although in the past Chinese citizens 
‘sought food and clothing’ (Ÿƒʝ), now they ‘hope for environmental protection’ (ǁƩ>) 
and a ‘beautiful and liveable environment so they can ‘drink clean water, breathe fresh air, and 
eat safe and secure food’.1012 However, to achieve this China should not: 
abandon industrial civilisation and return to original modes of production and living. Instead [we should] 
place the carrying capacity of the natural environment as a foundation and the laws of nature as a norm in 
order to achieve the goals of sustainable development and harmony between man and nature to create 
development, an enjoyable, prosperous life, and civilised and eco-friendly society.1013 
His comments reflect the ecological modernisation position that China needed to continue with 
its modernisation rather than the alternatives of deindustrialising or reverting to a pre-industrial 
civilisation. 
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In a 2012 speech to the Politburo, Xi Jinping observed that ‘as China’s economic and social 
development continues to deepen, the status and role of ecological civilisation construction has 
become increasingly prominent’. China needed to fully integrate ecological civilisation into its 
‘economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, and social 
construction’. 1014  Xi Jinping has also interwoven ‘ecological civilisation’ into his ‘two 
mountains theory’ (äȭ), which he first raised during his tenure as Zhejiang Governor in 
the 2000s.1015 In 2013, he described this to the media:  
The construction of an ecological civilisation is an issue of paramount importance that concerns the well-
being of the people and the future of the nation. For China to realise industrialisation, urbanisation, 
informationisation, and agricultural modernisation, it must embark on a new path of development. China 
has placed ecology and environmental protection in a more prominent position. We need clear water and 
green mountains but also gold and silver mountains… we must not sacrifice the ecological environment in 
exchange for momentary economic development. We put forward the strategic task of building an 
ecological civilisation and beautiful China, to leave behind for our children and grandchildren a beautiful 
homeland with blue sky, green land, and clean water.1016  
This ‘two mountains’ theory rhetorically echoed the ecological modernisation principle in the 
first sense that development must not only balance green mountains (ecological protection) 
and gold and silver mountains (economic development), and in the second sense that these 
metaphorical mountains are mutually reinforcing components of development. 
However, it was not until 2018 that Xi Jinping outlined in detail his vision for ecological 
civilisation in a speech to the National Ecological Environmental Protection Conference.1017 
This article, more so than the 2015 Central Committee and State Council policy documents 
and his above comments, reflected the importance of ecological civilisation in China’s 
contemporary policy discourse. He sought to place China’s existential nature of environmental 
problems in deep historical context, noting that ‘the decline of ecological environments…led 
to the decline of ancient Egypt and ancient Babylon’. Furthermore, the Hexi Corridor and Loess 
Plateau during ancient times ‘were severely damaged, which aggravated their economic 
 
1014 Xi Jinping 2012, 6. 
1015 Xinhua wang. 2018. “Meng kaishi di difang: xue fang Xi Jinping “san nong” sixiang de Zhe Jiang shijian” 
(Where the dream began: a study of the Zhejiang practice of Xi Jinping’s “agriculture, rural areas and farmers” 
thought), 4 July, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2018-07/04/c_137299846.htm. Accessed 22 May 2018. 
1016 Renmin wang. 2016. “Xi Jinping: Jianshe meili Zhongguo, gaishan shengtai huanjing jiushi fazhan 
shengchanli” (Xi Jinping: building a beautiful China, improving the ecological environment means developing 
productivity), 1 December, http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2016/1201/c385476-28916113.html. Accecssed 
15 May 2018. 
1017 This May 2018 speech was widely published seven months later in 2019 through state and non-state 
publishing channels.  
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decline’. 1018  However, China could use history as a guide to appreciate the possible 
consequences of future development ()ɪ)ǇNŐ). History showed Xi Jinping that 
‘China’s environmental capacity was limited’ and its ‘ecosystem was fragile’. Like Pan Yue, 
he evoked Chinese classical thinkers, as well as Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, placing 
modern environmental thought within Chinese classical philosophy and the Party’s Marxist 
doctrine. He also listed six fundamental principles of ecological civilisation: 
1. Persistence in the harmonious co-existence of humans and nature. 
2.  Clear waters and green mountains can bring us prosperity and wealth. 
3.   A good ecological environment is the most common benefit for people’s lives and their wellbeing. 
4.   Mountains, rivers, forests, farmlands, lakes, and grasslands are the life of a community. 
5.   Use the most stringent systems and governance to protect the ecological environment. 
6.   Seek the construction of a global ecological civilisation.1019 
Xi integrated his sixth point with his promotion of China’s ‘one-belt, one-road’ (íɍ), 
noting that ‘the concepts and practices of ecological civilisation should benefit the people of 
all countries along the route’.1020 While many China watchers would criticise the sentiment of 
that statement, due to the construction of coal-fired power plants in ‘one belt, one road’ 
nations1021, they at least demonstrate the attempt at a convergence of economic and ecological 
rationality in China’s environmental policy discourse. 
This chapter has shown the ecological civilisation bears many of the conceptual hallmarks 
of the process of ‘ecological modernisation’. Chinese academics have noted this similarity in 
their academic discussions concerning the two concepts. For instance, in an article published 
in 2018, two academics from the CCP’s Central Party School, Bo Hai ȘƉ and Zhao Jianjun 
ɉüP traced the idea of ecological modernisation from Joseph Huber to Arthur Mol, noting 
that these two concepts shared a similar ‘problem orientation’ (ɻʘĩ) and ‘theoretical 
connotations’ (ƭȭOƍ) because they both focused on the interaction between ‘human social 
systems and natural systems’.1022 They argued that China’s ecological civilisation should ‘draw 
on the theory of Western ecological modernisation, the ecological civilisation construction in 
 
1018 Xi Jinping 2018. “Tuidong woguo shengtai wenming jianshe mai shang xin taijie” (Promote China’s 
construction of an ecological civilisation to a new level), Renmin wang, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2019/ 
0131/c1024-30603879.html. Accessed 23 May 2019. 
1019 Ibid. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 See Pike, Lilli. 2019. “‘Green Belt and Road’ in the spotlight,” China Dialogue, 24 April, https://www. 
chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/11212--Green-Belt-and-Road-in-the-spotlight. Accessed 29 May 2019. 
1022 Bo Hai and Zhao Jianjun 2018, 101. 
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China can form its modernisation mode from system construction, market and economic 
subjects, social forces and technological innovation’.1023 As of June 2019, there are over 120 
articles on the Chinese journal database China National Knowledge Index whose ‘main 
subject’ (ʘ) was ‘ecological modernisation’ and ‘ecological civilisation’. 
Conclusion: Ecological Civilisation and Ecological Modernisation 
This chapter has shown that the Chinese idea of ecological civilisation has grown from an 
environmental concept discussed within academic circles in the 1980s to a politically 
prominent concept employed by the most politically powerful Party officials to frame the future 
of China’s development. It represents the latest environmental sustainability concept in China 
and is even more all-embracing than the concept of a low-carbon economy examined in 
Chapter Eight. 
This chapter has shown that ecological civilisation performs a role as a ‘capstone’ 
environmental reform concept. Its supporters have sought to bind ecological modernisation 
notions into a narrative that conforms with China’s cultural and ideological history. Ecological 
civilisation charts the evolution of these ecological modernisation ideas in China. Even though 
the ideas inherent in ecological civilisation were akin to those already tested in some developed 
capitalist countries (such as Western Europe), it was an endogenous concept that emerged 
within Chinese academia and was then appropriated by China’s bureaucracy as an ideological 
and culturally appropriate solution to balance ecological and economic rationality and progress 
China as it emerges from and transcends the tumultuous stage of its ‘industrial civilisation’. 
 
  
 
1023 Ibid, 101-102. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
This thesis has adopted a discursive reading of China’s recent environmental reforms. It has 
been guided by the following questions:  
1. Have ecological modernisation ideas influenced China’s environmental policy 
agenda?  
2. Which institutions and officials have been the key advocates for the inclusion of 
ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental 
policy agenda?  
3. What concerns have been the key drivers for the inclusion of ecological 
modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda?  
4. To what extent have ecological modernisation ideas evolved within the Chinese 
government’s environmental policy agenda? 
The thesis identified five concepts that could be seen as meeting the criteria for an ecological 
modernisation discourse. These concepts were cleaner production, circular economy, green 
GDP, low-carbon economy, and ecological civilisation. How have the previous five chapters 
answered the questions that guided the thesis? 
1. Have ecological modernisation ideas influenced China’s environmental policy 
agenda? Through analysing each of the five concepts identified for discursive assessment, this 
thesis has shown that ecological modernisation ideas have influenced Chinese environmental 
policy. Its influence can be seen in China’s environmental policy discourse, from the early 
1990s onward through a growing convergence of economic and ecological rationality. This 
convergence signifies a profound intellectual and cultural shift in China’s economic and 
environmental policy discourse. Before the 1972 United Nations Human Environment 
Conference in Stockholm, China’s officials had little understanding of ‘acid rain’ or 
‘environmental protection’ (see Chapter Five). However, since that time, these officials have 
become steadily more aware of the pressing environmental issues confronting their nation, 
whether these problems involve industrial pollution that fouls its air and waterways, population 
growth that steadily increases China’s ecological footprint, or carbon emissions that are 
changing the planet’s climate. 
Yet while China’s ecological rationality expanded, it still had to overcome an entrenched 
economic rationality with China’s senior policymakers. The example of Vice Premier Li Peng, 
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outlined in Chapter Five, provided a stark example of how China’s economic development 
objectives outweighed environmental considerations during the early stage of their post-Mao 
modernisation (see Chapter Four). Although Li Peng understood that China’s industry had 
fouled the air and contaminated waterways, his policy discussions lacked the environmental 
concern of his deputy, Qu Geping. His commentary highlighted how he understood China’s 
industry contributed to ‘air pollution’, yet he prioritised China’s need to grow its economy 
further before it could ever think of incorporating what he considered ‘expensive’ pollution-
abatement technology. To draw on the imagery of the ‘environment Kuznets curve’1024, Li 
Peng believed that China needed to undertake more economic development if science and 
technology were ever going to help it ascend the developmental scale and descend the inverted 
parabola of environmental impact. 
However, this economic mindset had changed by the early 1990s as China grappled with 
the contradictions of its development and engaged in international environment and climate 
meetings. Environmental problems were perceived as worsening, while environmental 
management measures provided little headway against the extensive onslaught of China’s rapid 
industrialisation. Based on these ongoing issues, China’s leaders reinforced the concept of 
‘environmental protection’ when the National People’s Congress in 1989 passed the 
Environmental Protection Law removing its decade-long ‘trial’ status (see Chapter Two). In 
1992, another momentous act occurred when the National Party Congress endorsed the notion 
of a ‘socialist market economy’, emphasising that the CCP now supported capitalist principles, 
rather than socialist planning, as the guide for China’s future modernisation. China’s 
policymakers understood that this endorsement of the market would place further stress on the 
environment, as China’s economy grew without the productivity shackles of a socialist 
economy (see Chapter Four).  
The Chinese government joined with other market economies and the international 
community in endorsing sustainable development at the United Nations Rio Earth Summit in 
1992 and, alongside China’s Agenda 21, this endorsement became a ‘guiding principle’ for the 
PRC’s future aspirations for its development (see Chapter Two and Chapter Five). As 
illustrated in Figure 10.1, ecological modernisation policy solutions based on the notion of 
sustainable development were the result of the convergence of economic and ecological 
 
1024 Stern, Common and Barbier 1996. 
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rationality. Chinese authorities believed that these policies would provide China with a path 
through the contradictions between ‘environmental protection’ (ecological rationality) and a 
‘socialist market economy’ (economic rationality).  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Figure 10.1: Sustainable Development and the Convergence of Economic and Ecological Rationality in 
China’s Environmental Policy Discourse 
However, sustainable development assigned a policy straitjacket for China’s policymakers. 
In the future, any economic development that they considered would have to take into account, 
at least rhetorically, environmental protection measures once the restrictions that Li Peng had 
placed on ecological modernisation aspirations were lifted in the early 1990s (see Chapter 
Five). Chapters Five to Nine have shown that with the absence of these limitations, ecological 
modernisation ideas have increasingly been given greater encouragement within China’s 
environmental policy discourse.  
2. Which institutions and officials have been the key advocates for the inclusion of 
ecological modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy 
agenda? Chapter Five to Chapter Nine have detailed how China’s environmental bureaucracy 
were initially the key advocates for ecological modernisation ideas. Policymakers within the 
State Environmental Protection Bureau, State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA) and Ministry of Environmental Protection (and State Forestry Administration) strongly 
promoted ecological modernisation ideas through their support of ‘cleaner production’, 
‘circular economy’, ‘green GDP’, ‘low-carbon economy’ and ‘ecological civilisation’. The 
most prominent official was China’s ‘father of environmentalism’ Qu Geping who pioneered 
China’s ecological rationality and first advocated ecological modernisation-based policies to 
protect China’s worsening environment. Qu was ably assisted by Cao Fengzhong who worked 
in each of the institutions mentioned above. He contributed to the early discussion of cleaner 
production, circular economy and green GDP (see Chapter Five, Chapter Six, and Chapter 
Seven).  
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However, this thesis also has identified that the convergence of economic and ecological 
rationality in China was further advanced through support from China’s economic bureaucrats 
within the traditional economic planning organs of the government. Chairman Ma Kai and 
Vice-Chairman Xie Zhenhua from the National Development Reform Commission are two of 
the most prominent examples of economic bureaucrats who influenced China’s environmental 
policy agenda as they endorsed ‘cleaner production’, ‘circular economy’ and ‘low-carbon 
economy’ in their policy discourse. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also partnered 
with the SEPA to formulate a new environmental national accounting with ‘green GDP’ as 
shown by the discussion in Chapter Seven. 
3. What concerns have been the key drivers for the inclusion of ecological 
modernisation ideas within the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda? This 
thesis has shown that concerns surrounding industrial pollution, solid waste, high resource use, 
environmental degradation and global warming influenced Chinese policymakers to advocate 
ecological modernisation-based policies. For instance, cleaner production tackled the specific 
issue of growing industrial pollution (see Chapter Five), while a circular economy sought to 
overcome the more general linear process of development that operated along a ‘resource – 
production – consumption’ continuum, and to reduce waste through a recycling economy and 
society (see Chapter Six). Green GDP sought more generally to minimise environmental harm 
through a specific accounting framework to calculate environmental pollution and count the 
cost of environmental management (see Chapter Seven). Low-carbon economic development 
specifically sought to reduce the amount of carbon that China’s industries were discharging 
into the atmosphere, even though this target would affect the economy more generally (see 
Chapter Eight). Finally, ecological civilisation was the most general, capstone, concept which 
sought to refashion Chinese politics, economy, and society along more environmentally 
sustainable lines (see Chapter Nine). Policymakers advanced each of these concepts because 
of ecological concerns. Nevertheless, it was the market-based economic rationality of China’s 
policymakers and concerns for maintaining China’s emerging within the international 
economic order that underwrote their inclusion of these ecological modernisation ideas in 
China’s environmental policy discourse. 
4. To what extent have ecological modernisation ideas evolved within the Chinese 
government’s environmental policy agenda? This thesis has shown that ecological 
modernisation ideas have evolved to a significant degree in China (see Figure 10.2). Initially, 
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ecological modernisation ideas centred on clean technology and the market. For example, the 
impetus behind cleaner production was not just assisting Chinese enterprises to reduce their 
levels of industrial pollution through clean technology, but also making those enterprises more 
efficient and profitable by using that technology. Policymakers wanted to create a culture of 
innovation within Chinese industry, especially the township village enterprise (TVE) sector 
that would encourage research and development (see Chapter Five). With respect to a circular 
economy, the objective was not only reducing resource usage and waste in China, but also 
allowing new sustainable industries to emerge, and increasing the profitable circular-economic 
interaction between companies. The efficiency aspect of a circular economy was also framed 
within the broader context of China’s resource dependence on energy and other resources, as 
shown by Ma Kai’s comments about China’s energy shortages (see Chapter Six). In the case 
of green GDP, Chinese policymakers in the SEPA and the NBS wanted to capture a more 
realistic account of the negative environmental externalities surrounding China’s economic 
development and to strengthen China’s decentralised environmental governance, an issue that 
Chapter Two had identified as being problematic. Such a metric, Pan Yue from the SEPA 
believed, would allow Chinese authorities to get a better gauge of how to foster an 
‘environmental culture’ amongst cadres and achieve sustainable development (see Chapter 
Seven). Furthermore, China’s climate change negotiator Xie Zhenhua asserted that undergoing 
low-carbon development not only would provide China with a path that could reduce its carbon 
emissions but would also deliver to China’s economy new sustainable industries (see Chapter 
Eight). Finally, by embracing ecological civilisation, China’s leaders have adapted the ideas of 
ecological modernisation to their own ideological and historical context. Using this capstone 
environmental reform concept, they have incorporated ecological modernisation ideas into the 
larger historical narrative of China’s ‘civilisation’, basing it on the nation’s Marxist and 
Classical history. The substantive involvement of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang strongly indicates the importance that China’s senior leadership place on 
this concept as a key piece of environmental reform (see Chapter Nine). Figure 10.2 illustrates 
how these environmental concepts have contributed to the development of ecological 
modernisation discourse in China since the beginning of the ‘socialist market economy’ era of 
the early 1990s. 
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Figure 10.2: The Evolution of Ecological Modernisation Policy Discourse in China 
Research Implications 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on ecological modernisation in a number of 
important ways. A significant contribution this makes to existing literature is methodological 
and conceptual. Rather than viewing ecological modernisation as an overarching 
suprahistorical process, as most ecological modernisation theorists do, this thesis has added to 
the ‘ecological modernisation discourse’ literature by demonstrating that ecological 
modernisation in a Chinese context can be purposefully analysed as a set of ideas that 
policymakers draw on to frame their future development.  
Although this research has adopted a discursive approach, it enhances the understanding of 
the importance of the ‘discursive’ aspect within Molian ecological modernisation theory. It 
does this through using seven ecological modernisation discursive indicators generated from a 
synthesis of the research and thinking of John Dryzek, Marteen Hajer, Albert Weale and Arthur 
Mol (see Chapter Three). Focusing on policy discourse, rather than the process of ecological 
modernisation, permits researchers to understand the objectives of policymakers and therefore 
the meaningfulness of environmental policy action, whether it involves an industry that 
operates based on ‘cleaner production’, an economy that operates according to the principles 
of a ‘circular economy’, a government that utilises ‘green GDP’ to measure sustainable 
development, an economy that reduces its carbon emissions through ‘low-carbon 
development’, or a society that progresses towards an environmentally sustainable ‘ecological 
civilisation’.  
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Second, this thesis has provided new insights as to how to discover whether ecological 
modernisation ideas have influenced the Chinese government’s environmental policy agenda. 
Chapter Five to Chapter Nine stress the importance of exploring the specific arguments put 
forward by Chinese officials in their policy commentary. This thesis has shown that examining 
policy discourse generated by Chinese government and Party officials allows researchers to 
determine whether ecological modernisation ideas have influenced the policy decisions of 
Chinese officials. Scrutinising (and translating) this material allows for an understanding of the 
policy rationale behind their decisions. While this is hardly a new Sinological approach, the 
literature on China’s environmental reforms can sometimes overwhelmingly focus on present 
outcomes and neglect to examine the origins of specific environmental policy ideas (see 
Chapter Two). Researchers can sometimes place too much emphasis on policy documents at 
the expense of exploring the policymakers who create those policy documents. Sometimes, 
understandably, scholars ignore this material because of reasons of Chinese illiteracy. 
However, the perusal of original Chinese documents releases researchers from a reliance on 
Western commentary and allows them to explore the rich policy discussion from primary 
Chinese-language sources. This was essential to the discursive nature of this thesis. For 
instance, by returning to the environmental policy discussion of the 1980s, I was able to 
uncover the incongruency between the arguments of ‘Qu Geping in the pre-Li Peng era’ and 
‘Qu Geping during the Li Peng era’ (see Chapter Five). It permitted me to chart the emergence 
and development of China’s nascent ecological rationality towards industrial pollution through 
the eyes of China’s environmental bureaucrats. What this policy discourse showed was that 
before Li Peng became the chairman of the National Environmental Protection Commission, 
Qu Geping was advocating policies in the first few years of ‘reform and opening up’ that were 
akin to ecological modernisation.  
This is not to state that secondary source material in English does not have its place: as the 
green GDP analysis demonstrates (see Chapter Seven), such secondary source material allowed 
me to use another political lens to further clarify Chinese policy discourse when primary source 
material neglected to state the explicit reasons for green GDP’s policy demise. However, to 
return to the point raised in Chapter Three, without access to original Chinese language policy 
discourse, then researchers can only consider ecological modernisation by examining empirical 
measures of economy, industry, society and environment. The problems with this approach 
were highlighted in Chapter Three where I discussed the problems I faced when approaching 
this thesis topic. The Chinese-language policy discourse detailed in this thesis allows for an 
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enhanced appreciation of the underlying rationales, meaning and mindsets that drove 
policymakers in China to embrace ecological modernisation ideas and policy decisions. 
A third contribution of this thesis involves highlighting how China’s characteristic approach 
to environmental protection was heavily influenced not only through reflection of its own past, 
but also through reflection of the history of other countries. While their outlook emerged from 
a deep reflection of their country’s modernisation, Chinese policymakers also came to 
appreciate that the environmental problems plaguing development in China had also afflicted 
other developed countries. In each chapter, evidence has been presented of officials who had 
experienced ‘study missions’ to developed countries, and through these visits came to realise 
the ‘backward’ nature of China’s environmental governance. Other evidence has been 
presented of policy officials being heavily influenced by foreign empirical research or 
ecological philosophy. The examples of environmental reform in Western Europe, Japan, 
Norway and the United States provided Chinese policy bureaucrats with the empirical 
justification to introduce ecological modernisation policies. Their perceived successful 
environmental reforms imbued a sense of optimism in their vision for the future if China 
integrated similar market-based economic rationality into its environmental policies. 
Significantly, this is consistent with Arthur Mol’s ongoing understanding of the process of 
ecological modernisation on a global scale. 
Fourth, this thesis has also shed further light on the role that non-Chinese stakeholders 
perform as global carriers of ‘ecological modernisation’ in China. Chapter Two detailed how 
scholars have identified the influential role that foreign governments and research institutes 
have had on Chinese environmental reform, but this thesis has provided additional insights into 
how environmental sociologists can understand how specific environmental ideas are adopted 
and adapted in developing countries. Mol has previously discussed the role of ‘globalisation 
processes’ as social carriers of ecological modernisation-inspired environmental reform.1025 
The evidence canvassed in Chapter Five demonstrates how international discussions 
surrounding ‘cleaner production’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s influenced Chinese 
policymakers such as Qu Geping to call for cleaner production initiatives in China. Chinese 
intellectuals and policymakers eagerly consumed ecological economics literature that exposed 
them to the notion of ‘a circular economy’ (see Chapter Six). Moreover, Chapter Seven detailed 
 
1025 Mol 2001, 69. 
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the policy and financial assistance that the Norwegian Government and the World Bank 
provided in the late 1990s and early 2000s to promote a ‘green GDP’ in China. Similarly, the 
UK Government provided policy and financial assistance to the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences in order to replicate a ‘low-carbon economy’ in China (see Chapter Eight). 
A fifth contribution from the findings from this research (an expansion of the second and 
third contribution) is the suggestion that ‘environmental policy entrepreneurs’ 1026  in the 
Chinese government sought to create the same process of ecological modernisation that they 
observed in developed countries, even if they were oblivious to the term ‘ecological 
modernisation’. To borrow (and slightly alter) Alex Inkeles’ famous phrase: they wished to 
‘make China ecologically modern’. 1027  In particular, an examination of Chinese policy 
discussions reveals that China’s environmental policy entrepreneurs believed that the key 
elements of EMT (or ecological modernisation discourse) were lacking in China. This was 
important for recognising the urgent need to transition to sustainable development. For 
instance, Chinese environmental bureaucrats realised in the early 1990s that China’s 
enterprises operated backward pollution abatement technology. Some TVEs still used outdated 
equipment from the Maoist era, which contributed further to rising pollution. Rather than rely 
on the importation of expensive technology from developed nations, these bureaucrats saw the 
role of the government as fostering research and development through tax-exemptions and tax 
subsidies to make the multitude of market-orientated Chinese companies become ‘active’ 
participants in creating more efficient industries and business operations (see Chapter Five). 
They had witnessed such research and development in developed countries and wanted to 
replicate the same phenomenon in China.  
However, as shown in Chapter Seven, the failed implementation of green GDP demonstrates 
that environmental policy entrepreneurs are insufficient in themselves to embed this process of 
ecological modernisation in the nation’s policy development. Moreover, the discussion of low-
carbon economy strongly suggests that the discursive process of ecological modernisation can 
be lengthy if sensitive ecological concerns are involved (see Chapter Eight). Nevertheless, the 
most recent example of ecological civilisation outlined in Chapter Nine indicates that Chinese 
policymakers still aspire to create a society based on ecological modernisation principles. They 
 
1026 Mintrom and Norman 2009. 
1027 Inkeles 1969. 
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and the Chinese leadership view ‘ecological civilisation’ as the logical progression from the 
environmental contradictions that emerged from industrial civilisations and a way to ensure 
that China could guarantee ‘cleaner production’, a ‘circular economy’, and a ‘low-carbon 
economy’.  
Sixth, this thesis shows that in their aim to create ecological modernisation, Chinese 
policymakers have advocated policies that conform with what Peter Christoff would term 
‘weak ecological modernisation’ (see Chapter Two).1028 The evidence outlined in all five case 
study chapters showed that they have advocated policies that Christoff would define as 
economic, technocratic, instrumentalist, neo-corporatist, and Western-centric. China’s 
ecological modernisation discourse has evolved as shown by its latest iteration, ‘ecological 
civilisation’, but even that concept still eschews the stronger elements of ecological 
modernisation that are more communicative and incorporate democratic elements that 
genuinely maximise public participation in ways that could challenge state authority. There 
remains a distinct lack of wanting to foster civil society organisations within China’s ecological 
modernisation discourse beyond general rhetoric. Future research could fruitfully target the 
consequences of this lack of engagement for the process of ecological modernisation in China. 
Overall, this finding aligns with the views of Lei Zhang, Arthur Mol and David Sonnenfeld 
who determined that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ 2007 modernisation report 
headed by He Chuanqi 60 was characterised by a weak reading of ecological modernisation 
(see Chapter Two). It also conforms with the views of Bruce Gilley who believed that Chinese 
climate change policy evinced ‘environmental authoritarianism’ (see Chapter Two). Chinese 
policymakers are intertwined with the party-state apparatus in China. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that Chinese environmental bureaucrats, many of whom are members of the CCP, 
shun environmental reforms that could weaken the CCP’s Leninist grip on political power. 
A seventh contribution of this thesis is that it has shown that in tandem with the convergence 
of economic and ecological rationality (see earlier section), China’s economic bureaucrats have 
begun to embrace environmental reform ideas through proposing policies characteristic of 
ecological modernisation. This provides an additional understanding of the ‘greening of 
economic agencies’ that Han Shi and Lei Zhang identified in China’s government (see Chapter 
Two). Ma Kai saw the need for China to transition to a circular economy not only because of 
 
1028 Christoff 1996. 
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pollution and high resource use but also because it could face economically-detrimental ‘green 
barriers’ from developed nations with trade barriers based on environmental standards. Qiu 
Xiaohua from the NBS actively contributed to the debate surrounding green GDP. Because of 
the NBS’s position as the chief compiler of China’s GDP statistics, Qiu believed that they 
should become involved, with the SEPA, in creating a new developmental indicator that took 
into account negative environmental outcomes. Moreover, NDRC Vice-Chairman Xie 
Zhenhua, China’s lead climate change negotiator to the United Nations, actively promoted a 
low-carbon economy. Like Ma Kai, Xie understood that a low-carbon economy would allow 
China to avoid international ‘climate barriers’ being placed on its industries. The transition to 
a low-carbon economy would help China’s economic transition to greener industries. (Xie’s 
career embodies this convergence, because he was the head of China’s central environmental 
agencies between 1993 and 2005).1029 Yet, Chinese economic bureaucrats have refrained from 
meaningfully entering the debate on ‘ecological civilisation’ apart from peppering their 
speeches with the slogan in a superficial manner, and this is an ongoing research area that 
researchers could continue to explore in order to measure the progress of ecological 
modernisation in China. 
Eighth, more generally, the case studies of Chinese environmental policy reform have 
shown that entrenched political interests can stymie the development of ecological rationality 
and ecological modernisation ideas. For example, Li Peng’s focus on economic development 
objectives over environmental protection meant that China lost a decade of potential 
environmental reform. Qu Geping’s environmental policy discourse changed under the 
leadership of Li Peng at the National Environmental Protection Commission from 1984 to 1988 
(see Chapter Five). It was only in the late 1980s, after Li Peng had left the National 
Environmental Protection Commission, that Qu Geping resumed his support of ecological 
modernisation measures such as clean technology once he commenced his new position as the 
inaugural director of the SEPB.  
Green GDP provides another example of the role that political rationality can play in 
obstructing ecological modernisation ideas. The political capital supporting the SEPA’s and 
 
1029 Xie ‘resigned’ from the SEPA after the Songhua River chemical factory explosion in November 2005. He 
was appointed as a vice-chairman of the NDRC in December 2006, see 2005. “Environment chief resigns in 
China,” New York Times, 2 December, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/02/world/asia/environment-chief-
resigns-in-china.html. Accessed 23 June 2019. 
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NBS’s implementation of green GDP was eroded when sub-central political actors pushed back 
on the concept, purportedly because of ‘implementation’ concerns (see Chapter Seven). The 
concept of a low-carbon economy also demonstrates how embedded economic interests can 
retard the progress of ecological rationality on specific environmental issues, such as 
anthropocentric climate change. Even though the climate change debate in China commenced 
in the early 1980s, it took the State Council until 2007 to entertain the possibility of ecological 
modernisation ideas such as low-carbon economy because of the perceived threat of climate 
change mitigation policies on economic development (see Chapter Eight). 
To summarise, the research in this thesis makes the following contributions to scholarly 
knowledge: (1) The utility of exploring environmental reform through the discursive heuristic 
of ecological modernisation; (2) New methodological insights into how researchers can 
discover ecological modernisation using Chinese-language primary source material; (3) A 
better understanding of the reflexive underpinning to ecological modernisation policy 
discourse in China; (4) Additional insights into the function that non-Chinese stakeholders 
serve as facilitators of ecological modernisation in China; (5) An analysis of how 
environmental policy entrepreneurs in the Chinese government have sought to create the 
process of ecological modernisation in China; (6) Analysis that ecological modernisation in 
China is best characterised as a ‘weak version’; (7) A new understanding of the role that 
economic bureaucrats perform in advancing ecological modernisation policies in China; (8) A 
recognition that political interests can thwart the advancement of ecological rationality and 
ecological modernisation policies in China. 
Research Beyond This Thesis 
The research for this thesis has centred its attention on the ‘first principles’ of China’s 
policymakers. It has sought to understand the fundamental motivation that shapes how these 
policymakers understand environmental governance in China and how ecological rationality 
and economic rationality interact. It has shown that over the past few decades, ecological 
modernisation ideas have increasingly influenced how Chinese officials interpret the range of 
policy options at their disposal. Ecological modernisation has now become a fundamental 
element of China’s environmental policy discourse and agenda.  
To return to the discussion that framed the start of Chapter Three where I outlined my 
difficulties as a researcher in applying the concept to empirical reality, the findings from this 
thesis suggest further research opportunities. Although there were certain methodological 
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limitations with applying EMT to the power generation industry in China, a discursive 
approach could assist in discovering whether ecological modernisation shapes how Chinese 
officials view environmental reform in different industries. For example, the findings in this 
thesis, would provide a better basis for reorientating the research that I originally set out to 
undertake, namely exploring the extent to which ecological modernisation ideas shape the 
power generation industry, ranging from coal-fired power generation, gas-fired power 
generation and hydroelectricity. Exploring the discourse of government officials would allow 
researchers to establish the extent to which ecological modernisation ideas guide policy 
decisions in the power generation industry. Furthermore, opening up the analysis to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) would provide new insights into how these same ideas shape 
management decisions in China’s central SOEs. This could eventually enhance our 
understanding of the process of ecological modernisation in China. 
Future research could also continue to monitor China’s bureaucratic organs, both economic 
and environmental, to examine the progression of ecological modernisation ideas in China. 
Such research could discover the new policy agents (or environmental policy entrepreneurs) 
who drive Chinese environmental reform in a way that integrates economic and environmental 
objectives. This thesis has revealed that many of the senior policymakers who advanced 
ecological modernisation positions did so with considerable thought and nuance: especially Qu 
Geping, Pan Yue, Xie Zhenhua, and Ma Kai. The policy discourse of these officials displays 
them as committed bureaucrats who wanted to solve the contradiction of economic 
development and environmental damage in post-Mao China. Although Chinese authorities 
have made great strides in environmental protection over recent decades, economic 
development still negatively impacts China’s environment. Therefore, it is useful to continue 
to examine the policy discourse of bureaucratic agencies such as the NDRC or Ministry of 
Ecological Environment to identify new environmental ideas that exhibit ecological 
modernisation discourse, or which suggest a slide away from ecological modernisation. As the 
twists and turns of policymaking in this thesis has shown, it would be foolhardy to consider 
ecological modernisation as a one-way linear process.  
 As registered early in this thesis, one of the limitations of my approach (admittedly due 
space as well as the framing of the research questions) has been that the ideas and discourse of 
many non-state actors have not received primary attention. Further, research could examine 
official environmental policy discourse with respect to social movements. As noted earlier, 
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Chinese authorities have promoted what Christoff labels a ‘weak version’ of ecological 
modernisation that promotes top-down solutions for China’s environmental problems. Chinese 
authorities have welcomed the role that some environmental NGOs play as a ‘third force’ 
within environmental protection work, but at times they have also tightened restrictions on 
Chinese civil society, especially during the Xi Administration (2012–present) (see Chapter 
Two). However, Pan Yue’s comments concerning green GDP, ecological civilisation and the 
cultivation of an ‘environmental culture’ in China suggests that some policymakers have been 
amenable to ecological modernisation ideas that foster ‘the broad participation of the people’. 
Perhaps because of his formative years as an environmental reporter, Pan believed that without 
transparency and the active participation of Chinese citizens ‘the cause of environmental 
protection would become a minority issue’ (see Chapter Six). He appreciated that cadres and 
industry needed public oversight. Even though his comments were made 15 years ago, it 
remains pertinent to examine contemporary environmental policy discourse to detect whether 
policymakers are turning towards specific environmental ideas that genuinely foster the 
inclusion of non-state actors to remedy environmental problems, perhaps by leveraging off 
Western environmental discourse. The broad and nascent nature of ‘ecological civilisation’ 
suggests that policymakers have the potential to use this concept as a rhetorical vessel to 
advance innovative ideas that allow Chinese NGOs to engage with the state in a more 
deliberative manner. However, these ideas would have to overcome entrenched political 
interests that would regard such moves as subverting the Party’s control over Chinese society. 
Given the significance of civil society organisations in ‘stronger’ versions of ecological 
modernisation, these are important new grounds for exploration. 
In addition, while this thesis has focused on the underlying rationale and mindsets of central 
government and Party officials, its findings suggest the need to expand that scope to explore 
provincial, municipal and county policy discourse. This would involve examining the extent to 
which ecological modernisation ideas influence how lower levels of China’s bureaucracy 
rationalise development and environmental policy. As the famous Chinese saying goes: ‘the 
higher ups have their policies, while the lower downs have their countermeasures’ (ŒĶǣ
	ŒÜǣ). If China is to realise its stated goal of an ‘ecological civilisation’ then it requires  
the sustained, concerted and genuine will of the multitude of cadres dispersed throughout 
China. The failed policy initiative of green GDP in the mid-2000s demonstrates that ecological 
modernisation ideas can face stiff resistance from bureaucratic stakeholders outside of Beijing. 
However, evidence from Li, Miao and Lang’s 2011 research into environmental governance in 
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county-level cities in Suzhou suggests that some local cadres do realise that ‘environmental 
protection could actually be used to enhance economic development’.1030 Furthermore, this 
research has shown that, nearly a decade and a half on from green GDP’s demise, central 
Chinese authorities still pursue environmental policies that exhibit ecological modernisation 
characteristics. Therefore, it remains pertinent to examine the extent to which these ideas have 
filtered down to the lower bureaucratic ranks and, with that, whether there are any regional and 
economic differences. 
This thesis has refrained from making any judgements concerning the efficacy of grounding 
environmental reform in ecological modernisation-based principles. It is beyond the scope of 
its stated research questions. However, it is a valid question to ask whether ecological 
modernisation will reduce China’s environmental impact. Two commentators referred to in 
Chapter Two express scepticism. Peter Christoff believes that the weak version of ecological 
modernisation has less efficacy to promote institutional transformations that are truly 
environmentally sustainable. Moreover, Chinese neo-Marxist Huan Qingzhi does not believe 
that ecological modernisation is ‘where China is moving ahead or should be headed’. 
Christoff’s general argument and Huan’s specific argument deserve to be evaluated in greater 
detail by researchers. China, at the moment, is one of the most significant laboratories testing 
the efficacy of ecological modernisation, and this experiment has global environmental 
ramifications. Chinese authorities are attempting environmental reform and ecological 
restructuring on a large scale not yet previously undertaken in human history. Therefore, it 
remains important to assess the degree to which China will be able to ecologically modernise 
and avert the serious (or possibly existential) environmental implications of its development. 
Lastly, although ecological modernisation remains an important policy discourse both in 
China and abroad, it is just one of several identified environmental discourses (see Chapter 
Three). This research focused on ecological modernisation because of the strong influence that 
theorists such as Arthur Mol have had on environmental sociology. A future topic of research 
could explore whether other established environmental discourses are applicable to 
understanding China’s environmental policy agenda. Alternatively, researchers could examine 
environmental policy discourse in China to generate new environmental discourses. For 
instance, ‘ecological civilisation’ materialises as a concept that deserves deeper investigation 
 
1030 Li, Miao and Lang 2011, 132 
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at the central and sub-central levels to divulge its distinct discursive characteristics. Prima facie 
evidence suggests that ecological civilisation is a unique environmental concept in China 
because policymakers sought to intertwine ecological civilisation into their nation’s ideological 
and cultural history in a manner that was different to the other four concepts (even if it did 
exhibit strong ecological modernisation ideas). Moreover, the policy pronouncements by Xi 
Jinping concerning ecological civilisation suggest that this capstone concept will remain 
relevant for as long as he chooses to remain in power. Therefore, it remains particularly 
germane to understand the environmental concept that will guide the largest global contributor 
to carbon emissions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter started by answering the four key questions that shaped the analytical 
framework of this thesis. It has detailed how ecological modernisation ideas have influenced 
China’s environmental policy agenda since the beginning of the Reform era. Environmental 
bureaucrats first championed ecological modernisation ideas in their policy discussions, but 
since the late 1990s, prominent officials in China’s economic agencies also have called for 
those same policies. Environmental concern over industrial pollution drove the initial calls for 
ecological modernisation measures, but over time other environmental threats such as high 
resource use, environmental degradation, industrial and household waste, and climate change 
have underpinned support of policies that advance ecological modernisation ideas. This chapter 
has also detailed how this thesis has charted the evolution of ecological modernisation ideas 
within China’s environmental policy discourse. This evolution presently sits with ‘ecological 
civilisation’ performing as a capstone concept within China’s environmental policy agenda. 
The chapter has then summarised the eight findings from this research surrounding, the 
strengths of exploring environmental policy reform through the discursive heuristic of 
ecological modernisation and how translated material can assist that exploration for non-
English speaking countries such as China. The chapter has also revealed the reflexive 
foundation to ecological modernisation policy discourse in China and provided additional 
insights into the role that non-Chinese stakeholders serve as facilitators or conduits of 
ecological modernisation in China. Moreover, it has identified the role that government 
officials from both the environmental and economic sections of China’s bureaucracy have 
performed in generating ecological modernisation discourse. The sixth and seventh 
contributions have highlighted that Chinese environmental policy entrepreneurs have created 
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a weak version of ecological modernisation in China. The last contribution has identified the 
role that political interests have had in influencing the incorporation of ecological 
modernisation ideas into environmental reform.  
The chapter concluded by presenting new avenues of research: examining ecological 
modernisation discourse in the power generation industry; investigating the future evolution of 
ecological modernisation discourse in China’s bureaucracy, especially with respect to non-state 
actors; expanding the scope of ecological modernisation to include sub-central policy actors; 
analysing whether China’s quest to create an ecological modernisation-based ‘ecological 
civilisation’ will yield a sustainable transformation for China’s economy and society; and, 
lastly, opening up an analysis of China’s environmental policy agenda to include other 
environmental discourses.  
This thesis has detailed how Chinese authorities have sought to create ‘ecological 
modernisation with Chinese characteristics’ over the past few decades. Future researchers have 
therefore a wide range of issues that need to be addressed in order to evaluate the effectiveness 
of ecological modernisation in achieving long-term environmental sustainability in China. 
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